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The editors of this book have a long and interconnected history, and the book 
itself has been long in the making. Having participated in the upheavals of 
the 1960s and spent the next two decades on the socialist left in different 
parts of the country, the three of us met in the late 1980s on the Boston collec-
tive of the journal Socialist Review. Although our faith in the socialist project 
subsequently ebbed, we remained both committed to progressive politics and 
fast friends.
 As our political views evolved, our friendship endured and was nurtured 
over the next fifteen years through regular outings to action movies of uneven 
quality that our vastly more discriminating wives refused to see. When one 
of us departed for California in 2003, we looked over the next several years 
for ways to keep in touch beyond the occasional e- mail and visit. It was then 
that the fourth member of our movie group, Lou Ferleger, suggested to Jim 
Cronin that with our collective expertise on European and American politics, 
the three of us should collaborate on a book. With the center- left parties that 
we all studied and agonized over in difficult straits, Jim proposed an edited 
volume on the parties on both continents. The other two of us jumped at the 
chance to work together on a project close to all our hearts.
 We pulled together a stellar cast of contributors who wrote draft chapters 
that were presented and discussed at a stimulating conference at the Center 
for European Studies at Harvard in May 2008. A conference in spring 2009 
to celebrate George Ross’s retirement at the Brandeis Center for German and 
European Studies was also used to present work based on some of the chap-
ters in this book. After several rounds of revision by our authors and two 
lively, scotch- fueled editorial meetings near Lake Tahoe and on Cape Cod, we 
produced the book before you.
 In pulling this volume together, we have of course accumulated many 
debts. First and foremost, we wish to thank our authors, who we think have 
contributed chapters of exceptional quality. We also appreciate the help of 
Valerie Milholland and Miriam Angress at Duke University Press in shepherd-
ing this book through the editorial process.
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Introduction
The New World of the Center- Left
James Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch
Left History and Its Crossroads
The idea of the “left” has varied greatly since its first appearances on the 
benches of France’s revolutionary assemblies. Born of rebellion against per-
ceived injustices in capitalist development, the left has had to adapt con-
stantly, often painfully, to the dynamics of capitalism and the changing di-
mensions of capitalist societies. The subject of this book is how parties and 
movements of the center- left have responded to the vast shifts that have oc-
curred in worlds around them since the 1970s. But before turning to this, it is 
worth reviewing some of the left’s experiences with crossroads in the past.1
 Faced with early industrialization, different lefts had tense discussions 
about whether the socialist movement should work through the state or work 
from the ground up through social movements like trade unions. Would social 
democracy come from high- level political action, or action at the very base of 
society? These discussions led to divisions between anarchists and socialists, 
memorialized in Marx’s vivid anti- anarchist polemics. In some places, like the 
United States, divisions between advocates of politics and advocates of trade 
unionism reproduced these earlier arguments in different forms. These early 
disputes have continued to help shape the trajectories of many, if not most, 
labor and socialist lefts since then.
 In the early twentieth century, after it had become clear that industrial 
capitalism had more staying power than earlier lefts had anticipated, there 
came new and bitter splits between revolutionaries and social democrats—
Kautsky versus Bernstein being but one example. For social democrats, if 
capitalism was not about to implode, leftists had to settle in for the long haul 
by building and deepening a democracy which would eventually empower 
the people to demand changes to humanize harsh market societies. Revolu-
tionaries concluded, quite differently, that if capitalism had unexpected stay-
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ing power, quasi- military vanguards of professional revolutionaries should 
transcend it by putchist force. The vanguardists, inspired by the success of 
the October revolution in Russia, advocated disciplined party centralization 
to seize power and the building of socialism from above by technocrats of 
revolution acting in the name of the “masses.” The legacies of this division 
permeated and often poisoned the left’s twentieth century.
 Earlier left theorists had also assumed that the left would naturally be 
internationalist. “Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but 
your chains” was one famous statement of this thesis. But in 1914, when real, 
existing socialists marched eagerly into the trenches in national uniforms to 
massacre one another, there came a shocking correction. The lesson was that 
from then on lefts would be national.2
Postwar Crossroads and Golden Ages
The lefts that we are about to analyze emerged from another crossroads that 
began after the Great Depression and the Second World War. In Western 
Europe countries rushed to emulate the mass production consumer capital-
ism pioneered in the United States, while the United States deepened its own 
version. Lefts in these nations were deeply touched by the general issues 
raised by this new society and economy, which often came simultaneously 
with new democratization, particularly in the societies where fascism and 
authoritarianism had won in the interwar period. The puzzle of this period, 
now seen by many nostalgically as a golden age, was whether left parties and 
movements would seek to transform capitalism into a new form of socialism 
or rather “settle” for the new compromises between capital and labor that 
postwar welfare states, Keynesianism, and new economic growth seemed to 
allow.
 Answers varied, and the world of postwar lefts became an exotic mosaic. 
Where lefts were divided between social democrats and communists, as in 
Latin Europe, they had difficulty winning power, and even extensive welfare 
states and protective employment relations systems were often promoted by 
others. British Labour occasionally won power, but had problems conciliat-
ing Labourism with economic dynamism. The Swedes, the great success story, 
were never particularly Keynesian, but they built an egalitarian middle- class 
system which created stakeholders for social democracy and also had mecha-
nisms to compete in the international economy. The Germans succeeded, 
again without much Keynesianism, when strong unions and innovative pri-
vate sector exporters cooperated on wage restraint and flexibility, carefully 
supervised by a very demanding central bank. Americans, with fewer social-
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ists and weaker socialist dreams, continued their waning New Deal trajectory, 
falling well behind their European counterparts.
 The left’s key claims in this golden age are familiar. Capitalism was deeply 
flawed, unable to manage the risks that it created, prone to waste and peri-
odic crises, and an incubator of inequality. Capitalist markets left to them-
selves paid little attention to human needs, often corrupted political life, and 
were imperfect in the terms of economics textbooks. Left politics had strong 
remedies to propose, mainly through action by the national state. Keynesian-
ism might help states shape their macroeconomic policies by managing de-
mand to limit the chaos, even out ups and downs, achieve full employment, 
and target particular groups through welfare state programs and industrial 
policies. The world of the golden age was industrial, and in it workers counted 
most because they created value and had the most significant needs. They 
were, or would be, well organized into trade unions, they would support left 
visions of change, and they voted for progressive political parties.
Lefts after the Golden Age?
Four decades later this left world and its slogans have disappeared. Indeed 
one rarely hears the term “left” these days: instead, electable left parties of 
the world are almost always labeled “center- left.” Center- lefts now include 
a variety of political forces, among them social liberals, social democrats, 
democratic socialists, progressives, greens, and human rights campaigners. 
They accept markets and a mixed economy, but favor limited state interven-
tion, are “moderate” in most ways, and are somewhat “libertarian.” Perhaps 
the most important thing, however, is that this new center- left accepts the 
multiple constraints of economic internationalization. With the limited ex-
ception of the brief period at the onset of the current crisis, it has abandoned 
Keynesianism in favor of “sound” budgetary practices involving low deficits, 
low debts, and restrained spending. The dream of full employment has been 
replaced by an emphasis on achieving price stability and promoting national 
competitiveness in the broader world. Commitments to redistribution have 
been attenuated, and center- lefts have learned to live with greater income 
inequality. Postwar ideas about social policies and employment relations sys-
tems to provide lifetime security have been leavened by notions about choice 
and “flexibility.” The center- left remains reformist, but with a changed reper-
tory that now includes environmentalism, civil and human rights, and indi-
vidual cultural liberties on top of older concerns like economic security and 
cross- class redistribution. The idea of transcending capitalism and creating 
“socialism” has completely disappeared.
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 Center- lefts now live in a changed environment and work with changed 
political technologies. There are fewer workers, and unions are weaker. Mass- 
based political parties are in decline. Politics, even on the left, has been pro-
fessionalized, and sophisticated specialists now track potential voters and 
issues into every nook and cranny of ever more complicated, individualized 
societies. Money also talks louder, along with wealthy lobbies, in a world 
where extensive and expensive media attention counts hugely. Last but not 
least, the transition from left to center- left has made for political orphans 
who often do not recognize their concerns in what center- lefts are propos-
ing. Some of these would earlier have been in what were once called “mass 
organizations.” Others, in “new social movements,” issue- focused NGOs, or 
lobbies, would earlier have looked to left parties for inclusion of their issues 
in party programs and outlooks. They are now much more likely to take their 
appeals directly to engaged audiences and to policymakers, often through the 
Internet. From the point of view of center- left parties, these orphans can be 
politically volatile and unpredictable. Some, like anti- globalization activists, 
see themselves as the “left of the left” whose protests will keep the center- 
left “honest.” Others will stick to their own issues even if it hurts the center- 
left’s electoral chances. Still others venture into a fluid world of populism to 
oppose freer trade and immigration, or even join mobilizations over “values” 
or “threatened identities.”
 It would be wrong to conclude that the coming of center- lefts marks the 
dead end of the left’s long march, however. Labour and social- democratic 
parties and, in the United States the Democratic Party, have remodeled their 
outlooks, organizations, and relationships with constituents in response to 
very large, often global, changes. The political space within which they oper-
ate has changed greatly. But neoliberalism, which vaunts markets as the ap-
propriate place for all social decision making, has not succeeded in banishing 
all effective opposition. Left- right competition is still the most prominent fea-
ture of our politics (Noel and Therien 2008); center- lefts still advocate seri-
ous reformist programs, and they still win support and elections.
 This book seeks to explore the center- left’s new political space and the con-
tent that fills it in different places. What is the demand out there for center- 
left reformism? What are the hopes of the center- left and the projects that it 
proposes in response? The chapters that follow will explore these issues his-
torically and comparatively through a range of case studies covering various 
nations, including the United States. They will consider why and how the old 
world of the left has given way, what the new world of the center- left looks 
like, and how promising its future may be. What we will see is a patchwork of 
different center- lefts, some with serious problems, others just barely coping, 
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and still others doing very well. We insist that new political spaces for the 
center- left have emerged everywhere, however, and our interest is in illumi-
nating how different parties have acted to fill them and to take advantage of 
the opportunities they offer.
From Left to Center- Left: Three “Crises”
Sometime in the 1970s the long postwar boom came to an end for western 
democracies, beginning a long crisis that challenged the certainties of the 
world in which the left had lived for a quarter- century after 1945. Inflation, 
built into postwar settlements in many western democracies, had already 
been slowly rising in the 1960s. Successful Fordist reindustrialization in West-
ern Europe and Japan had slowly diminished America’s competitive advan-
tages. The American decision in 1971 to abandon the commitment to gold 
enshrined in the Bretton Woods agreement began a lengthy process of re-
adjustment. This process was then massively complicated by the oil shocks of 
1973 and 1979, which fused rising unemployment and uncontrollable infla-
tion in a “stagflation” that in theory could not happen.
 The slump that followed ended the Keynesian era and its consensual 
assumptions about running the economy, including the compatibility of a 
large state sector, high public expenditure, and prosperity. For left and social 
democratic parties throughout the industrial world, including the Democratic 
Party in the United States, Keynesianism had for a time made it possible to 
maintain that market- constraining social and economic policies—large wel-
fare states, protective labor laws, high redistributive taxation, and an activist, 
regulatory state—were good for the economy and society and in the national 
interest.3
 With Keynesianism challenged, this understanding of the public good was 
no longer compelling. This was particularly true when ascendant neoliber-
alism argued for reversing Keynesian priorities, asserting that large govern-
ment, centralized planning, high taxes, and social spending were antitheti-
cal to growth and should be considered obstacles to prosperity. The most 
visible reversal came in the realm of macroeconomic policy. The notion that 
smart demand management could fine- tune otherwise unruly markets and 
produce consistent growth was largely abandoned. What replaced it was a 
turn to what some have labeled a “market fundamentalism,” which largely 
conquered public servants, politicians, economists, and the news media. 
Monetarism and fiscal retrenchment quickly became the norm, and empha-
sis shifted to “supply- side” policies and efforts to produce competitiveness 
through higher productivity, greater flexibility, and constant innovation.
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 Neoliberalism promoted a vastly different view of the state and its roles. 
Where American liberals and social democrats elsewhere had seen the state 
as an essential and largely benign instrument, the new advocates of the mar-
ket saw it as detrimental and sought to restrict its scope and impact. This 
meant, in the first instance, ceasing to see the state as the solution to social 
and economic problems and abandoning commitments to full employment—
probably the most important legacy of the 1930s. The more extreme formula-
tions of neoliberalism insisted on the need to permanently reduce taxes, pri-
vatize nationalized industries, and pursue deregulation, thus depriving the 
state of the means to steer the economy. Beyond that, the state itself should 
be restructured so as to use market mechanisms to deliver services and mar-
ket criteria to assess its performance. Wherever possible, the state should not 
provide services directly but rather contract or partner with private compa-
nies to do so.
 This shift posed a huge challenge to the center- left: would it also make 
the turn toward the market or would it resist? The answer was a long time in 
coming, for it required the experiences of policy failure and electoral defeat 
to produce a major rethinking. It was the sorry fate of many of the social- 
democratic, labor, and democratic parties to be in power during the 1970s 
and early 1980s and to suffer the frustrating consequences of changing en-
vironments around them. In Britain the Labour governments led by Harold 
Wilson and then James Callaghan responded to the oil shocks by adopting 
income policies that the party’s core supporters came to reject in a defiant 
wave of strikes, leading to the election of Margaret Thatcher and nearly two 
decades of neoliberal Conservative rule. In the United States Jimmy Carter, 
facing stagflation and foreign policy crises, was equally ineffective and also 
prepared a turn to the right in 1980. In France, the Mitterrand government, 
elected in 1981 and committed to strong Keynesian and statist reforms, had 
to retreat rapidly on almost every front. Center- left parties in general, includ-
ing those that built the “Nordic model,” had difficulty adapting economic and 
social policies to the problems of the new era, problems with which voters 
were overwhelmingly concerned.
 A second crisis, more political than economic, was soon to follow, involv-
ing the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disappearance 
in 1991 of the Soviet Union.4 These huge events further narrowed the dis-
cursive and programmatic political space within which the center- left could 
operate, putting paid to what remained of any nineteenth- century vision of 
replacing capitalism with a wholly different system. There was great irony in 
this, because parties of the democratic left had long been at pains to distance 
themselves from communism and “actually existing socialism.” But in fact, 
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while western democratic socialists had vehemently deplored the illiberal, 
antidemocratic practices of communism, they had nonetheless held many 
abstract beliefs and predispositions in common with their communist rivals. 
Although the intensity of the most utopian of these passions had slowly at-
tenuated in most of the left since 1945, what happened between 1989 and 
1991 nonetheless forced a reckoning with the socialist past and its thinking 
about the world. The dream of transcending capitalism disappeared, making 
a political life bounded by capitalism and markets look permanent. This shift 
dictated a more restricted definition of what was politically possible and 
desirable. It is important to add that the end of the cold war and the Soviet 
experiment occurred when campaigns for hard- line neoliberalism—the po-
litical consequence of the economic crisis that opened in the 1970s—were 
reaching their apogee. The western victory over “already existing socialism” 
was thus a huge gift to market fundamentalists.
 Globalization is our third critical event, or process, and its effects on the 
center- left have already been very powerful. Beginning in the 1990s fast- 
moving trends that expanded world trade, opened product and financial mar-
kets, and heightened international capital mobility combined to place new 
limits on how national states could manage their economies, protect workers 
and their environments, and pursue fiscal policies, including those that pro-
vided social services. The crisis of the 1970s and computer technologies had 
opened the door to financial globalization, which came on strong in the 1990s 
with the growth of multinational companies, tentacular investment banks, 
mutual and hedge funds, futures, swaps, derivatives, and rapidly flowing hot 
money. Over the same period successive GATT rounds had lowered tariffs 
and opened trade, culminating in 1995 in the new World Trade Organization. 
The Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and the IMF—had also done 
their part by energetically imposing the “Washington consensus” on coun-
tries that resisted the new orthodoxies. In Europe the move toward more open 
markets had also been pushed forward gradually by European integration, 
but it took the single market program and Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) after 1985 to institutionalize fully open markets and the new para-
digms of price stability and budget balancing. Less encompassing regionaliz-
ing efforts in North America had similar results. Economic and policy borders 
became more permeable, affecting sovereignty and narrowing what national 
governments could do.
 The limits created by globalization were also in part discursive and ideo-
logical. Motivated by either sincere belief or perceived political imperatives, 
politicians and intellectuals of the left and the right now ruled out all sorts of 
policy options because of the supposed dictates of the global economy. The 
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reality beneath the rhetoric was nevertheless sobering enough. The global 
economy and new technologies clearly made it easier to move capital and 
jobs to places with fewer rules and lower labor costs. They also allowed em-
ployers and, more broadly, investors to threaten such moves and thus en-
hance their political leverage to insist that states adopt their preferred fiscal, 
monetary, and regulatory policies. The impact of globalization was made still 
more real as it became itself more truly global. While the United States and 
Europe might have begun the processes that created a more open world mar-
ket and to that extent laid the ground rules for its operation, other nations 
joined in and thus acquired an interest in keeping it open and functioning. 
Specifically, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and other “emerging” economies 
entered global manufacturing with a vengeance, marching forward on the 
back of huge comparative advantages in labor costs and growing economi-
cally at rates not seen since the nineteenth century. Energy producers like 
Russia, the leading Arab oil exporters, Venezuela, Nigeria, and South Africa 
were no less invested in the world market, whatever the ideological complex-
ion or rhetoric of their regimes. The effect was to reinforce the trend toward 
international economic interdependence and to underline the dictates of 
globalization.
 Taken together, these three shocks remade the world in which center- left 
parties and movements operate. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
the contemporary center- left is itself a product of this new world and the 
constraints and opportunities that it presents. In this transformed world, the 
alternative to actually existing capitalism is not socialism, but a better and 
more just capitalism. Scholars and activists now study not transitions to so-
cialism but the “varieties of capitalism” or the virtues and vices of distinc-
tive “worlds of welfare” and state provision (Hall and Soskice 2001; Esping- 
Andersen 1990; Schröder 2008).5 This is not a time bereft of possibilities, but 
it is a moment when possibilities need to be located within the global econ-
omy rather than outside or in opposition to it. This is, most important, a mo-
ment when to be effective the center- left must be creative and find opportu-
nities in new policies and strategies.
From Left to Center- Left: Large Social Changes
The effects of the passing of the Keynesian era, the collapse of socialism in 
Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union, and the coming of a more in-
tense era of global economic competition were felt at the levels of both ide-
ology and policy. It was hard to know what to believe, what to hope for, and 
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what actually to do. But the center- left confronted yet another set of prob-
lems about electability. To be successful in the new era it had also to come to 
grips with a fourth major challenge: the shifting social bases of its political 
appeal. The left’s utopias, legends, programs, and practices had historically 
been grounded in the social movement of the industrial working class, espe-
cially its most organized sectors and occupations. This fact, true even if elec-
toral success also typically required support from the middle and professional 
classes, had been built upon long and storied historical struggles. The rich 
lore that surrounded the Paris Commune, the Haymarket, the struggle for the 
eight- hour workday, the October Revolution, the British General Strike, the 
French strikes of 1936, the struggle against fascism, the French May and Ital-
ian Hot autumn of the 1960s, to list but a few headline moments, nourished 
the politics of generations.
 In recent decades, however, these stories, traditions, and utopias have be-
come far less meaningful. The social bases of “progressive politics” have dra-
matically shifted, mainly because of the transition to what has been variously 
termed a “post- industrial,” “service,” or “knowledge- based” economy. Start-
ing in the 1920s, if not earlier, services began to grow faster than industry in 
developed economies (Clark 1940). The trend accelerated with the informa-
tion and communications revolution that began in the 1970s. The introduc-
tion of labor- saving technologies, including computer- based technologies, 
together with rising consumer affluence and demand for new goods and ser-
vices substantially transformed the nature of the workforce.
 The first consequence is that the industrial working class has literally 
shrunk. In 1950 agriculture had accounted for 28.3%, industry for 34%, and 
services for 37.7% of employment in developed countries. By 1971, with Ford-
ist mass production at its peak, the figures were 12.7%, 37.9%, and 49.4%. By 
1998 they were 4.8%, 27.0%, and 67.4%. While the added value of manufactur-
ing to GDP hovered at around 35% of the total throughout this period, deindus-
trialization proceeded apace and the number of industrial workers, relative to 
other wage earners, steadily declined (Feinstein 1999). Much of the manufac-
turing not already relocated to developing countries is now capital- and skills- 
intensive, and the workers who remain are better educated and trained, live 
better and differently, partake in mass consumption and culture, and are no 
longer encapsulated in the working- class subcultures that informed the my-
thologies of the left’s pasts. Many are also women, now somewhat better off 
when compared to men even if not yet equal, and in most countries male 
breadwinner status and pay scales are in retreat. Rising living standards have 
also blurred the line between workers and the lower middle class, while ser-
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vice work is often hard to categorize as either blue- or white- collar, manual 
or non- manual. The demographic underpinnings for what Eric Hobsbawm 
(1978) once labeled the “forward march of labour” have thus dissipated.
 Similar things can be said of the organizational structures that sustained 
older left projects. In some countries—mainly smaller ones—union mem-
bership remains practically obligatory (because of what is called the Ghent 
system) and therefore at high levels. Since the 1980s, however, union mem-
bership in the EU- 15, the heartland of traditional social democratic politics, 
has declined by roughly 20%. And where trade unionism has not been quasi- 
obligatory, unions have had a particularly rough ride. In France union mem-
bership has halved since 1970 and is now at 8% of the workforce (around 3% 
in the private sector); in Germany it is 22% and falling; in the United King-
dom it is down one- third, to roughly 30%; and in the United States it is down 
to 12.5%. In most of Europe declines may be mitigated somewhat by legal ex-
tensions of collective agreements to non- unionized workers. Even there, how-
ever, over time the membership drop is likely to undermine these extensions 
and the overall meaningfulness of collective bargaining. And in more liberal 
industrial environments, where contract extensions don’t exist, the situation is 
much worse (Visser 2006). In the United States 13.8% of workers are covered 
by contracts, as are 30% in the United Kingdom. Moreover, most union orga-
nizations, however powerful, have themselves changed. Earlier efforts to fuel 
broader working- class cultures have given way to the provision of highly pro-
fessionalized and bureaucratized representational services for members.
 Lefts and center- lefts have needed middle- class help to “march forward,” 
and this in turn has always necessitated complicated strategic calculations 
and compromise (Przeworski 1985; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). With the 
relative decline of the organizations, culture, and size of the working class, 
this need is now overwhelming. Average employment in services in the EU- 
15 area in 2006 was 70% of the labor force, compared to 78% in the United 
States (OECD 2008a). “Services” are not an undifferentiated group, however, 
and involve occupations ranging from low- paid precarious work, through so-
cial service workers in caring and teaching work, to relatively secure pub-
lic sector functionaries, professors, and investment bankers. The challenge 
of formulating appeals to capture the needs and aspirations of such a di-
verse population is daunting. At one end of the spectrum, low- paid personal 
and distributional service workers are the core of a growing “working poor” 
whose needs for dignity and “social inclusion” are widely recognized but not 
easily addressed by the existing repertoire of center- left policy prescriptions. 
That these populations often consist of immigrants or ethnic minorities com-
pounds the danger of an emerging social dualism between market insiders 
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and outsiders, a split that can and occasionally has become political and is 
almost always detrimental to the center- left.
 Attending to the concerns of more middle- class and professional constitu-
encies is more complicated still. Political science literature has made much 
of the emergence of “post- material values” among educationally credentialed 
new middle strata (Inglehart 1990). The strategic problem is that center- lefts 
have problems conciliating traditional “material” issue outlooks with the 
more “libertarian,” individualist, and universalist passions of new middle- 
class groups (Kitschelt 1994). Concerns for the environment or for human 
rights or the rights of women and minorities might well be compatible with 
the traditional goals and visions of the left, but they sometimes seem not to 
be. In any event, engineering the ideological, programmatic, and organiza-
tional changes needed to reconcile the conflicting demands of constituents 
who have “material” needs and demands with others who have “left liber-
tarian” or “quality of life” concerns is now a baseline for center- left success. 
Achieving it remains a struggle, however.
 As if the changing social bases of center- left parties were not enough of 
a challenge, the ways of doing politics have changed as well. In the United 
States after the Second World War—earlier than in Europe—new worlds of 
political campaigning opened up, connected to the decline of traditional 
party organizations and their constituent groups, especially labor unions, 
and the simultaneous rise of modern mass communications, particularly 
television and later the Internet. As costly “air wars,” including positive and 
negative TV ads, replaced the grassroots, labor- intensive “ground wars” of 
old, political consultants of various kinds—strategists, pollsters, media ex-
perts, and fundraisers—assumed control of political campaigns from tradi-
tional party leaders. More recently, American parties have adopted sophisti-
cated, computer- assisted “micro- targeting” techniques, through which vast 
amounts of consumer data are analyzed to identify likely sympathizers. Mes-
sages are then delivered to these voters by direct mail, phone calls, and in-
creasingly, with the rediscovery of the value of face- to- face contact, in person 
by grassroots volunteers.
 In the new style of electoral campaigning, issues have remained impor-
tant for attentive voters. Advanced polling techniques are used to ascertain 
voters’ preferences on salient issues, while “issue ads” and other media tac-
tics are used to “frame” issues in language favorable to particular candidates, 
to “prime” voters to judge candidates on the basis of issues that a particular 
party “owns,” and in some cases to persuade voters to change their prefer-
ences. In complex post- industrial societies, however, the rise in salience of 
new social, cultural, environmental, and other non- economic issues along-
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side traditional economic ones means that candidates have to position 
themselves on multiple issue dimensions to win the support of some groups 
without alienating others that have conflicting preferences. To avoid such 
dilemmas, politicians often take vague or ambiguous issue positions. Beyond 
this, because most voters are relatively inattentive to politics and have little 
awareness of candidates’ issue positions, one contemporary trend, greatly 
reinforced by the growing role of the mass media, is for electoral campaigns 
to downplay issues and instead foreground themes that demand less from 
viewers and listeners. These include incumbents’ performances and candi-
dates’ personal characteristics—their integrity, honesty, experience, leader-
ship ability, religiosity, patriotism, affability, race or gender, physical attrac-
tiveness, etc.
 These new media- centered and computer- aided campaign techniques are 
very costly and would thus seem likely to disproportionately benefit conser-
vative parties tied to powerful business interests and other wealthy donors. 
Parties on the center- left may also have more qualms and hesitations about 
making use of these tactics than their opponents. But the very newest of these 
campaign techniques, enabled by the emergence of the Internet, may actually 
be of greatest value to parties of the center- left. For example, in the United 
States Barack Obama—through his own campaign website, social network-
ing sites like Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter, YouTube videos, e- mail, and 
text messaging—was able to raise vast sums of money from small donors and 
mobilize tens of thousands of grassroots volunteers, both processes contrib-
uting immensely to his innovative and successful presidential campaign. In 
the French presidential campaign in 2007 Ségolène Royal used analogous 
techniques to short- circuit her Socialist rivals and win her party’s nomina-
tion, even though, unlike Obama, she did not win the general election.
 All this is not to suggest that the new forms of campaigning are of deci-
sive importance in determining election outcomes. The so- called fundamen-
tals—the balance of partisan identification in the electorate, the state of the 
economy and international relations, and the popularity and effectiveness 
of the executive—retain a dominant role. But especially in close elections, 
campaigns can definitely matter; and the changed character of political cam-
paigning adds yet another challenge to the parties of the center- left.
Policy Dilemmas
Shifting bases of political allegiance, combined with the new economic con-
straints and new campaigning techniques, vastly complicate the task of 
putting together stable and long- term center- left coalitions. They also make it 
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harder to develop policies to bring and hold together fragmented and hetero-
geneous constituencies and then to govern effectively. In the policy realm, 
for example, center- left parties—especially in Europe—must adapt to new 
monetary policies that emphasize price stability and deemphasize counter-
cyclical spending, constraints limiting their ability to reward old and new 
constituencies. They also confront difficult issues of welfare state reform 
prompted in part by aging populations that have produced skewed pension 
dependency ratios and rapidly rising healthcare costs. They must devise pro-
grams in response to new social needs—childcare for new single- parent and 
two- breadwinner families and support programs for the working poor, for 
example. Most controversially, they are expected to promote flexible labor 
markets without undermining employment security, to reform institutions 
governing industrial relations, and to promote new patterns of cooperation 
between labor and capital. An equally difficult challenge involves reforming 
educational systems to promote lifelong learning, training, and retraining. 
Finally, they need to find new revenue sources without damaging national 
economies engaged in global competition. These strategic dilemmas have cre-
ated new political minefields.
 There is another side to this, however. The new conditions also open up 
new political space for center- left parties and political entrepreneurs. With 
older certainties gone, there is much greater room for more persuasive and 
creative center- left politicking than earlier. Navigating the contemporary 
maelstrom of changing economies, social bases, and political technologies is 
obviously difficult. But recent setbacks notwithstanding, there is ample evi-
dence that parties of the center- left remain capable of winning elections. The 
American presidential election of 2008 provides some evidence, but other 
data are easy to find in contemporary European history. The changes that we 
have listed have not eliminated the political space for strategies and policies 
beyond, and often against, the neoliberal paradigm. In a number of countries 
humanized “supply- side” alternatives to Keynesian demand management 
have produced successes. Productivity- enhancing public investment—in 
education and training, infrastructure, and new technologies—has been ex-
panded without abandoning fiscal restraint. It also seems possible, given the 
right raw materials, to make labor markets more flexible and liberalize them 
without turning them into the sites of wars among the insecure. This, plus 
innovative attention to equal opportunities and public services, and absent 
severe macroeconomic shocks, can generate levels of growth, employment, 
and other benefits sufficient to produce electoral victories. Policies aimed at 
and premised on delivering economic growth thus remain prominent. They 
have not dominated center- left policymaking quite as much as they did in 
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the past, however, as new issues, backed by new constituencies, have be-
come more prominent. In part this is because the same economic processes 
that have led to fewer manual workers have also produced more white- collar 
professionals who can be mobilized by the center- left on social and cultural 
rather than economic issues. The increase in women’s employment likewise 
contains possibilities as well as challenges. The declining significance of class 
more broadly creates room for a politics that broaches questions of racial 
and sexual equality, human rights, war and peace, the environment, and life-
styles—questions that cut across electorates differently from earlier class 
cleavages. Center- left parties, which have long debated the electoral signifi-
cance of these shifts, by now have come to understand them reasonably well 
and have begun to successfully incorporate new issues into their electoral ap-
peals and programs. On old and new issues, with old and new constituencies, 
there are real possibilities for the center left even in a different world.
There Are Center- Lefts and Center-Lefts . . .
All center- lefts have had to confront these crises and changes, but it would 
be misleading to argue that there is one center- left everywhere challenged in 
the same way. Histories and policy legacies vary tremendously from country 
to country in ways that may either facilitate or hinder adaptive responses to 
new conditions. In addition, differences among national constitutional, insti-
tutional, and political systems can result in a wide range of policy responses 
to similar economic and other circumstances. Specific location in the uneven 
development of the unfolding global economy is also important. The chap-
ters in this book will illustrate these different variables at work through case 
studies.
 Different narratives about recent political changes tend to have differ-
ent heroes. Many center- leftists grant pride of place to the Nordic countries. 
These countries, perhaps uniquely, have been able simultaneously to adapt 
public financial practices to new international standards, promote public in-
vestment and flexible internal labor markets to facilitate rapid innovation, 
and sustain generous welfare states. Denmark and Sweden have been particu-
larly good at active labor market “flexicurity” policies that liberalize labor 
regulations while providing support to wage earners looking to make employ-
ment transitions and reskill. There are specific reasons for this. The Nordic 
countries, each different, are all very small—the population of Denmark is 
about the same as that of greater Boston, for example. Their size has long 
obliged them to be open to international trade, and over time they have in-
ternalized the lesson that success on international markets demands high 
Introduction 15
levels of national cross- class cooperation. Active labor market policies and 
monetary policy prudence have long been central parts of the package. The 
Swedes were never extravagantly Keynesian, for example, and the Danes tied 
their currency to the D- Mark early in the 1980s, binding themselves to the 
tough monetarism of the German Bundesbank. As conditions changed around 
them, therefore, Denmark and Sweden began with helpful policy legacies, 
although even being so endowed none of the Nordic countries has avoided 
severe moments of crisis and change.6 Moreover, their much- admired labor 
market flexibility, monetary soundness, and admirable welfare states have 
not always helped the center- left. In Denmark social democrats have been 
relatively weak and the country is now run by a center- right coalition. Finn-
ish politics has almost always involved centrist governing coalitions. In Swe-
den once- hegemonic social democrats are now out of power and, if they 
return, will only do so as part of a complex coalition. The Norwegians are 
exceptional in this discussion because they have had oil to grease their eco-
nomic wheels.
 The United Kingdom has provided a very different northern European 
success story, although it now seems over. Here good recent results for the 
center- left are in large part the product of radical discontinuities caused by 
Thatcherite neoliberalism. The Thatcher years undid much of Old Labour’s 
postwar heritage of a vast, inefficient, public sector, decentralized collective 
bargaining that fed chronic inflation, and persistent budgetary difficulties. 
They left a lean, mean liberal environment, and until its defeat in 2010, New 
Labour achieved success through its intelligent acceptance of this as a basis 
upon which to build. The point of departure for its Third Way was thus an ex-
treme market fundamentalism that cried out for a move to the center and an 
effort to restore public services. New Labour was also blessed until recently 
by a decade of steady economic growth, which it helped sustain through 
prudent public financial management. New Labour thus had resources for a 
series of modest innovations, particularly in social policy. To be sure, it took 
policy creativity to zero in on what to do, and the good if also flawed leader-
ship of Tony Blair to carry it out. The present financial crisis profoundly chal-
lenges the New Labour formula, however.
 The EU’s continental political economies, in contrast to the Nordic coun-
tries and the United Kingdom, have been more troubled, with center- lefts 
deeply implicated. Excepting brief interludes, France has had low growth and 
high employment since the early 1990s. The French left, obliged to work radi-
cal changes in financial and monetary policies in the 1980s, has been slow at 
adapting to the need for a more liberal and flexible labor market. These two 
processes may have been linked. French governments of the center- left and 
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sometimes of the center- right, afraid of electoral reactions to labor market 
reform, reduced the size of the workforce at taxpayers’ expense in ways that 
may have made economic matters worse. One consequence has been high, 
and not terribly productive, levels of public spending. Moreover, despite in-
cremental but serious welfare state reforms, there has been growing division 
between insiders and outsiders. The center- left has had huge problems devel-
oping attractive, coherent programs and has lost almost all major elections 
since 1993.
 Germany started out better placed than France for the new world. It did 
not need to abandon Keynesianism, because the long- standing monetarist 
practices of its Bundesbank had ruled it out in the first place. Also, Germany 
pursued an export- oriented development strategy built around very competi-
tive manufacturing operations, whose success had trickled down to finance 
a generous welfare state. Thus while virtually everyone else faced trauma in 
the 1980s, Germany sailed as Modell Deutschland. But the end of the cold war 
and globalization proved more troublesome. German unification, a huge po-
litical success, was promoted in economically unsound ways and led to huge 
and chronic internal west- east transfers (upward of 5% of GDP annually), a 
huge jump in unemployment, and chronic budgetary problems. Germany re-
mains the world’s leading exporter, but at the cost of increased capital invest-
ment and labor shedding. Germany’s exporting companies now employ fewer 
well- paid, highly skilled, and flexible workers. But German society has been 
more and more troubled. Recent social policy reforms have helped, but the 
German welfare state remains expensive, and trickle- down effects from suc-
cessful exporting no longer reliably float broader living standards. The result 
has been insider- outsider dualism. The German center- left, held responsible 
by parts of its working class base for painful welfare state reforms, has lost 
electoral support to a new left competitor, die Linke, whose stock in trade is 
defensive resistance to social policy change.
 In southern Europe the distinctive character of political regimes has af-
fected prospects of the center- left. In Italy the left long meant the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI), which had deep working- class roots, solid experience 
in local government, and a leadership less craven in its relations with Moscow 
than its counterparts in the rest of Europe, France especially. It would for all 
these reasons become Eurocommunism’s best hope in the 1970s. But the PCI 
was also ghettoized, and its dominance of the working- class vote produced for 
most of the postwar era a rallying of right- wing and centrist political forces 
around the Christian Democratic Party (DC), which had an effective lock on 
central government. That firm grip allowed Italian politics to remain clien-
telist and corrupt, and the corruption enveloped nearly everyone, including 
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the socialists under Bettino Craxi. The end of the cold war and of Christian 
Democratic domination had the effect of undermining both left and right: the 
PCI became a shadow of its former self; the DC suffered massive defections 
and was replaced by smaller, more erratic, and often right- wing groupings; 
and the socialists never recovered from the scandals known collectively as 
Tangentopoli. One consequence was a center- left that was fragmented and 
lacked a history, vision, and program; a second was the rise of the clownish, 
populist, but electorally successful Silvio Berlusconi; the third was a policy 
stasis, as no party or coalition could muster the will or the means to reform 
the welfare state and economy. Italy as a society has thus also moved toward 
the dualism—the insider- outsider pattern visible elsewhere—but with more 
corruption and, it must be admitted, much better style.
 Spain, Portugal, and Greece, in contrast, all lived under authoritarian dic-
tatorships that did not end until the mid- 1970s. In both Spain and Greece they 
ended in ways that helped lefts to become center- lefts and then gave them an 
unusual record of electoral success. In part this was because in both countries 
rights had been tainted by complicity with the dictatorships. The center- lefts 
thus had access to power which, in the context of joining the EU and mod-
ernizing their societies and economies, gave them a widely shared national 
mission and, with success, strong new credibility. The Portuguese left did less 
well, losing its post- dictatorship advantage through excess revolutionary pos-
turing and internal divisions.
 The new lefts of Eastern European countries provide different illustrations 
of the importance of historical legacies. Revulsion with the communist past 
ruled out the emergence of strong forms of traditional social democracy. As 
they democratized and built market societies, these countries started out on a 
more liberal path than their Western European neighbors. Ironically, this ten-
dency has not prevented center- lefts, often formed from the remnants of com-
munist parties, from winning elections. The policies that they then carried to 
power have been very different from those in the West. Two decades of tran-
sition are not long enough to discern permanent trends, however, and the 
situation remains unsettled.
 Including the American Democratic Party in a comparative analysis of 
center- left parties is unorthodox, since unlike Europe, America has not pro-
duced a socialist movement tied to a strong union movement.7 Yet the Demo-
crats may have become center- left before anyone else, obliged by their differ-
ent historical trajectory to build complex alliances with social groups other 
than the working class and to deal with unusually powerful capitalists. At the 
same time, from the New Deal through the 1960s the Democrats followed 
many of the policy trajectories of their European brethren. But constrained 
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by an anti- statist political culture, a fragmented federal state, and a weak 
labor movement, the American welfare state was a “residual” one, combin-
ing tax- subsidized, employer- provided retirement and healthcare benefits for 
workers in the core, mostly unionized sectors of the economy, government- 
sponsored pension and healthcare programs for the elderly, and means- tested 
programs for the poor. Momentum in the growth of an already limited wel-
fare state was largely stopped in the early 1980s by a deeply rooted and long- 
lived conservative political reaction that lasted until Barack Obama’s victory 
in 2008.
 Ironically, owing to the size and global strength of its economy, the United 
States has been able to circumvent some of the crises that have bedeviled 
European countries. The United States spearheaded the international shift 
away from Keynesianism, but the administration of Ronald Reagan, while 
hawkish about the practices of other governments, was able to engineer a 
quick and politically beneficial recovery from transitional recession by run-
ning budget deficits that could, thanks to American international monetary 
and financial centrality, be financed in global capital markets by foreign in-
vestors and central bankers. It was only during the Democratic, center- left 
presidency of Bill Clinton that the United States turned toward obeying stan-
dard rules of fiscal responsibility; these were swiftly abandoned by President 
George W. Bush, who returned to the use of internationally financed budget 
deficits to fund sweeping, politically driven tax cuts for corporations and the 
upper class. Rule violations and role reversals have seemed eminently fea-
sible for a country that has been the biggest elephant in the international eco-
nomic zoo, at least until very recently.
 The negative consequences of these practices and of the harsh conserva-
tism that pushed them forward are in part why even as Europe continued to 
liberalize, the Democratic Party in the United States began to move toward a 
more active government economic role. With the bursting of the technology 
and housing bubbles, economic growth and job creation in the United States 
slowed, while globalization, technological change, the weakening of labor 
unions, a declining minimum wage, and regressive Republican tax policy con-
tributed to stagnant wages, eroded retirement and healthcare benefits, and 
increased inequality. In response to all these developments, as well as to the 
resulting shift of American public opinion to the left since the mid- 1990s, 
and with the continued availability of capital in global markets, Democratic 
policy intellectuals and politicians themselves moved a bit to the left. Re-
considering the economic and political primacy of reduced budget deficits, 
Democratic elites, in some cases drawing on the example of the European ex-
perience, began to call for universal healthcare, increased public investment, 
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wage insurance for workers displaced by globalization, and progressive tax 
reform.
 This Democratic shift to the left accelerated briefly in the wake of Obama’s 
victory and the global economic crisis, which at least temporarily relaxed tra-
ditional constraints on an expanded government role. In addition to rescuing 
failing financial institutions and auto companies, Obama and congressional 
Democrats, in the face of vociferous Republican opposition, passed a mas-
sive economic stimulus program and a budget resolution—including aid to 
the states and big increases in public investment in infrastructure and “green 
jobs”—to spark an economic recovery and strengthen the foundations for 
long- term growth. After an epic battle, Obama and his allies then successfully 
restructured the nation’s healthcare system and later enacted an important 
if modest financial reform bill. However, a persistently weak economy and 
mounting public concern over bailouts, rising spending and deficits, and “Big 
Government” led to significant Republican gains in the congressional mid-
term elections in 2010, jeopardizing the durability of the recent shift to the 
left in United States politics.
 There is therefore considerable variety in the economies and societies 
where center- left parties operate and hope to make gains. There are also very 
different histories, whose legacies may not quite determine the future but 
nevertheless matter greatly. Still, the center- left parties work within strik-
ingly similar electoral maps across Europe and North America, confront sur-
prisingly similar social and economic problems, and must find their way 
within a common world economy. We believe that it is therefore worth ex-
amining their situations and prospects together.
The Book and Its Goals
The book explores the post- Keynesian, globalized political world in which the 
center- left finds itself after the cold war and assesses its consequences and 
implications. It is premised on a belief that it is unhelpful to lament the recent 
narrowing of political debate and to regard the acceptance of new constraints 
as betrayal. Instead, it will probe the new political structures faced by the 
center- left with an eye toward realizing, seizing, and expanding the political 
possibilities that they offer. We shall investigate the center- left’s more suc-
cessful initiatives and analyze when and where they occurred, which condi-
tions facilitated the most useful political responses, which barriers blocked 
their emergence in other places, and how they were subject to limitations 
even where they were politically feasible. Our work as presented here will 
often be historical, but we shall try consistently to look forward. It will be 
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broad in its reach but necessarily selective; and it will be transatlantic, but 
also aware of the very real differences that separate the European experience 
from that of the United States.8
 The first chapter focuses on the unique history of social democracy in 
Europe and its roles in securing democracy, prosperity, and a measure of 
social justice and social protection in the postwar years. It also makes clear 
the pitfalls, detours, and false starts that accompanied what the author, Sheri 
Berman, considers the victory of social democracy, and the continuing diffi-
culties that social democrats have had in understanding their own achieve-
ments, sustaining them in hard times, and building upon them in the most 
recent era. Gerassimos Moschonas follows with a comparative essay on the 
shifting electoral fortunes and social bases of center- left parties over the past 
quarter- century. The story he tells is mixed and complicated, like Berman’s, 
in which achievements and setbacks are carefully balanced through time and 
space. Less mixed, but unsurprisingly so, is the record of center- left parties 
in eastern and central Europe surveyed by Jean- Michel De Waele and Sorina 
Soare. In that unfortunate region the legacy of “actually existing socialism” 
and Soviet domination cast doubt on the legitimacy of anything calling itself 
socialist or social democratic, even as the economic and social wreckage left 
behind called out for a political vision offering more than neoliberalism and 
“shock therapy.”
 Three case studies follow: on Britain, France, and Sweden. Britain and 
Sweden illustrate two potentially viable paths for center- lefts. France, in con-
trast, embodies many of the obstacles to taking any path. James Cronin re-
views the unhappy history out of which New Labour emerged and argues 
that this history, and the desire to transcend it, explain a great deal of what 
New Labour has been about. Viewed in that historical context, New Labour 
has achieved more than it is usually credited with having achieved. It may or 
may not be a model for the center- left, but despite its defeat in the elections 
of May 2010, it is at the least a model worth studying. Art Goldhammer and 
George Ross undertake a similar analysis of the lengthy process by which the 
French center- left reached its present impasse. They see a record of incoher-
ence and factionalism that has prevented French socialists from capitalizing 
on the many failures of their opponents and from undertaking the sorts of 
policies that might give them a more lasting purchase on voters’ preferences. 
Jonas Pontusson tells a different story about Sweden, where, he explains, a 
period of political uncertainty and economic distress in the 1980s afforded 
social democrats the opportunity to sort out what was central in their vision 
and program. That involved a reaffirmation of the party’s commitment to 
work rather than to a particular job, to the skills and training and social sup-
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ports required for obtaining and keeping work, and to a world market in 
which workers and firms would find their just rewards. If properly under-
stood and locally tailored, this slimmed- down and updated Swedish model 
can, Pontusson insists, inspire the center- left in countries far different from 
Sweden and its Scandinavian cousins.
 What form of center- left politics is likely or even possible in a place as dif-
ferent as the United States? That is part of what the three chapters focused 
on the American experience seek to determine. In his chapter on electoral 
dynamics, Ruy Teixeira makes the argument that for all of America’s real and 
imagined “exceptionalism,” and notwithstanding its setback in the congres-
sional midterm elections in 2010, the party of the center- left is in the process 
of becoming politically dominant. Democrats have emerged as the party of 
professionals in the “knowledge” industries and the service sector as well as 
of women, the young, and ethnic and racial minorities. The party has lost 
support among its traditional bases in the white working class, but offsetting 
this to a considerable extent is that those workers who do vote Democratic, 
mainly those in trade unions, turn out in large numbers to do so. Teixeira 
differs sharply from those who argued before the last two election cycles 
that the unusual strength of the religious right, the effects of Republican- 
controlled redistricting, and the enduring attraction of tough rhetoric on na-
tional security, immigration, and divisive social issues had given Republi-
cans a permanent edge. Teixeira concludes his highly useful corrective by 
predicting that despite the current decline in Obama’s popularity and the 
Democrats’ substantial midterm losses in 2010, due in both cases mainly to 
the weak economy, the subsequent economic turnaround and the continued 
growth of the Democrats’ demographic coalition will likely produce a reelec-
tion victory for Obama in 2012 and a broader Democratic revival. Time will 
tell if Teixeira’s relatively optimistic forecast is borne out.
 Chris Howard breaks with the conventional wisdom about the supposed 
retrenchment of American social policy, describing a record of consistent and 
not insignificant increases in what would normally be considered govern-
ment social expenditure. Spending in the United States does not match that 
in other developed nations, but America is not quite the laggard it is often 
thought to be. Howard stresses three additional and critical features of the 
American welfare state: a reliance on the tax system to transfer funds to those 
in need; the tendency of government programs to miss those most in need 
and to focus instead on those with real but less pressing needs; and, because 
the United States economy generates very unequal incomes and distributes 
wealth disproportionately to the very top, the failure of increases in social 
spending to do much to redress inequality. Howard further shows that the 
22 Cronin, Ross, and Shoch
Democratic Party bears considerable responsibility for the recent growth in 
social spending, although the enactment of social programs and the shift in 
the distribution of social benefits has often required cooperation from Re-
publicans. Assessing the future of the American welfare state in the wake of 
the current economic crisis, Howard notes the many positive provisions of 
the recently enacted economic stimulus and healthcare reform bills. He con-
cludes somewhat pessimistically, however, that for a number of economic and 
political reasons, Obama and congressional Democrats are unlikely to make 
more than a dent in poverty and inequality.
 James Shoch’s chapter on globalization begins by noting that European 
social democrats have long recognized the benefits of free trade while both 
compensating “losers” with various social policies and expanding public in-
vestment to boost national competitiveness and save and create jobs. The 
Democratic Party, however, once committed to free trade, has in the past few 
decades charted a different course. Democratic presidents representing broad 
national constituencies have continued to promote trade liberalization. But 
congressional Democrats, under strong pressure from trade-battered labor 
constituents while also unable or unwilling to press for significant compensa-
tory or public investment programs in the face of Republican attacks on them 
as “tax- and- spend” liberals, have instead opposed and in some cases blocked 
recent free trade initiatives. Barack Obama’s victory and the expansion of 
the Democrats’ congressional majorities in 2008 initially appeared to signal 
a new era of increased social and public investment spending and thus also a 
possible eventual decline of labor and Democratic opposition to freer trade. 
But Democratic midterm losses in 2010 and likely further Senate setbacks in 
2012, Shoch concludes, have seriously diminished these prospects.
 Taken together, the three chapters devoted to the United States show that 
the center- left in America faces much the same set of problems as elsewhere 
and, especially in light of the election results from 2008, that the Democratic 
Party’s potential to win elections, despite its current slide in approval, may 
be at least equal to that of any center- left party in Europe. The American 
chapters also show, however, that historically center- left policies are perhaps 
harder to develop, implement, and maintain in America than in Europe. Still, 
policy and politics go together everywhere, and some of the most pressing 
policy concerns will pose difficulties for center- left parties on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The last three chapters in the book demonstrate this very clearly. 
Jane Jenson looks closely at what have been termed “new social risks” and 
the policy responses they have provoked. New risks come in part from the 
changing demography of the workforce, as more women work and family 
structures shift, and from the changed nature of work itself, which is now 
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less secure, more variable over time, and more highly concentrated in sectors 
and regions. Specifically, there are now more single mothers as well as more 
women working, and more of the so- called working poor. The main response 
to this set of changes has been to try to get more people into the workforce—
labor market activation is the term for this—or to make work pay better, 
either by subsidizing low- paid work or by supplementing wages with social 
supports. Jenson demonstrates that these problems and responses are shared 
across different countries with historically rather different welfare systems 
and types of political economy. The implication is that systems and regimes 
and parties can and will learn from each other, because whatever the policy 
legacy, the problems are converging in a more and more global economy.
 Sofía Pérez makes a very similar argument about an issue that is equally 
important for the center- left: immigration. All over Europe there are more 
immigrants than before, and some of them, especially those from Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East, are by definition more different from Europeans 
than earlier immigrants and in that respect less easily integrated in the soci-
eties to which they have come. The effects of immigration have varied be-
tween countries, Pérez shows, but everywhere it matters in unprecedented 
ways and, one might add, in ways that have affected American politics for a 
very long time. The center- left has problems with immigration, since part of 
its natural base (organized labor) may find immigrants an economic threat, 
but the center- right faces similar problems (with employers). Both factions 
try to avoid these problems through symbolic political positions which tend 
to cancel the partisan effects.
 The penultimate piece in our collection is George Ross’s analysis of the im-
pact of the European Union on the center- left. When the EU began as a Com-
mon Market, many on the left regarded it as either a capitalist plot or an ir-
relevancy for national politics. Then from the mid- 1980s, when the EU came 
to exercise new and extensive power over its member states, lefts had to pay 
more attention. For a while some hoped for a “social Europe,” but recently the 
EU has looked more like a force for globalization and market liberalization. 
Ross provides a tour of these moves and what each has meant for parties of 
the center- left across the continent. His is a particularly intimate and, at base, 
disenchanted view, but he sees possibilities as well as constraints in EU insti-
tutions which are obliged to speak in, if not seek, broad consensus. Ross’s ac-
count of the EU is in many ways an account of the present state of the world 
economy and of the institutions and assumptions that govern it, and so also 
of their impact on the prospects of the center- left in Europe and elsewhere. It 
is a reminder again of the novel mix of constraints and opportunities, limits 
and possibilities, within which center- left politics now operates, and which 
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must be mastered if it—or rather they, for the constituents of the center- left 
are many and varied—are to prosper and fulfill the hopes of supporters.
 The book ends not with a summary but a set of reflections on what the 
center- left and its components—be they socialists or social- democrats or 
democratic socialists or members of the Labour Party or just plain Demo-
crats in the United States—have meant in the past and how the world they 
inhabit today requires that they evolve new identities, meanings, and means 
of being effective. The portrait which emerges is varied and nuanced. Some 
center- lefts are better placed than others to conciliate the demands of eco-
nomic management, humane policy innovation, and popular support. Some 
live in institutional environments that favor success; for others this is less 
true. Some have been able to sustain support among a large number of voters, 
while others live in fragmented political landscapes that vastly complicate 
the tasks they need to undertake. All face a new historical crossroads, cre-
ated by the collapse of the global financial sector that spread from the United 
States outward beginning in 2008.
 It is too soon to know what this crisis will bring for center- lefts, but signifi-
cant change is likely. Initial responses pointed to a blunting of the excessive 
faith in markets that had colored politics everywhere where center- lefts had 
operated for the past quarter- century, a return to government and politics 
in the making of key economic and social decisions, enhanced regulation of 
markets, and perhaps even more extensive global governance. All these ini-
tial efforts were first aid, designed to save North America, Europe, and the 
rest of the world from the catastrophic collapse of the global financial sector. 
They did not necessarily indicate a fundamental shift, and in any case history 
tells us that major economic crises have not immediately helped lefts. The 
“Great Recession” lingers, its effects still spreading, but if recent electoral 
cycles are an indication, it has benefited center- right parties for the most 
part. This is predictable, as is the way in which conservatives have sought 
to turn what was initially a crisis of capitalism, for which capital itself was 
largely blamed, into a crisis of the welfare state and social provision. The 
big question not yet answered is whether, as has often happened in the past, 
center- lefts will eventually be able to regroup, gain strength, and bring new 
and needed reforms. Crises can present great political opportunities, but one 
can never be sure just who will be able to seize these opportunities. Center- 
lefts should be in a position to profit if they are able to recognize that this 
crisis is an invitation not to resurrect the past but rather to innovate in ways 
that could enhance and restore economic security and produce sustainable 
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Part I
Ideas, Projects, and Electoral Realities

Social Democracy’s Past  
and Potential Future
Sheri Berman
The aim of this book is to figure out “what’s left of the left,” that is, what the 
left or center- left stands for and should aspire to accomplish in our current 
globalized world. Globalization is seen as particularly problematic for the left 
because it has thrown into question many of the left’s traditional policies and 
principles. Many insist, for example, that the increasing mobility and inter-
nationalization of capital have permanently shifted the balance of power in 
society in capital’s favor. As the exit options of capital grow, so does the bar-
gaining power of employers vis- à- vis labor, thereby complicating efforts to 
regulate and control business decisions and development. Similarly, increas-
ing international competition is said to make things like generous welfare 
states and high tax rates an impediment to efficiency and therefore luxuries 
that states can no longer afford. But perhaps more important than global-
ization’s impact on policies traditionally associated with the left is its direct 
challenge to many of the postwar left’s key ideological principles. Among 
the most striking features of contemporary globalization debates is the wide-
spread belief in the primacy of economics. In the world envisioned by neo-
liberals, markets would be allowed as great a degree of freedom and as wide 
a scope as possible and states would be knocked from the “commanding 
heights” that they occupied during the postwar era (Yergin and Stanislaw 
1998). Given the historic connection between social democracy and the use 
of the state to provide services, facilitate growth, and generally tame the mar-
ket and temper its effects, the logic of this position is that at the beginning 
of the twenty- first century there is not much “left of the left” at all. In fact, 
a number of commentators have announced that “socialism is dead” and, as 
Ralf Dahrendorf pointedly insisted, “none of its variants can be revived.” It 
is now time, according to Anthony Giddens, to begin the process of “burying 
socialism.”1
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 This chapter argues that such pessimism and the reading of history that 
underlies it are not merely premature but wrong. Indeed, the very condi-
tions that have led so many observers to proclaim the left’s demise provide 
an excellent context for its reexamination and perhaps even rejuvenation. 
This is because for all its purported novelty, the issue at the heart of contem-
porary globalization debates—whether states can and should dominate mar-
ket forces or must bow before them—is in fact very old. Social democracy, 
the most successful version of leftist thinking and politics during the twenti-
eth century, emerged from similar debates within the international socialist 
movement a century ago. It is only because these debates have been forgotten 
or misunderstood—at least until the onset of the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis of 2008—that contemporary discussions of left and contempo-
rary political alternatives are so superficial and intellectually impoverished, 
and why it is so important to refresh the democratic left’s collective memory 
about its past. This chapter will endeavor to do just that, providing a brief 
summary of the emergence and rationale of social democracy. It will then 
use this history to provide a foundation upon which to begin thinking about 
possible paths forward for the democratic left today.
The Origins of Social Democracy
Social democracy’s intellectual origins lie in a debate that began within the 
international socialist movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Like 
now, this was a period of rapid globalization. Spurred on by new technolo-
gies in communications and transportation, capitalism had developed re-
newed vigor and was rapidly spreading its tentacles across the globe. These 
changes made many question the “orthodox” version of Marxism that had 
established itself as the official ideology of much of the international socialist 
movement by this time.2 The most distinctive features of this doctrine (which 
was largely codified by Marx’s collaborator and leading apostle, Friedrich 
Engels, and popularized by the “pope of socialism,” Karl Kautsky) were his-
torical materialism and class struggle, according to which history was pro-
pelled forward not by changes in human consciousness or behavior but rather 
by economic development and the resulting shifts in social relationships. As 
Engels put it, “The materialist conception of history starts from the propo-
sition that . . . the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions 
are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in man’s better insight into eternal 
truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. 
They are to be sought, not in the philosophy but in the economics of each par-
ticular epoch” (Engels 1962, 365–66). As one observer noted, what histori-
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cal materialism offered was an “obstetric” view of history: since capitalism 
had within it the seeds of the future socialist society, socialists had only to 
wait for economic development to push the system’s internal contradictions 
to the point where the emergence of the new order would require little more 
than some midwifery (Cohen 1999). And in this drama the role of midwife 
was played by class struggle and in particular by the proletariat. In Kautsky’s 
words, “economic evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will compel 
the exploited classes to rise against this system of private ownership” (Kaut-
sky 1910, 90–91). With each passing day, ever larger would grow the group 
of “propertyless workers for whom the existing system [would become] un-
bearable; who have nothing to lose by its downfall but everything to gain” 
(Kautsky 1910, 119).
 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, it was becoming increas-
ingly clear that many orthodox Marxist predictions were not coming true. 
The proletariat was not experiencing a steady “immiserization,” small farm-
ing and businesses were not disappearing, economic growth was continu-
ing, and general economic collapse seemed increasingly far off. Just as Marx-
ism’s failings as a guide to history and economic development were becoming 
clear, moreover, criticism arose within the international socialist movement 
regarding its inadequacy as a guide to constructive political action. Parties 
acting in Marx’s name had become important political players in a number 
of European countries by the end of the nineteenth century, but orthodox 
Marxism could not furnish them with a strategy for using their power to 
achieve any practical goals. Orthodox Marxist thought had little to say about 
the role of political organizations in general, since it considered economic 
forces rather than political activism to be the prime mover of history.
 Around the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, many on the 
left faced a troubling dilemma: capitalism was flourishing, but the economic 
injustices and social fragmentation that had motivated the Marxist project 
in the first place remained. Orthodox Marxism offered only a counsel of pas-
sivity—of waiting for the contradictions within capitalism to bring the sys-
tem down, which seemed both highly unlikely and increasingly unpalatable.
 Orthodox Marxism’s passive economism also did little to meet the psycho-
political needs of mass populations under economic and social stress. As 
noted above, the last years of the nineteenth century, like those at the end of 
the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty- first, were marked by a wave 
of globalization and rapid, disorienting change. This caused immense unease 
in European societies, and critics, not just on the left but increasingly now 
on the nationalist right, railed against the glorification of self- interest and 
rampant individualism, the erosion of traditional values and communities, 
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and the rise of social dislocation, atomization, and fragmentation that capi-
talism brought in its wake (Hughes 1977). Orthodox Marxism had little to 
offer those interested in actively responding to capitalism’s downsides (rather 
than merely waiting for its collapse) and little sympathy or understanding for 
growing nationalist sentiment. It was against this backdrop and in response 
to these frustrations that revisionism emerged.
 As the nineteenth century drew to its close, several socialists realized that 
if their desired political outcome was not going to come about because it was 
inevitable (as Marx, Engels, and many of their influential followers believed), 
then it would have to be achieved as a result of human action. Some, such as 
Lenin, felt that it could be imposed, and set out to spur history along through 
the politico- military efforts of a revolutionary vanguard. Others, not willing 
to accept the violence or élitism of such a course, chose to revamp the social-
ist program so as to attract the support of a majority of society. They felt that 
if the triumph of socialism was not going to be inevitable, it could be made 
desirable and emerge through the active, collective efforts of human beings 
motivated by a belief in a better, higher good.
 These democratic revisionists rejected the pseudo- scientific and material-
ist justifications of socialism proffered by orthodox Marxists and called for a 
rediscovery of socialism’s moral roots, for an emphasis on the ideals and spirit 
underpinning the original Marxist project. (As some contemporary observers 
noted, they wanted to exchange Hegel for Kant.) Although their thoughts and 
actions often emerged independently and differed according to local context, 
democratic revisionists shared an emphasis on the desirability rather than 
the necessity of socialism, on morality and ethics as opposed to science and 
materialism, and on human will and cross- class cooperation rather than ir-
resistible economic forces and inevitable class conflict. The most influential 
member of this group was Eduard Bernstein, an important figure in both the 
international socialist movement and its most powerful party, the Sozialde-
mokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD).
 Bernstein attacked the two main pillars of orthodox Marxism—historical 
materialism and class struggle—and argued for an alternative based on the 
primacy of politics and cross- class cooperation. His observations about capi-
talism led him to believe that it was not heading toward its collapse but rather 
was becoming increasingly complex and adaptable. Thus instead of waiting 
until capitalism’s demise for socialism to emerge, he favored trying to ac-
tively reform the existing system. In his view the prospects for socialism de-
pended “not on the decrease but on the increase of . . . wealth,” and on the 
ability of socialists to come up with “positive suggestions for reform” capable 
of spurring fundamental change (Bernstein 1898).
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 Bernstein’s loss of belief in the inevitability of socialism led him to appre-
ciate the potential for political action. In his view, orthodox Marxists’ faith 
in historical materialism had bred a dangerous political passivity that would 
cost them the enthusiasm of the masses. He felt that the doctrine of inevitable 
class struggle shared the same fatal flaws, being both historically inaccurate 
and politically debilitating. There was actually a natural community of inter-
est between workers and the vast majority of society that suffered from the 
injustices of the capitalist system, he argued, and socialists should regard 
dissatisfied elements of the middle classes and peasantry as potential allies 
ready to be converted to the cause.
 Bernstein’s arguments were echoed by a small but growing number of re-
visionist socialists across Europe, who shared an emphasis on a political path 
to socialism rather than its necessity, and on cross- class cooperation rather 
than class conflict. During the last years of the nineteenth century and the 
first years of the twentieth, revisionism progressed in fits and starts, within 
and across several countries, and although Bernstein and his fellow revision-
ists insisted that they were merely “revising” or “updating” Marxism, their 
fiercest critics—the defenders of orthodoxy—saw clearly what the revision-
ists themselves were loath to admit: that they were arguing for a replace-
ment of Marxism with something entirely different. By abandoning histori-
cal materialism and class struggle, they were in fact rejecting Marxism as 
thoroughly as Marx had rejected liberalism a half- century earlier. But the 
revisionists were not yet ready to fully accept the implications of their views 
and make a clean break with orthodoxy. The result was growing tension and 
confusion, which left the international socialist movement, like many of its 
constituent parties, a house divided against itself. The First World War and its 
aftermath brought the house down.
 The vast changes unleashed by the Great War led many on the left to ex-
plicitly reject class struggle and historical materialism and to openly em-
brace their antitheses—cross- class cooperation and the primacy of politics. 
The doctrine of class struggle suffered a critical blow with the outbreak of the 
war. Socialist parties across the continent abandoned their suspicion of bour-
geois parties and institutions and threw their support behind the states they 
had hitherto pledged to destroy. The doctrine came under even more pressure 
in the postwar era, as the democratic wave that spread across much of Europe 
confronted socialists with unprecedented opportunities for participation in 
bourgeois governments. Given a chance to help form or even lead democratic 
administrations, many were forced to recognize the uncomfortable truth that 
workers alone could never deliver an electoral majority and that cooperation 
with non- proletarians was the price of political power. The war also revealed 
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the immense mobilizing power of nationalism and bred a generation that 
valued community, solidarity, and struggle. Populist right- wing movements 
across the continent were riding these trends, and many socialists worried 
that clinging to orthodox Marxism’s emphasis on class conflict and proletar-
ian exclusivity would prevent them from responding to the needs of ordinary 
citizens and thus cause them to lose ground to competitors.
 The second pillar of orthodox Marxism, historical materialism, was also 
dealt a critical blow by the war and its aftermath. The pivotal position occu-
pied by socialist parties in many newly democratized countries after the 
Great War made it increasingly difficult to avoid the question of how political 
power could contribute to socialist transformation, and the subsequent onset 
of the Great Depression made submission to economic forces tantamount to 
political suicide. Protests against liberalism and capitalism had been growing 
since the end of the nineteenth century, but war and depression gave these 
protests a mass base and renewed momentum, with the legions of the dis-
affected ready to be claimed by any political movement promising to tame 
markets. Orthodoxy’s emphasis on letting economic forces be the drivers of 
history meant that here too it ceded ground to activist groups on the right.
 As socialist parties stumbled and fell in country after country, a growing 
number of socialists became convinced that a whole new vision was neces-
sary for their movement—one that would supplant rather than tinker with 
orthodoxy. So they turned to the themes set out by revisionism’s pioneers 
a generation earlier: the value of cross- class cooperation and the primacy 
of politics. In the context of the interwar years and the Great Depression 
this meant first and foremost using political forces to control economic ones. 
Where orthodox Marxists and classical liberals preached passivity in the face 
of economic catastrophe, the new, truly “social democratic” leftists fought for 
programs that would use the power of the state to tame the capitalist system. 
Neither hoping for capitalism’s demise nor worshipping the market uncriti-
cally, they argued that the market’s anarchic and destructive powers could 
and should be fettered at the same time that its ability to produce unprece-
dented material bounty was exploited. They thus came to champion a real 
“third way” between laissez- faire liberalism and Soviet communism. These 
themes found their advocates within all socialist parties. In Belgium, Hol-
land, and France, for example, Hendrik De Man and his Plan du travail found 
energetic champions. De Man argued for an activist strategy to combat eco-
nomic depression, an evolutionary transformation of capitalism, and a focus 
on the control rather than the ownership of capital. Activists in other parts 
of Europe echoed these themes: in Germany and Austria reformers advo-
cated government intervention in the economy and pseudo- Keynesian stimu-
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lus programs; and in Sweden the Swedish social democratic party, the SAP, 
initiated the single most ambitious attempt to reshape capitalism from within 
(Berman 2006).
 Regardless of the specific policies they advocated, one thing that joined all 
budding interwar social democrats was a rejection of the passivity and eco-
nomic determinism of orthodox Marxism and a belief in the need to use state 
power to tame capitalism. In order to do this, however—and finally relegate 
historical materialism to the dustbin of history—they had to win majority 
support for their programs and fight back the advances of the growing nation-
alist right. Hence during the interwar years many returned to the themes of 
cross- class cooperation that Bernstein and other revisionists had preached 
a generation earlier. In an era of dislocation and disorientation, these social 
democrats realized that appeals to the “people,” the “community,” and the 
common good were much more attractive than the class struggle perspective 
of orthodox Marxism or the individualism of classic liberals. Therefore they 
often embraced communitarian, corporatist, and even nationalist appeals 
and urged their parties to make the transition from workers’ to “people’s” 
parties.
 It was only in Scandinavia and in Sweden in particular that a unified party 
embraced this new approach wholeheartedly. This is why one must turn to 
the Swedish case to observe the full dimensions, and potential, of the so-
cial democratic experiment at this time. During the interwar years the SAP 
began to develop a comprehensive economic program designed to harness 
the powers of the market and reshape the Swedish polity. In selling this pro-
gram to the electorate, especially during the depression, the SAP stressed its 
activism and commitment to the common good. For example, during the elec-
tion campaign of 1932 a leading party paper proclaimed: “Humanity carries 
its destiny in its own hands. . . . Where the bourgeoisie preach laxity and sub-
mission to . . . fate, we appeal to people’s desire for creativity . . . conscious 
that we both can and will succeed in shaping a social system in which the 
fruits of labor will go to the benefit of those who are willing to . . . participate 
in the common task” (Social- Demokraten, 15 September 1932).
 The SAP’s leader Per Albin Hansson, meanwhile, was popularizing his 
theme of Sweden as the “folkhemm” or “people’s home.” He declared, “The 
basis of the home is community and togetherness” and stressed that social 
democracy strove to “break down the barriers that . . . separate citizens” 
(Hansson 1982 [1928]). The result was that while in countries such as Ger-
many and Italy the populist right assumed the mantle of communal solidarity 
and put together devastatingly effective cross- class coalitions, in Sweden it 
was the social democrats who became seen as the champions of the “little 
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people,” the party that was “one with the nation” and was taking critical steps 
toward becoming a true “people’s party.” These positions helped the SAP to 
form a majority government through an alliance with the peasantry, and reap 
political rewards from the economic recovery that eventually occurred.
 By the mid- 1930s the democratic strand of revisionism had therefore blos-
somed into a powerful and creative political movement all its own. Ortho-
dox Marxism’s historical materialism and class struggle were jettisoned for a 
belief in the primacy of politics and cross- class cooperation, and these prin-
ciples were translated into a distinctive and viable policy agenda based on a 
“people’s party” approach together with a commitment to using the state to 
control markets. Together this added up to social democracy. It was only in 
Sweden, however, that social democrats were able to take charge of a politi-
cal party, and so it was only there that the social democratic agenda was fully 
implemented during the interwar period.
The Postwar Era
If during the interwar years social democrats generally lost the battle for the 
soul of the left, except in Scandinavia and particularly in Sweden, the story 
changed after the Second World War as many of the social democrats’ ideas 
and policies ultimately triumphed, on the left and across much of the politi-
cal spectrum. The political chaos and social dislocation of the 1930s were 
held to have been caused by the Great Depression, which in turn was held 
to have been caused by unregulated markets—and so actors from across the 
European political spectrum agreed on the inadvisability of taking that path 
again. And so as Europe struggled to rebuild economically while trying to 
head off the political and social instability that had led to ruin in the past, 
there was widespread agreement that unchecked capitalism could threaten 
goals in all three spheres. After 1945, therefore, Western European nations 
started to construct a new order, one that could ensure economic growth 
while at the same time protecting societies from capitalism’s destructive con-
sequences (Marglin and Schor 1991; Armstrong, Glyn, and Harrison 1991). 
As John Ruggie has put it, postwar policymakers “seized upon the state in 
the attempt to reimpose broader and more direct social control over market 
forces,” redefining the “legitimate social purposes in pursuit of which state 
power was expected to be employed in the domestic economy” (Ruggie 1982, 
386). No longer would states be limited to ensuring that markets could grow 
and flourish; no longer were economic interests to be given the widest pos-
sible leeway. Instead, after 1945 the state became generally understood as the 
guardian of society rather than the economy, and economic imperatives were 
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often forced to take a back seat to social ones. Throughout Western Europe 
states explicitly committed themselves to managing markets and protecting 
society from its most destructive effects.
 Across Europe, in short, the postwar order represented something quite 
unusual. Crosland pointed out that it was “different in kind from classical 
capitalism . . . in almost every respect that one can think of” (Crosland 1967, 
34), while Andrew Shonfield questioned whether “the economic order under 
which we now live and the social structure that goes with it are so differ-
ent from what preceded them that it [has become] misleading . . . to use the 
word ‘capitalism’ to describe them” (Shonfield 1969, 3). But of course capital-
ism did remain—even though it was a very different capitialism than before. 
After 1945 the market system was tempered and limited by political power, 
and the state was explicitly committed to protecting society from the market’s 
worst consequences. Scholars have long recognized that this new order rep-
resented both a decisive break with the past and a repudiation of the radical 
left’s hopes for an end to capitalism (Maier 1981; Offe 1983). What they have 
often failed to appreciate is just how much it was a repudiation of traditional 
liberalism as well. The core principle of the new system—that political forces 
should control economic ones—was a reversal of both classical liberalism’s 
theory and its long- standing practice. The most common term used to de-
scribe the postwar system—Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982)—
is thus a misnomer. If liberalism can be stretched to encompass an order that 
saw unchecked markets as dangerous, that had public interests trump private 
prerogatives, and that granted states the right to intervene in the economy 
and society to protect a “common” or “public” interest, then the term is so 
elastic as to be nearly useless. In fact, rather than a modified, updated form of 
liberalism, what spread like wildfire after the war was really something quite 
different: social democracy.
 Although the postwar order represented a clear triumph for social demo-
cratic principles, and marked the first time that Western Europe was able 
to combine economic growth, well- functioning democracy, and social sta-
bility, social democracy’s victory was not complete. Many on the right ac-
cepted the new system out of necessity alone: once their fear of economic 
and social chaos (and the radical left) faded, their commitment to the new 
order also faded. But more interestingly, many on the left failed to understand 
or wholeheartedly accept the social democratic compromise. Although after 
1945 almost all democratic socialist parties eventually turned themselves into 
champions of policies that helped temper and redirect market forces, this 
practical reorientation was not always matched by an equivalent ideological 
one. Many democratic leftists may have embraced social democratic words 
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but still didn’t hear the music, and they continued to proclaim their dedica-
tion to classic, pre- war ideological goals such as transcending capitalism en-
tirely and avoiding too- close relationships with non- proletarian groups.
 The classic unfolding of this drama occurred in Germany. Despite a radi-
cally changed environment, after the war the German social democratic 
party, SPD, offered Germans a rehashed version of its pre- war program and 
appeal.3 The theoretical and historical sections of the party’s program spoke 
in traditional Marxist tones not dramatically different from those invoked at 
Erfurt more than half a century earlier. Kurt Schumacher, who dominated 
the leadership until his death in 1952, proclaimed: “The crucial point [of the 
SPD’s contemporary agenda] is the abolition of capitalist exploitation and the 
transfer of the means of production from the control of the big proprietors to 
social ownership, the management of the economy as a whole in accordance 
not with the interests of private profit but with the principles of economically 
necessary planning. The muddle of the capitalist private- economy . . . cannot 
be tolerated. Planning and control are not socialism; they are only prerequi-
sites for it. The crucial step is to be seen in drastic socialisation” (Schumacher 
1986 [1945], 274).
 In addition to offering a bleak, intransigent view of capitalism’s possibili-
ties and calling for widespread nationalization, the SPD more or less returned 
to its traditional emphasis on workers and suspicion of other parties. Under 
Schumacher “the party slid all too easily into the oppositional stance of the 
Weimar days, supremely confident that it could spurn co- operation with 
bourgeois parties and win power effortlessly through the logic of history” 
(Carr 1987, 194). But if Schumacher and his cronies were comfortable with 
such a position, others in the party, and especially its younger echelons, were 
not. As the SPD’s membership declined in the 1950s, it became painfully clear 
that without a change it was heading for permanent minority status. Mean-
while, the contrast between an increasingly dictatorial regime in the East 
and the Federal Republic’s prospering economy helped many to realize that 
a fully socialized economy was inimical to both democracy and growth (Carr 
1987, 196). As a result, in 1955 Schumacher’s successor Erich Ollenhauer set 
up a commission to reevaluate the party’s direction and appeal.
 The outcome was a full reconsideration of the SPD’s course in German 
politics, the famed Bad Godesberg program. Essentially this committed the 
SPD to the twin aims of a modern social- democratic program: a people’s party 
strategy and a commitment to reform capitalism rather than destroy it. In 
particular, Bad Godesberg proclaimed that the party “no longer considered 
nationalization the major principle of a socialist economy but only one of 
several (and then only the last) means of controlling economic concentra-
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tion and power” (Braunthal 1994, 18). In the program’s well- known phrase, it 
committed the SPD to promoting “as much competition as possible, as much 
planning as necessary.” Bad Godesberg also attempted to reach beyond the 
working class by making clear the party’s desire for better relations with the 
churches and its commitment to defending the country and supporting its 
military. Finally, the Bad Godesberg program marked the triumph of social 
democracy through its clear, if implicit, severing of socialism from Marxism:
Democratic socialism, which in Europe is rooted in Christian ethics, 
humanism and classical philosophy, does not proclaim ultimate 
truths—not because of any lack of understanding for or indifference to 
philosophical or religious truths, but out of respect for the individual’s 
choice in these matters of conscience in which neither the state nor any 
political party should be allowed to interfere.
 The Social Democratic party is the party of freedom of thought. It is a 
community of men holding different beliefs and ideas. Their agreement 
is based on the moral principles and political aims they have in com-
mon. The Social Democratic party strives for a way of life in accordance 
with these principles. Socialism is a constant task—to fight for freedom 
and justice, to preserve them and to live up to them. (Miller and Pott-
hoff, 1986, 275)
 Bad Godesberg marked a clear shift in the SPD’s stated identity and goals. 
Yet if somewhere Bernstein was smiling about his ultimate triumph over 
Kautsky, he might also have been a bit troubled, because the shift was at 
least as much pragmatic as it was principled, motivated by a desire to break 
out of a political ghetto rather than a decision to chart a bold course for the 
future. In a country where national socialism was a recent memory and “real, 
existing” socialism was being built next door, the wish to avoid ideology and 
grand projects is perhaps easy to understand. And it was made possible by the 
leadership transition to Ollenhauer, “a solid, loyal party functionary, a man 
dedicated to oiling the wheels of a smoothly running bureaucratic machine 
[who] was as far removed from the consuming political passions that fired 
Kurt Schumacher as anyone in the SPD could be” (Parness 1991, 60). But if 
the SPD’s de- ideologizing made it more palatable and less scary to voters—
and it did indeed eventually lead to an expansion of the party’s support and 
its participation in government—it also had its drawbacks. In particular, it 
“rendered [the SPD] unserviceable as a nexus for creating and reproducing 
utopian aspirations” (Gorski and Markovits 1993, 44), alienating from the 
party those dissatisfied with the status quo and looking to transform it into 
something better.
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 By the 1960s the SPD’s reorientation had thus opened a political space to 
the party’s left, a trend furthered by its increasing intolerance of intraparty 
disputes and its own activists, and the fall- out from its “Grand Coalition” 
with the CDU. When the pragmatic and centrist Helmut Schmidt became 
chancellor after Willy Brandt resigned in 1974, the SPD’s postwar transfor-
mation was complete. Competent and determined but lacking transformative 
goals and an ideological temperament, Schmidt focused on proving that his 
government, and the SPD more generally, were the most capable caretakers 
of Germany’s domestic economy and international standing. Schmidt com-
mitted himself to maintaining and improving the living standards of Ger-
many’s citizens and committed the country to accepting NATO missiles on 
European soil. Although successful on their own terms, these stances further 
alienated the left, and by tying the party’s fortunes ever closer to the coun-
try’s economy they made the SPD vulnerable to the economic downturn that 
began in the 1970s.
 In short, by the 1970s the SPD had become so fully integrated into the sys-
tem, and so inflexible and ideologically exhausted, that the partial discredit-
ing of its leadership by economic turmoil dealt it a blow from which it has yet 
to recover. Over the next generation the party hemorrhaged members and in-
creasingly became a home for the elderly and beneficiaries of the status quo. 
It lost the support of the young and the radical (many of whom turned left to 
the Greens), as well as many of the poor, unemployed, and alienated (some of 
whom have lately turned to right and left- wing populism and some to the left, 
die Linke). Lacking anything distinctive to offer, the hollowed- out SPD now 
finds itself electorally vulnerable, subject to internal dissension, and increas-
ingly unable to generate either enthusiasm or commitment from anybody.
 In Italy and France the left’s trajectories were not entirely dissimilar, al-
though it took even longer for socialists in both countries to make their peace 
with reality. In Italy the socialists “jettisoned what remained of [their] Marx-
ist heritage” only in the 1970s (De Grand 1989, 161–62). When the Partito 
Socialista Italiano (PSI) reestablished itself after the war it quickly returned, 
like the SPD, to many of the same patterns and practices that had doomed it 
to irrelevance in the 1920s. Its initial postwar leader, Pietro Nenni, sought to 
ally, and even merge, with the Communists (the PCI), and believed that the 
party’s foremost goal should be the immediate formation of a “socialist Re-
public.” His stances alienated the party’s more moderate and social demo-
cratic elements, leaving the PSI weakened by infighting.
 By 1947 Nenni’s opponents had split off, leaving him free to dally with the 
Communists and reorganize the party along Leninist lines, thereby turning it 
into probably the “most radical and, in a Marxist sense, fundamentalist, of all 
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European socialist movements” (Laqueur 1970, 155). Despite or probably be-
cause of this, the PCI soon overwhelmed the hapless PSI, becoming the main 
party of the left and wresting away control of many of the affiliated organiza-
tions of the labor movement (Di Scala 1998, 280). This left the Italian center 
up for grabs, a situation of which the Christian Democrats took full advantage 
to become Italy’s dominant party.
 After many years of political irrelevance the PSI was finally turned around 
by Bettino Craxi, who transformed it into a moderate reformist center- left 
party by the 1970s. At least initially this strategy paid off, and Craxi became 
the first socialist prime minister of Italy in 1983. Yet the party proved unable 
to build on this success and construct a distinctive and dynamic movement 
with broad appeal. It was “too late to wrench the PCI’s strong grip from the 
masses” (Colarizi 1996, 151), and in any case the PSI now lacked the type of 
clear ideological profile that might attract committed followers and engen-
der real enthusiasm. Making matters worse, Craxi suffered from the same 
weaknesses as other Italian politicians, and in the 1990s he was convicted of 
accepting bribes and kickbacks. With a discredited leader and no particular 
raison d’être, Italian socialism found its renewal short- lived.
 French socialism offers yet another dreary version of the same theme. 
After the war the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) aban-
doned many of its traditional policy stances, and most importantly ended its 
long- standing internal battles over whether to accept a position as a junior 
partner in a governing coalition. Nevertheless, despite such changes the party 
was unable to make a full break with its past or drop its Marxist rhetoric. Its 
most prominent member, Léon Blum, vociferously urged a change of course 
and pushed for a socialism based on evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change, one committed to appealing to “people in every walk of life” rather 
than one steeped in class warfare and worker exclusivity (Graham 1994, 271–
76; Halperin 1946). Yet his pleas were rejected, and at its first postwar con-
gress in August 1945 the SFIO proclaimed: “The Socialist party is by its nature 
a revolutionary party. It aims at replacing capitalist private property by a 
society in which natural resources and the means of production are socially 
owned and classes have been abolished. Such a revolutionary transforma-
tion, though in the interest of all mankind, is to be achieved only by the work-
ing class. . . . The Socialist party is a party of class struggle founded on the 
organized working class” (Braunthal 1967, 24).
 During the following years the orthodox faction of the party continued to 
gain in strength. At the party’s congress in 1946, for example, this wing, under 
the leadership of Guy Mollet (who soon became the party’s general secre-
tary), attacked Blum’s “watering down” of the party’s principles and “all at-
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tempts at revisionism, notably those which are inspired by a false humanism 
whose true significance is to mask fundamental realities—that is, the class 
struggle” (Colton 1966), 459.
 Unsurprisingly, as a result the party’s membership declined from 354,000 
in 1946 to 60,000 in 1960, while its share of the vote dropped from 23% in 
1945 to 12.6% in 1962. Its bastions of support ended up being not the working 
classes, the young, or the more dynamic sectors of the economy but rather 
middle- aged civil servants and professionals along with those who stood 
to lose from rapid social and economic change (such as textile workers and 
small farmers). As in Germany and Italy, meanwhile, one consequence of the 
SFIO’s rhetorical radicalism was that it provided an opening for the center- 
right—here in the form of Gaullism—to capture those groups alienated by 
the left and form a true cross- class coalition on the other side of the aisle, 
thereby becoming the dominant force in French political life.
 The SFIO remained stuck in a rut through the 1960s; yet continual elec-
toral defeats, culminating in routs in 1968 and 1969, finally led to change. 
Mollet retired in 1969 and a new, more pragmatic organization, the Parti 
Socialiste (PS), arose in 1971. It insisted on maintaining a clear left- wing pro-
file, at least in part so that it could form an alliance with the Communists. 
The two forces eventually agreed on a unity program, the Programme Com-
mun, which committed the Communists to democracy and pluralism and the 
socialists to economic radicalism, including large- scale nationalizations. This 
combined front came to power in 1981 during an economic downturn by con-
vincing voters that it had the most promising and innovative solutions to 
France’s problems.
 Unfortunately the socialists’ economic program did not work out as hoped, 
and the long- awaited socialist government soon found itself overseeing an 
economy in turmoil. Forced to act but with little else to fall back on, the 
socialists ended up making a dramatic volte- face: by 1982 the PS had moved 
from advocating one of the most radical economic programs of any socialist 
party in Europe to implementing deflationary measures and dramatically cut-
ting public spending. By the end of the twentieth century the French social-
ists, like their German and Italian counterparts, had shown themselves able 
to win elections but could no longer explain to themselves or others why any-
one should care.
 Not all socialist parties suffered the same fate. As might be expected, the 
Swedes did well—largely because they, unlike most socialist parties elsewhere, 
understood and believed in what they were doing. The SAP was able to prosper 
at the polls and maintain its distinctiveness by recognizing that the two tasks 
were in fact complementary: the party’s ability to integrate individual policy 
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initiatives into a larger social democratic whole ensured that it remained more 
vibrant and successful than most of its counterparts in the rest of Europe.
 To be sure, the Swedish social democrats started off the postwar era in a 
better position than parties on the left elsewhere. They could build on their 
own governing record rather than struggle to reestablish their very existence 
as a party, and their country emerged in better shape from the war than did 
most others. But even more than luck and a head start, their success was due 
to their having fully internalized the core elements of social democratic ideol-
ogy and devoted themselves to developing creative policies for putting them 
into practice.
 Politically the SAP worked during the postwar years to strengthen its hold 
over a broad cross- section of the Swedish electorate. Continuing the strategy 
that it had embraced during the interwar years, the party directed its appeals 
not to workers alone but to the Swedish “people” ( folk) in general. In doing 
so it exploited its wartime leadership role, loudly proclaiming its commit-
ment to social solidarity and the national interest. There was no conflict be-
tween these positions and social democracy, the party insisted, because social 
democracy properly understood was all about advancing collective interests 
rather than those of a particular group or class. SAP appeals were saturated 
with references to “solidarity,” “cooperation,” and “togetherness.” This was 
especially true in discussions of plans for an expanded welfare state, which 
was presented as part of the SAP’s strategy for creating “the strong society” 
(starka samhället) and protecting the public from the uncertainties and in-
securities inherent in modern capitalism. Meanwhile the SAP also continued 
along its pre- war path of using state intervention to manage the economy 
and sever the link between individuals’ market position and their broader life 
chances (Stephens 1986; Svensson 2002; Pontusson this volume). What made 
these efforts so distinctive was not only the sizable amount of intervention 
and decommodification they involved, but also the way they were presented 
as part of a larger, transformative project. The Rehn- Meidner model, for ex-
ample, was sold not merely as a practical package of wage regulations but 
as a case study in the party’s strategy of increasing “social control” over the 
economy without resorting to full- scale nationalization (Meidner 1993, 211). 
The Swedish welfare state was understood in a similar way. Its comprehen-
siveness and universalism helped “manufacture broad class (even cross- class) 
solidarity and social democratic consensus,” while at the same time margin-
alizing “the market as the principal agent of distribution and the chief deter-
minant of peoples’ life chances” (Esping- Andersen 1985, 245). The party con-
sciously used social policy to expand its hold over the electorate and develop 
a sense of common interests across classes.
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 Recognizing the growing importance of white- collar workers, for example, 
the SAP explicitly designed social policies that would appeal to them and 
tie their interests to those of other workers. This was particularly clear in 
the fight over supplemental pensions at the end of the 1950s, when the SAP 
“stressed the common interests of manual and white- collar workers [in these 
pensions] and the struggle for the[m] as of vital interest for all wage- earners” 
(Svensson 1994, 272). As with increased economic management, moreover, 
welfare state enhancements were presented as valuable not only on their own 
terms but as steps toward a better future. The party insisted that the welfare 
state itself represented a form of socialism, since under it “the total income of 
the people was regarded as a common resource and a portion of it was trans-
ferred to those with inadequate incomes” (Sainsbury 1990, 66).
 All these strategies proved quite successful, and in the years after the 
war the SAP was able to remain firmly anchored in the working class while 
strengthening its support well beyond it. Still by far the largest party in the 
Swedish political system, it used its dominance to shift the country’s center 
of political gravity to the left, and built the greatest record of political hege-
mony of any party in a democratic country during the twentieth century.
 Even so, the party did not escape unscathed from some of the problems 
that set back its counterparts elsewhere. Like them, in the 1970s it was forced 
to reevaluate some of its traditional tactics and even strategies (Blyth 2002). 
It went through a period in the late 1980s when it appeared to be drifting 
intellectually and politically (Blyth 2002). But because it had strong reserves 
of political, ideological, and intellectual capital to draw on, and had reshaped 
the political and social structure of Swedish society so extensively, in the 
end the party was able to weather the storm better than others. It bounced 
back politically, recaptured power in the 1980s, and although currently out of 
office, remains the dominant party in the Swedish political system (although 
it is not as hegemonic as before). It has maintained its ability to appeal to 
voters across much of the political spectrum and managed to coopt many new 
“postmaterialist” issues such as environmentalism and women’s rights. And 
economically it recovered from the fiasco surrounding wage earners’ funds by 
essentially promising the electorate that it would maintain traditional social 
democratic policies while updating them as appropriate to deal with con-
temporary challenges—something at which it has been relatively successful, 
overseeing impressive economic growth in recent years during its time in 
office, while still maintaining high levels of social spending and a commit-
ment to egalitarianism and social solidarity.
 Perhaps the SAP’s greatest success has been to preserve a sense of social 
democratic distinctiveness in Sweden (Castles 1978). Despite all the changes 
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that have occurred in both the domestic and international economy over re-
cent decades and the current existence of a bourgeois government, the vast 
majority of Swedes acknowledge and accept the SAP’s basic ideas about the 
virtues of social solidarity, egalitarianism, and political control over the econ-
omy. Rather than question whether these social democratic concepts are 
worthwhile, political debate in Sweden has tended to be about whether the 
socialists or the bourgeois parties are best able to implement them together 
with steady growth.
UNDErSTANDING SOCIAl DEMOCrACy’S original rationale and gaining a 
renewed appreciation for its role in twentieth- century political development 
is reason enough to reconsider the movement’s history. It turns out that there 
are other pressing reasons to do so as well, since many of the hard- earned 
insights of earlier ideological battles have been forgotten in recent years, as 
a shallow version of neoliberalism has come to exert an almost Gramscian 
hegemony over mainstream public debate.
 Globalization, it is often said, marks a new era. The spread of markets 
across the globe, and the deepening and quickening of economic intercon-
nections accompanying it, is creating a fundamentally new environment for 
leaders and publics, imposing burdens while constraining choices. You can 
either opt out of the system and languish, or put on what Thomas Friedman 
has called neoliberalism’s “Golden Straitjacket”—at which point “two things 
tend to happen: your economy grows and your politics shrinks” (Friedman 
1999, 87).
 Globalization’s onward march has produced a backlash too, of course, and 
anti- globalization protests have become a regular feature of contemporary 
life. Yet if contemporary neoliberals of the right and center dismiss concerns 
about globalization’s individual and social costs, large sectors of the left ex-
hibit the opposite tendency and dismiss the huge gains that the global spread 
of capitalism has brought, particularly to the poor in the developing world. 
These debates resemble nothing so much as those that took place a century 
ago, out of which the social democratic worldview first emerged (Berman 
2006).
 Democratic revisionists such as Bernstein saw that capitalism was not col-
lapsing and seemed likely to be around for at least the medium term. They 
decided accordingly to try to reform and reshape it rather than destroy it. 
Democratic revisionists also recognized the need to counter the immense 
mobilizing power of nationalism and offer something to the vast majority of 
people suffering from the injustices and dislocations of capitalism. Their suc-
cessors a generation later built upon this foundation, arguing that the time 
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had come to put aside calls for capitalism’s collapse and instead focus on 
managing and directing markets. By the 1930s social democrats recognized 
that markets and capitalism were not only here to stay but were an invaluable 
tool for producing growth and wealth. At the same time, they never wavered 
in their insistence that while markets made great servants, they also made 
terrible masters. Capitalism might be necessary to ensure an ever- increasing 
economic pie, but it had to be carefully regulated by states so that its negative 
social and political consequences could be kept in check. During the 1930s 
social democrats came to see as never before how widespread and powerful 
was the longing for some sort of communal identity and social solidarity, and 
that if they did not come up with some convincing response to this longing, 
other more nefarious movements would do so in their place.
 Whether or not the participants recognize it, in other words, today’s battles 
over globalization are best viewed as simply the latest chapter in an ongoing 
debate over how to reconcile capitalism with democracy and social stability. 
Now as before, liberals who venerate markets uncritically and old- style left-
ists who are unwilling to recognize any good in them have little to offer the 
vast majority of people who recognize and want to share in capitalism’s ma-
terial benefits but who fear its social and political consequences. Then as now, 
many liberals only see capitalism’s benefits while many on the left only see its 
radical flaws, leaving it to social democrats to grapple with a full appreciation 
of both.
 Participants at both extremes of today’s globalization debates need to be 
reminded that it was only through the postwar settlement that capitalism and 
democracy found a way to live together amicably in much of the West. With-
out the amazing economic results generated by the operations of relatively 
free markets, the dramatic improvements of mass living standards through-
out the West would not have been possible. Without the social protections 
and limits on markets imposed by states, in turn, capitalism’s benefits would 
never have been distributed so widely and political and social stability would 
have been infinitely more difficult to achieve. One of the great ironies of the 
twentieth century is that the very success of this social democratic compro-
mise led it to become a background condition of modern life, letting us forget 
how new and controversial it was at one time.
 Thus the appropriate response to contemporary conditions is neither to 
worship capitalism nor scorn it, but to recognize its advantages and dis-
advantages and figure out ways to deploy the former against the latter. The 
challenge is to dust off the principles underlying the postwar settlement and 
generate from them new initiatives that address today’s new problems and 
opportunities. Many of the policies that worked during the postwar era have 
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run out of steam, and the left should not be afraid to jettison them. The im-
portant thing is not the policies but the goals—encouraging growth while at 
the same time protecting citizens from capitalism’s negative consequences. In 
the era opened up by capitalism’s most recent crisis, the opportunity for such 
political creativity is great, but it will not last forever.
 Building on the best traditions, the center- left must reiterate its commit-
ment to managing change rather than fighting it, embracing the future rather 
than running from it. This might seem straightforward, but in fact it is not 
generally accepted. Many European and American liberals and social demo-
crats are devoted to familiar policies and approaches regardless of their prac-
tical relevance or lack of success. And many peddle fear of the future, fear of 
change, and fear of the other. Increasing globalization and the dramatic rise 
of giants in the developing world such as China and India are seen as threats 
rather than opportunities.
 At its root, these fears stem from the failure of many on the center- left to 
appreciate that capitalism can be a positive- sum game, not a zero- sum one—
that over the long run the operations of relatively free markets can produce 
net wealth rather than simply shift it from one pocket to another. Because so-
cial democrats understand that basic point, they want to do what they can to 
encourage trade and growth and cultivate as large a net surplus as possible—
all the better to tap it to pay for measures that can equalize life chances and 
cushion publics from the terrors and blows that markets can inflict.
 Helping people adjust to capitalism, rather than engaging in a hopeless 
and ultimately counterproductive effort to hold it back, has been the historic 
accomplishment of the social democratic left, and it remains its primary goal 
today in those countries where the social democratic way of thinking is most 
deeply ensconced. Many analysts have remarked, for example, on the impres-
sive success that countries like Denmark and Sweden have had in managing 
globalization—promoting economic growth has increased competitiveness 
even as the state has ensured high employment and social security. The Scan-
dinavian cases show conclusively that social welfare and economic dynamism 
are not enemies but natural allies. Not surprisingly, according to surveys it is 
precisely in these countries that optimism about the future and opinions of 
globalization are highest. In other parts of Europe, on the other hand, fear of 
the future is pervasive and opinions of globalization astoundingly low. Since 
the election of 2008 opinion in the United States has been decidedly more 
mixed. The goal of the American center- left should therefore be to advocate 
policies and programs that promote both growth and social solidarity, rather 
than forcing a choice between them. Concretely this means agitating for poli-
cies—like reliable, affordable, and portable healthcare, tax credits and other 
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government support for retraining, investment in education, and unemploy-
ment programs that are both more generous and characterized by properly 
aligned incentives—that will help workers adjust to change rather than make 
them fear it.
 Just as important is for the center- left to regain its former optimism and 
vision. Many self- described parties of the left and center- left win elections, 
but few inspire much hope or offer more than a kinder, gentler version of a 
generic centrist platform. Given the left’s past, this is simply astonishing. The 
left has traditionally been driven by the conviction that a better world is pos-
sible to achieve and that it is the left’s job to bring it into being. But some-
how this conviction was lost during the last few decades. As Michael Jacobs 
has noted, “Up through the 1980s politics on the left was enchanted—not 
by spirits, but by radical idealism; the belief that the words could be funda-
mentally different. But cold, hard political realism has now done for radical 
idealism what rationality did for pre- Enlightenment spirituality. Politics has 
been disenchanted” (Jacobs 2002). Many have welcomed this shift, believing 
that transformative projects are passé or even dangerous. But this loss of faith 
in transformation “has been profoundly damaging, not just for the causes of 
progressive politics but for a wider sense of public engagement with the po-
litical process.”
 As social democratic pioneers of the late nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth recognized, the most important thing that politics can provide is 
a sense of the possible. Against Marxism’s and liberalism’s laissez- faire and 
ultimately passive views of history, they pleaded for the development of a 
political ideology based on the idea that people working together could and 
should make the world a better place. The result was the most successful po-
litical movement of the twentieth century, one that shaped the basic politico- 
economic framework under which we still live. The problems of the twenty- 
first century may be different in form, but they are not different in kind. There 
is no reason that the accomplishment cannot be developed and extended.
Notes
 1. See Sassoon 1996, 647, for quotes from Alain Touraine, Dahrendorf, and Giddens.
 2. There is a great debate in the literature about whether “orthodox Marxism” is a 
logical continuation or betrayal of Marx’s thought. Since I am not concerned here with 
the true nature of Marxism but rather with how a generation of socialists interpreted 
or perceived Marxism, this debate is not directly relevant to the argument presented 
here. Nonetheless, it is clear that Marx’s relative lack of concern with politics, com-
bined with his emphasis on the primacy of economic forces in history, created a fateful 
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dynamic for the generation of socialists that followed him. See, for example, Miliband 
1977; Tucker 1970; Gouldner 1980; Schwartz 1995; and Cohen 1999.
 3. This is perhaps easier to understand if one recognizes that many of the party’s 
initial postwar leaders came from its pre- war ranks. Carr 1987; Miller and Potthoff 
1986.
Historical Decline or Change of Scale?
The Electoral Dynamics of European  
Social Democratic Parties, 1950–2009
Gerassimos Moschonas
I wish it was the sixties.
 –Radiohead, “The Bends” (quoted in Glyn 2006)
Is Something Important Happening to Electoral Social Democracy?
In this period of significant political and ideological change, electoral de-
velopments have attracted lively research on an international scale. Para-
doxically, however, the electoral dynamics of party families have not been 
sufficiently studied from a comparative and historical point of view. As re-
gards social democracy, a very limited number of works are devoted to the 
diachronic development of its electoral strength although arguments about 
electoral trends are everywhere (Merkel 1992a; Merkel 2001; Delwit 2005; 
Bergounioux and Grunberg 1996; and, for the European elections, Grunberg 
and Moschonas 2005). What hasn’t been written and said, by scholars and 
pundits and politicians themselves, about the sudden weakness or strong re-
surgence, the stagnation or golden age, the crisis, the decline, the stability, or 
indeed the end of social democracy?
 The question of the electoral development of social democracy will be the 
principal subject of this chapter, which charts the electoral condition of Euro-
pean socialism decade by decade from the 1950s to 4 October 2009; 1950 is 
chosen as the starting point for observation because an analysis of electoral 
trends can only usefully begin then. The immediate postwar period was cer-
tainly a critical moment, but the lack of electoral crystallization and consoli-
dation renders it highly anomalous and hence inappropriate as a point of de-
parture.
 The performance of socialist and social democratic parties will be ob-
served in sixteen West European states (including, since the 1970s, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain). Italy will be excluded from the statistics, even though it 
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is a country where the left has been (and remains) influential, and not only 
electorally. The bankruptcy of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in the 1990s (a 
unique case of the actual disappearance of a socialist party) and its “replace-
ment” by a communist party putatively transformed into a “fully fledged 
social- democratic party” (Favretto 2006, 163)—today’s Democratic Party—
make diachronic comparison inappropriate. This is all the more true because 
the electoral bases of these two parties, which were rivals for many years, 
were historically very different in terms of electoral sociology. Including Italy 
would complete the general picture but would also lead to distortions of the 
“dynamic” picture that is our main focus.1
 This effort will provide a comprehensive empirical grounding to help 
answer the questions that swirl around the state and fate of the center- left, 
and of social democracy in particular. Is it possible to craft a reliable peri-
odization of the electoral development of European socialism? Was there an 
electoral golden age? Is the hypothesis of decline corroborated by the elec-
toral facts? Is the thesis of overall stability (or “slight decline”), which is 
dominant in the specialist literature, confirmed? Which national parties have 
been the big winners and the big losers over these last sixty years? What 
happened in the late 1990s, during a “brief spell of social- democratic hege-
mony” (Bonoli 2004, 197), when social democrats dominated governments in 
Europe? To these questions I shall try to provide a “quantitative” response, 
while being fully conscious that the quantitative necessarily prompts inter-
pretive or explanatory reflections, which will be taken up in the final part of 
this chapter.
 The central question is of course whether something important is hap-
pening to social democracy as an electoral force. The answer is an unequivo-
cal yes. Social democracy is in electoral crisis, albeit not in all countries, 
and where it is, not to the same degree and not in the same way. Despite 
local variations, the qualifications suggested by the specialist literature have 
now been overtaken by the steady march of electoral indicators. The trend is 
neither cyclical nor random. This crisis is not “historic,” and there is probably 
nothing inexorable about it, but it is serious. The solidity of the “old house” 
(to borrow a phrase from Léon Blum) is shaken, and the decline is profound 
and serious. Social democracy is experiencing a new electoral era, even if the 
dynamics of electoral change proceed in zigzags. The medium- term prospects 
for social democrats look bleak, and the recovery will not be easy.
 Is there then “nothing but doom and gloom in the house of social democ-
racy”? (Berger 2004, 393). The answer is paradoxical: in terms of electoral 
arithmetic the crisis is serious; in terms of its political significance for gov-
ernance it seems less so. This is a new electoral era, and the center- left is not 
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the only political force to be affected, so the concept of “electoral crisis” does 
not have the same content as it did in the past. There appears to be a “broken 
equilibrium” in politics, rather than a paradigm shift (Jouke de Vries, quoted 
in Becker and Cuperus 2007). Social democracy is thus not “a threatened 
species” (Hinnfors 2006, 32), at least not yet. Furthermore, it is not the first 
time in history that social democracy is perceived (to borrow Stathis Kaly-
vas’s expression regarding Catholicism) as “a declining and spent force, re-
treating in front of modernization” (Kalyvas 2003, 303). This does not alter 
the fact that social democratic parties are in the process of changing stature 
and dimension. They have become smaller and less imposing and also less 
stable and robust. There has been a change in scale.
The Three Phases of Electoral Social Democracy
Over the long term (1950–2009) socialists, considered as a political family, 
have become weaker electorally. In the thirteen countries where diachronic 
comparison is possible (table 1), electoral contraction was marked and 
reached a peak in the years after 2000. Social democracy declined from an 
unweighted average of 33.2% in the 1950s and 1960s to 26.6% in the period 
2000–2009, a fall of 6.6 percentage points, or 19.8%; eleven of thirteen 
parties registered scores inferior to those of the 1950s. Only two parties, in 
France and Germany, improved their performance, and these parties had 
been decidedly weak in the 1950s—a decade which for them, against the gen-
eral trend, was the worst of the postwar period. From another perspective, if 
one compares the period 2000–2009 with the best decade of each party, the 
universality of the decline is still more impressive (see table 5). All parties, 
without exception, were electorally less successful in the 1990s and 2000s 
than they had been in the past.
 Social democratic parties obtained their best results in the 1950s and 
1960s (an unweighted average of 33.2%), fell back moderately in the 1970s 
(to 31.7%), stabilized at a somewhat lower level in the 1980s (31.1%), and 
then returned to the path of decline in the 1990s (29.2%) and 2000–2009 
(26.6%). The decline had been steady, with each decade being less good elec-
torally than the previous one (−1.5% in the 1970s; −0.6% in the 1980s; −1.9% 
in the 1990s; and −2.6% in the 2000s). Thus the decline tended to become 
more marked in the 1990s and 2000s, although social democracy was already 
weaker in these years. The data in table 1 indicate that the performance of so-
cial democracy can be meaningfully broken up into three phases of approxi-
mately twenty years each:
 1. The first involved an electoral bright spell (the 1950s and 1960s). While 
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not quite a “golden age” (other than in a small number of countries, social 
democracy’s performance was not extraordinary), it was unquestionably the 
European center- left’s best.2 Equally important was the remarkable electoral 
stability of the social democratic parties (Spyropoulou 2008, 51–52). The 
1950s and 1960s represent an electoral summit in two respects—high elec-
toral scores and low volatility—that has not been attained since.
 2. This positive period was followed by a generally moderate process of 
erosion during the 1970s and 1980s. This was also a phase marked by electoral 
disorder and significant national fluctuations. This was apparently a tran-
sitional phase distinguished by sharp and contradictory movements. Thus 
social democracy became significantly weaker in more than half of the thir-
teen countries included in table 1 (Denmark, Britain, Norway, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Belgium, and Switzerland). Second, in a number of these countries 
(Denmark, Britain, and Norway) spectacular defeats were suffered. In the 
Table 1. Electoral Performance in Legislative Elections as Measured by Percentage of 
Votes for Socialist Parties by Decade, 1950–2009
1950–59 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99
2000–
2009
Austria 43.3 43.3 50.0 45.4 37.3 33.7
Belgium 35.9 31.0 26.6 28.0 23.3 24.6
Denmark 40.2 39.1 33.6 30.9 36.0 26.8
Finland 25.3 23.4 24.5 25.4 24.4 23.0
France 15.2 15.9 21.0 34.5 20.6 24.4
Germany 30.3 39.4 44.2 39.4 36.9 31.9
Ireland 10.9 14.7 12.7  8.9 14.9 10.5
Luxembourg 34.1 33.5 24.8 29.0 23.9 22.5
Netherlands 30.7 25.8 28.6 31.0 26.5 21.2
Norway 47.5 45.5 38.8 37.4 36.0 30.8
Sweden 45.6 48.4 43.7 44.5 39.8 37.5
Switzerland 26.5 25.1 24.1 20.6 20.9 21.4
United Kingdom 46.3 46.1 39.1 29.2 38.8 38.0
Unweighted average 
 of 13 countries
33.2 33.2 31.7 31.1 29.2 26.6
Greece 19.5 43.4 42.3 41.6
Portugal 33.4 26.4 39.0 39.9
Spain 29.9 43.9 38.2 40.2
Unweighted average 
 of 16 countries
33.2 33.2 30.9 32.4 31.2 29.2
Source: The data presented here and in the following tables are mostly based on voting statistics 
published by the relevant government agencies. For the most recent period much of the informa-
tion is available online at various websites. The data have been gathered, checked, and assembled 
into their current form by the author.
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1980s some of the parties in retreat (the Social Democratic Labour Party of 
Sweden, or SAP; the Belgian Socialist Party, or PS; and the Luxembourg So-
cialist Workers’ Party, or lSAP)—recovered some of their lost ground, while 
others continued on their downward slope (the Danish Social Democrats, or 
SD; and the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, or SP) or dramatically 
accelerated it (the British Labour Party). By contrast, four social democratic 
parties registered considerable success: the Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many (SPD), the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), the Social Democratic Party 
of Finland (SDP), and most notably the Social Democratic Party of Austria 
(SPÖ).3
 Spectacular defeats coexisted with dazzling successes, contraction with 
progress, violent decline with rapid recovery of influence, volatility with sta-
bility. Thus throughout these twenty years the electoral facts seem to lack any 
consistent pattern. Nevertheless, if the overall picture is mixed, three new 
trends are evident:
— A moderate electoral decline which, though not general, affected a ma-
jority of center- left parties. Since the electoral losses were modest in the 
aggregate, and since national developments were decidedly mixed, this 
was probably not the most important trend.
— A small number of “catastrophic” electoral results (Denmark and Norway 
in 1973, the United Kingdom in 1983). These indicate that something un-
precedented was occurring at the core of social democracy’s electoral sup-
port—something beyond conjunctural oscillations. But this “something” 
applied to only a very limited number of elections and parties.
— The increased volatility of social democratic performance is the third and 
arguably the most important development. Table 2 measures the number 
of elections per decade in which socialists won or lost five or more percent-
age points compared with their score in the previous election. The pattern 
is crystal- clear. Instability strongly increases after the 1960s. The behavior 
of social democratic voters becomes more volatile and anarchic during the 
1970s, and this pattern persists.
 In sum, the contrast with the past was neither consistent nor systematic 
in the years 1970–89. But it did exist. Mixed signals predominated and in-
creased weakness involved only a small number of countries. Further, the 
impressive performance of the Greek, Spanish, and French socialists in the 
1980s, together with quite good results in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, 
and Luxembourg, constituted reasons for optimism (see also Delwit 2005, 
63). Whether from the standpoint of electoral arithmetic or that of the psy-
chology of actors and voters, this was not tantamount to electoral crisis. No 
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retrospective reading of the period can alter this fundamental reality. On the 
other hand, if there was no electoral crisis, there were clear indications of 
partial or selective retreat—and of great instability. In the 1970s and 1980s 
European socialism entered a new era.
 3. The third period—the 1990s and 2000s—was marked by a new pro-
cess of electoral retreat. Throughout these nineteen years social democracy’s 
earlier losses were confirmed. Worse, it lost further ground and lost it more 
rapidly. Relative to the high point of the 1950s and 1960s, more than two- 
thirds of the losses (to be precise, −4.5 points, or 68.2% of the total decline) 
occurred in this period. Individual parties, with the notable exception of 
British Labour, all turned in average performances in the 2000s that were 
decidedly inferior to those of the 1970s and 1980s. Certainly the simultaneous 
victories of the social democrats in the second half of the 1990s—an event 
rare in the annals of electoral history—created the impression of a strong re-
surgence and a change in trends. In fact the recovery of influence in the late 
1990s was modest and certainly very brief (see discussion below). In addi-
tion, since 2000 the process of decline has again intensified and deepened. 
During this third phase (1990s and 2000s) signs of weakening abounded, in-
stability was strongly on the increase, and electoral earthquakes multiplied, 
demonstrating the extent to which socialist parties had become vulnerable.4 
The electoral base of social democracy became less broad and far less solid.
The Complexity of the Decline:  
North and South, Big and Small, and the European Union
The preceding analysis has not taken into account results in Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece, for the Iberian countries were long dominated by authoritarian 
regimes and there was no social democratic party in Greece. When we include 
the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), the Panhellenic Socialist Move-
ment of Greece (PASOK), and the Socialist Party of Portugal (PS) in our calcu-
lations, the image of electoral decline is considerably attenuated.
Table 2. Changes of More Than 5% in Socialist Vote between Two Legislative Elections
Number of Cases
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Increase of More Than 5% 2 4 2 7 3
Decrease of More Than 5% 1 4 7 8 8
Note: Includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
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 If one compares the thirteen countries counted for the early years with 
the sixteen relevant to the later years, the unweighted average declines from 
33.2% for the 1950s and 1960s to 29.2% for the years 2000–2009. Viewed this 
way, socialists lost four points of the total vote, or 12% of their own vote (as 
opposed to a drop of 19.8% for the thirteen parties for which we possess an 
uninterrupted series of electoral statistics). A calculation of this sort is meth-
odologically debatable (because it compares thirteen parties for the 1950s 
with sixteen for the 2000s), but it does offer a more rounded sense of the 
“state we are in.” It is also important to note, from this overall perspective, 
the very good performances of the socialist parties during the 1980s, often 
viewed as a period of social democratic setback and “held up as the decade 
of the wave of triumphant neo- liberalism” (Delwit 2005, 63).
 The most interesting aspect of the positive news from the south is not 
quantitative but qualitative: when, against the “general” trend, a group of 
parties shows signs of lasting success, it is the significance of the general 
trend that warrants reexamination. Thus an integrated reading yields a “dual” 
image of the electoral dynamic of contemporary social democracy. These two 
electoral faces of the socialist and social democratic family, both of which are 
“true,” bring out the unique and somewhat contradictory character of the cur-
rent situation. The southern performance illustrates the complexity of social 
democratic decline.
 A further illustration of the political complexity that lies behind the general 
decline can be seen in the different dynamics of parties from large countries 
and those from small countries. Figure 1 graphs the data. It is apparent that 
socialist parties from large countries (Germany, Britain, France, and Spain), 
which are the main contributors to the socialist group in the European Parlia-
ment and exercise greater influence within the European Union (EU) system, 
do markedly better than those from small countries (in the 2000s, 33.6% as 
opposed to 27.8% for small and medium- sized countries), the reverse of what 
prevailed in the 1950s. In addition, they do markedly better than the socialist 
family as a whole.5 While the 1950s were the worst decade for socialists from 
large countries (because of the extreme weakness of the French socialists and 
the mediocre performance of the German SPD), the period of the last thirty 
years was an era of moderate success, with strong British and Spanish results 
making a particular contribution. Nevertheless, in spite of this trend the most 
recent electoral developments in Germany (2009) did not help to improve the 
social democratic influence inside the EU.
 Yet another useful approach to the data is to focus on the performance of 
the center- left in the European Economic Community (EEC) and European 
Union (EU). Successive enlargements seem to have led to political consolida-
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tion for the socialist family inside the EEC/EU institutional system. Figure 2 
displays the trajectory of social democratic electoral strength in legislative 
elections in the countries of the European Communities (from the “inner six” 
of 1957 to the larger group that existed after the “Big Bang” expansion of 
2004). The center- left achieved better results in the period 1986–2004 than in 
the first three decades of the EEC. From a level of 29.3% in the period 1957–72 
for five countries (France; the Federal Republic of Germany, or FrG; Luxem-
bourg; Belgium; and the Netherlands, with Italy again excluded), the average 
rises to 31.3% for fourteen countries for 1996–2004. Among the new entrants 
the parties of southern Europe (PASOK since 1981, PSOE and the Portuguese 
PS since 1986) have made the greatest contribution to this upward trend. The 
enlargement of 1995 (Sweden, Finland, and Austria) also improved center- left 
influence, albeit only slightly. As a result, the losses of some of the founding 
members, notably in the Benelux countries, have been more than made up for 
by the new entrants. The consequence has been an enhanced socialist pres-
ence in European institutions, notably the European Council.6 Only the recent 
(but, it must be noted, the largest) enlargement of 2004 served to weaken the 
center- left.
 These different calculations qualify the extent of social democratic decline 
over time and also change the political significance of the decline. The devel-
opment and maturation of the European Union, which in the 1990s became 
a much more influential political entity than the European Economic Com-
munity of previous years, increased the interdependence between national 


















Figure 1. Average percentage of votes cast for socialist parties by decade in large and in 
small or medium- sized countries, 1950–2009.
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states and altered the centers of decision making. Especially since the 1980s 
social democracy has become weaker as an electoral phenomenon than it 
was in the past. However, its forces are now better distributed geographi-
cally and are also rather more concentrated in decision- making sites. In con-
sequence, it is not unreasonable to think that we are witnessing a decline of 
social democratic political influence that is much less important than the 
strictly arithmetical tendencies might imply. Paradoxically, and fortunately 
for social democracy, electoral and political dynamics do not fully converge.
Classical Social Democracy: The Locomotive Breaks Down
This complex and varied pattern of social democratic performance can be fur-
ther clarified by two exercises that group parties in more politically and his-
torically meaningful categories. The first centers primarily on the governmen-
tal capacity of parties and their rootedness in the working class; the second 
effort involves a categorization based on the type of policy regime, specifi-
cally the different “worlds of welfare” that social democratic parties helped 
to create and have then inhabited.
 In tables 3 and 4 center- left parties are divided into three groups using a 
typology developed by Merkel and further refined for this chapter (Merkel 
1992a). By far the most important criterion is electoral status and resulting 
governmental capacity. The second is the relationship between parties and 
Figure 2. Average percentage of votes cast for social democratic parties in legislative 


























Historical Decline or Change of Scale? 59
trade unions (no matter which side historically has preceded or dominated 
the other) and the extent of parties’ integration in working- class milieus. 
The third and least important criterion is a judgment based largely upon the 
party’s history which allows me—only when it comes to borderline cases—to 
include in the same group parties with similar historical trajectories.7
 The question of electoral status is fundamental, for it determines whether 
social democratic parties can govern alone or as dominant coalition partners 
and whether as a consequence they have the necessary resources to decisively 
influence key policy decisions and policy outcomes and hence the capacity to 
“narrow or widen the ‘corridor of action’ for the subsequent choices” (Merkel 
2001, 34). In this sense electoral influence is an indirect identity factor, a con-
stitutive element of party identity dynamics. Using these criteria makes it 
possible to place parties in one of three quite distinct categories.
 1. Social democratic and Labourist parties: high electoral status. The 
Table 3. Electoral Performance in Legislative Elections as Measured by Percentage of 
Votes for Social Democratic Parties Classified by Type, 1950–2009
















Austria 43.3 43.3 50.0 45.4 37.3 33.7 −22.2
Denmark 40.2 39.1 33.6 30.9 36.0 26.8 −33.3
Germany 30.3 39.4 44.2 39.4 36.9 31.9 5.3
Norway 47.5 45.5 38.8 37.4 36.0 30.8 −35.2
Sweden 45.6 48.4 43.7 44.5 39.8 37.5 −17.9
United Kngdom 46.3 46.1 39.1 29.2 38.8 38.0 −17.9
Unweighted  
 average 42.2 43.6 41.6 37.8 37.5 33.1 −21.5
















Belgium 35.9 31.0 26.6 28.0 23.3 24.6 −31.6
Finland 25.3 23.4 24.5 25.4 24.4 23.0  −9.3
Netherlands 30.7 25.8 28.6 31.0 26.5 21.2 −30.9
Luxembourg 34.1 33.5 24.8 29.0 23.9 22.5 −34.0
Switzerland 26.5 25.1 24.1 20.6 20.9 21.4 −19.2
Unweighted  
 average 30.5 27.8 25.7 26.8 23.8 22.5 −26.1
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parties in this group—Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, 
and Germany—represent governmental social democracy par excellence. 
Four of them (the Swedish, Austrian, Danish, and Norwegian parties) pos-
sess the distinctive character istics of the “classical” social democratic model 
and pursue policies characteristic of the “welfare statist model” (Merkel 
1992a, 144–45). The British Labour Party, representing a different, so- called 
Labourist model, is also included in this group. Its high electoral status, its 
ability to govern in single- party governments (largely the result of the elec-
toral system in the United Kingdom), and its historically great penetration in 
the working class justify this choice. These five parties were by far the most 
strongly working- class parties in the 1950s and 1960s.8 The SPD, a party with 
heavy history, completes the picture of this first group. Its consistently solid 
electoral performance (fluctuat ing around or above 35% of the electorate) 
and its status as the dominant partner in governmental coalitions (the prac-
tice of forming “great coalitions” being less frequent in Germany than in the 
consensus- based democracies of the second group) explain its inclusion in 
this category.9 Typically forced to govern in coalition governments and char-
acterized by a more cross- class base of support, the German party represents 
something of a borderline case, but on balance it fits better in this group 
than in any other. Included in this first group are the world’s strongest social 
democratic parties. Their strength and durability have led some of them to 
be labeled huge “tankers,” to use Peter Glotz’s term, that turn around very 
slowly (quoted in Kitschelt 1992, 198).
 2. Pragmatic coalition- oriented parties: medium electoral status. This 
grouping contains the social democratic parties of Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Finland, and Switzerland, which are distinguished by 
their intermediate competitive status and less dominant role in government. 
Since 1945 they have been relatively frequent participants in coalition gov-
ernments, most often with moderate center, center- right, or Christian demo-
cratic parties. In general they have developed a mainstream and moderate 
Table 4. Electoral Performance in Legislative Elections as Measured by Percentage of 













Spain 29.9 43.9 38.2 40.2
Portugal 33.4 26.4 39.0 39.9
Greece 19.5 43.4 42.3 41.6
Unweighted average 27.6 37.9 39.8 40.6
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social democratic profile with a connection to trade unions. Most important, 
they have been more or less systematically involved in the “consensus- based” 
politics typical of polities that discourage the exercise of classical majoritar-
ian politics.10 (This group coincides with the “pragmatic coalescent type” of 
Merkel’s typology, with Germany excepted and Luxembourg added.)
 3. Late- developing socialists. The center- left parties of Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal constitute a third category. Despite their recent electoral successes 
these parties differ from classical or labourist social democracy on account 
of their overall constitution and historical context. They exhibit medium or 
weak cooperation with fragmented unions; working- class tradition is weaker 
in these countries, and there is thus lower electoral penetration in the work-
ing class; they face or have faced strong competition from the left; and the 
political system in which they operate has historically less developed demo-
cratic institutions and a less extensive welfare state.11
 Using this admittedly partial and necessarily somewhat arbitrary classi-
fication, it can nevertheless be seen fairly clearly that the parties of the first 
group were the electoral locomotive of European socialism after the Second 
World War. In the 1950s the average for these parties was 42.2% (if we ex-
clude the German SPD, 44.6%). This impressive performance makes it pos-
sible to say that a golden age of social democracy definitely existed. How-
ever, it only involved five socialist parties—the Swedish SAP, the Norwegian 
Labour Party (DNA), the Danish SD, the British Labour Party, and the Aus-
trian SPÖ12—and did not last much beyond the 1960s.
 Adverse trends became evident in the 1970s with a decline in the group’s 
average performance, but the news was not all bad, particularly in Germany 
and Austria. Two subsequent and abrupt regressions—the first in the 1980s 
and the second in the 2000s—nevertheless signaled the effective end of the 
propellant power of this group of five parties.
 In the 2000s the average of their performance stood at 33.1%, which meant 
that for the full 1950–2009 period the average losses amounted to 9.1%. The 
large social democratic parties had lost 21.5% of their previous influence. 
Losses of this magnitude clearly mattered, and they were rendered more sig-
nificant because they often came in the form of electoral earthquakes—as in 
Denmark and Norway in the 1970s, Britain in the 1980s, and Denmark and 
Norway again in the 2000s. Thus the old electoral locomotive of European 
socialism went into a dangerous spiral. The electoral retreat appears as a 
slow, steady slide, almost without interruption, that is still in progress. The 
electoral golden age now seems far removed. The years since 2000 have also 
inflicted a lot of damage. In the period 2000–2009 none of the parties in the 
first group received more than an average of 38% of the vote, whereas during 
62 Moschonas
the 1960s none of them averaged less than 39.1%. Thus the best average results 
for the 2000s are inferior to the worst results for the 1960s. This is a clear indi-
cation of electoral “banalization” of this distinguished company of parties.
 The fate of parties with intermediate electoral status was if anything 
worse. This group registered even greater losses than the group of most clas-
sically social democratic parties. Their performance dropped 8 percentage 
points, hence a loss of 26.1% of their electoral strength during the 1950s. 
The lSAP lost 34% of its strength since the 1950s, the Belgian PS 31.6%, and 
the PvdA 30.9%, while the Dutch compete with the Norwegians for the gold 
medal for electoral instability (cf. Spyropoulou 2008, 53). Losses for parties 
in this category differ from those of the first group in one important respect: 
they are more randomly distributed in time and less structured.13 It is there-
fore less easy to locate a precise turning point or cause. On the other hand 
the decline is cumulatively stronger, and the warning signs appeared earlier 
for the social democratic parties more systematically involved in consensus- 
oriented decision making. These “pragmatic coalition- oriented parties” are 
suffering more than other parties of the center- left.
 The picture of declining strength of social democratic parties changes 
considerably when one looks to the south (table 4). The southern European 
parties, which turned in excellent electoral performances during the 1980s 
(with the exception of the Portuguese socialists), consolidated their strong 
positions and improved their average in the 1990s and 2000s. The improve-
ment was above all due to the strong resurgence of the Portuguese PS, which 
obtained its best historical result (45.1%) in the 2005 elections—the best 
score of any socialist party anywhere in Europe for 2000–2009. The PSOE 
achieved its best results in the 1980s but also consolidated its position in the 
2000s after a significant drop in the 1990s. By contrast, PASOK, although per-
forming very solidly overall, appears to have entered a phase of soft electoral 
decline (see Voulgaris 2008) despite its triumphal return to power in 2009.14 
The southern pole is by far the strongest in European socialism today—a 
major novelty in the electoral history of socialism.
 These results can be refined still further by looking at social democratic 
parties in countries with different kinds of welfare states. In table 5 we clas-
sify parties based on whether they operate in states with social democratic, 
Christian democratic, or liberal welfare regimes and compare their perfor-
mance for the period 2000–2009 with their best average performance in 
any decade since the 1950s (no matter which decade was the best).15 The re-
sults are stark and surprising: parties in classic “social democratic” welfare 
states (relative average change −26.7%) and those in Christian democratic 
welfare regimes (−28.2%) have been more adversely affected than those in 
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liberal regimes (−16.5%). Interestingly enough, in the list of big losers we find 
some of the most prominent and most recognizable brands of European social 
democracy: the Norwegian DNA (−35.2%), the Danish SD (−33.3%), the Aus-
trian SPÖ (−32.5%), the Belgian PS (−31.6%), the Dutch PvdA (−31.6%).
 Much the same picture emerges if we use the classification offered by 
Esping- Andersen in his The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). Thus 
figure 3 displays the electoral influence of the socialist parties in two extreme 
groups of countries: the so- called high decommodification group, which in-
cludes the classic social democratic models of Sweden, Norway, and Den-
mark as well as the “traditionalist- conservative” welfare states such as the 
Table 5. Welfare Regimes and Change in the Social Democratic Vote, Best Decade versus 
2000–2009 (percentage of votes)
Social Democratic Liberal Christian Democratic
Austria −32.5 Australia −15.7 Belgium −31.6
Finland  −9.6 New Zealand −15.8 France −29.3
Denmark −33.3 United Kingdom −17.9 Germany −27.8
Norway −35.2 Ireland −29.6






























Figure 3. Welfare regimes, decommodification status, and average percentage of votes 
cast for social democratic parties in legislative elections, 1950–2009.
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Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria; and the “low decommodification” group 
of liberal regimes, including the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, and 
Australia (Esping- Andersen 1990, 52, 47–54).16 For parties belonging to the 
high decommodification group, the decline is extraordinary (a proportional 
change of −28.15% compared to the 1950s), while for parties belonging to the 
low decommodification group the losses are much less serious (−15.24% in 
relative terms). Again the contrast is too strong not to matter.
 Parties operating in liberal environments or Labourist parties that are 
more market- friendly appear to be resisting decline better than those in so-
cial democratic environments.17
 Taken together, these data show fairly convincingly that the parties which 
have fared worse electorally are those at the very center of the social demo-
cratic project. The implications would seem to be serious indeed.
The Myth of the Landslide of the Late 1990s: A New Golden Age?
The principal unit of analysis employed here—electoral average by decade—
does not capture short- term fluctuations, which are what in fact determine a 
party’s transition to opposition or its arrival in government. In addition, it ar-
tificially fractures electoral time, because political dynamics do not obey the 
logic of rounded- up figures. Thus according to our data the 1990s represented 
yet another stage in the sequence of the electoral erosion of social democracy 
(see table 1). However, toward the end of the 1990s twelve out of fifteen gov-
ernments in the European Union were either single- party social democratic 
governments or coalition governments with social democratic participation. 
The “magical return of social democracy,” as it has been called, does not fea-
ture prominently in our data (Cuperus and Kandel 1998, 11). It was quite real, 
but it was also fleeting and modest in its scope and consequences.
 The data in table 6 describe the electoral cycle of the 1990s. They show, 
first of all, that the peak of social democratic influence was not at the end of 
the 1990s but toward the middle of the decade. In this period social demo-
crats, scoring 32.3%, advanced by 2 points compared with the previous elec-
tion, an undoubtedly solid achievement. Ironically, however, at the moment 
(the late 1990s) when the governmental power of social democratic parties 
was “at an historic peak” (Merkel 2001, 35), they had already begun their 
transition to electoral regression (31.1% is the average for the last election in 
the 1990s, as against 32.3% for the penultimate one). To a certain extent this 
explains the short- lived character of their governmental domination. Already 
on a downward electoral slope at the end of the decade, they saw things get 
worse: socialists only obtained 29.6% in the first election in the 2000s (−1.5% 
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compared with the late 1990s and −2.7% compared with the mid- 1990s). The 
decline being rapid and marked, the new century very soon put an end to the 
socialist majority in the European Council.
 Not only was the revival brief, it was also modest. If one excludes the 
southern parties from the calculations, the image of electoral progress is con-
siderably attenuated. The peak achieved toward the middle of the decade 
(29.7% for the thirteen countries) was in fact below the average social demo-
cratic score—not the peak—for the 1980s (31.1%), well below the score for 
the 1970s (31.7%), not to mention the scores for the 1950s and 1960s (33.2%; 
see table 1). Thus there was nothing extraordinary about the electoral rise 
of the period, which did not exceed the habitual electoral ceiling of perfor-
mances in this era.
 Third, the governmental swing in Europe was the result of mixed tenden-
cies at a national level. Significantly, nine of the sixteen parties considered 
here were in electoral decline by the last election of the 1990s, while only 
seven were in ascent. The electoral trend was not general, which explains 
how socialists dominated governments in Europe on the basis of an electoral 
advance that was limited in aggregate terms but remarkable at the level of 
certain national political systems. The modest impetus that imparted power 
(when one thinks in European terms) often concealed landslides at a national 
level.
 On balance, the widespread view of commentators at the time that Europe 
was experiencing a kind of social democratic “resurrection” is not confirmed 
by the data. What made this image plausible was the roughly simultaneous 
coming to power of center- left parties in France, Britain, and Germany. The 
image of an electoral “renaissance” of social democracy was fashioned after 
these victories. Given the demographic, geopolitical, and in part intellectual 















Unweighted average (without  
 Spain, Portugal, Greece)
29.0 29.7 28.9 27.5
Total unweighted average  
 (all 16 countries)
30.3 32.3 31.1 29.6
* For countries with only two elections in the 1990s, average of antepenultimate election is calcu-
lated by taking into account the last election of the 1980s.
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influence of the three countries concerned, it was politically legitimate. But 
it was electorally exaggerated. Social democracy (with Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal excepted) dominated governments in Europe on the basis of crisis 
figures. In retrospect we know that these figures (concerning the thirteen 
parties of our analysis) were by far the best for the whole period extending 
from 1990 to 2009. But they were inferior to previous ones. Such perfor-
mances do not call into question the cycle of erosion.
 A rather more accurate understanding of the modest gains of the 1990s 
can perhaps be gained by looking at the best and worst performances by 
social democratic parties over the longer period, 1950–2009. Figure 4 shows 
the average of the five best and five worst results for center- left parties for 
each decade. The decline is very clear. What is equally clear is that the best 
showings of the 1990s, which led to social democrats coming to office, did 
not come close to matching the achievements of earlier periods. Nor did they 
reverse the long- term trend.
 Put another way, the truly extraordinary electoral achievements of the 
1950s and 1960s now seem to be out of social democratic reach. Since the 
1980s social democracy has achieved successively smaller victories than in 
the previous decades. From this perspective the results of the late 1990s were 
electorally rather ordinary. Social democracy as a political phenomenon has 
become smaller, its “carrying electoral capacity” correspondingly weaker. 





















1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2009
Worst electoral results
Figure 4. Average percentage of votes cast for social democratic parties in five best and 
five worst elections for parties in each decade, 1950–2009 (Greece, Portugal, and Spain 
excluded).
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found itself temporarily in power at the end of the 1990s. In a sense the return 
to power was genuinely “magical.”
What Kind of Crisis?
The electoral retreat of social democracy transcends spatial boundaries and 
national borders within Europe; it even transcends “oceanic frontiers” (cf. 
Horn 2007, 190). It is a complex, multilayered process, and several causes 
act together to produce it. On this very fluid terrain, where a whole host of 
parameters is in play and where the share of hypothesis and deduction is 
large, we won’t venture to propose a “general theory” of social democratic 
electoral dynamics. Accordingly, this discussion will attempt an answer to 
three questions: How are we to explain the divergent electoral dynamics in 
northern and southern Europe? Is the social democratic electoral decline 
inexorable or irreversible? And how serious is the electoral crisis of social 
democracy, and how temporary or enduring could it be? The discussion aims 
to outline a general framework of influences; it will offer nothing more than 
some reference points, “some indices of weighting.”
Understanding the Winners
The excellent performances of the Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek parties 
represent the major exception to the long- term process of social democratic 
decline. Their successes, moreover, have lasted nearly as long as the down-
ward slope of the other socialist parties. During the period of initial success 
(in the 1980s) it was reasonable to argue that there was a two- speed or two- 
track electoral pattern in operation—the old “mature” Nordic parties versus 
the “new,” expanding, but not yet consolidated parties in the south—which 
might be merely temporary. Today this makes less sense, for the southern 
“latecomers” have experienced not only the initial upturn of the 1980s but 
also serious setbacks and proud recoveries. There is clearly more at work here 
than a matter of “catching up” or “maturation.”
 PASOK and PSOE are by far the most successful group of parties in the 
European socialist and social democratic family.18 The puzzle of their suc-
cess is all the more intriguing for three reasons. In the first place, these two 
parties have followed rather different political and economic itineraries. Sec-
ond, they have failed to honor numerous electoral promises. Finally, their 
economic records have generally not been brilliant (examples: the Spanish 
socialists’ disappointing jobs record or the shipwreck of Greek Keynesianism 
during the 1980s). An extensive discussion of their accomplishments is not 
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possible here, but one obvious historical comparison stands out: these two 
parties managed to create, in much the same fashion as the Swedish SAP in 
the 1930s and the Austrian SPÖ in the early 1970s, a new mainstream that was 
ultimately accepted and broadly legitimated by all political forces. They ex-
ercised prolonged ideological and political domination, though shorter than 
in Scandinavia.
 A further and related factor contributed to the initial success (at the end of 
the 1970s and during the 1980s) of both PASOK and PSOE: the lack of credi-
bility of the principal right- wing parties, a deficit linked to the black pages 
of history of both countries (party system factor). Nonetheless, a favorable 
ideological framework does not lead to a long- lasting electoral dominance.
 In effect, above and beyond the initial ideological weakness of the right, 
three policy factors explain the electoral dominance of PASOK (1981–2004) 
and PSOE (1982–96 and from 2004 to the present): first, the implementa-
tion of more advanced social policies than those of right- wing or centrist 
parties (socialist policies on health, pensions, social benefits, education, and 
reducing regional inequalities largely explain the two parties’ initial momen-
tum and the persistence, especially in the case of PSOE, of their electoral 
success); second, the institutional modernization undertaken by the socialist 
governments (a key dimension of which was the deepening of democratiza-
tion); third, measures of cultural modernization (the implementation of “pro-
gressive” reforms affecting private life and relations in civil society).
 Overall the socialists proved capable of clearly dominating their center- 
right opponents in these three areas (social policy and the welfare state, 
political liberalism, and cultural liberalism), and it was these reforms that 
were supported by a majority of public opinion throughout the socialist 
reign (Moscho nas and Papanagnou, 2007, 75–81). By contrast, their advan-
tages in economic modernization and European policy ( joining the EEC) 
were either less strong (PSOE) or, in an initial phase, nonexistent (PASOK 
from 1981 to 1985). In this regard the adoption of a European perspective 
and the neoliberalization of their economic policy are in themselves insuf-
ficient to explain the two parties’ electoral domination even though within 
the European social democratic family PSOE found itself in the vanguard of 
economic liberalism and Europeanization. Now, socialist ascendancy in the 
areas of social policy, institutional modernization, and cultural moderniza-
tion was combined with an advantage of physiognomy in the sense that this 
triple domination was profoundly in tune with significant distinguishing fea-
tures of PASOK’s and PSOE’s initial ideological and programmatic profiles. 
In terms of identity, these thematic areas constituted—after the abandoning 
of the “radical scenario”—the main reference points of southern specificity 
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in the social democratic family. Over the long term the two parties—in spite 
of severe contradictions, broken promises, ideological treasons, and corrup-
tion—took a lead over their opponents on all these fronts. This created a com-
posite political cycle in which the economy was an important but not neces-
sarily or always a determinant aspect (Moschonas and Papanagnou 2007).
 All this underlines the reality that electoral ascendancy and decline are 
not produced simply by sociological trends nor by deft political management 
of electoral clienteles but are more a matter of having a credible political 
project, symbolic framework, and set of political opportunities. The southern 
case therefore demonstrates that ideas and policies as well as strong leader-
ship count; that political and ideological factors are critical in establishing 
class alignments and obtaining good electoral results. Sweden in the 1930s, 
1950s, and 1960s (because of the remarkable Swedish model) and Austria in 
the 1970s (because of the Austro- Keynesian stance) undoubtedly reinforce 
this thesis. So too does the more controversial British case in the 1990s and 
early 2000s.
 Britain is especially instructive. The “Third Way” project, an aggressive 
strategy that aimed to liberate Labourism once and for all from the image 
of a “tax- and- spend” party, acquired a central place in British politics. The 
adoption of an inventive version of economic liberalism—with an empha-
sis on “supply- side” interventions in education and training, a “huge invest-
ment” in public services, many measures taken to raise the income of the 
poorest—along with constitutional reforms and more generally a proven ca-
pacity to dominate the political agenda, were essential in producing repeated 
favorable electoral results (Seldon 2007, 646; Stewart 2007, 432; Shaw 2007, 
201–3; Cronin in this volume). Labour’s neoliberal macroeconomic manage-
ment, complemented by an innovative and bold set of social policies (not 
always social democratic in the traditional sense of the term), appears to 
have generated a new policy mainstream in the British political system. It 
is highly significant that even David Cameron, the leader of the Conserva-
tive Party, has come to embrace much of the Labour’s public service reform 
agenda (Seldon 2007, 650).
 Undoubtedly New Labour “killed” the old collectivist Labourist spirit and 
outlook (Cronin 2006, 53, 63). It also may have encouraged “the nation’s 
values to move in a more conservative direction” and at least indirectly 
undermined its capacity “to achieve electoral success over the long term” 
(Curtice 2007, 52). Under Blair overall income inequality remained “fairly 
static” (Stewart 2007, 432–35). However, the most striking electoral fact of 
the period 1997–2005 is the Labour Party’s very good performance among 
the non–manual labor categories of the population. This improvement, much 
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stronger than that of other social democratic parties, is largely explained by 
Tony Blair’s modernization strategy (Moschonas 2008b). New Labour’s ag-
gressive adoption of new policies and ideas (in other countries the set of new 
policies and ideas was more defensive) enabled British social democrats to 
penetrate part of the Conservatives’ natural social base. Despite its obvious 
lack of a central “ethical motivational core,” its neoliberal macroeconomic 
options, and its extremely catch- all discourse, New Labour chalked up an im-
portant number of thematic victories that elicited public approval and served 
to shape voting. This ideologically “eclectic” party (Shaw 2007, 186) thus be-
came the driving force of a significant political change. The British case dem-
onstrates that political factors are important in establishing new electoral 
(and class) alignments even though after twelve years in power Labour was 
ultimately defeated in the elections of 2010. Obviously the wearing effect of 
being in power for a long period seems today to exact a high electoral price—
in all probability higher than in the past. It also seems to involve a kind of 
programmatic exhaustion. In a case like this, the theme of “change”—a cen-
tral one in the strategy of the British conservatives (“it’s time for change”)—
emerges as a “super issue” and probably a decisive one.
 The current situation in Scandinavian countries tends to confirm the thesis 
that ideas and policies count: “if the Swedish party dropped the ‘big idea’ 
early, it has had over the years a number of ‘big issues’ around which to mo-
bilize a wider base of support. . . . Today, however, the Scandinavian, and in 
particular the Swedish Social Democrats’ policy agendas, appear bereft of big 
issues” (Arter 2003, 97). Put slightly differently, if ideas and big issues count, 
their lack counts too. The weakening performance of the SAP—a party that 
is nevertheless in a much better electoral position than its counterparts in 
Denmark and Norway—is powerfully consistent with the analysis developed 
here: in 2006 the Swedes suffered “their worst score in a parliamentary elec-
tion since 1920—that is, since the advent of fully democratic politics” (Aylott 
and Bolin 2007, 621). The recent difficulties of the Swedish SAP, whose party 
story still ranks as one of the best of all times, seem to be intimately con-
nected to a crisis of “policy horizons.”
 Certainly Sweden is still a social democratic nation, and the social demo-
cratic legacy is not really affected by the electoral retreat of the SAP, which 
although weakened remains a powerful electoral (and programmatic) ma-
chine. Scandinavian social democrats, compared to the Spanish, Greek, and 
Portuguese socialists or the British Labourists, are not less effective in achiev-
ing the traditional leftist goals of full employment and social justice; quite the 
contrary. Scandinavian social democrats remain by far the best “social brand” 
in the world. Scandinavia’s social experiment still represents a unique mix of 
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universal ideals and efficient policies (see Pontusson 2005; Pontusson in this 
volume). But after racking up ideological and policy successes for more than 
five decades, Scandinavian social democracy has entered a new phase. It now 
has great trouble repeating its previous achievements (and electoral results). 
It has lost the way, its own unique way, to connect with its constituencies’ 
soul. In effect Scandinavian social democrats, confronted with a modernized 
and “social” right in their own countries, failed to sufficiently renew their 
policy agenda and rearticulate—in a hegemonic manner—their own histori-
cal legacy. Thus they became less effective in dominating their right- wing 
opponents.
 To sum up, the core of our argument is not that southern socialism has the 
mastery of ideas and policy renewal within European social democracy. The 
Scandinavians, British, French, and partly the Germans continue to be the 
programmatic avant- gardes within the European social democratic family. 
For example, PASOK’s triumphal return to power in October 2009 was based 
on, among other things, the promise that Greece will become the “Denmark 
of southern Europe.” This promise says a great deal about the influence of 
the Scandinavian model. Northern and central Europe’s social democracy re-
mains ideologically pivotal and its programmatic and policy centrality, de-
spite its decreasing electoral influence, is as pronounced as ever within the 
center- left family.
 Hence our argument—and hypothesis—is that programmatic and policy 
novelty currently find a more favorable political and social terrain in non–
social democratic societies (southern Europe) or liberal societies (Great Brit-
ain, etc.) rather than in classically social democratic ones (Scandinavia). In 
the latter countries social democracy’s “ability to differ” is smaller, partly be-
cause of its previous successes. By contrast, in countries with less developed 
welfare states, less modern institutional structures, or both, we are witness-
ing a structure of opportunities more favorable to a left- wing agenda. In con-
sequence, our argument is not “ideational.” If ideas count, ideas and imagi-
nation are not constraint- free or circumstance- free.
 From this point of view, while the ideological and policy center of so-
cial democracy remains largely in central and northern Europe, Southern 
socialist parties seem to be in a better position to prevail ideologically over 
right- wing parties. Among the factors contributing to their good electoral re-
sults, modernization (frequently under the form of Europeanization) ranks 
high (Moschonas 2002). The goal of modernization entails solving a series 
of puzzles that are specific to these countries and enhance the innovative 
and problem- solving part of social democratic action. Obviously this is less 
the case in northern and central Europe, although investment of the terms 
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“modernity” and “modernization” by social democrats is not a new phenome-
non (examples: the SPD’s promise in 1969 to create a “modern Germany” and 
the project of Harold Wilson’s Labour Party of modernizing the British econ-
omy). In short, liberal and non–social democratic environments create and 
recreate a living space for social democratic and left- wing forces. They make 
the occurrence of programmatic and policy ascendancy a little easier for the 
left. The latest Spanish (2007) and Greek (2009) elections brought this reality 
into sharp focus.
 In more general terms, the problem with the current ideological and pro-
grammatic profile of classical social democracy is that it does not project a 
genuine “reformist imaginary.” Contemporary social democracy is bereft of 
big political—and policy—ideas in its electoral arsenal, ideas capable of cap-
turing intense public attention and structuring the vote. The whole history of 
social democracy, from the Erfurt Programme to the Stockholm School and 
Austro- Keynesianism, demonstrates that social democratic parties have suc-
ceeded in establishing themselves as majority forces when they have taken 
an ideological lead over their right- wing opponents by embracing program-
matic ideas and implementing policies which the latter were not yet ready 
to accept or implement—like universal suffrage and political rights for the 
working class, inventive policies against unemployment, the welfare state 
and Keynesianism, or an institutionalized role for trade unions. Parties are 
sites of policy- oriented ideas. Only if parties differ can they endure and domi-
nate their opponents. It is thus hard to see how social democratic parties can 
remain highly competitive if for more than thirty years they remain unable 
to generate an image of genuine ideological originality. And their deep com-
mitment to “a new round of catch- all policies” (Allen 2009, 641) has not made 
things easier.
 In conclusion, though it is impossible to quantify and therefore difficult 
to prove definitively, the thematic victories won by southern socialists (and 
by New Labour) and the current “thematic” or “agenda” crisis of “old” social 
democratic parties would seem to go a long way toward explaining the con-
trasting electoral dynamics in both the South and the North.
Inexorable Decline? The Class Factor and the Ideological Retreat
The question of thematic victories and defeats leads us to the question of the 
nature of the electoral crisis that social democracy experiences. Is the decline 
“inexorable” or “historical,” reflected as it seems to be in a shrinking of its 
core working- class clientele and a decreasing propen sity of workers to vote 
for the left, phenomena described by Hobsbawm (1981) and Adam Przewor-
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ski and John Sprague (1986) more than two decades ago? Undoubtedly the 
retreat is in part a “class affair” and a result of the shifting contours of class. 
But is it not also a product of a political and ideological transformation?
 The point of departure for the penetrating—and elegantly formulated— 
argument of Przeworski and Sprague is the minority status of the working 
class stricto sensu. Given this inescapable social reality, it is argued, socialist 
parties are condemned to minority electoral status when they pursue “pure” 
class strategies, but they also lose votes among the working class when they 
follow cross- class strategies. Confronted with this dilemma (i.e., a persistent 
trade-off between working- class and middle- class votes), social democrats 
have been “unable to win either way,” and the situation only worsens with 
time (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Przeworski 1985, 102–36).
 This view has been widely—and in part rightly—criticized on method-
ological and empirical grounds (Sainsbury 1990; King and Wickham- Jones 
1990; Merkel 1992b). Certainly much has changed since these arguments 
were first made. Nevertheless the curve of recent electoral developments, 
notably what we could identify as the second wave of electoral results (1990s 
and 2000s), shows that the paths of social democratic retreat closely re-
semble Przeworkski’s and Sprague’s scenario of “irreversible” decline.
 First, the development of social democracy’s electoral performances in 
the long run possesses all the characteristics of a decline that is difficult to 
arrest. Second, sociological data for the full period of 1967–2007 show that 
social democracy’s positions within the working class have been gradually 
but considerably weakened since the 1970s. At the same time, social demo-
cratic parties that have in recent years pursued the most strongly cross- class 
strategies have resisted decline much better and even made progress among 
the middle classes (Moschonas 2002 and 2008b). Third, the class structure of 
social democracy has changed in such a way that two social poles of almost 
equal arithmetical importance now coexist within social democratic elector-
ates: the working class and the middle strata (Moschonas 2002; cf. Merkel 
1992b, 27). On balance, and despite the many criticisms of the thesis pre-
sented by Przeworski and Sprague in Paper Stones (1986), it would appear 
that the dilemmas and trade-offs discussed nearly a quarter- century ago are 
real enough. And despite the changing terms of the trade-off (because of the 
gradual consolidation of new dividing lines, such as the cultural one, or the 
new polarization between winners and losers of European integration and 
globalization), the hard core of the argument (not some follies of the statisti-
cal calculations) seems to me solid.
 Without offering a full account of the issue, let us however notice some 
stubborn facts which seem to contradict, or at least qualify, this line of argu-
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ment. First, the electoral trade-off between working- class and middle- class 
votes did not take place (as far as classical social democratic parties are con-
cerned) in the 1950s and 1960s, when social democracy was at its ideological 
best, but later. It was really only with the breakdown of the Keynesian para-
digm that social democracy’s positions were weakened, both electorally and 
in the working- class milieu. Furthermore, the available evidence indicates 
that disaffection with social democratic parties tends to accelerate after a 
governmental failure of the left, especially in social policy. Bad results in 
government precipitate and structure working- class defection (Cautrès and 
Heath 1996, 566–68; also Kitschelt 1999, 324, 344).
 Second, the “new” economic policies adopted by social democratic gov-
ernments since the mid- 1980s have for the most part not lacked coherence, 
technocratic effectiveness, inventiveness, or social compassion. However, 
all poll research indicates that they did not produce positive electoral and 
identity effects equivalent to those of the Keynesian era. Thus the politico- 
economic originality of the social democratic alternative—or, to put it better, 
the understanding by voters of its originality and virtues—has been impaired. 
It would seem that the decline in the politics of growth makes it impossible 
to interpret social democracy “as quite dramatic evidence of the politics of 
solidarity” (Hibbs 1993, 66). This evolution, together with the collapse of 
communism, constituted a major turning point. It created what Laclau (2005, 
138) has labeled a “drastic rearticulation of the political imaginary,” which 
has been accompanied by the tendency to class dealignment since the 1970s 
and 1980s.
 These factors would support either an analysis that favors political (and 
policy) explanations of the electoral decline over more narrowly sociological 
explanations or one that insists on the impossibility of effective political man-
agement of complex sociological dynamics (Przeworski’s and Sprague’s view). 
If so, the trade-off between working- class and middle- class votes should be 
seen primarily as part of the wider process of political and ideological retreat 
brought about by the end of the so- called social democratic consensus. In fact 
the economic setting for left- wing political ideas changed dramatically after 
the 1970s and 1980s. The new economic policies of social democratic parties, 
together with, to paraphrase George Ross (1987, 32), the sudden absence of 
plausible ideological ways of being a social democrat, generated a break in 
social democratic identity. In this broader context the working- class defec-
tion was less the inevitable effect of an inescapable electoral dilemma than 
an effect of the end of the postwar economic and ideological cycle. It was pre-
cisely the inability of social democrats, with or without their enduring “elec-
toral dilemma,” to reestablish the conditions for more egalitarian policies 
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that generated (and later amplified) the defection of the working- class elec-
torate (Lavelle 2008). It was also this failure that favored, albeit indirectly, 
the consolidation of a cultural vote and to some extent amplified the electoral 
trade-off between working- class and middle- class votes. In consequence, the 
electoral trade-off became important within the new horizon of the political 
and ideological evolution of left politics. In the absence of a credible social 
democratic project for the future, ideological dynamics and class dynamics 
converged and created the electoral crisis.
 Let us return for a moment to the “winners”—the winners of the 1990s and 
2000s, but also those of previous decades. The Swedish party in the 1930s, 
the social democrats as a family in the first postwar period, the Austrian 
party in the 1970s, the French PS in the 1970s and 1980s, the southern parties 
since the 1980s—all demonstrated that political action and policy- oriented 
ideas count. These were instances of successful “hegemonic” political strate-
gies, and in pursuing these strategies electoral trade-offs were not crucial for 
determining electoral outcomes. However much Przeworski’s and Sprague’s 
arguments are tempting, however well they highlight the real trade-off be-
tween worker and nonworker votes, “they deny,” as Merkel perceptively 
notes, “the possibility to pursue the interests of different classes in a single 
synthetic political strategy” (Merkel 1992b, 17; see also Sainsbury 1990, 48). 
In reality the “dilemma of electoral socialism” denies the best moments of 
social democratic history. But it describes much better the current situation.
 The current problem of the socialist leaderships is thus not so much one 
of tactics concerning electoral target groups (middle classes or lower classes) 
nor one of political strategy, be it classical (positioning oneself more to the 
left or more to the right) or less classical (positioning oneself along the left- 
libertarian versus right- authoritarian political dimension). It is rather, and 
most importantly, a basic ideological and programmatic problem: How is 
the ideological and programmatic ascendancy of social democracy to be re-
stored? To define the problem this way is not to deny the importance of the 
question of strategic options—market- liberalizing centrist, left- libertarian, 
or a mixture of both—or social and cultural divides (Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt 
1999). It is to suggest, however, that national strategic options and there-
fore electoral performances are subordinate to a broader balance of ideo-
logical forces. From this point of view the end of the “old” ideological and 
programmatic ascendancy explains why approaches emphasizing strategic 
dilemmas and agency, no matter how valid they are, cannot sufficiently ac-
count for the major fact that in the last decades, in all kinds of possible trade-
offs and strategic scenarios, social democracy experienced an unprecedented 
electoral downturn.19 In essence the data and analysis presented here both 
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point to a tendance lourde that transcends national strategic subtleties: what-
ever the strategic posture adopted, whatever the social democratic response 
to its “strategic dilemmas” (Kitschelt, 1999, 321–44), social democracy has 
proved incapable of making up the electoral ground it lost in the 1970s and 
1980s. National strategic options and different configurations of competition 
are especially salient for any detailed understanding of national or short- term 
electoral tendencies (see Kitschelt and Rehm 2005; Kitschelt 1999), but they 
do not account for the general downward electoral trend.
 To summarize, if past social democratic electoral dominance was the re-
sult of powerful historical forces that brought about the rise and consolida-
tion of social democratic ideas, another powerful movement has led to the 
rise of neoliberal ideas and so has reversed the earlier pattern. The new social 
democratic ideological and programmatic stance—formulated in the second 
half of the 1990s around the ideas of the “Third Way”—lacks the “stature 
and the coherence” of previous social democratic projects (cf. Bonoli 2004, 
197). Social democrats are no longer one step ahead of the right- wing parties 
on issues such as social policy, welfare, economic efficiency, or moderniza-
tion, and they are losing votes. They are, it can be argued, one step ahead in 
the domain of cultural liberalism or cultural libertarian orientation, and they 
are accordingly gaining votes among the educated middle strata. As Arthur 
Schlesinger put it (1986, 276), “politics in the end is the art of solving substan-
tive problems.”
 All this does not attenuate the depth of the current social democratic elec-
toral decline; rather the contrary. But in ideological and programmatic mat-
ters, there is nothing “inexorable.” A hegemonic relation can always, sooner 
or later, be overturned or reversed. If so, nothing can prove that possibili-
ties for a new cycle of social democratic ideological domination have been 
permanently lost. The thesis that the current electoral decline is “historical” 
(or “inexorable”) is rather difficult to sustain. Electoral prospects remain an 
open- ended battlefield, even if the terrain and the advantage have shifted.
Relativizing Recovery Prospects, Relativizing Crisis
So how serious is the electoral crisis of social democracy? And how tempo-
rary or enduring might it be? The answer is that there is no easy recovery, 
no easy and rapid exit. The medium- term prospects for social democrats 
look bleak. They look bleak first of all because of the “rationale of numbers,” 
which are clear. The tendency is neither circular nor one of trendless fluctua-
tion. The electoral erosion is present in all but the three southern countries 
in Europe; it is similar everywhere and without any reversions to the status 
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quo ante. The scope, the phases, the highs and lows may differ, but the trend 
is universal and well structured. There has occurred a non- conjunctural at-
tenuation of the bond between socialist parties and the electorate.
 Prospects are also bleak because the electoral erosion does have sociologi-
cal underpinnings in the process of class dealignment. The tendency toward 
a gradual distancing between working- class voters and social democratic 
parties has lasted for nearly forty years. It is a sociological tidal wave (less 
pronounced in some countries such as Sweden, unmistakable and aggres-
sive in some others such as Denmark) that reduces social democracy’s natu-
ral level of support and renders a recovery more difficult. In addition, social 
democracy’s restructured base has become the locus of a profound tension 
between two economically and culturally distinct groups, the working class 
and the salaried middle strata. The “fragmented” social composition of social 
democratic electorates may add numbers on occasion, but it is also a con-
straining factor reducing the freedom to maneuver of socialist leaderships. 
It is an internal constraint in a period when the “external” constraints are all 
but rare.
 Third, and much more importantly, the electoral weakening of social 
democratic parties coincides with a parallel crisis of political projects and 
imaginaries (see discussion above). A host of economic and institutional fac-
tors, national and international—rather than some lack of imagination on 
the part of social democratic headquarters—explains social democracy’s in-
capacity to provide “new clues” for perceiving economic and social reality. 
In particular, the combined forces of globalization and Europeanization (in 
great part put in place by social democrats themselves) have not only changed 
the balance between politics and markets but created a redoubtable problem 
of collective action and coordination for all those aspiring to a left- wing re-
form strategy (Moschonas 2009). The extraordinary strengthening of the EU 
from 1985 until the end of the 1990s has functioned as a “conservative” insti-
tutional trap for the future, by locking in a neoliberal policy logic both at the 
EU level and in part at the national level (McGowan 2001; Moschonas 2009; 
Bailey 2009b; Ross in this volume). Moreover, the “nationalism paradox” of 
European unification (Cuperus 2007) reinforces cultural voting and becomes 
an additional factor of electoral weakness for parties of the social democratic 
type as well as a factor favoring the consolidation of new populist parties.
 Could this situation change easily? The answer is an unqualified no, be-
cause these “internal” and “external” factors represent sizable and not short- 
term obstacles to any policy reorientation. In a sense, today the “old” diffi-
culty of effective political management of complex class dynamics is largely 
aggravated by the “new” difficulty of effective political management of even 
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more complex economic and institutional dynamics. Thus the lack of a win-
ning ideological and programmatic formula, of a “single synthetic political 
strategy,” already at the source of the recent electoral crisis, risks being a rela-
tively lasting phenomenon. With respect to the social democratic electoral 
prospects, globalization and the EU are obstacles to a sustained electoral re-
covery of social democracy.
A Less Serious Crisis of Social Democratic Governance?
Is there nothing but gloom and doom ahead for European socialists? Here we 
must take note of an irony, a contradiction between electoral trends and the 
prospects for getting and holding office and for governing that offers a less 
depressing picture. Nearly all the available evidence suggests that the social 
democratic decline is part of a deeper and vaster electoral change which af-
fects other political forces—Christian democracy in particular—as much as 
it does the center- left. It is a period of fluid electoral landscapes and greater 
fragmentation that is inauspicious for parties of majority aspiration or parties 
in office, whether they are social democrats or their opponents. Thanks to the 
consolidation of new party actors—the average number of relevant political 
parties is clearly on the rise in western democracies (Henjak 2003)—and new 
or renewed party families (extreme right, greens, or radical left), the phe-
nomenon of electoral erosion must be relativized.
 The real political force of social democracy is obviously reduced by its 
declining electoral performances, but it is indirectly enhanced by the splin-
tering of the competition and the slumping fortunes of its main opponents. 
If the present is judged in the light of past electoral achievements, from the 
viewpoint of electoral history the crisis is indeed serious. But if the present is 
judged relative to itself, from the viewpoint of the actual balance of forces, it 
is less serious and different in kind. The unique moment of the 1990s, when 
modest aggregate gains for the center- left generated great governmental 
change, showed clearly that electoral power is a relative quantity in the con-
temporary world. Electoral power is not merely a matter of percentages.
 Social democratic parties have in this sense not fundamentally changed 
their competitive status—as certain Christian democratic parties have done. 
They have not become politically bankrupt, and they remain everywhere key 
forces in the political system, situated in an electoral zone close to the gov-
ernmental threshold (Bergounioux and Grunberg 1996, 279). This is a stra-
tegic position that slows the process of erosion in difficult times, and ac-
celerates the process of recovery in better times. Even in countries where 
the downward trend in social democratic voting was marked by brutal “rup-
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tures,” there was always a reverse, if not quite equal, subsequent swing of the 
pendulum, which has typically brought back the defeated socialist party close 
to the governmental threshold. This tendency to recover indicates a margin 
of safety and offers a timely reminder of the capacity of social democracy 
to remain a “credible contender for power” (Kalyvas 2003, 294) in a politi-
cal context characterized by “chronic political instability” (Wolfreys 2006). 
We would argue therefore that the electoral crisis of social democracy might 
be—in its political and, notably its governmental consequences—less marked 
and less serious than the data suggest.
Conclusions: A Change of Scale
Social democracy is between a rock and a hard place. In a way it put itself 
there. But in several other ways numerous “outside” factors—sociological, 
cultural, institutional—exerted important influence on its electoral dynam-
ics. Social democratic parties in Europe are caught in a net of multicausal 
constraints, including shifting demographics, ideological waves, European 
integration, globalization, governmental performances, and programmatic 
choices. Some of these factors are part of the explanatory background; others 
(governmental performances, programmatic choices, strategic leadership) 
are “direct causes.”
 In any case, a full explanation of the social democratic electoral retreat was 
outside the scope of this chapter. As for its structure, my main and central 
ambition was to document and specify the extent, contradictions, and true 
scale of social democratic electoral influence. My purpose was also to discuss 
two questions: First, how is one to explain the divergent electoral dynamics 
in northern and southern Europe? Second, is the electoral decline inexorable; 
is it “historical,” as described by Adam Przeworski and John Sprague more 
than two decades ago?
 Let us now try to recapitulate, clarify, and in part reformulate some of the 
theses of this chapter.
 The process of social democratic decline is highly systematic: it is relatively 
strong; it encompasses nearly all countries (with the exception of southern 
Europe); it is confirmed from one decade to the next; it becomes deeper as it 
progresses; it already has a past and a history; even when the electoral pendu-
lum swings back it systematically yields “smaller” victories than in the past; 
and it provokes occasionally “catastrophic” results and temporary “minor” 
collapses. The electoral dynamic of European social democracy is clearly de-
clining and, at the same time, the volatility of its performances is on the in-
crease.
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 The dynamic of decline is nevertheless complex, with the crisis proceed-
ing in zigzag fashion. It is evidenced in narrow defeats and victories, and 
landslide defeats and victories. It does not progress in a linear fashion but 
largely takes the form of volatile performances (supported by volatile voters). 
A gradual, slow decline at the aggregate level is however frequently violent at 
a national level. While it is conjuncturally discontinuous, it is persistent over 
the long term.
 Our initial—chronological—option to regroup electoral performances by 
decade, and not into political and economic cycles, actually yields a better 
description of the electoral development of social democracy. However our 
data are interpreted, the available electoral evidence fully justifies a division 
of the electoral time span of social democracy into three phases (each lasting 
approximately twenty years: the 1950s and 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s, and 
the 1990s and 2000s). This kind of division underscores better the specificity 
of the intermediate phase (the 1970s and 1980s: a period full of contradic-
tory trends), as well as the scale of the electoral crisis of the 1990s and 2000s, 
and refines approaches, such as Merkel’s, that distinguish between the period 
prior to 1973 and subsequent years. Developments in Australia and New Zea-
land also confirm, even more emphatically, that the period of weakening par 
excellence is the last twenty years. Broad economic and ideological cycles 
hold an important independent power in influencing electoral performances, 
but have no direct, self- evident, and immediate influence on electoral results. 
In any case, within the small sphere of numbers and symbols one can consider 
1973, the year of the two dramatic defeats in Denmark and Norway, as the de-
fining moment of electoral change.
 A particularly troubling finding is that those parties closest to the “clas-
sical” social democratic model (whatever its definition) have been affected 
more strongly than others and are to this extent more than others in the eye 
of the storm. It is the epicenter of historical social democratic forces, the hard 
core of the socialist family, which is under the most intense pressure (with 
the partial exception of Sweden). On the other hand, and perhaps for some 
equally troubling, Labourist parties of the Anglo- Saxon type have been more 
resilient. In addition, and again somewhat surprisingly, parties of high elec-
toral status and parties in more majoritarian political systems have resisted 
better than those in “consensus- based” democracies. It is of course impos-
sible to draw firm lines between these different experiences, but it is surely 
noteworthy that parties belonging to liberal environments (the United King-
dom, Ireland, but also New Zealand and Australia) or non–social democratic 
environments (Spain, Portugal, Greece: the fourth world of welfare capital-
ism, see Leibfried 2000, 193) have been doing better than those in more so-
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cial democratic environments. The tendency opens new research agendas and 
suggests new and stimulating topics of inquiry.
 Given these realities, it would seem that those arguing for only a “slight 
decline” in center- left fortunes have underestimated the magnitude and na-
ture of the electoral erosion (Merkel 2001; Delwit 2005).20 In addition, the 
very widespread belief in an electoral renaissance of social democracy in 
the late 1990s is largely misleading. Even the triumphant social democracy 
of the late 1990s clearly had less mastery over its electorate and its envi-
ronment than its predecessors prior to 1980. The current influence of social 
democracy in fact oscillates at around 80% of its level in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Spain, Greece, and Portugal not included). The drop is strong, although it is 
not cataclysmic. Thus we are not witnessing the “end” or the “death” of elec-
toral social democracy. Nevertheless, the paths of retreat show that the elec-
toral ebbing and greater instability of social democratic parties is a genuinely 
firm trend, a tendance lourde.
 It is clear as well that the “political power of economic ideas,” to borrow 
the apt expression of Peter Hall (Hall ed. 1989), which was an asset in the 
past, has become a liability for today’s social democratic parties. The domi-
nation of liberal economic ideas has destabilized social democracy. To some 
extent social democracy was able to integrate the neoliberal register into 
its own political rhetoric and governmental output. But this “grafting”—the 
left’s absorption of the right’s economic agenda (Duncan 2006, 483)—while 
electorally successful when first tried in the 1990s, might well serve to under-
mine its capacity “to achieve electoral success over the long term” (Curtice 
2007, 52; also Bailey 2009a, 32). In addition, the competitive security of so-
cial democracy seems affected by a certain revival of the radical left (commu-
nists, post- communists, left socialists).
 If the center- left’s ability to contest the neoliberal paradigm may have 
been limited in the period since 1980, it is also quite possible that the new 
hegemony can be undermined from within, from the difficulty of achieving 
a self- regulation of market forces. As the subprime mortgage crisis and the 
broader economic recession have recently demonstrated, the blind mechan-
ics of markets and the “irrational exuberance” of financial forces (Krugman 
2005, 30) may well reactivate core social democratic ideas about the regula-
tory role of politics and states. Moreover, and fortunately for social democ-
racy, there is abundant evidence that in the OECD countries “popular support 
for egalitarianism is very much alive” (Glyn 2006, 177). Even so, recent social 
democratic moves to the left, evident at the level of discourse, risk being 
without important policy consequences because of European constraints (in 
part put in place by social democrats themselves).
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 Recent developments in Europe offer fresh evidence. Despite the excep-
tional emergency circumstances, social democratic leaders, always trapped 
by European institutional constraints and poor cooperation, had great diffi-
culty in inventing new policies attuned to both the scale of the crisis and the 
requirements of the European stage. In reality they were seeking Keynesian 
solutions to the crisis while at the same time striving to maintain a neoliberal 
status quo and to preserve the Stability and Growth Pact. In this sense social 
democracy’s moves to the left are institutionally “rootless.” For now social 
democracy is still lacking a winning ideological and programmatic formula 
in the domain of economic and social policy.
 It is too soon to determine the influence of the economic crisis on the elec-
toral cycle. Nonetheless, early post- crisis election results do not show prom-
ise of much better times. In sum, two parties, the Norwegian DNA (+2.7%) 
and the Greek PASOK (+5.8%), registered important electoral progress (com-
pared with their previous electoral performance), while four are in decline 
(Austria, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Germany). Among the latter, for the 
Austrian SPÖ (−6%), the Portuguese PS (−8.5%), and of course the German 
SPD (−11.2%) the losses are highly significant. To these three cases of elec-
toral setback we should doubtless add the “catastrophic” result—a defeat 
without precedent—in the European Union elections of June 2009. Yet the 
number of elections is too limited to provide sufficient data to (re)establish a 
trend. In any case, in a time of distrustful electorates and of ideological and 
policy uncertainty, a long- term trend will not change without a good political 
reason.
 Overall, our findings largely confirm the thesis that social democratic 
parties have come down a notch in the political market; they have become 
“smaller.” And they will probably remain so for a long time to come. Being 
“smaller,” whether in the South or the North, will not prevent socialists from 
governing or winning elections, but it could prevent them from being consis-
tently successful over a long period. Social democracy has changed in stat-
ure and dimension, but its level of influence is still close to the governmental 
threshold. It remains in the game of governmental alternation and is still a 
“credible contender for power.” Any further losses beyond the current point 
of electoral erosion, however, could at least in some countries make less cred-
ible the strategy of acting like the natural party of government, or one of sev-
eral. Is social democracy at the point of crossing this “critical threshold”? 
Probably not, for political traditions take “a long time to establish and a long 
time to break down” (Wolfreys 2006). Historical parties, like spirits, live on 
and persist. Nevertheless, the major defeat in the European elections of 2009 
is a powerful warning signal. Concerning the long- term future, the evidence 
is far from clear.
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 Social democratic parties have changed in scale. In a sense—in just the 
sense that I have tried to develop in this chapter—this change of scale is “his-
torical.” It describes a new condition. But this “new” condition does not imply 
that the downward trend (at the aggregate level) will expand and deepen. It 
does imply, however, that there is no easy return to the electoral status quo 
ante. There is nothing contradictory in the supposition that social democracy 
at the aggregate level is likely neither to easily recover nor suffer further dra-
matic weakening. Both tendencies may be part of what makes the new situa-
tion “new.”
 I shall permit myself a final thought that mixes optimism and pessimism. 
In my view, the more time passes—and this is something that does not emerge 
from the figures presented here—the more northern socialists and southern 
socialists will come to have the “same shadow,” the same electoral future. 
This tendency will likely persist until the moment when a new reversal oc-
curs, as it surely will. This too does not emerge from the figures. But it repre-
sents the great lesson of the last 130 years of the history of European capital-
ism, a history intimately bound up with that of social democracy.
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Vivian Spyropoulou for generously allowing me access to her data, thereby facilitating 
my work in checking figures.
 1. The decision by Merkel (2001) and Delwit (2005) to include the Italian center- 
left in their calculations is no doubt intellectually legitimate, since the space of the 
center- left, with or without the PSI, has always been occupied by an organized politi-
cal force. In my view my choice has the merit of greater consistency. In any event, with 
or without Italy the aggregate trend does not change significantly.
 2. The designation (Golden Age) produces “a false impression of social democratic 
potency in the years of the ‘long boom’” (Callaghan 2000, 436).
 3. For the Austrians and the Germans the 1970s were the best decade of the entire 
postwar period (with an average score that was impressive for the SPÖ—50%—and 
excellent for the SPD—44.2%). For the Dutch (31%) and the Finnish (25.4%) the 1980s 
were their best years.
 4. Some examples illustrate the new situation with perfect clarity: −17.1% for the 
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French socialists in 1993 (1988: 34.7%; 1993: 17.6%); −10.8% for the Norwegians in 
2001; −7.9% for the Dutch in 1994 and another −13.9% in 2002; −8.9% for the Swedes 
in 1998; −7.9% for the Austrians in 1994; −6.8% for the Danish in 2001; −6.7% for the 
Belgians in 2007. Notwithstanding its small size, even the Irish Labour Party experi-
enced great instability. It more than doubled its electoral strength in 1992 and then lost 
8.9% in the subsequent election (1989: 9.5%; 1992; 19.3%; 1997: 10.4%).
 5. Overall we witness the same trend in European elections (Grunberg and Moscho-
nas 2005).
 6. In the European Parliament as well, successive enlargements of the EEC/EU have 
played an important role in the electoral consolidation of the socialist family (Grun-
berg and Moschonas 2005).
 7. Contra Merkel (1992a, 142), I do not group the French SFIO/PS and the Greek 
PASOK with parties of the “roman” variety (despite important similarities), and con-
versely, in an analysis focused on electoral trends, I find it difficult to consider the Ger-
man SPD and the Austrian SPÖ as belonging to different typological groups (despite 
important dissimilarities).
 8. These parties, from the standpoint of electoral sociology, were characterized 
during the 1960s by an electoral penetration that approximated or exceeded two- thirds 
of the working- class vote in Sweden and Norway, 60% in Great Britain, Denmark, and 
Austria, and just over 50% in Germany (Moschonas 2002, 50).
 9. Merkel includes the SPD in the “pragmatic coalescent” group. He also constructs 
a “Labourist” group containing the British and Irish Labour parties (Merkel 1992a, 
144–45). Historical and profile affinities partly justify this choice. Nevertheless, the 
political role assumed by the above- mentioned parties in their respective political sys-
tems is very dissimilar because of their differing electoral size.
 10. The border case here is the Finish SDP. A powerful party in the 1930s, it suffered 
from the consolidation of an influential communist pole and the division of the labor 
movement. The era of consensualism in Finish politics, which began in the mid- 1960s 
and ended only recently, allowed for SDP’s frequent participation in government. The 
intermediate competitive status of the party explains its inclusion in the second group 
(see Sundberg 1999, 57, 59).
 11. The French SFIO/PS party is not included in this group. The marked specificity of 
French socialism makes it a “unique” case (medium electoral status but in a majoritar-
ian political system; often governing in single- party governments; no connection with 
the trade- union movement; well- developed democratic institutions and welfare state; 
and last but not least, an uninterrupted series of electoral data). The French party, 
traditionally capable of the best and the worst, is characterized by a congenital insta-
bility. Badly weakened in the 1950s and 1960s and thus a mere shadow of its former 
self in the run- up to 1968 (Horn 2007, 163, 136; Ross and Goldhammer in this volume), 
it made significant breakthroughs in the 1980s. Overall it tends to stabilize at a higher 
level compared to the 1950s.
 12. Although this party experienced its real national golden age a little later, in the 
1970s.
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 13. In the light of this picture of abrupt declines and destabilization, the Finnish 
distinguish themselves by their remarkable stability. The exception came in the 1990s, 
when they made a modest breakthrough in 1995 (28.3%), only to return immediately 
afterward to more traditional results (22.9% in 1999).
 14. In the elections of 2007 PASOK posted its worst electoral performance (38.1%) 
since the late 1970s. However, we should note the excellent performance of the Greek 
socialists in 2009 (43.92%).
 15. Here we use the definitions offered by Stephens, Huber, and Ray (1999).
 16. Two more countries, Canada and the United States, included by Esping- Andersen 
in the low decommodification group (1990, 52) are not part of our calculations for evi-
dent reasons.
 17. The partial exception would be Sweden, though the SAP is rather friendly toward 
a market economy. See Hinnfors (2006) and Pontusson (this volume).
 18. The Portuguese PS has been moderately successful, but not on the scale of the 
Spanish and Greek parties (see Magone 2007; Delwit 2007).
 19. Thus according to Kitschelt, “given that social democratic politicians are ratio-
nal . . . the current search for new ‘winning electoral formulas’ on the political left 
may yield considerable electoral and programmatic instability of social democratic 
parties across Europe rather than uniform and progressive decline” (1999, 344–45). 
Since Kitschelt wrote, we have seen both electoral and programmatic instability and 
an (almost) uniform and progressive decline.
 20. Our individual country data confirm Merkel’s findings with only rare and slight 
differences. By employing Merkel’s periodization and approach (inclusion of Italy, ex-
clusion of Luxembourg), I recalculated the average electoral results for the periods 
1950–73 and 1990–99 (see Merkel 2001, 34). According to this calculation, the inclu-
sion of Italy in the Merkel’s data attenuates the social democratic retreat by 1.3 points, 
and the inclusion of Spain, Greece, and Portugal in the diachronic comparison adds 2.1 
more points to the downward trend for the period in question.
 In his detailed study, however, Pascal Delwit clearly highlights the main tendency: 
the downward trend “for the great majority” of social democratic parties as well as the 
“structural erosion” of the Scandinavian ones (Delwit 2005, 66–67).

Part II
Varieties of Social Democracy and Liberalism

Once Again a Model
Nordic Social Democracy in a Globalized World
Jonas Pontusson
What are the prospects for social democracy in the current era of global eco-
nomic crisis? The answer to this question surely depends on what we mean 
by “social democracy.” And to specify this we need empirical referents. By my 
reading of public debates as well as academic literature on both sides of the 
Atlantic, it has become increasingly common over the last couple of decades 
to conflate “social democracy” with “Social Europe.” This is unfortunate 
on two counts. First, the economic performance of continental Europe has 
been sluggish by comparison to that of liberal market economies such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Second, the notion of “Social Europe” 
usually connotes institutional arrangements—patient capital, codetermina-
tion, vocational training—that cannot readily be transposed to other settings. 
To the extent that this is what social democracy is all about, its relevance to 
contemporary politics in the United States or other liberal market economies 
would appear to be very limited.
 The basic aim of this chapter is in a sense to rescue social democracy from 
the economic travails of continental Europe by reinstating the Nordic coun-
tries as the main exemplars of the social democratic approach to managing 
capitalism. The reasons why the Nordic countries have figured so promi-
nently in discussions of social democracy hardly need to be rehearsed. In a 
nutshell, unions and social democratic parties have historically been stronger 
and more influential in the Nordic countries than in any other liberal democ-
racies. Social democratic parties governed Sweden, Denmark, and Norway 
more or less continuously from the 1930s into the 1970s and remain major 
contenders for government power in all the Nordic countries, including Fin-
land.1 As commonly noted in the existing literature, moreover, even center- 
right parties in the Nordic countries have to a large extent embraced social 
democratic policy priorities. All of this is well established. The “news” that 
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my discussion builds on is that the Nordic countries again became economic 
success stories over the period stretching from the mid- 1990s until the onset 
of the global economic crisis in 2008. Not only did the Nordic countries ex-
perience more rapid growth than just about any other OECD economies in 
this period (except Ireland), they also appear to have adjusted successfully 
to changes in the global economy by shifting into more knowledge- intensive 
services and manufacturing. The question becomes whether there is some-
thing social democratic about the recent success of the Nordic economies. If 
the answer to that question is yes, then it becomes plausible to argue that so-
cial democracy represents a realistic alternative to market liberalism, worthy 
of examination and perhaps emulation by progressive political forces outside 
the Nordic area.
 The chapter consists of three parts. In the first part, I delineate what is dis-
tinctively social democratic about the four Nordic countries by identifying 
policies (and policy outcomes) on which these countries differ from Germany 
and other “social market economies” in continental Europe. Building on sev-
eral existing typologies, I use the term “social market economies” (SMEs) to 
encompass France as well as Germany and its smaller next- door neighbors: 
Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands.2 In essence I consider 
policies that the Nordic countries have in common to be core social demo-
cratic policies provided that they also distinguish the Nordic countries from 
continental SMEs and that they can be traced to social democratic initiatives. 
This exercise yields the following broad features of what I will refer to as the 
“social democratic policy regime”: universalism in the design of social insur-
ance schemes, direct public provision of social services, solidaristic wage bar-
gaining, active labor market policies, policies to promote female employment 
and gender equality in the labor market, and finally, high levels of invest-
ment in public education and policies to equalize educational opportunity. 
Throughout the following discussion I emphasize complementarities among 
these policies. I also emphasize that these policies were designed to promote 
labor mobility and productivity as well as to redistribute income and equalize 
opportunity.
 In the second part of the chapter I address the institutional conditions for 
the success of social democratic policies by engaging with the varieties- of- 
capitalism literature. Contrary to what this literature seems to imply, I do not 
believe that the economic benefits of social democratic policies are contin-
gent on the persistence of “patient capital” and manufacturing systems that 
rely on the kinds of skills acquired by workers through vocational training 
along German lines. I argue that social democratic policies have benefits for a 
wide range of business activities and that more footloose or short- term inves-
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tors should be able to recognize these benefits. At the same time, I argue that 
the effective implementation of core components of the social democratic 
policy regime depends on the participation of organized business and above 
all on the existence of encompassing and cohesive unions.
 In the third part I contrast the economic performance of the Nordic coun-
tries since 1995 with that of continental SMEs. Here my core arguments are 
that the welfare states of the Nordic countries facilitated the adoption of de-
regulatory reforms that contributed to economic growth and restructuring 
and that the egalitarianism of these countries, particularly in the realm of 
education, has also contributed directly to their economic success. In addi-
tion to developing these arguments, I present data showing that the growing 
gap between labor- market “insiders” and “outsiders” is first and foremost a 
continental phenomenon. This and other dualist trends have been much less 
pronounced in the Nordic countries.
 By way of conclusion, I will briefly address the implications of the current 
economic crisis for the social democratic project as I understand it, as well as 
the lessons that progressive forces in the United States might draw from the 
Nordic experience.
Nordic Egalitarianism versus Continental Social Protection
In emphasizing differences between Nordic and continental political econo-
mies, my discussion builds on the insights of Esping- Andersen (1990) and 
subsequent comparative welfare- state literature (notably Huber and Stephens 
2001 and Swank 2002). This literature teaches us that the “conservative” wel-
fare states of continental Europe—above all Germany and France—provide 
insurance against income losses associated with unemployment, poor health, 
and old age that is roughly comparable to the insurance provided by Nordic 
welfare states, but they do so in ways that to a much greater extent preserve 
existing income and status differentials. Generalizing, we might say that the 
two core pillars of social protection in continental Europe are legislation and 
regulatory practices that restrict the ability of employers to fire workers, and 
mandatory social insurance based on earnings- differentiated benefits.
 Relative to the continental model, the welfare states built up by Scandina-
vian social democrats in the 1940s and 1950s were based on the idea of “so-
cial citizenship,” which concretely manifested itself in the emphasis on flat- 
rate benefits and government- provided services financed out of general taxes 
(rather than earmarked payroll contributions). Starting with the introduction 
of supplementary pension schemes in the 1960s, earnings- related benefits as-
sumed a prominent role, but the emphasis on the public sector has remained 
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a distinctive feature of Nordic welfare states. Equally important, these wel-
fare states incorporated the principle of earnings- differentiated benefits into 
comprehensive social insurance systems that covered everyone, as distinct 
from the occupationally (and sometimes sectorally) segregated insurance 
schemes characteristic of continental welfare states.
 Setting aside the public provision of services, the Nordic countries do not 
spend significantly more of their GDP on income transfers, yet they achieve 
a much larger reduction of household income inequality through income 
transfers than most of their continental neighbors do.3 Redistribution through 
taxes and transfers is clearly one crucial reason why the Nordic countries 
have a much more equal distribution of disposable income and also lower 
poverty rates than the social market economies of continental Europe, let 
alone the liberal market economies of the Anglophone world (see table 1).4
 It is important to note that redistribution was not the only motivation be-
hind the distinctive approach to welfare- state design adopted by Scandina-
vian social democrats. Another important motivation was the idea that pub-
lic provision of benefits, organized on a universalistic basis, would facilitate 
labor mobility across firms and across sectors of the economy and thereby 
provide for a more efficient allocation of labor. The attitude toward employ-
ment security adopted by the Swedish social democrats in the 1950s and 
1960s is also very relevant in this context. Cognizant of Sweden’s export de-
pendence and the need for economic restructuring in response to changes in 
world markets, Swedish union leaders and social democratic politicians very 
explicitly eschewed the idea that the government should provide workers 
with security in their current jobs. Their stated goal was to provide for “secu-
rity in the labor market,” as distinct from “job security.” Pursuing this goal en-
tailed generous unemployment compensation to protect workers against the 
income losses associated with unemployment, but also active labor market 
policies to help workers find new, higher- paying, and otherwise better jobs.
 In the context of severe industrial adjustment problems, the Swedish labor 
movement in the 1970s pushed for new laws restricting the ability of em-
ployers to fire workers. By recent OECD measures, employment protection 
in Sweden is slightly stricter than in Germany and less strict than in France 
(Pontusson 2005a, 120). Yet Denmark stands out as one of the West European 
countries with the least restrictive laws governing the ability of employers to 
fire workers. In this respect Denmark might be said to have remained more 
true to traditional social democratic principles than Sweden, but it should 
also be noted that standard OECD measures ignore the fact that Swedish em-
ployment protection legislation gives firms and unions the right to negotiate 
alternative arrangements, and the typical tendency is for collective bargain-
Table 1. Measures of Inequality, circa 2000





























lME average .332 14.4 3.58 .767 .812 2.53 52
 United States .370 17.7 4.35 .755 .857 2.79 53
Continental average .267 7.3 3.00 .797 .781 2.00 58
 Germany .275 8.4 2.93 .760 .797 1.73 59
Nordic average .244 5.9 2.23 .817 .919 1.76 68
 Denmark .225 5.4 2.16 .893 1.65 65
 Finland .247 5.4 2.41 .788 .929 1.86 63
 Norway .251 6.4 2.00 .906 1.75 69
 Sweden .252 6.5 2.35 .845 .949 1.79 74
 Limited market economy (lME) average = unweighted average for Australia, Canada, Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States
 Continental average = unweighted average for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland in columns 1–5, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in 
columns 6–7
 Nordic average = unweighted average for the four Nordic countries (except for column 4)
 (1) Gini coefficient for disposable household income (adjusted for household size). The figures 
refer to 2000 except for Australia (2001), the United Kingdom (1999), and the Netherlands (1999). 
Source: http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm.
 (2) Percentage of population living in households with less than 50% of the median disposable 
household income. Same years and source as column (1).
 (3) The ratio of earnings in the 90th percentile to earnings in the 10th percentile, gross earn-
ings for full- time employees. The figures refer to 1999–2000 except for Denmark (1990). Source: 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Relative Earnings Database 
(unpublished).
 (4) The ratio of the median female wage to the median male wage, full- time employees only. 
Same years and source as column (3).
 (5) The ratio of the female employment rate to the male employment rate in 2000 (employment 
rate = employed individuals as a percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 64). 
Source: OECD 2004, 295–96.
 (6) The ratio of 95th- percentile test scores to 5th- percentile scores on literacy tests for popula-
tion aged 15–65 in 1994–98. Source: OECD 2000, 135–36.
 (7) Percentage of the population scoring at level 3 or better on literacy tests. Same years and 
source as column (6).
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ing agreements to be more flexible than what the law prescribes. Particularly 
if we extend our perspective to encompass additional issues such as health 
and safety, the Nordic countries are still distinguished not only from France 
but also from Germany by their (de facto) reliance on collective bargaining 
rather than government legislation to regulate employment conditions.
 Alongside welfare- state universalism, the so- called Rehn- Meidner model 
deserves a prominent place in most discussions of Nordic social democracy as 
a distinctive policy regime. Conceived by economists working for the Swedish 
confederation of blue- collar unions in the 1950s, this intellectual construct 
became the justification for an aggressive union push for wage leveling and 
for the expansion of active labor market policies in the 1960s and 1970s. To 
varying degrees and with some modifications, unions and social democratic 
parties in the other Nordic countries emulated the policies associated with 
the Rehn- Meidner model.
 The Rehn- Meidner model articulated the egalitarian goals of the labor 
movement as part of a strategy to promote productivity growth and contain 
wage inflation. On the one hand, a concerted union effort to provide low- 
wage workers with higher wage increases than market forces dictated would 
squeeze the profits of less efficient firms (or sectors) and force them either 
to rationalize production or go out of business. On the other hand, wage 
restraint by well- paid workers would promote the expansion of more effi-
cient firms (or sectors). For the unions to pursue this strategy the government 
needed to develop active labor market measures that would ease the transi-
tion of workers from less efficient to more efficient firms and sectors and also 
to curtail wage drift caused by bottlenecks in the supply of labor.5
 The insight at the core of the Rehn- Meidner strategy is that low wages rep-
resent a subsidy to inefficient capital. At the same time, Rehn and Meidner 
recognized that wage differentials were necessary as an incentive for workers 
to acquire skills and take on more responsibility in the production process. 
The goal of union wage policy should be to eliminate differentials based on 
corporate profitability while maintaining differentials based on skills and 
effort. In other words, the goal of union wage policy should be “equal pay for 
equal work,” as distinct from “equal pay for everyone.”
 In practice it proved difficult for Swedish unions to maintain the distinc-
tion between “good” and “bad” wage differentials in the context of full em-
ployment and economy- wide wage bargaining. Solidaristic wage policy may 
have become too egalitarian in the course of the 1960s and 1970s, produc-
ing a generalized profits squeeze and ultimately a campaign by employers to 
decentralize wage bargaining in the 1980s (Pontusson and Swenson 1996). 
While Norway has retained peak- level wage negotiations, the locus of Danish 
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wage bargaining has also shifted to the industry level (Wallerstein and Golden 
2000). With respect to formal institutional arrangements, we can no longer 
speak of a Nordic model of wage bargaining that is clearly distinct from the 
continental model. In marked contrast to the social market economies of 
continental Europe, however, union membership held up quite well in the 
Nordic countries in the 1980s and 1990s (see table 2), and partly as a result of 
this, Nordic unions appear to have retained a greater capacity to coordinate 
their wage demands based on solidaristic principles. As table 1 shows, wage 
compression remains a distinctive characteristic of the Nordic countries as a 
group.
 The Nordic social democrats began to articulate gender equality as a core 
component of their reformist project in the 1960s and policies to promote 
women’s participation in the labor force—chiefly parental leave insurance 
and public childcare—emerged as a widely admired feature of the Nordic 
model in the 1970s. The literature on gender and the welfare state (e.g., 
Sainsbury 1999) commonly draws a sharp contrast between the progressive, 
gender- egalitarian approach to family policy characteristic of the Nordic 
countries and the conservative, “male- breadwinner” approach of Germany 
and other continental countries in which Christian democratic ideology has 
been influential. Relatedly, I want to emphasize the affinity between gender- 
egalitarian policies adopted in the 1970s and existing social democratic com-
mitments to the public sector and to solidaristic wage policy. While the ex-
pansion of welfare- related public services became the principal source of 
new employment for women from the 1960s through the 1980s, the closing 
of the pay gap between men and women was from the beginning a major ob-
jective of solidaristic wage policy.
 Column 4 in table 1 reports on gendered pay differentials, measured as the 
ratio of the median female wage to the median male wage, but these data 
pertain to full- time employees alone, and we only have data for two of the 
Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland. Combining these two, quite disparate 
observations yields an average that is two percentage points higher than the 
average for continental SMEs, but there is also a lot of variation among conti-
nental SMEs in this regard. The contrast between the Nordic countries and the 
continental SMEs is much clearer in column 5, which reports on employment- 
rate differentials between men and women. Women have a much higher labor 
force participation rate in Nordic countries than in either continental SMEs or 
Anglophone lMEs.
 The final contrast that I wish to draw between Nordic and continental po-
litical economies concerns education and skill formation. This is a topic that 
has recently caught the attention of students of comparative political econ-
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omy. In the Varieties- of- Capitalism (VofC) tradition, skill formation has come 
to be seen as the crucial link between social provisions and production strate-
gies (cf. Estevez- Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005; and Iversen 
and Stephens 2008). In a nutshell, the standard VofC argument is that high 
levels of employment protection and social insurance in the Nordic countries 
as well as continental Europe are associated, as both cause and effect, with 
the fact that these economies rely more heavily than liberal market econo-
mies do on firm- and industry- specific skills. Investment in specific skills is 
riskier than investment in general skills, and if this sort of investment is to be 
undertaken, there must be some assurance of good long- term employment 
prospects in the firm or industry to which the skills apply, as well as some 
assurance of income support during possible spells of unemployment. In turn, 
firms that rely on specific skills can be expected to join with skilled workers 
in a cross- class alliance in support of social protection as well as vocational 
training.
 In my view this argument captures something quite essential about the 
social market economies of continental Europe, but it misses several impor-
tant things about the Nordic experience. To begin with, the tension between 
vocational training that follows the German model and social democratic am-
bitions to remove barriers to class mobility through educational achievement 
deserves to be noted. In Sweden education reforms in the 1950s and 1960s in-
corporated vocational training for fifteen- to eighteen- year- olds into the new 
(comprehensive) secondary schools, effectively eliminating apprenticeship- 
based training (Pontusson 1997). Though some apprenticeship- based training 
survived in Denmark, the thrust of postwar educational changes in the other 
Nordic countries appears to have been similar to what we observe in Swe-
den. While the UNESCO sources cited by Iversen and Stephens (2008, 616) 
indicate that the proportion of school- age cohorts engaged in “vocational 
training” is about the same in the Nordic countries as in Germany (and much 
higher than in Austria or Switzerland), the question becomes whether the fig-
ures are really comparable. Based on the results of adult literacy tests, there is 
good reason to believe that the general- skills component of vocational train-
ing is more pronounced in the Nordic countries.
 A second and related point is that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden stand 
out as the three OECD countries that spend the largest share of their GDP 
on public education, with Finland ranked fifth (following New Zealand) on 
this measure (Iversen and Stephens 2008, 616; see also Pontusson 2005a, 
134). Partly in response to deteriorating employment conditions, the Nordic 
countries increased spending on higher education quite dramatically in the 
1980s and 1990s, but their most remarkable achievement in this realm has 
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to do with basic skills. In the international adult literacy study carried out 
by the OECD and Statistics Canada in the second half of the 1990s, the four 
Nordic countries stood out not only as the countries with the highest mean 
scores but also as the countries with the most compressed distributions of test 
scores (see table 1, column 6). The proportion of the population that passed 
the study’s threshold for “information age literacy” was also higher in the 
Nordic countries than in any of the countries included in the study (table 1, 
column 7).
 The Nordic experience suggests that educational equality and economic 
equality are closely linked. As Blau and Kahn (2005) point out, compression 
of educational achievement can be invoked to explain cross- national varia-
tion in wage inequality. At the same time, we might reasonably suppose that 
children from low- income households are better able to take advantage of 
educational opportunities when the distribution of household income and 
living conditions is more equal (cf. Iversen and Stephens 2008, 621–22). The 
very low rates of child poverty in the Nordic countries deserve to be men-
tioned in this context (see Pontusson 2005a, 160).
 Relatively high skill levels at the bottom of the skill hierarchy may have 
enabled employers in the Nordic countries to contend with the challenges 
posed by solidaristic wage policy, allowing them to deploy new technolo-
gies and thereby improve productivity with low- skilled workers. Also, the 
expansion of higher education has undoubtedly curtailed the growth of re-
turns to education in these countries. In both these ways public investment 
in education has made it easier for unions to practice wage solidarity. In the 
realm of traditional manufacturing, the argument about skills facilitating the 
deployment of new technologies surely pertains to technical as well as gen-
eral skills. What is most distinctive about the skill profile of the Nordic coun-
tries, however, is the quality of general skills at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. Public investment in education is particularly relevant to explaining 
why the Nordic economies have outperformed the continental economies in 
knowledge- intensive manufacturing and private services over the last fifteen 
years (a topic to which I shall return).
 To sum up, the preceding discussion calls into question the attempt by 
Esping- Andersen (1990) to capture what Nordic social democracy has been 
about with the concept of “decommodification.” Socializing social benefits or, 
in other words, reducing the role of firms (and families) as providers of social 
benefits has indeed been an objective of Nordic social democracy, but none 
of the policies enumerated above have entailed decommodification in the 
broader sense of an emancipation of workers from their dependence on the 
labor market. Quite the contrary, the thrust of the social democratic project 
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is to bring people into the labor market and then to empower them as sellers 
of labor power. In a sense the concept of decommodification is more appli-
cable to policies associated with Christian democracy and other strands of 
traditional conservatism on the European continent (including the Mediter-
ranean countries): employment protection, early exit from work, and policies 
designed to keep women in the role of homemakers.
 From a social democratic perspective the empowerment of workers as 
sellers of labor depends not only on the existence of a finely meshed social 
safety net but also on full employment, access to education (skills), and union 
representation. These should be considered core components of the social 
democratic project. My discussion also suggests that egalitarianism repre-
sents a more prominent feature of Nordic social democracy than Esping- 
Andersen’s seminal interpretation recognized.
 As indicated above, rejection of the idea of a trade-off between equality 
and efficiency is a defining feature of Nordic social democracy. In this re-
gard I want to emphasize that the main intellectual tradition of Nordic social 
democracy conceives “economic efficiency” in terms that are quite consis-
tent with mainstream economics. At least as I understand them, Nordic so-
cial democrats do not deny that egalitarianism might conflict with efficiency. 
Their core claim is rather that it is possible to redistribute income in ways 
that also promote productivity growth and a more efficient allocation of re-
sources.
Social Democracy and Varieties of Capitalism
The question of why social democratic ideas have been particularly influ-
ential in the Nordic countries lies well beyond the scope of this chapter, but 
I want to briefly address the related question of the extent to which social 
democratic policies presuppose a particular type of capitalism. Specifically, 
I wish to question—or at least qualify—what I take to be an implication of 
the VofC literature, namely that the institutional framework characteristic of 
“coordinated market economies” (CMEs) constitutes a precondition for suc-
cessful social democracy.6
 According to the VofC literature, encompassing and organizationally co-
herent (more or less centralized) unions and employer organizations are an 
important part of what distinguishes coordinated market economies from 
liberal market economies, but the distinction between these two types of 
capitalism ultimately hinges on corporate finance and ownership (cf. Soskice 
1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). Coordinated market economies are first distin-
guished by limited firm exposure to capital markets, with banks providing 
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long- term finance to the corporate sector and ownership being concentrated 
in the hands of a few long- term stakeholders. Cross- share holdings among 
firms are also common in coordinated market economies, protecting firms 
against volatile capital markets and the threat of hostile takeovers while also 
providing the basis for coordination among firms.
 We can distinguish several arguments that construe the dynamics of co-
ordinated market economies as supportive of social democracy—and con-
versely, construe “stock- market capitalism” as a force working against social 
democratic policies. To begin with, patient capital arguably allows firms to 
provide long- term employment for their employees, and long- term employ-
ment in turn provides the basis for trust and employees’ commitment to the 
success of the firm. Partly as a result of cooperative labor relations within 
firms, the comparative advantage of CMEs lies in the production of industrial 
goods of high quality. Their production strategies in turn allow for the high 
wages and taxes upon which the social democratic project depends. They may 
also allow for the compression of wage differentials. More specifically, as we 
have already seen, recent contributions to the VofC literature argue that reli-
ance on specific skills makes employers in coordinated market economies 
interested in employment protection and generous social insurance schemes.
 These arguments pertain to the congruence of social democratic policies 
with the production strategies of dominant business segments. In a different 
vein, one might also argue that the effective implementation of social demo-
cratic policies depends on the cooperation of organized business as well as 
organized labor or, in other words, that the effective implementation of these 
policies presupposes “corporatist” institutional arrangements. From this per-
spective firms in liberal market economies might stand to gain from social 
democratic policies, but they do not have the capacity to help governments 
implement these policies (e.g., Martin 2004).
 For the VofC literature, then, social democracy does not represent a viable 
policy regime for liberal market economies, while its prospects in coordi-
nated market economies are quite favorable. At the same time the VofC litera-
ture argues strenuously against the proposition that capital mobility and in-
tensified international competition favor lMEs over CMEs. The standard VofC 
argument on this score is that the institutional differences between CMEs and 
lMEs are the source of different comparative advantages: CME firms and lME 
firms pursue different innovation and production strategies, but these strate-
gies are equally viable. Rather than generate pressures for convergence on 
the liberal model, globalization actually serves to crystallize differences be-
tween the two types of capitalist economies (Soskice 1999).
 In my view the implications of capital mobility and the globalization of 
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finance over the last two decades are more far- reaching than VofC scholars 
typically recognize. On average, European firms may still be less exposed 
to capital markets than American firms are, but ownership structures and 
corporate governance practices have clearly shifted in a “liberal” direction 
across the coordinated market economies. In addition, the VofC argument 
about comparative advantage is strikingly manufacturing- centered and 
ignores the macroeconomic implications of differential growth rates across 
industrial sectors.7 CME firms specializing in “incremental innovation” may 
well be able to thrive in the new world economy, but if sectors in which com-
petition hinges on “radical innovation” grow at a much faster rate, this surely 
poses a problem for countries that have a comparative advantage in incre-
mental innovation.
 On the other hand, I want to suggest that the VofC literature exaggerates 
the extent to which the fate of social democracy is tied to the persistence of 
“patient capital” and manufacturing systems that rely on the kinds of skills 
that workers acquire through vocational training of the sort given in Ger-
many. As noted above, what distinguishes the Nordic countries in the realm 
of education and skill formation is not vocational training but rather pub-
lic investment in human capital in a much broader sense. Such investment 
facilitates productivity growth across a wide range of business activities, and 
more footloose or short- term investors should be quite readily able to recog-
nize its benefits. The same basic argument holds, it seems to me, for other 
components of the social democratic policy regime, notably the promotion of 
women’s participation in the labor force, the emphasis on getting the unem-
ployed back to work, and the mobility- enhancing implications of universal-
istic social insurance schemes. As for wage solidarity, let me simply reiterate 
that it is a policy designed to benefit any and all firms with above- average 
profits. In short, I fail to see any compelling reason why the economic and 
social benefits of social democratic policies should be more pronounced in 
coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies.
 The proposition that the effective implementation of social democratic 
policies presupposes institutional arrangements of the CME type cannot be 
as readily dismissed. Solidaristic wage bargaining and active labor market 
policies surely require participation and coordination by employers as well 
as unions. While this is less obviously so for other components of the social 
democratic policy regime, such as parental leave insurance and public spend-
ing on primary and secondary education, the notion of a “policy regime” 
implies interdependence among different policies. However, the argument 
about institutional capacity has more to do with encompassing unions and 
employer associations than with corporate finance and governance institu-
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tions. Historically the concentration of ownership and capitalists with inter-
ests in a number of different firms may have been a precondition for the 
emergence of relatively centralized employer and trade associations in north-
ern Europe, but it does not follow that recent changes in the structure of 
ownership and control undermine existing corporatist arrangements.
 Even more so than strong business organizations, strong unions must be 
considered an institutional prerequisite for successful social democracy. By 
“union strength” I have in mind both high levels of unionization and an or-
ganizational structure that makes coordination among unions possible. The 
latter feature is not adequately captured by centralization of authority in 
the hands of national union officials. Union strength involves limits on the 
autonomy of locals and shop stewards but also, perhaps more importantly, 
clear jurisdictional boundaries and the absence of inter- union competition 
over members. As emphasized by Kjellberg (1983), Nordic unions are distin-
guished by strong locals as well as strong peak associations.
 Strong and coordinated industrial unions are clearly critical to the imple-
mentation of solidaristic wage policy. Here I want to emphasize the less com-
monly recognized point that strong local unions have made it possible for 
Nordic social democrats to eschew detailed government regulation of em-
ployment and working conditions, instead relying on local unions to protect 
workers in this realm. I have yet to puzzle through the micro- foundations of 
this argument, but I am strongly inclined to believe that collective bargain-
ing provides a more flexible path to employment security than government 
Table 2. Unionization Rates, 1980 and 2000
1980 2000 Change
lME average 43 27 −16
 United States 22 13 −9
Continental average 35 23 −12
 Belgium 54 56 2
 Germany 35 25 −10
Nordic average 72 71 −1
 Denmark 79 74 −5
 Finland 69 76 7
 Norway 58 54 −4
 Sweden 80 79 −1
 Note: Continental average excludes Belgium; otherwise 
countries included in group averages are the same as in 
table 1 (columns 1–5).
 Source: OECD 2008b, 24–25, 34–35.
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legislation and that reliance on this method attenuates the trade-off between 
employment security and employment growth.
 Does union strength ultimately depend on the broader (or deeper) institu-
tional conditions emphasized by the VofC literature? Leaving aside Belgium, 
average union density in continental SMEs was actually lower than in Anglo-
phone lMEs in 1980 and fell by nearly as much over the last two decades of 
the twentieth century (see table 2). It is possible that some of the institutional 
features of continental SMEs actually contributed to union decline. The prac-
tice of extending bargained wage contracts to firms (or workers) that were 
not party to the contract poses the obvious question of why workers would 
choose to join unions in these countries. Similarly, employment protection 
legislation and works councils would seem to deprive unions of an important 
role at the local level. Here is another complementarity (or “virtuous circle”) 
that deserves to be noted: the social democratic policy regime depends on 
strong unions, but it also sustains strong unions.8
Economic Growth and Social Solidarity, 1995–2007
As Martin and Thelen (2007) have recently asserted, using Denmark and Ger-
many as illustrative cases, the trajectories of the Nordic countries and con-
tinental Europe have diverged since the early 1990s. Economic growth and 
cooperation between unions and employers have been restored and social 
solidarity has been maintained in the Nordic countries. By contrast, Martin 
and Thelen observe an erosion of social- market institutions and rising labor- 
market dualism in Germany and other continental countries. In what follows 
I will elaborate on this divergence and relate it to my earlier discussion.
 To begin with, table 3 brings out the contrast between the Nordic coun-
tries and continental Europe with respect to overall economic performance. 
To summarize, the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish economies have grown 
by an average annual rate of about 3% per capita while the Finnish econ-
omy has grown by an annual rate of nearly 4% since the end of the eco-
nomic crisis of the early 1990s. For Finland and Sweden in particular, but also 
for Denmark, this represents a strong improvement on the 1980s and early 
1990s, when Nordic growth—except for Norway, which benefited from oil ex-
ports—lagged behind not only the United States but also continental Europe 
by a significant margin. Over the thirteen years from 1995 through 2007 even 
Denmark, which grew more slowly than the other Nordic countries, grew 
at the same rate as the average for Anglophone lMEs (slightly higher than 
the United States growth rate) and outperformed the average for continental 
SMEs by one percentage point per year.9
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 Like the rest of Western Europe, the Nordic countries have relied heavily 
on productivity growth to achieve economic growth, and employment growth 
has been sluggish. In Sweden and Finland unemployment remains much 
higher than it was before the economic crisis of the early 1990s. Without 
minimizing this problem, which was the main reason why the Swedish social 
democrats lost the election of 2006, it is noteworthy that Sweden and Finland 
managed to avoid the pattern of Germany and other continental SMEs from 
the mid- 1970s through the mid- 1990s, when each successive recession was 
associated with a ratcheting up of the “equilibrium rate” of unemployment. 
In Sweden open unemployment jumped from 1.2% in 1991 to 9.9% but subse-
quently fell back, fluctuating in the range of 5 to 7% between 2001 and 2007. 
In Finland the rate of unemployment peaked at 15.1% in 1995 and fluctuated 
between 7% and 9% in 2001–7. It also deserves to be noted that Norway and 
Denmark have successfully maintained very low rates of unemployment over 
the last ten years, significantly below the United States rate, let alone the EU 
rate.10 Perhaps most importantly, economic growth has been accompanied by 
a very significant reduction in the duration of average unemployment spells 
in the Nordic countries since the mid- 1990s (see table 8).
 Nordic economic success over the last ten to fifteen years has occurred in 
the context of a continued shift to services as the principal source of employ-
ment. As table 4 illustrates, the continental SMEs experienced the biggest 
shift toward a postindustrial employment structure in the 1990s and early 
2000s, but the Nordic economies had gone farther down this path by the late 
1980s and the Nordic economies remained more postindustrial than the con-
Table 3. Average Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita
1984–94 1995–2007
lME average 2.8 2.9
 Ireland 4.0 7.5
 United States 3.0 2.8
Continental average 2.3 1.9
 Germany 2.8 1.5





 Note: Countries included in group averages are the same as in 
table 1 (columns 1–5), except that lME average excludes Ireland.
 Source: OECD 2008a, 249.
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tinental SMEs by the end of the recent boom. The continued shift to service 
employment is particularly noteworthy because the public sector’s share of 
total employment has either contracted or remained constant in the Nordic 
countries since the early 1990s.
 By all accounts the embrace of information- processing and communica-
tion technologies was a very important component of economic recovery in 
Sweden and Finland in the 1990s. Alongside the rise of Ericsson and Nokia as 
global ICT firms, these countries have become home to clusters of smaller ICT 
companies (Richards 2004). Relatedly, the spread of ICT use across manufac-
turing and public as well as private services appears to have been an impor-
tant factor behind rapid productivity growth not only in Sweden and Finland 
but also in Denmark and Norway.
 For 1995–2006 table 5 reports on annual growth of value added in four 
broad sectors: (1) low- technology manufacturing, (2) high and medium- to- 
high (HMH) technology manufacturing, (3) finance and business services, 
and (4) other private services.11 As the table indicates, the United States out-
performed Germany and the average for continental SMEs in every one of 
these sectors, but the performance gap was particularly pronounced for HMH 
manufacturing and other private services. Interestingly, HMH manufactur-
ing and other private services are also the two sectors in which Sweden and 
Finland clearly outperformed the continental SMEs in this period. The very 
strong performance of these countries in HMH manufacturing, with growth 
rates one and a half times the United States rate, is particularly striking. It 
Table 4. Services as Percentage of Total Civilian 
Employment, 1991–2007
1991 2007 Change
lME average 68.1 74.7 6.6
 United States 71.8 78.8 7.0
Continental average 60.5 71.2 10.7
 Germany 55.0 67.7 12.7
Nordic average 67.0 73.9 6.9
 Denmark 66.6 73.6 7.0
 Finland 62.3 69.7 7.4
 Norway 70.5 76.0 5.5
 Sweden 68.4 76.1 7.7
 Note: Countries included in group averages are the 
same as in table 1 (columns 1–5).
 Source: OECD 2008b, 24–25, 34–35.
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is also noteworthy that all four Nordic countries enjoyed stronger output 
growth than the continental SMEs in a wide range of private services.
 The emergence of the Nordic countries as models of how high- wage coun-
tries can meet the challenges of globalization by shifting to more knowledge- 
intensive manufacturing and service production is reflected in recent reports 
by the World Economic Forum (wEF). According to the forum’s most recent 
report on information- age preparedness (released in April 2008), Denmark 
is the most “networked economy” in the world, followed by Sweden in sec-
ond place, Finland in sixth place, and Norway in tenth place. On the forum’s 
broader index of global competitiveness, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland 
ranked third, fourth, and fifth in 2008. By contrast, continental SMEs other 
than Switzerland are notably absent from the top- ten list on both wEF in-
dexes.12
 The wEF rankings take into account the regulatory environment as well as 
the quality of human capital, infrastructure, and government support for re-
search and development. It is commonplace in OECD publications to attribute 
the recent successes of the Nordic economies to deregulatory, liberalizing re-
forms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., OECD 2007a). Let me briefly 
















United States 1.1 6.0 3.7 4.5
Continental averagee 0.7 3.4 2.8 2.4
Germany 0.4 1.0 3.5 2.1
Denmark −1.0 1.7 2.9 3.1
Finland 2.5 9.1 2.5 4.7
Norway 1.0 1.5 4.3 4.2
Sweden 0.9 9.1 3.2 4.0
 a Food products, beverages, tobacco, wood and wood products, pulp and paper products, print-
ing and publishing, other manufacturing and recycling.
 b Chemicals and chemical products, machinery and equipment, transport equipment.
 c Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services (computer and related activities, research 
and development, renting of machinery and equipment, etc.).
 d Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transportation, storage, and communica-
tions.
 e Same countries as in table 1 (columns 1–5).
 Source: OECD, STAN Structural Analysis Database, version 2008 (http://stats.oecd.org/).
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illustrate the kinds of reforms involved here with reference to Sweden. To 
begin with, the Swedish social democrats engaged in deregulation of capital 
markets and financial services on a scale quite similar to Mrs. Thatcher’s “Big 
Bang” in the second half of the 1980s. By all accounts this reform contributed 
to the ensuing assets bubble and the banking crisis of 1991–92, but it also 
seems to have improved access to capital for Swedish firms—and certainly 
had important consequences for the ownership and governance of Swedish 
business. Foreign capital entered on a massive scale through the foreign ac-
quisition of Swedish firms as well as portfolio investment in the 1990s (Hen-
rekson and Jakobsson 2005).
 In eliminating a variety of tax expenditures while lowering the nominal 
rate of profits taxation, the Swedish tax reform of 1990 was also inspired by 
market- liberal thinking. Less commonly noted, the social democrats presided 
over a comprehensive dismantling of price supports and other regulations 
of agriculture in 1990. Furthermore, successive Swedish governments in the 
1980s and 1990s enacted measures that effectively broke up public utilities 
and telecommunications monopolies and partially privatized the ownership 
of relevant state enterprises. Across the entire range of markets for manufac-
tured goods and private services, government reforms have sought to encour-
age competition and entrepreneurship.
 With Norway as something of a laggard, the other Nordic countries have 
engaged in similar deregulatory reforms. A systematic comparative analysis 
lies far beyond the scope of this chapter, but I doubt that anyone would con-
test the proposition that Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have embraced and 
implemented the deregulation of capital markets, product markets, and pri-
vate services to a considerably greater extent than continental SMEs like Ger-
many and France.13
 The Nordic countries reduced the income replacement provided by vari-
ous social insurance programs and also cut spending on public services in the 
early 1990s, but reforms of the welfare state were far more circumscribed 
than the deregulatory reforms enumerated above. Budgetary pressures rather 
than market- liberal ideas clearly constituted the primary motivation behind 
these reforms, and spending cuts were restored as economic growth picked 
up in the second half of the 1990s. Under the umbrella of “flexicurity,” Den-
mark reformed its system of unemployment support in the 1990s, restrict-
ing the duration of passive income support while expanding the rights of 
the long- term unemployed to individually tailored retraining (Madsen 2002), 
but this reform can hardly be described as “market- liberal.” To the contrary, 
it represents an embrace of the principles of Swedish active labor market 
policy. Other social policy reforms can also be said to have shored up existing 
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welfare states. Perhaps most importantly, it is striking that after two decades 
of reform, public monopolies in the provision of education, healthcare, child-
care, and elderly care remain effectively intact in the Nordic countries.
 The trajectory of Nordic political economies might thus be characterized 
as one of far- reaching but targeted or “asymmetric” liberalization, as dis-
tinct from the across- the- board liberalization of Thatcher’s Britain. As I have 
emphasized throughout this chapter, the asymmetric embrace of markets in 
some realms and rejection of market solutions in other realms has long been 
a hallmark of Nordic social democracy. With the benefit of hindsight, the de-
regulatory reforms enumerated above may have been an essential part of the 
political process that enabled the social democrats to regain their capacity to 
define the terms of economic and social policy debate. At the same time, it 
seems plausible to argue that the Nordic countries have been able to engage 
in far- reaching deregulation precisely because their citizens enjoy generous, 
publicly provided welfare provisions that render them less sensitive to the 
fate of the companies in which they work. In other words, the Nordic experi-
ence of the last couple of decades suggests that the compensatory logic of 
social welfare articulated by Katzenstein (1985) applies to domestic liberal-
ization as well as trade liberalization.
 Released shortly before the election of 2006, a report on the Swedish econ-
omy by a team of American and Swedish economists (Freeman, Swedenborg, 
and Topel eds. 2006) concluded that “excessive egalitarianism” remained a 
drag on economic growth and that the economic boom provided a favorable 
environment for allowing income differentials to rise. By contrast, I suggest 
that the egalitarianism of the Nordic countries has contributed positively to 
their economic success since the early 1990s. As I see it, three mechanisms 
are at work. First, coordinated wage bargaining with strong unions has lim-
ited wage differentials resulting from corporate profitability and kept pres-
sure on firms to improve productivity. Even within the private service sec-
tor, the logic of the Rehn- Meidner model still seems to work.14 Indeed, it is 
tempting to argue that the shift from peak- level to industry- level wage bar-
gaining has reduced the need for unions in the Nordic countries to pursue 
inter- occupational leveling and hence enabled them to pursue wage policies 
based more exclusively on Rehn- Meidner principles.
 Second, there can be little doubt that high levels of public investment in 
families and education since the 1970s (or earlier) contributed to the strong 
performance of the Nordic economies in the 1990s and 2000s, and especially 
to the growth of more knowledge- intensive sectors. The broad base of gen-
eral skills—or in other words, the relatively high level of general skills at 
the bottom of the skill distribution—clearly represents the distinctive ad-
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vantage of the Nordic countries, not only in allowing for the use of informa-
tion technology in the production of goods and services but also in making 
for more sophisticated consumers of ICT products. As noted earlier (table 1), 
“information- age literacy” is more widespread in the Nordic countries than 
in any other OECD countries.
 Finally, the Nordic economies have benefited in more or less tangible ways 
from high levels of female labor force participation and gender equality. 
Though I have no quantitative evidence on this score, the large- scale entry of 
women into managerial positions in the corporate sector represents an im-
portant new development in the Nordic countries over the last two decades. 
There is every reason to suppose that the quality of management improves as 
the pool of potential managers increases.
 The final contrast that I want to draw between Nordic and continental tra-
jectories since the early 1990s concerns labor- market dualism. The growth 
of precarious forms of employment and conflicts of interest between labor 
insiders and outsiders has recently emerged as a prominent theme in the 
comparative political economy of advanced industrial states. While King and 
Rueda (2008) treat dualist tendencies as a common feature of all OECD coun-
tries, others (e.g., Iversen and Stephens 2008, 605) conceive growing dualism 
as a distinctively continental European phenomenon. In the latter vein Palier 
and Thelen (2010) argue that growing labor- market dualism in France and 
Germany is a result of the distinctive political dynamics of labor- market and 
social policy reforms in these countries.
 Tables 6–9 present some preliminary evidence in support of the proposi-
tion that dualist tendencies have been less pronounced in the Nordic coun-
tries than in continental Europe over the last ten to fifteen years. To begin 
with, table 6 reports on the percentage of the labor force employed under 
fixed- term contracts. In the mid- 1990s fixed- term contracts were more com-
mon in the Nordic countries than in Germany and the continental SMEs as 
a group. However, the incidence of fixed- term employment declined in the 
Nordic countries (except for Sweden) while it increased on the European con-
tinent in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this respect the Nordic experience 
seems to resemble the experience of the United States more than that of con-
tinental Europe.
 Part- time employment is commonly viewed as another form of precari-
ous employment (e.g., King and Rueda 2008). As shown in table 7, part- time 
workers as a proportion of all workers increased very markedly in Germany 
from 1994 to 2007. The incidence of part- time employment also increased in 
the other continental SMEs over this period, but it declined in Sweden and 
Norway, as in the United States, and remained constant in Denmark. Start-
Table 6. Fixed- Term Employment as Percentage of 
Total Labor Force, 1994–2002
1994 2002 Change
lME average 8.1 7.1 −1.0
 United States 5.1 4.0 −1.1
Continental average 9.3 11.3 2.0
 Germany 10.3 12.0 1.7
Nordic average 14.5 12.4 −2.1
 Denmark 12.0 8.9 −3.1
 Finland 18.3 16.1 −2.2
 Norway 12.9 9.9 −3.0
 Sweden 14.6 14.8 0.2
 Note: lME average excludes Australia; otherwise coun-
tries included in group averages are the same as in table 1 
(columns 1–5). Figures in column 1 are from 1997 for Fin-
land and Sweden, 1996 for Norway.
 Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics Database (down-
loaded and compiled by David Rueda).
Table 7. Part- Time Employment as Percentage of 
Employed Population, 1994–2007
1994 2007 Change
lME average 17.3 18.6 1.3
 United States 14.2 12.6 −1.6
Continental average 18.8 28.8 10.0
 Germany 13.5 22.2 8.7
Nordic average 15.9 16.1 0.2
 Denmark 17.3 17.7 0.4
 Finland  8.9 11.7 2.8
 Norway 21.5 20.4 −1.1
 Sweden 15.8 14.4 −1.4
 Note: Part- time employment defined as less than 30 hours 
per week in one’s main job. For lack of data for 1994, lME 
average excludes Australia and continental average ex-
cludes Austria; otherwise countries included in group aver-
ages are the same as in table 1 (columns 1–5).
 Source: OECD 2008c, 352.
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ing at a much lower level, Finland is the only Nordic country that conforms 
to the continental European pattern with respect to the growth of part- time 
employment.
 Trends in the incidence of long- term unemployment constitute another 
point of contrast between the Nordic countries and continental Europe that 
is relevant to the theme of labor- market dualism. Table 8 reports on the per-
centage of the unemployed who have been unemployed for more than six 
months. During the economic crisis of the early 1990s this figure shot up in 
the Nordic countries, but it never quite reached continental levels, and it has 
Table 8. Long- Term Unemployment (More  
Than 6 Months) as Percentage of Total
Unemployment, 1994–2007
1994 2007 Change
lME average 49.9 30.2 −19.7
 United States 20.3 17.6 −2.7
Continental average 60.0 60.1 0.1
 Germany 63.8 71.3 7.5
Nordic average 48.1 27.3 −20.8
 Denmark 54.0 29.5 −24.5
 Finland 37.9
 Norway 43.7 25.1 −18.6
 Sweden 46.7 27.3 −19.4
 Note: To capture change over time, Nordic average ex-
cludes Finland; otherwise the countries included in group 
averages are the same as table 1 (columns 1–5).
 Source: OECD 2008c, 355.
Table 9. Incidence of Low Pay, 1994–2004
1994 1996 1997 1999 2002 2003 2004
United States 25.1 23.3






 Note: Figures represent percentage of full- time employees earning less than two- thirds of the 
median wage for full- time employees.
 Source: OECD Relative Earnings Database.
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subsequently been more or less halved in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
(with data for the mid- 1990s missing for Finland). Again, the contrast with 
continental Europe is striking. In Germany the incidence of long- term unem-
ployment rose dramatically while the overall unemployment rate held more 
or less steady from 1994 to 2007. Averaging across six continental SMEs, the 
incidence of long- term unemployment remained constant while the overall 
unemployment rate dropped.
 Finally, table 9 presents some fragmentary data on the incidence of low- 
pay employment, defined here as the percentage of full- time workers earn-
ing less than two- thirds of the median wage. The evidence suggests that the 
low- pay labor force has grown in the Nordic countries as well as continental 
Europe, but the increases in Denmark and Sweden are notably smaller than 
those observed in Germany and the Netherlands. As the incidence of low- pay 
employment in continental Europe has begun to approach levels character-
istic of liberal market economies, represented by the United Kingdom and 
the United States in table 9, the Nordic countries stand out even more by this 
measure.
 It deserves to be noted that overall wage inequality among full- time em-
ployees and inequality of gross earnings among working- age households have 
actually increased more in Sweden than in Germany since the 1990s (Pontus-
son 2005a, 45). In Sweden low- skilled and low- paid workers have fared rela-
tively well while highly educated workers have gained relative to the middle. 
This pattern of inequality growth, which resembles that of liberal market 
economies, may be more conducive than the continental pattern to the per-
sistence of a redistributive coalition of low- income and middle- income voters 
(cf. Lupu and Pontusson 2010). For our purposes, suffice it to say that the re-
covery and successful restructuring of the Nordic economies over the last 
fifteen years have not brought about any dramatic increase in the gap be-
tween labor- market insiders and outsiders.15 Relative to continental SMEs, 
the Nordic economies may be less in need of labor- market dualism because 
they rely more extensively on general skills and because their labor markets 
are more flexible.
THE POlICy rEGIME associated with Nordic social democracy cannot be 
captured by a simple formula along the lines of “politics against markets” 
(Esping- Andersen 1985). Rather, this policy regime represents an essentially 
pragmatic approach to managing contemporary capitalism, characterized by 
a combination of collective bargaining and government intervention to regu-
late labor markets, direct government provision of public goods, and redis-
tributive taxes and incomes transfers to correct for inequalities generated 
by markets. Nordic social democrats have not only been willing to concede 
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a lot of terrain to markets, they have celebrated the efficiency of markets as 
mechanisms to allocate productive resources. The “market- friendliness” of 
social democracy became more pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s, but it 
was also quite pronounced in the 1950s and 1960s, and the generous bound-
aries that social democratic ideology sets for market solutions to societal 
problems remain. To my mind, it is the radical trade- union initiatives of the 
1970s (Pontusson 1992) rather than the deregulatory reforms and budget- 
balancing measures of the 1990s that represent a radical break with the social 
democratic tradition. In particular, it is noteworthy that postwar Nordic gov-
ernments pursued quite restrictive fiscal policies (premised on full employ-
ment, the Rehn- Meidner model incorporated this policy stance).
 What are the consequences of the global economic crisis that began to 
unfold in the fall of 2008 for the social democratic policy regime as I have 
conceived it in this chapter? A few brief comments must suffice. The origins 
of the crisis clearly call into question the laissez- faire approach to financial 
markets adopted by Nordic social democrats, along with just about all other 
major political parties, in the 1980s and 1990s. It also seems clear, already, 
that recovery from the crisis will require fiscal stimulus on a scale that ex-
ceeds anything the Nordic countries have experienced since the 1930s. The 
Nordic countries are neither immune to the crisis nor particularly vulnerable. 
Most importantly for present purposes, the main policy challenges would 
seem to lie outside the realm of the social democratic policy regime. The 
social democratic policy regime itself does not prescribe a particular fiscal 
policy stance, restrictive or expansionary, and macro- economic conditions do 
not alter the (desirable) effects of its core components. The same argument 
holds, I think, with respect to the question of how financial markets should 
be regulated. These observations imply an important clarification of the pre-
ceding discussion: the social democratic policy regime as I conceive it is not 
a comprehensive regime that encompasses all aspects of economic and social 
policy.
 I have argued that the social democratic policy regime remains viable 
under conditions of globalization and liberalization. To clarify further, this 
part of my argument pertains specifically to the political and economic via-
bility of the social democratic policy regime. Throughout this chapter I have 
quite deliberately shied away from the question of which conditions will en-
able parties pursuing social democratic policies to be electorally successful. 
As Moschonas (this volume) shows, a secular decline of electoral support for 
mainstream social democratic parties has occurred across northern Europe 
over the last two or three decades. The reasons for this are complex, but one 
thing seems clear: societal demand for social democratic policies has not di-
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minished. With rising inequality and employment insecurity, the opposite is 
surely true. One might plausibly argue that the decline of unions and other 
social and political trends have diminished the voice of those who benefit 
most from social democratic policies. The Nordic experience suggests another 
possibility, namely that other political parties—other left parties as well as 
centrist and center- right parties—have embraced social democratic policies 
and thereby weakened the electoral appeal of social democratic parties. In 
my mind the extent to which the social democratic policy regime depends on 
electoral mobilization by social democratic parties is an open question.
 In closing, let me very briefly address the question of the relevance of the 
social democratic policy regime for progressive politics in the United States 
and other liberal market economies. In contrast to adherents of the Varieties- 
of- Capitalism school, I have emphasized in this chapter that core policies 
associated with Nordic social democracy are broadly conducive to produc-
tivity growth and benefit more efficient and knowledge- intensive firms across 
manufacturing and services. In addition, I have tried to suggest that “stock- 
market capitalism” does not necessarily render these policies inoperative. 
The pragmatic nature of the social democratic approach also deserves to be 
noted in this context. With regard to wage solidarity, for example, the social 
democratic approach does not prescribe some particular leveling of wage dif-
ferentials that must be obtained: any standardization of wages across firms 
with variable profitability is considered desirable.
 In short, I believe that there is quite a lot of room for social democracy in 
liberal market economies. At the same time, I have emphasized that the im-
plementation of solidaristic wage policy and other components of the social 
democratic policy regime presuppose relatively strong unions. To some ex-
tent government may be a “functional substitute” for strong unions. Most 
obviously, we might think of minimum wage legislation as a substitute for 
solidaristic wage bargaining, curtailing the extent to which low wages subsi-
dize inefficient firms. Similarly, government legislation can obviously provide 
workers with protection against unfair dismissals and serve to enforce occu-
pational health and safety standards. I do not wish to imply that government 
should desist from these activities, but the comparison of the Nordic coun-
tries and continental Europe introduces a cautionary note, for it suggests that 
extensive government regulation of labor markets and employment condi-
tions may preempt unionization. Building stronger unions must surely be an 
indispensable part of any effort to move economic and social policies in the 
United States in a social democratic direction.
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Notes
I thank Jim Cronin, George Ross, and Jim Shoch for their comments and, above all, 
their patience. For help with table 5, I am grateful to my research assistant, Michael 
Becher. Above all, I am very much indebted to Mary O’Sullivan, whose criticisms 
forced me to make major revisions at a stage when I thought that I was almost finished 
with this paper.
 1. Perhaps it is needless to say that I use the term “Nordic” rather than “Scandina-
vian” because I think that Finland deserves to be included among the countries with 
a social democratic policy regime. From a comparative Nordic perspective, the Finn-
ish experience is exceptional on at least two counts: the country industrialized much 
later than in Scandinavia, and political and ideological struggles on the left divided the 
labor movement. As a result, the Finnish social democratic party never assumed the 
same position as its Scandinavian sister parties held in the 1950s and 1960s, yet Finnish 
politics clearly shifted in a social democratic direction in the 1970s and 1980s. Argu-
ably, policy diffusion among the Nordic countries contributed to this development.
 2. “Liberal market economies” (lMEs) constitute another comparison group to 
which the following discussion will refer. Exemplified by the United States, this group 
also includes Australia, Canada, Ireland, and the UK. Pontusson 2005a juxtaposes 
lMEs and SMEs and then distinguishes between Nordic and continental SMEs. To em-
phasize differences between Nordic and continental political economies, I here reserve 
the term “social market economies” (coined by German Christian Democrats in the 
1950s) for continental countries with comprehensive systems of social protection. This 
terminological change is part of an effort to correct what I now consider a fundamental 
ambiguity in Inequality and Prosperity (2005). See Pontusson 2006 for an earlier “cor-
rection” along similar lines.
 3. Among continental welfare states Belgium stands out as comparable to the 
Nordic welfare states in terms of its redistributive impact. See Pontusson 2005a, 153–
62.
 4. Like most of the tables that follow, table 1 sorts countries into three groups and 
reports group averages as well as individual figures for the United States, Germany, 
and the four Nordic countries. Of course group averages sometimes hide significant 
variation within groups: the main instances of divergence within the continental and 
Nordic groups will be noted in the text.
 5. See Pontusson 1992 for a more detailed discussion of solidaristic wage policy as 
a form of industrial policy.
 6. To clarify, the Nordic countries and the continental European countries that I call 
“social market economies” are all (with the possible exception of France) “coordinated 
market economies” by the criteria of the VofC literature. Japan is commonly thought 
to exemplify yet another CME variant.
 7. See Pontusson 2005b for a more comprehensive critique of the VofC approach.
 8. Rothstein (1992) makes a similar argument about unemployment insurance. It 
is hardly a coincidence that public subsidies to union- administered unemployment 
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funds play a very prominent role in the unemployment insurance systems of Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland and that these countries also have very high and apparently 
resilient rates of unionization. Among continental SMEs Belgium alone has a Ghent 
system of unemployment insurance. For the Nordic countries this feature represents a 
very notable departure from welfare- state universalism.
 9. Note that in making these comparisons I do not include Ireland in the lME aver-
age, for the simple reason that Ireland grew at twice the rate of any other country in-
cluded in table 3 during the 1990s.
 10. At 2.6%, the Norwegian unemployment rate was the lowest of any OECD country 
in 2007. Three other countries performed better than Denmark (3.8%) by this measure: 
Korea, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The unemployment rates reported here are 
standardized rates from the OECD (2008b, 335).
 11. I follow OECD convention in classifying manufacturing sectors as either “low- 
technology” or “HMH.”
 12. In 2008 the Netherlands ranked seventh on networked readiness while Germany 
ranked tenth on global competitiveness. For further details see http://www.weforum 
.org.
 13. See OECD 2007, 44, for comparative data on product market regulations.
 14. By contrast, Iversen and Wren (1998) seem to posit (for reasons that I do not fully 
understand) that the logic of the Rehn- Meidner model only applies to manufacturing.
 15. The pioneering discussion by Rueda (2007) of the politics of insider- outsider 
conflict misses this contrast between Nordic and continental political economies 
(which all score high on his measure of “corporatism”).
Embracing Markets, Bonding with America,  
Trying to Do Good
The Ironies of New Labour
James Cronin
Not long after Labour won office in 1997, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder 
put their names to a book entitled The Third Way (Blair and Schröder 1999). 
It was not destined to be a best- seller, but it did capture the feeling in the late 
1990s that perhaps New Labour had solved the problem of how to be a social 
democratic party in an era largely inhospitable to parties and movements of 
the left. The party came to power armed with a supposedly new outlook and 
program and it had ridden its new message to an overwhelming electoral vic-
tory. Was New Labour the future?
 A decade later very few progressives, whether European social democrats 
or American liberals, would assign to New Labour such a historic role. The 
war in Iraq largely discredited Blair’s government at home and abroad, and 
the fallout from Iraq served to confirm for many, especially on the left, the 
suspicion that Labour under Blair’s leadership had sold its soul for politi-
cal power (Shaw 2007). Gordon Brown’s tenure was worse, for although he 
sought to separate himself from what were seen as the negatives of Tony 
Blair, he did not succeed in regaining popular support. Brown had some bad 
luck, though no more than is normal for a leader, and he suffered as the 
economy collapsed as well, but these factors alone cannot account for the 
dramatic decline in his, and the party’s, support. At least three other factors 
would appear to have been at work: Brown’s unattractive persona; a perhaps 
normal but in this case unusually rapid shift away from the party that had 
held power for over a decade; and the quite important fact that the Tories had 
not only a new and younger and more attractive leader but also a new set of 
policies that at least in theory were much closer to those of Labour than its 
earlier policies had been.
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 The effect of all this has been a kind of amnesia and absence of context in 
the assessment of what Labour achieved in its decade in power. Critics focus 
reasonably, but far too narrowly, on the recent defeat or on the party’s diffi-
culties over Iraq, and their eagerness to pronounce the “end of New Labour” 
suggests an antipathy masking itself as history. The newly elected leader, Ed 
Miliband, largely based his campaign on the need to go beyond New Labour 
and in this way abetted those who never liked it. The unfortunate effect is to 
largely pass over the actual record of Labour in government. There is also a 
tendency to forget that the appropriate context for assessing New Labour is 
the record of failure and frustration that preceded it: specifically, the eigh-
teen years that Labour spent in the wilderness after 1979, as Thatcher and her 
successors effectively destroyed what Labour had built over generations and 
in the process transformed the political landscape in Britain. This particular 
piece of forgetting has also allowed people to believe that because Labour 
won large parliamentary majorities in 1997 and again in 2001, the party was 
free to do more or less whatever it chose to do while in office. Forgetting the 
context affects the assessment of foreign policy as well and, because the war 
in Iraq turned out so badly, critics have not been compelled to confront the 
very complicated question of what a “progressive” foreign policy would look 
like in an age of globalization, “rogue states,” jihadist terror, and interna-
tional uncertainty. It has been enough to denounce what was done and those 
who did it. Fair enough for debate, not good enough as history or as political 
analysis, and quite unhelpful in answering the perennial but now especially 
urgent question: “What is to be done?”
Forged in Adversity: The Making of New Labour
New Labour’s claims to be new were, and indeed still are, sometimes dis-
puted. Inevitably the party in its current form bears the marks of its origins 
and its long history, not least in its name. Nevertheless it is also the product 
of a protracted and systematic effort to “modernize” the party, to reimagine 
its vision, to remake its program, and to develop new sources of support.1 The 
effort was a response to the challenges confronting all social democratic and 
liberal parties, but it is important to understand just how, and how seriously, 
these challenges presented themselves in Britain. Everywhere the center- left 
was forced to deal with the perceived ineffectiveness of Keynesian formu-
las in solving the economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s. This is not to 
say that Keynesian solutions were by themselves wrong or their theoreti-
cal underpinnings less firm than those supporting rival policy frameworks. 
The point is that the conventional wisdom associated with Keynesianism—
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the priority in policymaking given to full employment, the assumed compat-
ibility between large state expenditures and sustained growth, the notion 
that moderate shifts in fiscal and monetary policy could effectively manage 
economic problems—ceased to be compelling and so came to be less widely 
accepted.
 Nowhere did this process go further or have more devastating effects than 
in Britain. The “stagflation” of the 1970s was superimposed upon a pattern of 
long- term economic decline in the United Kingdom, and policymakers were 
asked to address both the short- term crisis and the secular trend. They failed 
on both counts, calling into question all their policy nostrums and discredit-
ing mainstream, consensually oriented Conservatism as well as the Labour 
Party. Labour was particularly vulnerable because it was in office during the 
period 1974–79, the worst of the crisis, and so bore much of the blame, and 
because even while it was in office its policies were incoherent. The party 
was deeply split between the left, centered increasingly on the figure of Tony 
Benn, and those on a looser right, though it is perhaps more accurate to call 
them centrists or simply moderates. The left wanted more state ownership 
and planning, more spending and taxes, and a “fundamental and irreversible” 
shift in power away from corporations and elites—what together became the 
“alternative economic strategy.” The strategy was premised on withdrawal 
from the European Community and the need to construct an autarchic “siege” 
economy during the transition. Centrists within the party were more corpo-
ratist in approach, keen to build on the party’s historic ties to the trade unions 
to craft a social contract that would hold down wages and prices while re-
distributing wealth toward the poorest by increasing “the social wage.”2 This 
was basically a strategy to manage the economic crisis of the 1970s and do 
some good for the least well- off workers in the process. Actual policy was 
decided and implemented by party moderates, though the left won many 
rhetorical battles and the unions exercised a veto over initiatives from wher-
ever they came. By 1979 policy had failed dramatically, and the Labour gov-
ernment led by James Callaghan found itself presiding over a “winter of dis-
content” brought on by a rebellion from within the ranks of trade unionists, 
especially in the public sector. Pictures of garbage piling up in the streets, re-
ports of graves undug and of ambulance drivers refusing to drive the sick to 
hospitals, paved the way for the election of Margaret Thatcher and a dramatic 
break with all the orthodoxies of the Labour Party, those of its right as much 
as its left. The shift away from Keynes would be truly seismic in Britain, and 
it would be ongoing.
 The turn away from Keynes and the state and toward the market was the 
defining and enduring feature of Thatcherism. Its “neoliberal” program had 
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enormous effects on the economy and society: it shifted the burden of taxes 
away from the wealthy; it abolished exchange controls and deregulated in-
dustry and finance; it renounced the government’s traditional commitment 
to full employment and replaced it with commitments to fiscal orthodoxy and 
the control of inflation; it abandoned previous “corporatist” policies, accord-
ing to which key decisions were discussed with representatives of industry 
and the trade unions—instead the government chose to confront the trade 
unions and restrict the scope and effectiveness of industrial action. Thatcher-
ism divested the state of ownership and hence control of key industries and 
to that degree gave away critical levers over the economy, and it sold off the 
bulk of the public housing that half a century of progressive urban policy had 
built.
 What was decisive and brilliant about these moves was that they were 
largely irreversible. Once the state has given up control and ownership over 
essential industries and resources, it is hard or at least prohibitively expensive 
to get them back; once taxes on the well- to- do are reduced, raising them again 
is nearly impossible short of a national emergency; once working people get 
a taste of homeownership, they do not want to lose what they now own; once 
the unions have been reduced in membership and political influence, they 
stay relatively powerless. Thatcher’s governments left a huge legacy that was 
very hard to displace, and it was this institutional inheritance that Labour 
was forced to deal with. New Labour has often been criticized for accept-
ing too much of this legacy.3 The party’s record in office, it followed, would 
amount to little more than a “humane Thatcherism” or, as one analyst labeled 
it, a kind of “compensatory neoliberalism.”4 Such criticism, however, is fun-
damentally and historically naïve, for it vastly underestimates the weight and 
durability of what Thatcher brought about.
 Labour in Britain also confronted, more sharply than the center- left else-
where, a rapidly changing electorate. The transition from an industrial to a 
postindustrial economy, from the production of goods to the provision of ser-
vices, was more drastic and abrupt in Britain than elsewhere in Europe or 
even in America. As of the 1960s Britain still had hundreds of thousands of 
workers employed in industries like mining, textiles, and shipbuilding. These 
were among the leading industries of the first industrial revolution and, ap-
propriately, were often Victorian in their use of technology, their manage-
ment structures, and their approach to marketing. They were old and destined 
to disappear. The United Kingdom also had its share of firms operating in the 
industries characteristic of the second industrial revolution—steel, chemi-
cals, later motor cars and other consumer durables—but even here produc-
tivity lagged and techniques compared poorly with those prevalent among 
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Britain’s continental competitors and in the United States. But neither Labour 
nor the Tories had much of a plan for managing the rundown of old industries 
and the shift into newer lines of work. The historic strength of finance and 
services did provide employment for an ever- expanding share of the work-
force, prompting endless discussions during the 1950s and especially the 
1960s about the “black- coated worker” (Britain’s term for the white- collar 
worker) and “affluent worker” and their impact on politics. But into the 1970s 
very large numbers continued to work in manual jobs in older industries. The 
effect on Labour as a party was twofold: first, it only gradually and incon-
sistently redirected its appeal toward white- collar workers and did little to 
adapt its message and appeal; and second, its policies were overwhelmingly 
oriented to protecting a workforce whose physiognomy was already changing 
and about to change even more. The clearest manifestation of this social fact 
was the enormous clout of coal miners within the counsels, thinking, and lore 
of the party: mining strikes in the early 1970s virtually brought down the Con-
servative government led by Edward Heath, for example, and served as the 
template for what “direct action” could achieve; and it would be the miners 
whose desperate but doomed strike in 1984–85 sealed the fate of the enduring 
tradition of Labour as the party committed overwhelmingly to the defense of 
manual workers.
 For the Labour Party, therefore, the transformation from a party of the 
workers to a catch- all cross- class party came very late and all of a sudden. 
During the Thatcher period, in fact, entire industries and working- class com-
munities simply disappeared, and when the economy slowly began to grow 
again in the 1980s it did not in any sense revive; rather, it expanded by means 
of new industries in new locations and in the process created the outlines of 
a new social structure. The Labour Party was therefore forced in the 1980s 
not only to develop new policies but to do so while confronting a new elec-
torate. It was this novelty that Marxism Today, the most thoughtful and en-
gaged advocate of a reoriented Labour Party, tried to capture with the phrase 
“New Times.” Deploying the classically Marxian trope of “base and super-
structure,” the New Times were said to be rooted in the transformation from 
a “Fordist” to a “post- Fordist” economy and required that ideas and policies 
be updated accordingly. The party had to alter its traditional rhetoric, policy 
assumptions, and even emotional attachments if it was to compete effectively 
in a post- Fordist, Thatcherite, neoliberal world. As with the shift away from 
Keynes, the Labour Party was pushed to reconstruct its social base, the con-
stituencies and interests that it spoke for, dramatically and abruptly.
 The need to reshape the Labour Party was made still more urgent by the 
electoral landscape of the 1980s. The split within Labour actually worsened 
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after 1979. The left effectively took over the party and prompted secession by 
the right, which in 1981 launched the Social Democratic Party (SDP) with the 
specific aim of capturing the center ground of British politics. Labour’s first 
response was to hold firm, and it chose to fight the general election of 1983 
on the most left- wing program it had ever espoused—what one MP called 
“the longest suicide note in history.” The party’s worst defeat since 1931 led 
to the election of Neil Kinnock as party leader. Kinnock was seen as a man 
of the left and elected as such, but he was ultimately to lead the party back 
toward the center. However, he was forced to spend his first two years dealing 
with the miners’ strike and the influence on the so- called Militant Tendency 
(a small but surprisingly effective Trotskyist sect) within the local parties in 
Liverpool and parts of London. By 1985 Kinnock turned to an effort to re-
shape the party’s message and, in effect, to compete for the centrist voters 
lost to the SDP and the Tories. To do so he gathered around himself a coterie 
of “modernizers” including Charles Clarke, Patricia Hewitt, and Peter Man-
delson. The immediate focus was presentation, but after the defeat of 1987 it 
would include policy as well. The Policy Review of 1987–89 moved the party’s 
program decidedly to the center. By certain standards it could be argued that 
Labour only became a genuinely social democratic party in 1989, when it 
finally reconciled itself to working within the “mixed economy” and gave up 
its aspiration, never realistic but nevertheless never relinquished, for socialist 
transformation.
 Despite this major policy reorientation, Labour failed again to dislodge 
the Tories in the election of 1992. It had seen off the threat from the SDP, but 
it was still far from being able to beat the Conservatives. This fourth succes-
sive defeat was in some respects even more traumatic than earlier ones. After 
all, the party had reformed itself, purged itself, fashioned a new and more 
attractive message, and still lost. The effects were mixed in the short term, 
profound and utterly decisive in the long term. Kinnock resigned straight-
away and was replaced by John Smith, a moderate Scot whose selection sig-
naled a period of consolidation and whose supporters believed that with “one 
more shove” Labour could win. The modernizers, who by this time were led 
by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, were appalled, for they believed that the 
lesson of 1992 was the need for further reform. When Smith died in 1994 he 
was replaced by Blair, who chose to push even harder on the modernizing 
agenda. His first big achievement was to convince the party that it should re-
place clause IV, the commitment to public ownership, in its constitution. The 
move was largely symbolic, but it had the right effect, for it sent a message 
to voters, the press, and potential rivals that Labour had become a quite new 
and different party.
122 Cronin
 These final moves toward modernizing and centering the party were at 
least partly stimulated by the two other forces that have recently constrained 
center- left parties across Europe: the collapse of communism and the progress 
of globalization. The Communist Party (CPGB) was never a major force within 
British politics, in part because it effectively chose to cast its fate with the 
Labour Party from the 1930s. Marxist ideas of various sorts had nevertheless 
a fairly wide influence on the left. The collapse of communism had an effect 
that was only modest practically, but large symbolically and emotionally. It 
was a signal that notions of socialist transformation, and hopes of transcend-
ing capitalism, really were the stuff of nostalgia and served no useful purpose 
even in the rhetoric of the Labour Party. To some, like Jack Straw, this meant 
that it was time to alter the party’s image and discourse by finally abandon-
ing claims about socialism and in particular by ridding the constitution of 
clause IV (Straw 1993). Blair, as party leader, would agree.
 Britain’s place in the world economy, and its unique dependence on inter-
national trade and finance, has long been an important factor in British poli-
tics. As the first and most consistent of free trade nations, Britain has been 
much more exposed to the opportunities and vulnerabilities that stem from 
that stance than its rivals and competitors have been (Trentmann 2008). This 
exposure was increased massively and deliberately after the election of Mar-
garet Thatcher: the Tories quickly announced the abolition of exchange con-
trols, for example, and sought to make London once again the world’s leading 
financial center, albeit through the activities of American banks and invest-
ment houses. The “big bang” of 1986 was the key milestone in this process. 
The Conservatives also welcomed foreign investment in industry and, per-
haps most important, were willing to see British firms perish if they could 
not effectively compete internationally. Britain was also keen on creating a 
European “single market” in the 1980s. All of this made globalization more 
real for Britain than for other major economies and made it easy and logical 
for the modernizers in the Labour Party to insist that their policies were to 
a considerable extent dictated by the need to compete in international mar-
kets. Some within the party might be tempted to object, of course, for there 
had been strong support within the party for policies that would constrain or 
counteract the world market and protect industry and jobs from its devastat-
ing effects. These were in fact the assumptions and intentions of the “alterna-
tive economic strategy” proposed in the late 1970s. But the implementation 
of that strategy was effectively preempted by the decision to secure an IMF 
loan in 1976. The need for the loan, though disputed then and since, offered 
a choice between participating fully in the world economy and not doing so. 
Once made, the choice was difficult to reverse; and the modernizers within 
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the party insisted that opting out was inconceivable (Burk and Cairncross 
1982; Fay and Young 1978; Callaghan 2000).
 So party competition, shifts in the sociology of the electorate, and the re-
peated failures of the Labour Party while in office and the consequent dis-
crediting of its policy assumptions, as well as the more diffuse but no less 
important effects of the end of communism and the advance of globaliza-
tion—all put enormous pressure on the Labour Party to become something 
very different. As the modernizers, Blair especially, came to understand this 
imperative, they sought to transform three of the defining features of the 
party. First, they worked hard to refashion the party’s image and rhetoric. 
This meant embracing modern campaign techniques and the instruments re-
quired to make them effective—polls, focus groups, and the employment of 
public relations staff rather than researchers or organizers. It also led to the 
selection of leaders and spokesmen who looked, talked, and acted the part. 
The second task was to redefine the message: Labour’s program during the 
1970s and into the late 1980s was on the whole quite radical, but it had by 
the 1990s been rejected again and again. The major work in revising the pro-
gram was done in the late 1980s under Kinnock, but the process would con-
tinue under Smith and Blair. With the accession of Blair to the leadership, 
moreover, revision became more intense and aggressive. So long as Kinnock 
and Smith were leaders, the move to the center was seen and understood as 
a tactical necessity, not something done out of conviction. Blair set out to 
convince voters that he really meant it, that he and Brown and their allies 
genuinely believed that the market was a good thing and not merely some-
thing to be accommodated, that New Labour could make a market economy 
work better and produce more humane outcomes, and that they embraced 
the future and the role of the market and of business within it rather than 
merely acquiescing in its inevitability. Not everyone within the party agreed, 
and many grumbled privately and a few openly, but the grumbling was much 
diminished when the party won office in 1997.
 The third and less often noted set of changes had to do with organization 
(Russell 2005). The structure of the Labour Party differed qualitatively from 
that of other parties in Britain and, it would seem, from social democratic 
parties elsewhere. Labour in origin was a projection of the trade union inter-
est into politics, formed largely to protect that interest industrially, and the 
trade unions were built directly into its organization. Thus most members of 
the party were members by virtue of their membership in trade unions; the 
great bulk of party finances came from the unions rather than from individual 
subscriptions or donations; at the annual party conference, which defined the 
party’s principles and set out its program, trade unions controlled fully 90% 
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of the votes until the early 1990s; and trade unions long had substantial built- 
in representation on the National Executive Committee. Inevitably the con-
nection largely defined the underlying outlook and culture of the party also, 
even if there was a gloss of ethical socialism and Marxism laid on top. And it 
served the party well over many years, providing financial support and the 
backbone of electoral mobilization.
 Over time, however, the union link had two further and ultimately un-
happy consequences. During the 1960s and especially the 1970s the party in 
government had tried to do three things simultaneously: to generate as much 
growth and employment as possible; to move the economy, or society, in a 
more collectivist and egalitarian direction; and to do these things while keep-
ing prices under control. The problem was that the first two objectives largely 
contradicted the third. Labour governments in Britain, like governments else-
where, had very few mechanisms at hand for maintaining price stability. The 
best they could do was ask the trade unions to help. Trade union leaders were 
willing, but their members were not. The effect was a series of botched efforts 
to get the trade unions’ cooperation in controlling inflation. In 1968–69, for 
example, the government produced a white paper, “In Place of Strife,” which 
proposed that union leaders be given the power to rein in unofficial strikes. 
In return unions and their members would be accorded an impressive array of 
rights and privileges. The effort got nowhere, and the government was forced 
into a retreat that showed its impotence in the fact of union resistance. A de-
cade later a still weaker Labour government tried to manage the economic 
crisis it faced by asking unions to agree to another year of wage restraint. 
Such a policy had worked from 1974 through 1977, as the government had 
offered increases in the “social wage”—i.e., in pensions and social services—
and in the wages of the poorest workers as part of a broad “social contract.” 
It finally failed, in the “winter of discontent.”
 The effect was not merely the election of Mrs. Thatcher. The inability to 
make the trade union connection work for Labour in power discredited the 
connection itself as well as the trade unions. The fiasco over “In Place of 
Strife” demonstrated that trade union leaders wielded a de facto veto over 
Labour policy; the winter of discontent demonstrated that the disaffected 
rank and file could veto what their leaders had decided on high. The party 
was rendered doubly ineffective. Leaders like Wilson and Callaghan and later 
Kinnock found the situation embarrassing; Blair regarded it as intolerable, 
and his allies were determined to overcome it. They were aided in this by 
Margaret Thatcher, who beat the miners into submission, rewrote labor law, 
and presided over a decade of industrial transformation that left the unions 
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severely weakened. For their part the Labour modernizers were careful in 
opposition not to promise to reverse Tory industrial relations policy; they 
also made it clear that the unions were not to enjoy special access to a future 
Labour government. More important, they initiated a series of alterations in 
the internal organization of the party that reduced the influence of the trade 
unions. The aim was not merely to distance themselves from the unions but 
to prevent the unions from ever exercising the decisive influence they had 
wielded during previous Labour regimes.
New Labour in Power
These decisions, the problems they were meant to solve, and the constraints 
they were intended to overcome all had a very big impact on what New 
Labour did in power after 1997. So too did the party’s promise not to exceed 
Tory spending limits for the first two years and the decision, made shortly 
after the election, to let the Bank of Eng land set interest rates outside the con-
trol of the government. The effect of a moderate program, a rhetoric aimed at 
consensus, and policies designed not to upset but reassure financial markets 
made for a first term with only modest achievements. Gradually, however, 
New Labour gained the confidence and experience to begin seriously to im-
plement its program. It also profited from the brute fact of economic success, 
which meant that the proceeds of growth could be used to direct money to 
Labour’s preferred objectives. In the election of 2001, moreover, the govern-
ment hinted at least at the prospect of an increase in national insurance con-
tributions—in theory not a tax increase, but everyone understood it as such—
and another decisive victory led to its adoption. Labour now had the money 
and the experience to put its stamp upon policy and upon society.
 What did it do, and how well? The answer depends in part on where one 
looks, on what area of policy one chooses to emphasize. Any list is arbitrary, 
but any moderately comprehensive one would presumably include: economic 
performance and employment; the funding and administration of public ser-
vices such as health, education, and transport, and how these translate into 
outcomes; the constitution and distribution of power and authority; and issues 
of personal and national security, from crime to foreign policy. What is perhaps 
most interesting about the experience of New Labour is that in most of these 
areas the government claimed to be doing something new and distinctive, dif-
ferent not only from the Tories but also from what past Labour governments 
had done or at least tried to do. In assessing its performance, it is therefore 
useful to ask both how New Labour did and also whether success or failure had 
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anything to do with the distinctive innovations, if any, made by New Labour in 
government. A thorough analysis would take volumes, but a brief inventory is 
possible (Shaw 2007; Seldon 2007; Toynbee and Walker 2010).
The Economy and Employment
Labour had the good fortune to inherit an economy in recovery. The party 
promised, of course, to manage growth better than the Tories, but it offered 
few specific proposals. Labour would essentially continue to provide a stable 
macroeconomic framework with only minor alterations. The most visible 
move was the decision to let the Bank of Eng land set interest rates free from 
detailed government involvement. Did this matter economically? It is difficult 
to say definitively, but the decision did send a message to financial markets 
that Labour was committed to market mechanisms and to the fight against 
inflation. The message was a welcome one to business and certainly did much 
to reassure investors that they had little to fear from New Labour. Whether 
that belief conduced to greater economic growth is, again, very hard to deter-
mine. What can be said is that this initial decision, coupled with a decade of 
generally prudent fiscal policy under Gordon Brown’s supervision, did noth-
ing to derail an economy that was already growing substantially. In fact, the 
record of sustained economic growth compiled during the first decade of New 
Labour rule exceeded that of any previous administration. It is of course pos-
sible that New Labour was merely profiting from policies begun earlier by 
its opponents and was unfairly given credit that others deserved, but that is 
how politics works.
 What was new about Labour’s economic and employment policies, then, 
was not any departures from what the Tories had put in place, but rather 
how they differed from the party’s history. New Labour broke decisively from 
what was seen as the pattern of previous Labour governments, which prom-
ised to do a great deal, to spend and (inevitably) to tax, and to make use of 
the state to spur economic growth and create jobs. New Labour no longer 
believed this was possible, and so did not promise it. What it did offer was 
a range of policies to increase employment by making people more employ-
able and giving them greater incentives to work. The theoretical underpin-
nings of the approach were found in “endogenous growth theory,” which 
focused on skills and knowledge. Practically speaking, getting more people 
into work—insertion, as some would call it, or labor market activation in 
another parlance—would simultaneously reduce the number on welfare and 
promote “social inclusion.” A prominent initiative, partly modeled on the 
welfare reform efforts of President Bill Clinton, was the so- called New Deal, 
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which offered financial support as well as childcare to those willing to enter 
approved training schemes, vocational education, or subsidized work (King 
and Wickham- Jones 1990). The first program aimed at the young; subsequent 
ones focused on single parents, the disabled, and the long- term unemployed. 
A related set of policies sought to reduce the disincentives to work: free or 
subsidized childcare, for example, would eliminate or at least lower that bar-
rier to employment; a minimum wage would make work pay better for the 
poorest; and the “Working Families Tax Credit” together with the Child Tax 
Credit would allow a kind of “top- up” beyond what they ordinarily earned. 
The aim was to escape the so- called poverty trap that rendered work less 
profitable than relief. Alongside these “active labor market policies” was 
a broader interest in encouraging human capital development through in-
creased investment in education and policies aimed at nurturing “knowledge- 
based” industries through more research and development. Labour chose to 
call this mix of policies “supply- side socialism,” and they did work on the 
supply side, though to call this socialism is rather a stretch (Romano 2006).
 Whatever the label, the consensus is that the New Deal, tax credits, train-
ing, and improved daycare arrangements have been moderately effective: 
more people were employed overall and in the target groups, and the wel-
fare of the poorest workers and their families substantially improved. It is 
of course hard to say with certainty that these shifts are long- term and that 
they will survive a sustained economic downturn, but the effects in the short 
and medium term have been largely positive. It also seems that in certain re-
spects the quality of work has improved and the rights of workers have been 
marginally enhanced. Policies on family leave and equal opportunity, for ex-
ample, have been deemed largely successful. Here the key was not so much 
new British laws and programs as the importation of European standards. 
During its long period in opposition the Labour Party had faced a dilemma 
over its stance on the rights of unions and of workers more generally. The 
Thatcher government’s industrial relations legislation was deeply resented by 
the trade unions but popular with voters. The party therefore needed to do 
something for the unions without alienating others. The solution was found 
in Europe: Labour decided to leave the Tories’ legislative framework intact 
but to accept the Social Charter first proposed by Jacques Delors. The Tories, 
by contrast, opted out of that bit of the European bargain. The social rights 
outlined in the charter stood between the minimal rights accorded workers 
and unions in current British law and the much more extensive set of protec-
tions and immunities that unions had enjoyed in Britain up through 1979. The 
party managed to convince the trade unions that the European package was 
the best they could get; and on assuming office in 1997 the government opted 
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in to its provisions. Unions and workers have benefited, more as individuals 
than collectively, and union membership, which declined precipitously in the 
1980s and 1990s, has begun to recover, if only slightly (Howell 2004).
Public Services
If Labour inherited an improving economy in 1997, it also inherited a de-
teriorating array of public services. Nearly twenty years of Conservative gov-
ernment bequeathed a legacy of underinvestment in education, health, and 
transportation. Scholars have debated to what extent the Conservatives were 
able to roll back the welfare state, and it is clear that they were able to make 
only modest cuts in the National Health Services (NHS) and for the most part 
in education (Pierson 1994). It is nevertheless also widely agreed that rates of 
increase were cut, necessary improvements and maintenance were delayed, 
and pay and conditions for public sector employees declined or improved 
only marginally. There was thus a historic deficit of expenditures that the 
Labour government would want to make up.
 That would almost have to happen, though finding the funds would not 
be simple. Doing so, and doing so with minimal tax increases or controversy, 
was Gordon Brown’s primary achievement as chancellor. It took a couple of 
years for the government to begin increasing expenditures on public services, 
but over time it provided enormous sums. Indeed, it has been widely reported 
that the NHS was simply unable to spend all that it was receiving from the 
government. And there have been results: the recruitment of doctors and 
nurses went way up in the health services, waiting times came way down. Ex-
penditures on health increased by 7.4% per year in real terms between 2002 
and 2008, for example, and nearly as much was spent on education. Spending 
for transport also increased substantially.
 Increased funding and better outcomes on a wide range of measures have 
nevertheless not brought happiness. Two reasons apparently account for this. 
First, taking responsibility for social provision makes any government, any 
agency, responsible for what goes wrong as well as for what works. Blair 
famously said that New Labour believes not in dogma but in “what works,” 
but what works tends not to be noticed and so is taken for granted while 
failure attracts endless attention. Every botched diagnosis, every MrSA in-
fection, every drop in exam results, every train failure is reported and some-
one is blamed, so it is very hard for any government to get proper credit for 
improved services. This enduring condition has been exacerbated by New 
Labour’s approach to the public sector. Early on New Labour decided that 
increases in funding had to be accompanied by “reform,” and reform was 
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typically defined, controversially, as involving increases in competition and 
choice. The public sector, in New Labour’s view, should be restructured ac-
cording to the principles and practices of the market. In certain cases services 
should be provided directly by the private sector, even if that led to profit 
making at public expense. It also meant a shift in rhetoric, with public sector 
workers and their unions cast as opponents of reform, as “producer interests” 
that got in the way of the interests of consumers or patients or clients or pas-
sengers, and whose self- interested rigidities effectively reduced choice.
 Why did New Labour choose this approach to the public sector? For some, 
it was because they really believed in choice and the superiority of market 
models. Evidently Blair really did think that competition and choice, whether 
in medicine or in education, would produce superior outcomes. For others, it 
was more a matter of expediency: getting the private sector to help finance 
new schools, hospitals, buses, and trains or to perform certain medical pro-
cedures would allow a more rapid expansion and improvement. Critics have 
of course pointed out that privately provided services and facilities are no 
cheaper or better than those done by and through public authorities, and 
sometimes have higher cost and lower quality, but that is not the point: the 
perceived need as of 1997 was for speed. There was also the issue of politi-
cal expediency, in both the short and long term. Short- term, it was believed 
to be easier to sell increased public expenditure if that was going to pro-
duce not just more but better, more “reformed” services. Long- term, many 
within New Labour reckoned that the viability of the public sector depended 
on keeping the middle classes and the increasingly affluent working class 
within the system. The big threat to the public sector, it was argued, was the 
defection of people whose standards were rising and who could afford to go 
elsewhere. To keep them happy meant providing higher standards and more 
choice within the basic framework of public provision. This strategic argu-
ment is hard to prove or disprove, but it is not for that reason wrong, disin-
genuous, or unimportant. Labour’s policies toward the public sector have as a 
result proved highly controversial, and disaffection within the ranks of public 
sector workers has prevented Labour from reaping the benefits that its record 
of increased expenditures might otherwise merit. Critics have claimed with 
some success that New Labour has eroded the “public service ethos” and in 
that sense violated its core principles.
 This critique has been reinforced by the lack of interest that New Labour 
has shown in another core principle in its tradition: equality. The data here 
are frankly contradictory. Under Labour the fate of the poorest section of 
society has improved a great deal: child poverty in particular was lessened; 
the working poor became much better off; and the tax and benefit system be-
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came more redistributive. At the same time, inequality has slightly increased. 
How are these developments reconciled, in fact and in theory? It is clear that 
recent economic trends have been very regressive in their effects. Incomes 
have grown much faster for the middle and upper classes than for others, 
those with property and investments have fared much better than those with-
out, and the ongoing shift away from industry and toward services has con-
tinued to reduce the number of high- paying manual jobs. In that context—
as, it should be noted, in most other advanced countries—inequality steadily 
increases. In Britain, supporters of New Labour will argue, inequality has 
grown less and has to some extent been counteracted by government policy. 
The defense is compelling enough, but it is also true that in theory New 
Labour is not averse to increases in wealth or inequality. From the beginning 
New Labour asserted that it wanted to be pro- business and that it heartily 
approved of entrepreneurship and the accumulation of wealth. Labour pro-
fessed to want “more millionaires,” not fewer. And it is this attitude, particu-
larly as and when it combines with the disparaging of the public sector and 
the constant hectoring to reform it, that has convinced at least some people 
that New Labour has truly “lost its soul.”
The Constitution, Power, and Security
For most of its history the Labour Party has been about “the social.” Of neces-
sity it has had to develop a foreign policy, policies toward crime and the regu-
lation of personal life, and a philosophy of how government should work, 
but it has typically not distinguished itself on these issues. The party has 
not fundamentally challenged the “Westminster model” of government but 
has sought instead to capture the model; it has been moderately liberal on 
matters of rights and social questions, but hardly in the forefront on these 
matters; and its foreign policy has not differed fundamentally from that of 
its rivals. Indeed before the advent of New Labour the Labour Party’s great-
est success had been in the 1940s, when it could claim to be the party which 
best represented the national interest rather than the interests of a particular 
class, and when it managed to portray its opponents as willing to sacrifice the 
national interest. Labour was at that moment the national party, not a sec-
tional interest, and as such would do a better job of protecting the state, its 
institutions, and the “British way of life.”
 It is therefore ironic that in the decade after 1997 Labour brought into 
effect a series of far- reaching constitutional changes. The most important 
were devolution in Scotland and Wales, decisions with potentially transform-
ing consequences for the shape and definition of the nation; reform of the 
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judiciary and the House of Lords, a process that is far from completed; and 
the incorporation into British law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and other EU laws which have in effect given Britain its first written 
constitution. In addition, there is peace and the beginnings of reconciliation 
and devolved government in Northern Ireland, a success in foreign policy 
with major constitutional ramifications. The full effects of these innovations 
will not be clear for a very long time, but they are likely to be profound.
 Radical constitutional change was not something with which Labour had 
ever been identified, and it was not very high on Labour’s list of priorities in 
1997. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Labour has been given little 
credit for these initiatives. Instead it has suffered for its ambivalence toward 
these shifts even as it has overseen their implementation. It has appeared in-
consistent and illiberal to advocates of constitutional reforms and so forfeited 
its place as the party most strongly committed to typically liberal reform. 
Labour has been vulnerable to the charge of illiberalism on several other 
fronts as well. Blair declared that Labour would be both “tough on crime, 
[and] tough on the causes of crime.” The point was to take away the ability 
of the Tories to claim that Labour was “soft on crime” because of its concern 
with getting at its root “causes” rather than punishing criminals and protect-
ing victims. Labour actually managed to get crime down, or at least the main 
measures of crime, and it adopted policies like the introduction of “anti- social 
behavior orders,” or ASBOs, that allow it to claim to be decisively on the side 
of the victims of crime. The party’s stances on immigration and asylum have 
been similar. Under Labour, Britain has had more generous policies on immi-
gration and asylum than most other European countries, but the government 
has also worked assiduously to convince voters that both are under control. 
It has received little credit and considerable criticism for its specific mix of 
tough rhetoric and moderately open policy on these issues.
 Assessing these policies is therefore especially difficult, partly because the 
issues and data are complex but mainly because it is difficult to know what 
standard to apply. Over a protracted period Labour has been a socially lib-
eral party, although the Liberal Democrats (and the parties which merged to 
create them) have occasionally competed on these grounds. The architects 
of New Labour understood that the party needed to maintain that stance 
while also finding a way to compete for voters who were less socially lib-
eral but might respond to other elements of the party’s appeal. They chose 
in response to move toward what was regarded as the center on such issues 
as crime and immigration. To some extent this dilemma reflects the shifting 
social base of Labour. Like social democratic and liberal parties elsewhere, 
Labour now gets as many votes from the professional middle classes, espe-
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cially in the public sector, as from the working class, and among these newer 
supporters social liberalism is quite important.5 So too are economic issues 
like support for spending on public services, an area in which these voters 
very often work. By most accounts, however, working- class voters are less 
liberal or progressive on social issues. New Labour’s strategy, both in opposi-
tion and in government, has been to try to satisfy both groups and find ways 
of maintaining the party’s traditional liberalism while allaying voters’ fears 
about crime, immigration, asylum, and most recently terrorism. It is a deli-
cate balance, and probably the best that a party like Labour can do is adopt 
a series of compromises that will, with luck, keep the issues from becoming 
salient enough to rupture the coalition required for electoral success. Still, 
balancing of this sort gives further ammunition for those who wish to argue 
that Labour has “lost its soul.”
 Much the same dilemma confronts Labour regarding foreign policy, 
but on this issue the party has less control of what is and is not salient and 
when. Clearly, Iraq became far more salient than Blair or his colleagues ever 
dreamed, except perhaps in their worst nightmares. Just what an appro-
priate Labour foreign policy would look like is by no means obvious. After 
Blair’s resignation and David Miliband’s appointment as foreign secretary, 
the government chose to put somewhat less emphasis on the “special rela-
tionship” with the United States. It was also eager to be seen as more multi-
lateral and more attentive to Europe than it seemed to be in the first years 
after 9/11, and to emphasize goals like development aid and climate change 
that command wide if perhaps shallow public support. It is not a distinctly 
new foreign policy, but a more agreeable one. It still leaves open, however, 
just what Labour’s orientation should be, or should have been, toward the 
awkward questions of “humanitarian intervention,” terrorism, and Britain’s 
long- standing strategic posture as America’s closest ally. The reason these 
are open questions is that despite Blair’s activism and decisiveness and de-
spite New Labour’s efforts to rethink policy across a wide range of issues, the 
party as a whole has not engaged in any fundamental reassessment of foreign 
policy over the past quarter- century.
 The roots of today’s uncertainties within the Labour Party go back at 
least to the election of 1983, which Labour fought on a program of unilateral 
nuclear disarmament. Voters got to choose between Labour’s antinuclear and 
implicitly anti- NATO stance and the Conservatives’ far different policies—
continued support for NATO and nuclear weapons and support for the United 
States regardless of the scary rhetoric of President Reagan’s administration 
and the deployment of intermediate- range (Pershing and Cruise) missiles in 
Europe. Thatcher won a huge victory, aided in no small measure by Britain’s 
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recent triumph in the Falklands. In the aftermath Labour began to back off 
its unilateralist and non- nuclear positions, but it failed to do so effectively 
and the issue again cost votes in 1987. In the policy review that followed the 
defeat, one working group was commissioned to look at foreign and defense 
policy, but its members had great difficulty reaching a consensus until they 
took a trip to Moscow. Mikhail Gorbachev met the delegation and told them 
not to fret. The British nuclear deterrent was not a matter of great concern 
and besides, the United States and the USSr were in the process of agreeing 
to a package of major reductions in both intermediate and strategic weapons. 
The debate within the party was adjourned rather than resolved, and the 
issue dropped way down the list of party concerns as the cold war ended. 
The effect was to bequeath to New Labour a heritage of ambivalence in for-
eign and defense policy. Antiwar and antinuclear sentiments sat uneasily 
alongside the traditional Atlanticist and anticommunist record of the post-
war Labour governments.
 New Labour thus took office in 1997 with virtually no experience in for-
eign and defense matters, with few specific commitments and no clear vision. 
Once in power Labour opted for continuity: it reaffirmed support for the 
Atlantic alliance and came to share the basic policy orientation and prefer-
ences of President Clinton—free trade, the promotion of human rights and 
market- based democracies, the enlargement of organizations like the EU and 
NATO, and “engagement” with the UN and other multilateral institutions. 
New Labour also shared with the United States a determination to maintain 
Anglo- American military power at roughly the levels set at the end of the 
cold war. Blair and the shadow foreign secretary, Robin Cook, thus differed 
but minimally with their Tory predecessors, though in opposition they had 
sharply criticized the Tories’ apparent indifference to the tragedy of Bosnia.6 
The Labour government would go on, largely at Blair’s insistence, to emerge 
as a strong advocate for selective “humanitarian intervention,” and Blair 
would personally push Clinton toward a more active policy in Kosovo. It was 
in the context of the debate over Kosovo that in April 1999 Blair gave his fa-
mous speech in Chicago on the “Doctrine of International Community” and 
made this position explicit (Blair 1999; Little and Wickham- Jones eds. 2000; 
Kampfner 2004; Rawnsley 2001; Coates and Krieger 2004; Freedman 2005).
 That statement put Britain on record in support of aggressive action to re-
spond to “rogue states” and humanitarian crises, a commitment that would 
facilitate the subsequent choice to invade first Afghanistan and then Iraq in 
the aftermath of 9/11. It was in that respect an important precedent, but it is 
clear that back in 1999 very few, including Blair, envisioned the world as it 
would become after 9/11 or the very different context in which foreign policy 
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would be carried out in that world. Still, New Labour had cast its fate with 
the United States and the “special relationship,” and with the principle of 
humanitarian intervention, and it would become very difficult to turn back. 
What made it especially difficult was that New Labour had no other coherent 
or convincing set of policies on which to draw. Debate over foreign policy had 
simply not been a priority in the party since the end of the cold war, and the 
New Labour project was a largely domestic affair: it did not encompass an 
alternative vision of Britain’s role in the world. Nor, frankly, is it likely that a 
lengthy prior debate would have done much to prepare the party, or Britain 
more generally, for the difficulties presented by 9/11 and the rise of militant 
Islam. Knowing what they know now, neither Brown nor Miliband nor Jack 
Straw nor Blair himself would have been likely to argue for the invasion of 
Iraq, but even now the present lack of a clear alternative suggests that getting 
it right would have been very hard. And would the Americans have listened 
if they had succeeded?
 Foreign policy matters, however, and Iraq matters because on this issue 
New Labour was seen very much to have lost its way and perhaps its very 
soul. That the Tories would undoubtedly have done the same thing as New 
Labour, and that the Liberal Democrats would never have had the opportu-
nity to decide on the right or wrong strategy, does not make the loss of sup-
port, and of legitimacy, any less real for New Labour. Blair left in 2007, but his 
successor was not able to recoup the support that Blair lost because of Iraq. 
Again, that Brown’s Conservative challenger failed to offer a fundamentally 
different policy did Labour no good, for it did not constitute a reason to come 
back to Labour. Nor was there an obvious set of domestic issues with which 
to lure voters back, for the Conservatives under David Cameron had moved 
to the center on most key issues and effectively stolen New Labour’s rhetoric 
(Rentoul 2008). The effect of this curious conjuncture is that not only voters 
but also scholars, political leaders, analysts, and activists failed to appreciate 
the numerous and often quite successful innovations to which New Labour 
could rightly lay claim. New Labour thus became a model that voters chose to 
reject in May 2010. New Labour’s history and its record may nevertheless con-
tain lessons critical for the renewal and advance of the center- left everywhere 
but in Britain. If it is to play such a role elsewhere, or even regain a purchase 
on the allegiance of British voters, however, New Labour may well require 
new labels, new rhetoric, and new understandings. This will also not be easy. 
It has been claimed again and again that New Labour has offered no distinct 
vision, just clever rhetoric (Fairclough 2000). Perhaps, but not for lack of try-
ing. When New Labour was still taking shape as a political force in the 1990s, 
there were in fact repeated efforts to outfit it with a discourse and rationale 
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that would capture what was actually new and different about it. At least two 
big ideas were floated, along with a more modest argument from Blair, be-
fore New Labour settled on the ultimately unsatisfactory “Third Way.” The 
first idea was community, or communitarianism. The reasoning was that the 
party needed a phrase that pointed to the same values or goals as socialism 
but avoided the assumption that the way to achieve them was through the 
state. Talk of community implied that citizens had duties as well as rights and 
that to some extent the two were interdependent; and it allowed the party to 
avoid charges that it was too soft or permissive. It fit especially well with the 
phrase, coined by Brown but used by Blair, “tough on crime, tough on the 
causes of crime.”
 The notion never quite caught on, perhaps because its inherent, and in-
tended, illiberalism had little appeal within the party. The second concept 
that was aired and debated in the mid- 1990s was that of “the stakeholder 
society” (Hutton 1995; Hutton 1997). Again, the purpose was to convey what 
was regarded as a key principle of socialism without using the word. All citi-
zens had a stake in society and the economy, not just the owners of capital, 
and their interests should be taken into account in policymaking. It was pre-
cisely this meaning, however, which rendered the idea unviable: it was seen—
allegedly by Gordon Brown, but surely by others as well—as too threatening 
to capital at a moment when Labour sought to reassure business of its inten-
tions. The concept also lent itself to particular appropriation and use by trade 
unions, for if anyone besides owners could reasonably claim a stake in a firm, 
it was surely the organized workers. This too was a message that New Labour 
did not wish to send.
 So both “community” and “the stakeholder society” were left to the side, 
as was an argument that Blair began to develop in his anniversary lecture on 
the election of 1945, published as Let Us Face the Future (1995). In it he made 
the controversial claim that what triumphed in 1945 was not socialism nor 
even social democracy, but a distinctly British type of progressive politics 
that combined socialism and liberalism. The model for Blair was thus less the 
Labour government elected in 1945 than the New Liberalism represented by 
the Liberal government elected in 1906. Blair insisted that the Labour Party 
should combine the virtues of both traditions. Once more, the obvious inten-
tion was to avoid the negative associations attached to socialism by instead 
proclaiming allegiance to the inheritance of liberalism in its reforming, so-
cially concerned, and mildly collectivist variety of the early twentieth cen-
tury.
 This outpouring of argument, of theory, occurred at precisely the moment 
when New Labour was shedding its old image by abandoning clause IV of its 
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constitution, and it was obviously directed at creating an effective substitute. 
None of these ideas succeeded in doing so, however, and by the time of the 
election of 1997 that seemed not to matter. New Labour won a decisive vic-
tory without having settled upon a big new idea or even an animating slogan. 
It was in this context that the party settled on the relatively vacuous notion 
of “the Third Way.” As critics have cruelly pointed out, the Third Way has no 
intrinsic meaning at all: it is merely a way of saying that the Labour Party was 
neither this nor that, neither the hard- hearted Tories nor the dour and diri-
giste socialists of the past. Its content was, at least at the beginning, negative 
and empty. Over time a cluster of quite thoughtful people—Anthony Giddens 
most prominently—would try very hard to fill in the vast conceptual space 
inside the Third Way (Giddens 1998; Giddens 2000; Giddens ed. 2001). The 
exercise was not without merit, for it provided the rubric under which quite 
useful debates were conducted on policy and on more fundamental questions 
about the relationship between markets and states, the individual and society, 
justice and equality, and the environment and the global economy. The work 
would continue in think tanks like the Policy Network, the Institute for Public 
Policy Research, the Foreign Policy Center, Demos, and others, and with con-
siderable sophistication. Yet it was and still is an elite discourse—the Policy 
Network, for example, began as the Progressive Governance Network and in-
cluded only the leaders of center- left governments—and its focus on policy 
did not and still does not easily translate into marketable slogans. There was 
probably never any real possibility that the concept of the Third Way could 
have inspired the kind of enthusiasm and loyalty which other terms—social-
ism, social democracy, or, in their own way, community or stakeholding—had 
done, or might have done, whatever the venue and style. In the event, talk of 
the Third Way inevitably died down and Labour in office was unable to come 
up with anything to take its place.
 So long as the party kept winning elections, the absence of a big idea 
probably did not matter greatly. As the party’s fortunes declined, gradu-
ally under Blair and then more seriously under Brown, the lack of a major 
unifying theme or vision came to be more acutely missed. Will Labour find 
one in opposition? Does it actually need any particular animating vision? 
There has recently been some renewed attention devoted to the possibility 
of combining the best of liberalism and of social democracy by crafting a 
new definition of citizenship which in one version would be anchored in a 
new constitution for Britain. There are also those who, in response to the 
weakening of New Labour, would prefer to revert to the old and reconnect 
with an older social democratic tradition emphasizing redistribution and 
an expanded role for the state. The issue is unlikely to be settled at the level 
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of theory and will effectively be decided by the choices made by Gordon 
Brown’s successors.
 It was clear by early 2010 that the future of the Labour Party would hinge 
largely on the choice of leader, but also on the electoral performance of the 
party under Brown, on the manner and context of Brown’s leaving, and on 
the character of the opposition that the party would face once Brown was re-
placed. The election of 6 May produced unexpected results on all three fronts. 
To begin, Labour performed better than predicted. During the election cam-
paign the rapid rise of Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats—attributed 
most plausibly to the impact of television debates staged for the first time 
ever—raised the possibility that Labour would be pushed into third place be-
hind the Tories and the Liberal Democrats. That did not happen: by election 
day “Cleggmania,” as it was called, had faded and the party secured 23% of 
the votes and lost five seats in the House of Commons, for a modest total of 57; 
the Tories had failed to break through, getting just over 36% of the vote and a 
plurality (306) but not a majority of seats; and Labour had rallied to win 29% 
of the vote and 258 seats. The result was, or so it seemed, a hung parliament; 
and then, to the surprise of many, the Conservatives and the Liberal Demo-
crats formed a coalition. In the process Gordon Brown made a dignified and 
gracious exit.
 Critics of Labour, and especially of “New Labour,” had anticipated a his-
toric collapse, and the circumstances in which the election was fought were 
about as bad as one could imagine. Labour had been in power for thirteen 
years, and the enthusiasm generated way back in 1997 had long since dissi-
pated. The party’s achievements, which were many and substantial, were for-
gotten or taken for granted; its style—the tendency to “spin,” its preference 
for increasing taxes and spending by “stealth,” its sometimes vacuous rheto-
ric—had begun to grate; and many had never forgiven the party for the de-
bacle in Iraq. Even more important, according to exit polls, was the state of 
the economy, for which Labour was forced to bear responsibility. Brown and 
his chancellor, Alastair Darling, had by all accounts responded effectively to 
the financial crisis, but the economy remained in terrible shape and the loom-
ing budget deficit seemed to guarantee an era of austerity which would erode 
much that Labour in power had wrought. In addition, there was the utter dis-
aster of the expenses scandal, a phenomenon that affected both the major 
parties (and the Liberal Democrats rather less) and heightened the sense that 
something had to change. And finally there was Brown himself, with a “face 
made for radio” and an affect and personality that did not come across well in 
any medium, who was forced to compete on television with two younger and 
much better performers. Back in 1994, when Blair had persuaded Brown to 
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step aside in the leadership contest, a key consideration was how much better 
Blair performed on television and in Parliament. Little had changed on that 
score by 2010.
 Add these adverse conditions together and it is hard to imagine a party in 
power not losing many votes and seats. The party did lose on both measures 
in 2010, but no more and perhaps even less than they could and should have 
lost. Why? The short answer is that the architects of New Labour got it right 
and Labour’s policies were more or less where they ought to have been. The 
Blairite embrace of the market may have been excessive, but only marginally 
so, and it was probably more effective than the alternative; the party may also 
have been too quick to “spin” rather than to explain, but in a world of instant 
communication and in a country with a press that feeds on controversy and 
scandal, to err in that way was surely better than to have erred in the direc-
tion of greater candor; constant talk of “reforming” public services and in-
creasing choice may have alienated some of Labour’s supporters in the trade 
unions and the public sector, but not enough to prevent the unions from bank-
rolling the party’s election campaign; and in the desire to appear tough on 
crime and immigration and terrorism, the party may well have veered too far 
from its socially and politically liberal traditions, although its policies were 
less illiberal in practice than its rhetoric might have implied. And of course 
the Labour government’s willingness to lend its support to the United States 
and its adventures was also profoundly controversial, but again, would the 
alternative have been more successful? The attack of 9/11 was truly an excep-
tional moment, and a reluctance to back the United States then would have 
been unthinkable. Once that backing was offered the options were limited; 
and New Labour had extremely bad luck in having to deal not with Bill Clin-
ton or Barack Obama but with George W. Bush.
 The argument that Labour, in its New Labour incarnation, had been sen-
sible and effective gains at least some support, if not confirmation, by what 
has come to replace it. The Tories, it would seem, made gains by moving 
to the center and toward the mix of policies on welfare and the public sec-
tor favored by Labour (Bale 2010). If the heart of the Conservative Party re-
mained Thatcherite, its head led Cameron and his allies to speak a different 
rhetoric, write a different manifesto, and run a different campaign. It may 
also be that the party did not do even better in the election because voters 
perceived this split between head and heart and feared a return to Thatcher-
ism or something like it. If so, then the coalition with the Liberal Democrats 
was a brilliant move, for it allowed the Conservatives to ditch those policies 
that were most attractive to its Thatcherite wing and move much closer to the 
sort of centrist and socially liberal policies that can help them win elections. 
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If the coalition lasts—and the commitment by the two parties to stay together 
in government for a full five years should not be discounted—it will ironi-
cally represent the triumph of Labour’s efforts to move Britain away from 
the Thatcherite settlement and toward the political center, toward something 
more humane and stable. It will also confront Labour with the need to differ-
entiate itself from a discourse, a reality and a set of policies that it did much 
to create.
 There is great irony, of course, in the fact that as the coalition speaks in 
the language of fairness, it has adopted a policy of extreme fiscal austerity 
and begun to blame Labour for running up deficits and leaving the country 
in dire straits. The cuts proposed by George Osborne seem to many to be the 
equivalent of the measures taken by Thatcher (McKibbin 2010). And yet both 
the total of cuts proposed, and many of the details, differ only marginally 
from what Labour had proposed or was prepared to do if it been reelected. 
This is surely why the initial resistance to the coalition’s austerity measures 
was modest and restrained. That may change as the more controversial and 
draconian policies come into effect—especially if the protests over tuition 
fees are an indicator—but will Labour be able to offer a credible vision that 
is radically different? Will the new leader, Ed Miliband, succeed in crafting a 
credible Labour response? His politics are slightly less Blairite than those of 
his brother David, whom he defeated in the leadership election. Will that help 
or hurt in this process?
 It seems unlikely, and the situation in which Labour finds itself would 
seem to argue more for continuity than for change, especially if change is 
conceived as a reversion to something that looks and sounds like “old Labour” 
and feels like the “winter of discontent.” It would be foolish to keep talking 
about “New Labour” so long after its invention and so long after the phrase 
did its work in separating the party from those aspects of its past that were 
no longer popular. New slogans will by necessity emerge, and they ought to 
embody substantive new thinking about issues on which New Labour was 
most vulnerable. Still, a more fundamental break seems unlikely and indeed 
unwise, for a rejection of Labour’s recent past would mean turning one’s back 
on a record marked by considerable success and on a brand of politics that 
may well represent a viable future for center- left parties and movements in 
Britain and elsewhere.
Notes
 1. For greater detail and more extensive documentation of this historical process 
see Cronin 2004.
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 2. Deciding who was the left, who was the center, and who was the right of the 
party was often tricky. A clear “right” had emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
around the party leader, Hugh Gaitskell, and his ally, Tony Crosland, the main theo-
retician among the “revisionists.” Leaders such as Callaghan were intellectually quite 
close to this camp, but their strong ties to the trade unions, or at least Callaghan’s 
strong ties, were probably more important in determining his policies. He is probably 
better regarded as being in the center of the party. Harold Wilson’s achievement was 
of course to bridge the factions, but at considerable cost; Tony Benn’s later failure was 
to divide them and drive the right completely out of the party. Tracking the disputes 
and arguments within the party is entertaining; somewhat harder is figuring out the 
basis of coexistence. The best answer to the puzzle, I have argued, focuses on the term 
“labourism,” an outlook that was genuinely shared and served to distinguish the party 
from its competitors in the United Kingdom and also from its sister parties on the con-
tinent. For an explanation see Cronin 2004, 7–10.
 3. See the vigorous and engaging debate between Mark Wickham- Jones (1995) and 
Colin Hay (1997).
 4. Stephen Gill (1995) used the phrase “disciplinary neoliberalism” to describe the 
Thatcher era and neoliberalism more broadly; it was revised to “compensatory neolib-
eralism” by Perry Anderson (2007).
 5. See the essays by Gerassimos Moschonas and Ruy Teixeira in this volume.
 6. Determining the right response to the post–cold war crisis in the former Yugo-
slavia was clearly not easy, but some people were demonstrably wrong. For a compel-
ling argument on the deficiencies of the British response see Simms 2002.
Reluctantly Center- Left?
The French Case
Arthur Goldhammer and George Ross
Structuring the Puzzle
France today is often portrayed as a country uniquely refractory to reform. 
This is highly misleading. In the decades following the Second World War, 
which Jean Fourastié has referred to as les Trente Glorieuses, deep struc-
tural reform enabled France to achieve a rate of growth in per capita GDP 
that was among the highest in Europe.1 The resources that made this remark-
able performance possible—technologically advanced firms, superbly trained 
elites, highly productive workers, and a political will to remain competitive—
remain in place. In recent times, however, France has been slow to respond 
to the challenges of the increasingly globalized economy. One reason for this 
has been that the French left has had serious difficulties functioning in this 
new environment.
 Why has the French left had such difficulties? To answer this question we 
begin by underlining three persistent elements of the French political system 
that mark the period from the 1960s to the present. The first is chronic divi-
sion. Unlike some other lefts, the French left has always been divided.2 Com-
munists and Socialists coexisted, often with smaller groups around them and 
frequently in conflict, for much of the twentieth century. The competitive 
games that these divisions created have complicated the tasks of devising the 
left’s goals, programs, and policies, with powerful consequences for its iden-
tities and prospects. Next, partly because of these divisions, the left has been 
fixated on preserving a French social model. At the end of the Second World 
War elites agreed on the need for rapid economic modernization led by the 
state, together with an extensive welfare system under “paritary manage-
ment,” according to which social insurance programs (health, pension, unem-
ployment) were administered not by the state but by employer associations, 
unions, and other organized “stakeholders.” The left has increasingly defined 
itself as the defender of this distinctive “French model.” The third element is 
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presidentialism. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic endowed the presi-
dency with vast powers, making it the linchpin of French political life, and 
diminishing the power of Parliament. Accompanying this, a two- round elec-
toral system, intended to transform a multiparty system into a bipolar one, 
meant that a successful presidential candidate had to be able not only to unite 
his own party but also to appeal to centrist voters in the second round. These 
three structural elements have shaped the left’s response to the challenges of 
the post- Keynesian era.
François Mitterrand Climbs the Summit
Since all power flowed from the presidency, the Socialists had to find a way 
to defy the old adage that “you can’t win with the Communists and can’t win 
without them.” Mitterrand, leader of the Parti Socialiste (PS) since its re-
organization in 1969–71, therefore struck a deal with the Parti Communiste 
Français (PCF), set out in the landmark “Common Program for a Government 
of the Left” (1972). The program, biased toward the PCF’s reform proposals, 
advocated extensive new nationalizations, planning, energetic Keynesianism, 
expanded welfare programs, enhanced powers for unions and workers, and 
decentralization. With this compact Mitterrand came very close to defeating 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1974.
 Giscard, intent upon building a new hegemonic center- right party, favored 
liberalizing social and economic reforms of which many Gaullists disap-
proved. The left began to argue that “liberalism,” as practiced by Giscard 
and Raymond Barre, prime minister after 1976, marked a repudiation of the 
French postwar model and promised a “return to the model” if elected. The 
international situation had changed, however. In the Eng lish- speaking coun-
tries monetarism was becoming the new orthodoxy; price stability, even at 
the expense of employment, replaced Keynesian stimulus policies. In line 
with these trends Giscard and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany agreed 
to create a European Monetary System to limit the damage from floating ex-
change rates. Over time this system was likely to impose rigorous German 
monetary standards on the traditionally more lax French.3
 The stage was thus set for the presidential elections in the spring of 1981, 
the critical moment for the French left. In the first round Mitterrand stood for 
the Socialists, Georges Marchais, secretary general of the PCF, for the Com-
munists. On the right Giscard d’Estaing, the incumbent, faced a determined 
Jacques Chirac, the neo- Gaullist. Mitterrand (with 25.85%) decisively de-
feated Marchais (15.34%, down 6% from Jacques Duclos’s share of the vote in 
1979) and then Giscard in the second round. The PS also captured an absolute 
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majority of seats in the National Assembly, leaving the Communists no choice 
but to join a left unity government under the new prime minister, Pierre Mau-
roy.4 For a brief period the left’s persistent division was overcome, therefore, 
and the first eighteen months of Mitterrand’s experiment demonstrated that 
he was serious about restoring the French postwar model, with the state in 
a leading economic role. The government nationalized several key industrial 
firms and most banks.5 Other key reforms included political decentralization, 
enhanced representation in the workplace, and stronger legal foundations for 
local unions, which led to greater flexibility in collective bargaining. The left 
also introduced a wealth tax on large fortunes (the Impôt de Solidarité sur la 
Fortune, or ISF), abolished the death penalty, and privatized television and 
radio networks.
 The more immediate problem was high unemployment. To combat this, 
170,000 new public sector jobs were created in 1981–82. The left also tried 
to stimulate consumption by raising the minimum wage, pensions, family 
allowances, and housing subsidies. A fifth week of vacation was added, the 
retirement age was reduced to sixty, and negotiations were begun to shorten 
the legal work week to thirty- nine hours. The effort failed, however. Unem-
ployment rose by 300–400,000 in the first year, and high inflation led to 
exchange difficulties. Because France had attempted to reflate while other 
countries deflated, much of France’s additional demand went to purchase 
cheaper foreign goods, creating the largest balance- of- payments deficit in 
French history. The franc came under pressure within the European Mone-
tary System, and a first devaluation in the fall of 1981 failed to alleviate the 
problem. More generally, combining supply- side “progressive” technocratic 
statism with strong Keynesianism clearly did not work.
The U- Turn
The bills began to come due around June 1982, when the government re-
trenched with tough austerity measures, including a wage and price freeze, 
new restrictions on capital movements, de- indexing of wages, high interest 
rates, and draconian budget cuts. The new policies proved to be effective but 
not sufficient, and by the spring of 1983 the left faced a critical choice: either 
leave the EMS and float the franc, or stay and make basic domestic economic 
policy changes. After hesitating Mitterrand favored the second option, which 
led to the so- called U- turn. The government abruptly stopped using the pub-
lic sector to maintain employment and turned instead to harsh industrial re-
structuring.
 The shift affected diplomatic as well as economic policy. To Mitterrand, a 
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staunch European, staying in the EMS meant renewed engagement with Euro-
pean integration. Austerity was unpopular, and Mitterrand needed a justifica-
tion for his choice. Belt- tightening could be presented as a means to achieve 
noble European goals. The idea was to use European integration, which 
France strongly favored, to apply outside pressure in support of needed do-
mestic policy changes in France. One result was the appointment of Jacques 
Delors as president of the European Commission.
 In January 1985 Delors, Mitterrand’s first finance minister and an architect 
of the policy shifts of 1982–83, launched a vast program to liberalize and de-
regulate the EC internal market. He would subsequently propose a new Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU).6 The French hoped thereby to seize some 
control over monetary policy from the German Bundesbank and thus reduce 
the bias toward price stability, at the cost of ceding French monetary policy 
prerogatives to European control.
 The turn to austerity, the abandonment of key instruments of statist eco-
nomic control, and the new European initiatives meant that important fea-
tures of the French postwar model would be jettisoned. What remained was 
a French social model, without the full range of economic policy prerogatives 
that had kept it on track during les Trente Glorieuses. In the medium term 
there was perhaps vague hope that liberalization and Europeanization would 
rekindle growth and reduce unemployment. In the short run, however, the 
left needed to satisfy its electorate. The Socialist- governmental left had suc-
cessfully coopted a part of the Communist- extragovernmental left’s base, be-
ginning the long, slow decline of the PCF. Yet without policies to satisfy the 
hopes that had been aroused in 1981, the PS could easily lose the new voters 
it had gained—voters who saw themselves as constituting a distinct left wing 
of the party, not always in solidarity with the increasingly center- left leader-
ship and its very different social base.
 Mitterrand won reelection in 1988, but the economic situation had wors-
ened. Unemployment, 6% when the left won in 1981, had risen to over 11% 
by 1987. Earlier reforms, enacted in a more hopeful time, were now incorpo-
rated into a set of policies that have been described as the “social treatment of 
unemployment.” A shorter work week, a fifth vacation week, and a reduced 
retirement age kept unemployment levels from rising even higher, albeit at 
the cost of lowering labor force participation rates. An ordinance in 1982 gave 
workers strong incentives to “pre- retire,” or go half- time at fifty- five or even 
fifty (many were obliged to do so). In 1984 the government instituted further 
early retirement incentives to encourage industrial restructuring. New youth 
employment programs, usually involving temporary training positions, were 
added to the mix. More spending on education pushed a higher percentage 
of each age cohort into university and technical training, to similar effect.
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 Left governments were loath to change the standard labor contract (the 
CDI, or contrat à durée indéterminée). In contrast to countries with “flexi-
curity” arrangements—where law and social policy protect workers rather 
than jobs—the CDI protected particular jobs rather than workers. The CDI 
had been an important working- class victory, to be tampered with by left gov-
ernments at great risk. But in a period of increasing economic uncertainty its 
persistence led French employers to avoid new CDI hires except in the most 
buoyant of economic circumstances. When the left tried to encourage new 
hiring, it therefore generally resorted to new, temporary, often heavily subsi-
dized employment contracts. This made those who already had CDIs more de-
fensive and those who did not more insecure. Older workers were likely to be 
better protected than younger ones. Younger workers with fewer educational 
credentials were worst off. Universalist republican rhetoric notwithstanding, 
differences between insider and outsider thus grew rapidly.
 France’s workforce and labor market changed dramatically in these years.7 
French society was becoming more “dualized”: a part of the population held 
steady jobs at reasonable pay and enjoyed social protections; others lived 
more precarious lives. In the presidential campaign of 1988 Mitterrand re-
sponded to growing public concern about social exclusion by proposing the 
rMI (revenu minimum d’insertion).8 In time, despite tight eligibility control, 
the “insertion” part of the rMI became less important than the “revenu,” 
owing to the chronic absence of jobs.
 The cost of French social policy therefore increased rapidly (from 19.2% of 
GDP in 1970, to 26% in 1981 and nearly 30% in 1995). Since payroll taxes paid 
for key welfare provisions, rising tax levels pushed France out of line with its 
European competitors. This prompted the creation of the contribution sociale 
généralisée (CSG) in December 1990. The CSG was a new flat tax on incomes 
dedicated to financing social programs, set initially at 1.1%. The idea was to 
broaden the tax base sustaining the French social model, a change justified 
in the name of “solidarity.”
 For the two most expensive social programs, pensions and healthcare, 
cost pressures increased. Pension costs rose in part because of changing 
demographics but also because the “social treatment of unemployment” re-
moved older workers from the labor force by encouraging early retirement. 
In healthcare costs rose for the same reasons as everywhere else, including 
changing demographics and expensive technological progress. The French 
welfare state model contributed to these cost pressures. The model, it will 
be recalled, was built primarily on social insurance programs managed in a 
“paritary” way. Immediate stakeholders shaped policy decisions, with a ten-
dency to offload costs on others. Yet paritary management and maintaining 
the stakeholders’ voice were untouchable. Governments that pushed too hard 
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to lower costs faced strikes and protests. Pension reform, for example, be-
came a political third rail, while government efforts to reduce hospital costs 
(the one area of healthcare that it did control) prompted walkouts by nurses 
and physicians.
 The government of Michel Rocard (1988–91) was as close to being “center- 
left” as French Socialists in the Mitterrand era came. Rocard benefited from 
the first serious upturn in the European and international economy since the 
1970s, with GDP growth jumping to nearly 4% in 1988 and 1989. But France’s 
structural economic problems remained. The economy was sluggish, the so-
cial treatment of unemployment was very expensive and compounded labor 
market rigidities, and chronic budgetary deficits obliged a constant chipping 
away at social costs.
 The end of the Mitterrand years was also troublesome for the PS. The party 
was racked by scandal. With Mitterrand’s second term expiring in 1995 and 
the president himself dying, struggles over leadership and potential presi-
dential candidacies revived bitter factional disputes. One flashpoint occurred 
during the referendum campaign on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The PS 
and the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), Giscard’s center- right 
party, formed a united front to promote a “yes” vote, and they eventually 
prevailed, though barely. But parts of the PS, including the Centre d’Études 
et d’Éducation Socialistes (CErES) faction around Jean- Pierre Chevènement, 
campaigned for a “no.” The episode showed that the decline of the PCF had 
not ended division on the left. Other “extragovernmental” political forces and 
social movements sought to occupy the spaces that the PCF had vacated. It 
was at this point, for example, that nationalist anti- globalization sentiment 
emerged, led by new groups, including the Association pour la Taxation des 
Transactions Financières et l’Aide aux Citoyens (ATTAC). These developments 
inevitably had repercussions inside the PS. Cowed by the renewed hard- left 
sentiment, all but a few center- left PS reformers muted their rhetoric.
 The EMU that emerged from Maastricht was decisively “monetarist,” de-
spite the French aim of weakening German influence over European mone-
tary policy. The new European Central Bank would be completely committed 
to price stability, while the treaty contained only vague language about co-
ordinating macroeconomic policy and promoting growth. Maastricht also 
established strict convergence criteria for potential EMU members, includ-
ing targets on national budget deficits (less than 3% of GDP), debt levels (less 
than 60% of GDP), interest, and inflation. In 1991 France was well placed to 
meet these targets, but this soon changed.
 German post- unification policies helped fuel a European boomlet in 1991–
92. When the Bundesbank tried to correct, it overshot, instigating a recession 
that hit France hard. Failing to meet convergence targets was not an option: 
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without France there could be no EMU, which would have been a disastrous 
defeat for the European integration that French statesmen had worked to pro-
mote. Yet the new policy constraints inevitably meant austerity, slow growth, 
and higher unemployment. The structural problems that had emerged in the 
1980s would grow more serious over time. In the twilight of the Mitterrand 
years it fell to the right to deal with the consequences.
The Post- Mitterrand Era
The era of “historic compromise” à la française, which began with the Con-
gress of Épinay in 1971, had thus reached its end. Mitterrand, the inscrutable 
master strategist and tactician (known by the sobriquet “Le Florentin,” a trib-
ute to his Machiavellian cunning), had been too clever by half. His seduction 
of the Communist Party ultimately sapped its sinews, leaving a large bloc of 
voters no longer firmly moored à gauche. Mitterrand had also taken various 
steps (such as the introduction of proportional representation for the legis-
lative elections of 1986) to ensure that the Front National would emerge as a 
serious competitor to the “legitimate republican right,” but had failed to fore-
see that the party of Le Pen would attract some of these now drifting voters 
(or their children). Alternative parties of the left—Trotskyites and Greens—
competed for these votes as well, and after fourteen years of Mitterrrandist 
rule and innumerable scandals, these groups were even less susceptible to 
the blandishments of power than they had been previously (doubts about the 
wisdom of becoming “parties of government” had never been extinguished in 
these quarters, even in the heyday of the Common Program). For these extra- 
governmental leftists, along with parts of the union movement, defending a 
French model that the Mitterrand years had undermined became a stock in 
trade.
 As for the Socialists, with the president in decline no single voice could 
adequately represent the increasingly cacophonous party, once again divided 
into rival factions openly contending for the post- Mitterrandist succession. 
Although Lionel Jospin emerged as the dominant figure among the cohort of 
politico- technocrats with whom Mitterrand had surrounded himself, he had 
no shortage of rivals. All were experienced in a variety of ministerial and po-
litical roles, but none could claim Mitterrand’s mastery of the art of politics. 
Hence small technocratic reforms took priority over more ambitious transfor-
mations. More and more voters came to feel alienated from political life and 
unrepresented at the national level.
 In the wake of Maastricht the issue of whether to embrace or resist integra-
tion with the global economy loomed increasingly large. A deep fissure had 
developed in the Socialist Party. Internationalists—Delors, Rocard, Strauss- 
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Kahn—continued to support the transfer of many economic decision- making 
powers to the European level, but a distinct left wing of the party became in-
creasingly skeptical of both Europe and reform. In this the Socialist left wing 
converged with the Gaullist right wing, although the issues were framed in 
rather different terms. If the goal of the socialist left was to protect the French 
social model by preserving the economic prerogatives of the French state, 
on the right it was to preserve French sovereignty and independence, which 
were seen as threatened not only by rival states but also by multinational cor-
porations.9
 Jacques Chirac, head of the Rassemblement pour la République (rPr), 
the largest party on the right, established his claim to become the right’s pre-
sumptive presidential candidate in 1995 after leading his party to an over-
whelming victory in the legislative elections of 1993. Meditating on his own 
experience under Mitterrand, who had persuaded him to become the first 
“cohabitation” prime minister in 1986 and then defeated him in the presi-
dential election in 1988, Chirac prevailed on Édouard Balladur to accept the 
prime ministership. On the strength of strong opinion polls Balladur then 
decided to betray “his friend of thirty years” and challenge Chirac’s claim.10 
The unions subsequently staged a series of actions to defend the social secu-
rity system, in protest against Balladur’s efforts to control the budget deficit 
through tax hikes and benefit reductions. Chirac, ever the political chame-
leon, entered the presidential arena armed with a new slogan: to “heal the 
social fracture.”11 He argued that the real “social fracture” was not between 
workers and employers but rather between insiders and outsiders and prom-
ised to reduce it as president. This was in part a ploy to finesse the divisions in 
his party and bridge the gap between pro- European neoliberals, indifferent, 
he implied, to the plight of the excluded, and anti- European “sovereignists,” 
who scornfully dismissed the neoliberal “social Munich” but had nothing to 
offer insiders that would match the benefits accruing from participation in an 
increasingly globalized economy.
 In effect the presidential election of 1995 endorsed a continuation of Mit-
terrand’s equivocal economic policies: neither full liberalization and open-
ness nor outright decoupling from Europe and the global economy. After 
Jacques Delors withdrew from the presidential race, Lionel Jospin easily 
disposed of the Socialist secretary general Henri Emmanuelli. The Social-
ist center- left thus gained ascendancy over the party’s left. Chirac defeated 
Jospin in the second round, drawing votes from his right, which had nowhere 
else to go, as well as from the center. Chirac was elected with just under 53% 
of the vote.
 Observers believed that Chirac came into office in a position of strength. 
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He had supplanted a tired Socialist regime, defeated a serious rival in his own 
camp, and enjoyed a majority of 80% in the National Assembly (as a result of 
the right’s impressive victory in the legislative elections in 1993). He also con-
trolled the Senate and most regional and departmental councils. Neverthe-
less Chirac, whose instinct was to err by excess of caution, had to be dragged 
into reform by his prime minister Alain Juppé, who forcefully pointed out 
that the problems Balladur had been trying to solve remained as obdurate as 
ever. In order to meet the requirements imposed by the EMU, Chirac would 
have to reduce the budget deficit. The problem had indeed grown to serious 
proportions: between 1990 and 1995 the social security deficit had more than 
quintupled, doubling as a share of the total deficit. Balladur had attempted to 
reduce the shortfall through privatizations, but one- time proceeds from the 
sale of national enterprises could do little to halt the rapid increase in out-
lays for medical care and retirement benefits. A more drastic overhaul was 
 inevitable.
 In short order Juppé had a plan. Its thoroughness, professionalism, and 
impeccable arithmetic drew wide admiration from intellectuals, editorialists, 
and much of the political class, including followers of the Socialist Michel 
Rocard and the CFDT trade union, eager to establish its reformist bona fides 
as a “modern” union that understood the trade-off between short- term wage 
restraint and long- term growth. The plan included a provision to require the 
parliament to vote each year on a social security financing plan (this was in-
corporated into the Constitution in February 1996). There were other signifi-
cant innovations as well, such as the Contribution for the Reimbursement 
of the Social Debt (CrDS), a new tax set at 0.5% of revenue to pay off the 
accumulated social security deficit; a 1% increase in the Generalized Social 
Contribution, or CSG (described earlier); a 1.2% increase in health insurance 
payments by retired and unemployed workers; a one- time tax on the pharma-
ceutical industry; reduction of maternity benefits; a structural reform of the 
hospital system; and a host of lesser measures.12
 The plan may have been technically seductive, but since it had been elabo-
rated in secret and announced as a fait accompli, it proved politically dis-
astrous. A perceived attack on railway workers, who enjoyed an especially 
favorable special retirement regime, led to a strike that brought the country 
to a standstill for several weeks, and many other categories of workers in 
both the public and private sectors supported the strikers because they felt 
that their own pensions were threatened.13 Juppé, seriously weakened by the 
strikes, was forced to withdraw much of his reform program, although he 
hung onto his job for more than a year.
 The social fracture rhetoric that had got Chirac elected thus found little 
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translation into concrete policy. To be sure, modest health insurance reform 
was enacted, and “urban development zones” were established in the hope 
of reducing unemployment in the suburbs. In addition, the Contrat Initia-
tives Emploi (CIE) did create fifty thousand new jobs, but it cost twelve bil-
lion francs. Here was yet another stab at what had come to be called “social 
treatment of unemployment,” by now a venerable tradition. The unemploy-
ment rate did begin to decline slowly, although critics claimed that the offi-
cial statistics understated the real scope of the problem. By subsidizing entry- 
level jobs and protecting workers in uncompetitive firms, government policy 
discouraged long- term hires and the kind of deeper structural reform being 
tried elsewhere. Firms were encouraged to supply temporary labor needs 
with subsidized interim workers rather than invest in productivity- enhancing 
technology.
 Chirac’s master counterstroke, in reserve since the election, was to dissolve 
parliament in the spring of 1997. In his mind this maneuver would relegiti-
mate his presidency and revive his mandate. The right- wing majority in the 
National Assembly, in place since 1993, had grown restive, and Chirac hoped 
that the maneuver would reestablish his control over his own party’s depu-
ties. Polls indicated that although the prime minister was unpopular, so was 
the left, and Chirac expected a new and reinforced majority to emerge from 
the early election (the next scheduled parliamentary election was not until 
1998). He was wrong. Jospin, the last avatar of the Mitterrandist “Socialo- 
Communist” coalition scored 43% in the first round of voting, easily outstrip-
ping the rPr with 36.5 and the Front National with 15.
 Thus Lionel Jospin became prime minister, and for the next five years 
Chirac would be obliged to “cohabit” with the man he had defeated for the 
presidency only two years before. Yet this stroke of good luck for the Social-
ists also inaugurated a period in which they sought to appease the extra- 
governmental left and their own left wing with policies in which they did 
not fully believe while at the same time hoping that the expanded European 
market, which they did not wholeheartedly embrace, would bring sufficient 
economic improvement to carry them through the next presidential election. 
It was not an unreasonable hope, because French growth had shown signs of 
recovery, with new jobs created and unemployment declining. Yet this tem-
porary good news only allowed the party to postpone reconsideration of its 
core principles.
 French Socialists had not been obliged to conquer power by adapting to 
a political landscape fundamentally reshaped by powerful conservative pre-
decessors like Thatcher or Reagan. Instead they had power handed to them 
by the blunders of Chirac and Juppé. Once in power, the party therefore 
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found itself saddled with a program even more incoherent than political pro-
grams generally are. The party platform for 1997 included a plank calling for 
a thirty- five- hour week. Dominique Strauss- Kahn, who had put it there, later 
said that he would not have done so if he had foreseen that the left might win. 
Unanticipated victory forced the government to make good on its promise. 
The chief burden of the change fell on smaller firms, which found the “flexi-
bility” envisioned by the law difficult to achieve. This difficulty durably alien-
ated a segment of the centrist electorate, especially middle managers and 
small business owners, whose support the Socialists would desperately need 
in future presidential elections. Some blue- collar workers also resented the 
loss of overtime opportunities.
 The left also enacted the so- called Emploi- Jeunes or Youth Employment 
Act in 1997, creating a new type of state- subsidized five- year labor contract. 
The jobs were often with local government or charitable service agencies, 
and while the intention was to equip otherwise unemployable youths with 
“employment skills,” again there was no stimulus to subsequent hiring by the 
private sector. Employment did increase toward the end of the 1990s, raising 
false hopes that these modest employment measures, together with continu-
ing social security reforms similar to those already undertaken by the right, 
would soon set things right.
 In more Eurocentric Socialist circles, there was considerable hope—and 
a certain naïveté—about the anticipated benefits from the post- Maastricht 
European Union. In an interview in 1997, Jean- Pierre Jouyet, Jacques Delors’s 
chief of staff in Brussels before assuming responsibility for European affairs 
as a member of Jospin’s staff,14 envisioned the “political union of Europe 
through economic harmonization within ten years.”15 Optimism was buoy-
ant and at first seemed justified, as temporary economic improvement led to 
Socialist success in the European Parliament elections of 1999, while Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who led the right- wing slate on a neoliberal platform, was beaten 
badly. But the incoherence of the left’s program soon began to take its toll. 
Annual hours worked per capita dropped to one of the lowest levels in the 
OECD as the thirty- five- hour week took hold, social policy expenses grew, and 
subsidized low- end jobs weighed on the budget without increasing aggregate 
demand. The average retirement age fell. Workforce participation declined, 
especially for youths and seniors. All of this magnified the budget deficit, and 
when the economy turned downward after 2001, divisions within the left and 
the PS about the wisdom of “deepening” the European Union were exacer-
bated.
 Jospin’s government also moved on a second social front. In addition to 
shortening the work week it expanded and reformed medical insurance with 
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the couverture maladie universelle (CMU, or universal health coverage), which 
was adopted on 27 July 1999.16 The CMU not only expanded coverage but also 
made supplementary private insurance available to some five million people 
who could not otherwise afford it.
 As the presidential election of 2002 approached, the disaffection from 
what the French call la classe politique—the established party leaderships of 
both the left and the right—was glaringly apparent despite extensive reform-
ing since Chirac’s election. In 1995 the abstention rate had been 20%, the 
highest in any presidential election in the Fifth Republic, and after seven 
years of confusion, in which the left and right had “cohabited” to pursue 
reforms that seemed to mirror one another, a substantial number of voters 
concluded that it hardly mattered who won. The smaller parties of the left, 
convinced that the Socialist Party had been taken over by technocrats, saw 
no particular utility in attempting to achieve unity in the pre- election period, 
and all contested Jospin’s claim to represent the undivided opposition.
 Lionel Jospin, on the other hand, had little taste for the hard- left rheto-
ric that Socialist leaders habitually mobilized to try to cement a coalition of 
the left in anticipation of an electoral test of strength with the right. As un-
employment continued unabated, immigration and security became major 
issues. Inflation and stagnant wages (with a compressed wage spectrum 
owing to a high minimum wage and subsidized entry- level jobs) persuaded 
many workers that their standard of living was falling because of the EU and 
globalization. To top it all off, Jospin waged a singularly passionless and lack-
luster campaign. Disaster followed. Jean- Marie Le Pen narrowly outpolled 
Jospin in the first round of the election, 16.9% to 16.2. An anti-Le Pen coali-
tion then gave Chirac more than 80% of the vote in the second round.
 The verdict of the polls was harsh but not incomprehensible. The Social-
ists had demonstrated that they were no worse, and indeed probably better, 
at managing the market economy than their opponents. They had promised 
their voters something more, but had been unable to define clearly what this 
was or whether it aimed at success in the globalized economy or at some 
vaguely adumbrated “social market” alternative. They were at pains to deny 
that their approach to globalized capitalism had anything in common with 
any sort of “third way” compromise. Yet the policy package on offer from the 
left was similar to that on offer from the right: adjustment of the fiscal sys-
tem to maintain social spending at a steady level while shifting the burden 
from payrolls to a broader citizen base; a variety of labor- market activation 
policies ( job search assistance, job retraining, continuing education, benefit 
reform); and social security reform to take account of demographic changes. 
This policy convergence reduced the electoral contest to a battle over tech-
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nical details: modifications to the legal work week (such as haggling over de-
tails of compensatory time, overtime pay, etc.), the precise package of retire-
ment reforms, the mix of broad- based versus payroll taxes.
 The left’s policy package satisfied no one. Adherents of the “second left”—
mainly university- educated “knowledge workers” whose politics had been 
forged in the anticolonial and cultural struggles of the 1960s and 1970s—
were put off by what they saw as band- aid measures and rhetorical appease-
ment: subsidized McJobs (such as the Emplois- Jeunes), protectionism, and 
“economic patriotism” (denunciation of plant closings and investments by 
“Anglo- Saxon pension funds,” predatory hedge funds, etc.). Workers and mili-
tant schoolteachers (who made up the rank and file in more than one Socialist 
Party federation) preferred the old class- against- class rhetoric and resented 
the dominance in the party leadership of graduates of elite schools such as 
Sciences Po and the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA). Much of the 
policy effort of this elite went into devising strategies to preserve the insti-
tutions of the French welfare state through small- scale reforms rather than 
understanding the profound transformation of the global economy. The idea 
that competition might require radical restructuring of the production pro-
cess, quick response to exploit niche markets, and investment in productivity- 
enhancing high- technology back- office systems was too politically challeng-
ing to take on. Despite fitful efforts to revamp universities and promote closer 
cooperation between academic research and industrial r&D, the deepening 
fiscal crisis limited what might have been done even if more attention had 
been devoted to growth- enhancement policies.
 From his peculiar if lopsided victory Chirac concluded that he could con-
tinue to muddle through, provided that he did nothing energetic enough to 
upset the applecart. In a conciliatory gesture that confirmed this strategy, 
he appointed Jean- Pierre Raffarin, a lackluster Giscardian centrist, as prime 
minister. The one undeniable success of his presidency—eight years after the 
debacle of the Juppé plan—was a partial overhaul of the retirement system 
for which his minister of social affairs, François Fillon, working closely with 
CFDT head François Chérèque, was chiefly responsible. By leaving the so- 
called special retirement regimes intact, Fillon and Chirac avoided a repeti-
tion of the paralysis of 1995, because transport workers remained untouched. 
In 2003 nature turned against Chirac, as a terrible heat wave led to fifteen 
hundred deaths, mainly of the elderly. The loss of life was probably com-
pounded by shortages of personnel in hospital emergency rooms, due in part 
to cutbacks in the medical care budget, as well as by staff management prob-
lems that arose after reduction of the workweek.
 If Europe and the EMU had been the undoing of Chirac’s first term, it was 
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again Europe that undid his second. Progress toward a European constitu-
tional treaty, responsibility for which Chirac had assigned to his old nemesis 
Giscard, led the president, perhaps concerned as much with dividing the left 
as with the EU, to seek approval in a referendum in May 2005. Once again 
polls had indicated initially that the referendum course would be safe; ma-
jorities of up to 70% were predicted. In the event, however, the referendum 
went down to defeat by a margin of 55 to 45%. The Socialist Party remained 
split on the issue, while opposition within the UMP, though not inconsid-
erable, was tamped down by Nicolas Sarkozy, the erstwhile protégé first of 
Chirac and then of Balladur, who remained strongly pro- Europe.
 Sacrificing Raffarin to atone for this gaffe, Chirac then made his second big 
blunder, appointing the impetuous Dominique de Villepin, his only remain-
ing confidant and the architect of the ill- fated dissolution of parliament in 
1997, to head the government. Villepin, who entertained presidential ambi-
tions for 2007, had hoped to upstage his rival Sarkozy, but events intervened. 
In late 2005 riots erupted in a suburb of Paris after two youths died while 
attempting to evade the police. Then early in 2006 Villepin launched a new 
attack on the unemployment problem by proposing a “first hire contract” to 
encourage the employment of young workers—yet another half- measure in 
lieu of a comprehensive reform of labor laws. Students took to the streets in 
protest, universities were shut down by strikes, and there was sporadic vio-
lence. Villepin dug in and refused to withdraw the bill. The episode came to 
a comic conclusion when Chirac, bafflingly silent throughout the mounting 
unrest, finally decided to allow the bill to become law while promising at the 
same time that it would not be “promulgated,” meaning that it would remain 
a dead letter. This effectively ended his presidency, though he would remain 
in office for another year, and it reduced Villepin’s presidential aspirations to 
ashes. Sarkozy remained the only viable candidate on the right.
 Meanwhile, the Socialist Party under the leadership of François Hollande 
had made no progress toward resolving its internal divisions. The center- left 
had its champion in Dominique Strauss- Kahn; Laurent Fabius, a centrist at 
heart who had opportunistically become a leader of the “no” camp in the EU 
constitutional referendum of 2005, proposed himself to lead the party’s left 
wing. Hollande hoped to paper over the division between left and center- 
left with a new procedure to designate the presidential candidate, which he 
hoped would lead to a compromise candidate, perhaps himself. Membership 
of the party was thus opened up to anyone willing to pay a membership fee 
of 20 euros, with no obligation to attend meetings, serve the party, or par-
ticipate in internal debates. All members could then vote in an internal party 
primary to name the candidate. In preparation there was unprecedented 
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televised debate among the contenders, whose chances of success against 
Sarkozy were constantly monitored through opinion polls. Although many 
long- standing party members preferred one of the so- called éléphants—
party stalwarts and courant leaders such as Dominique Strauss- Kahn, Lau-
rent Fabius, or Jack Lang—it was ultimately not Hollande but his longtime 
companion and mother of his children, Ségolène Royal, who won. President 
of the Poitou- Charentes region, Royal was popular, telegenic, and well known 
because of service in Jospin’s government as minister of the environment, 
among other roles. She routed her opponents, drawing over 60% in the party 
primary.
 Yet Sarkozy, who in 2004 had assumed leadership of the Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (UMP), had a considerable head start, having had time 
to reshape the party into a support vehicle for his presidential ambitions. 
Though Sarkozy was a bitter foe of Chirac, the president had been unable 
to avoid appointing his popular young rival to various ministerial posts, and 
while at Interior, for example, Sarkozy had used his media skills to put vari-
ous hot- button issues such as crime, immigration, and religion at the fore-
front of the political agenda. His strategy was clear: to woo Front National 
voters by taking a strong line on these divisive social issues while pushing 
for neoliberal reforms such as reduction of the wealth tax and estate tax, de- 
taxation of overtime hours and other revisions of the thirty- five- hour week, 
reform of the special retirement regimes, labor- market activation, and em-
ployment contract reform that might appeal to a broad swath of center- right 
and even center- left voters disappointed with the Socialists’ lack of clarity on 
economic policy. Although François Bayrou, the independent centrist candi-
date, made a strong showing in the first round, Royal survived only to be de-
feated by Sarkozy, who took 53% of the vote.
 Sarkozy’s approval rating immediately after the election rose to above 
70%, a level scarcely seen in the history of the Fifth Republic, and the stage 
seemed set for quick enactment of his program. Although he did manage to 
enact reforms on a wide front with less opposition than might have been ex-
pected, by the end of 2007 his popularity had begun to plummet, and by Feb-
ruary 2008 it had dropped below that of Chirac after the strikes of 1995. Wide-
spread criticism of Sarkozy’s presidential style and exposure of his turbulent 
private life contributed to this. With the increasingly unfavorable economic 
conjuncture in the wake of the American subprime debacle and subsequent 
global credit squeeze, anxiety about the future of the French social model re-
surfaced. Sarkozy, like Chirac before him, had been elected not to dismantle 
the welfare state but to introduce sufficient modifications to preserve it. What 
had seemed bold in May 2007 seemed a year later not to be enough, while 
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Sarkozy had apparently lost the ability to persuade his countrymen that con-
fidence and energy alone are enough to overcome all obstacles. Any final 
judgment on his presidency, however, would be premature.
wE BEGAN By claiming that the story of the French left since 1970 could best 
be understood by examining the lasting effects of three factors: persistent 
division on the left, firm adherence to the “French social model,” and the cen-
tral role of the presidency. These persistent influences continue to shape the 
French left today, but their surface manifestations have evolved considerably.
 The fundamental cleavage on the left is no longer that which once sepa-
rated the Socialist Party from the Communist Party. The PCF was never 
exactly a revolutionary party, despite unstinting support for Soviet interests, 
but its vocation had never really been to govern either. The Common Pro-
gram of the 1970s transformed it into a party interested in governing but did 
not entirely dissipate the conviction of a part of the population (and of the 
PCF itself ) that the best way to protect the interests of the “people of the left” 
was less to influence government policy than to oppose it. This sentiment, 
though less powerful than it once was, continues to motivate perhaps 10–15% 
of voters, who cast their votes for the parties of the extreme left, the extreme 
right, the Communist rump, and even the Greens, in the hope of demonstrat-
ing a disruptive potential sufficient to inhibit governments from pursuing re-
forms deemed to be aimed at dismantling the French social model.
 The Socialist Party itself is divided internally, although the divisions were 
temporarily damped down by Mitterrand’s leadership and success. Both had 
worn out by 1995, however, and since that date the PS’s internal cleavages 
have become more important than those that divide the left more gener-
ally. In recent years these divisions have crystallized most visibly around the 
question of Europe. The referendum of 2005 on the European Constitutional 
Treaty made it clear that despite a substantial pro- Europe majority within the 
party, considerable anti- Europe sentiment persisted: 41% of militants wanted 
the party to oppose the proposed European constitution; 26 of 102 party fed-
erations turned out majorities in favor of a “no” vote.
 The basis of this opposition is quite different from the negativism of the 
extra- governmental left. For the latter, which also opposed a strengthened 
“Europe,” the French state, no matter who controls it, is helpless in the face 
of Europeanization and global capitalism. True political action can then take 
only two forms: using the electoral process as a “forum” to give voice to those 
hurt by neoliberal globalism, and resorting to extra- governmental activity 
(mobilization on the picket line, on the shop floor, and in the streets). Its 
aim must be defensive: to protect what remains of the French social model 
by blocking reform efforts decried as camouflaged destruction. For the left 
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wing of the Socialist Party, by contrast, the political objective is rather to 
strengthen the state against supranational and transnational institutions be-
lieved to be intent on eroding the French social model. The state is supposed 
to stand between labor and capital, just as the king once stood (symbolically 
if not in reality) between the people and the nobility.
 All Socialists thus see their part as very much a party of government, one 
whose raison d’être, unlike that of extra- governmental leftists, is to win elec-
tions and exercise power. Their version of the socialist project takes the form 
of policy prescriptions applicable to things as they are, not things as they 
might be if the rapport des forces were somehow different. Yet a division re-
mains between those who have deeply internalized the U- turn of 1981–83 as 
a step in the right direction and those who look back on it as a mistake. The 
former like to describe themselves as modernizers, and since 1995 they have 
been touting the need for a “renovated” party. “Modernization” is of course 
a capacious word, invoked to justify political programs of both right and left 
since the Franco- Prussian War. In the present context, however, the central 
claim of center- left modernizers is that the scale of the capitalist system has 
changed; production, finance, and the supply of labor have all become global-
ized to a much greater degree since 1970 and especially since the mid- 1980s. 
To maintain social protections, therefore, political and social actors must see 
the state that they wish to influence as part of a supranational institutional 
network. The political game therefore becomes multilevel and far more com-
plex than in earlier periods.
 The Socialist modernizers thus emphasize the international dimension of 
policy and especially the constraints imposed on domestic economic policy by 
France’s implication in a global system. Acceptance of what might be called 
“center- left” outlooks—the importance of price stability, fiscal self- control, 
economic flexibility, and the need to innovate constantly—follows from this. 
Their opponents focus rather on the internal politics of the nation- state. For 
them the central problem is less to find optimal economic policies than to 
change the rapport des forces to give greater weight to the preferences of 
left- wing voters generally rather than those of left policy elites, which are 
often quite similar to the preferences of right policy elites. In sum, the left 
is now effectively tripartite: the extra- governmental left opposes both (stat-
ist) nationalists and (internationalist) modernizers. All three factions invoke 
preservation of the French social model, our second persistent influence, as 
the primary objective of politics. The problem is that their definitions of the 
core of the social model vary. In addition, each faction of the left believes that 
the others’ preferred means of achieving the common goal will lead to disas-
ter in the future as it has done in the past.
 To win big elections, especially the all- important presidency, some kind 
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of political unity must be engineered out of division. Although the elements 
have changed, unity is no easier to achieve now than it was in the 1970s 
(table 1). Socialist modernizers have to conciliate nationalists and seduce 
extra- governmental parties and movements to have a chance of winning. 
Lionel Jospin refused to do this in 2002, instead campaigning as if only the 
second round runoff counted, and he failed disastrously. It is very likely that 
when modernizers do try to broaden their political base they will end up 
being bound to programmatic concessions and promises that they will have 
difficulty redeeming without sacrificing “modernizing” realism.
 This reconfiguration of the left political contest parallels underlying eco-
nomic and social changes. With the relative decline of heavy industry and 
mass production, the old armies of blue- clad factory workers have dimin-
ished in size and militancy. The unionization rate in France has fallen to the 
lowest level in Europe (7%). The workforce has become increasingly differen-
tiated and better educated. Service and support workers outnumber skilled 
and semiskilled industrial workers. The patron of old—be he paternalistic 
guardian or Zolaesque taskmaster—is now buffered by squadrons of well- 
educated cadres versed in the techniques of human resource management. 
Older images of social conflict have partly given way to new images. Yet the 
older images sometimes resurface in misleading ways, as in the demonstra-
tions against the first hire contract in 2006.
 Again, the centrality of the presidency—and of Mitterrand’s strategy for 
winning it, the only successful left strategy to date—cannot be ignored. The 
triumphant Common Program sustained an unnatural hybrid of a workers’ 
party with a clientelist party built on the representation of a variety of local 
Table 1. Fragmentation of the French Left
Extragovernmental 
Left Socialist Left Socialist Center
Strategic orientation Obstructive National- statist International- 
multilevel









Europe Oppose Oppose Support
Tactical orientation Streets, shop floor, 
picket lines
Institutional reform Economic 
governance
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interests (including workers’ interests) and competition among internal fac-
tions and grouplets. Neither party to the coalition had a clear agenda for na-
tional rule or a deep comprehension of the priorities that would need to be 
addressed after capturing the presidency. Mitterrand therefore called upon 
a cohort of technocrats to fill key positions in the government and adminis-
tration. These people, creatures of Mitterrand and entirely beholden to him 
for their political careers, have dominated the party in the first decade of the 
twenty- first century: witness the contest to become the presidential candi-
date in 2007, which pitted Ségolène Royal against Dominique Strauss- Kahn 
and Laurent Fabius—all three énarques (graduates of ENA), all three former 
ministers, all three deeply imbued with a top- down, presidentialist vision of 
the political process.
 Presidentialism has created a problem of credibility for the Socialists as 
the society has changed under them. A presidential campaign, if it is not to 
sink beneath a welter of tedious prescriptions for improvement tous azimuts, 
must articulate a clear and comprehensible transformative vision. For Mitter-
rand it was enough to give voice to the democratic desire for alternance. By 
1981 voters who had never recognized themselves in Gaullism could be satis-
fied with the prospect of wielding power for the first time. But in the nearly 
thirty years since the Socialists’ U- turn of 1983, the Socialists have become an 
established party of government. Like their opponents on the right they have 
pursued piecemeal reforms designed to shore up the welfare state, some of 
which have actually helped France face the future. Yet unlike the right, they 
have not been able to articulate a new transformative message to embellish 
their skillful technocratic management.
 The center- left core of the Socialist Party has been struggling since 1995 
to define what a “modernized and renovated” socialist program should look 
like. The result has been to cement old divisions and heighten mutual sus-
picion among party factions, albeit with new faces to represent them. In 
keeping with the training, predilections, and government experience of its 
key leaders, the center- left has emphasized the need for economic reform to 
maintain (insofar as possible) the productivity and competitiveness on which 
the welfare state depends. In many respects the reforms that it advocates re-
semble those favored by the center- right. The center- left’s appeal to the me-
dian voter thus relies on trust: we advocate reforms similar to those proposed 
by the center- right, but we promise you a more favorable distribution of the 
expected fruits of growth. It is a vision predicated on centralized power, be-
nevolent expertise, and a not- too- restive base. By contrast, the Socialist left 
wing is more responsive to the fears of its base that economic reforms rep-
resent a camouflaged attack on hard- won popular victories of the past. The 
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quarrel is really over what constitutes the core of the French social model. Is 
it basically a bargain over the distribution of gains from economic growth, 
in which case the maintenance of growth is crucial? Or is it rather compa-
rable to a military campaign, in which social gains are objectives which, once 
seized, must be held at all cost, to limit the strategic options of “the enemy?” 
To counter the institutional power of “the economists,” the left wing advo-
cates institutional change that would shift power away from the central ad-
ministration and toward parliament, regions, and cities. Decentralization, it 
is hoped, will both multiply the range of voices in governing councils and de-
finitively alter the priorities of policymaking.
 The presidential candidacy of Ségolène Royal in 2007 can be viewed as an 
attempt to bridge these gaps. Some of her key advisors were from the Social-
ist left, and the candidate’s emphasis on “citizen juries” and elimination of 
the cumul des mandats (holding of multiple offices) directly translated some 
of the left’s platform planks for institutional reform. Yet she also signaled a 
readiness to accommodate the “economists” of the center- left by associating 
herself with Blairism, a conveniently vague portmanteau word standing for 
“Anglo- Saxon neoliberalism with a human face.” More substantively, she sig-
naled flexibility on reform of the thirty- five- hour week, labor contracts, and 
retirement benefits. Like others before it, this attempted reconciliation foun-
dered on incomprehension and lack of trust. In this case, though, it was not 
the rank and file that feared betrayal by elite economists; it was rather the 
economists who feared that Royal, having spent her career without passing 
by way of the central posts of economic policymaking, could not be trusted 
to execute or even understand the nature of the necessary economic reforms.
 Hostility to Royal was again evident in the selection of a new leader of the 
Socialist Party. The process of “renovation” launched immediately after the 
party’s failure to capture the presidency in 2007 proved to be a muddled affair 
that ended in stalemate. Three challenges to Royal emerged from the center 
of the party, one led by Mayor Bertrand Delanoë of Paris, another by Pierre 
Moscovici, widely seen as a stalking horse for Dominique Strauss- Kahn, and 
a third by the mayor of Lille, Martine Aubry. A fourth challenge came from 
the left wing of the party, led by Benoît Hamon. Ultimately the three centrist 
factions united behind Aubry. In a first round Hamon took nearly 20% of the 
votes. In the runoff Aubry and Royal split the party down the middle. Aubry 
won with a plurality of 102 votes out of nearly 175,000 cast, but her victori-
ous coalition was united by only one thing: hostility to Royal.
 And there, for the time being, the French left remains stuck: divided into 
mutually suspicious factions, none capable by itself of putting forward the 
kind of comprehensible and comprehensive recipe for transformation that 
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is needed to capture the presidency. The impasse is unlikely to be resolved 
by internal debate, which for twenty years has been largely a dialogue of the 
deaf. More likely it will take an external shock to push the factions together, 
or else to tear the left apart once and for all, as has begun to happen in a num-
ber of other EU countries (for example by the appearance of die Linke to the 
left of the German SPD). There might conceivably be a recomposition of the 
center, in which center- right and center- left join forces against radicalized 
extremes. But the presidentialist regime—our third persistent structural in-
fluence—tends to make this prospect unlikely.
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The Evolving Democratic Coalition
Prospects and Problems
Ruy Teixeira
After the presidential election of 2004, many on the center- left in the United 
States were strikingly pessimistic about the Democratic Party’s future pros-
pects. Retaking control of the Congress seemed out of reach given the advan-
tages of incumbency and a Republican mobilization machine that was widely 
viewed as both more effective and more ruthless than that of the Democrats. 
Perhaps if the Democrats built up their strength and fought hard in the next 
round of reapportionment, retaking Congress might be possible in the next 
decade. But it was foolish to expect success much sooner than that.
 As for the presidency, that seemed more possible, but Democrats worried 
that Republicans had a lock not just on the South but on a wide swath of 
culturally conservative states in the Plains, Southwest, Mountain West, and 
Midwest. The GOP’s demonstrated ability to mobilize voters in these states 
with a conservatism that melded national security and cultural concerns was 
thought to offer the Democrats little chance of expanding the electoral map in 
their favor. The most that Democrats could hope for was to refight the battle 
of Ohio again in 2008 and hope that this time they would win.
 But even at the time there were strong arguments to be made that this 
take on the Democrats’ prospects was unduly pessimistic. An alternative line 
of analysis suggested that the Republicans’ strength was vastly exaggerated, 
tied to an event (September 11, 2001) whose political salience would decline 
over time. This decline would eventually expose their weakness as a political 
party with a philosophy and program that were remarkably out of step with 
demographic and geographic shifts that had been transforming the American 
electorate.
 The results of the midterm elections of 2006, in which the Democrats re-
took Congress and made significant gains in a wide range of swing and GOP- 
leaning states, seemed to suggest that the second line of analysis was more 
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plausible and that the GOP was a party on the ropes while the Democrats 
were a party in ascendance. In the next election, of course, the political situa-
tion only worsened for the GOP and improved even more for the Democrats, 
as Barack Obama was decisively elected president and the Democrats ex-
panded their majorities in both houses of Congress. However, the midterm 
elections of 2010, in which the Republicans regained control of the House of 
Representatives and picked up six Senate seats, restored at least temporary 
parity to the party system in Congress and clouded the immediate future of 
American politics.
 In what follows, written mainly before the 2010 midterms, I describe the 
various trends that drove the Democrats’ ascendance through 2008. I also 
much more briefly explain the contrasting 2010 results.
The Once and Future Democratic Majority
Racial and ethnic minorities are probably the single strongest element of the 
emerging Democratic coalition. In 2000 Al Gore carried the minority vote by 
75–23, and even in John Kerry’s losing effort in 2004 he still carried the mi-
nority vote by 71 to 27. In that election, according to the exit polls, minorities 
made up 23% of the overall vote. That compares to around 15% of voters in 
the early 1990s when Bill Clinton was first elected.1
 And in 2006 and 2008 the Democrats did even better. In 2006 they carried 
the minority congressional vote by 77–22.2 In 2008 the minority share of 
voters in the national exit poll reached 26% and the minority vote was an 
impressive 80–18 for Obama, a 62- point margin, significantly greater than 
Kerry’s 44- point margin in 2004.
 These minority gains figured greatly in many key states carried by the 
Democrats in 2008. In Ohio, for example, the minority share of voters rose 
from 14% to 17% and black voters supported Obama by a stunning 95- point 
margin (97 to 2), compared to Kerry’s 68- point margin (84–16). In Nevada 
the minority share of voters rose by a full 8 points, from 23% to 31% of voters, 
with 95–4 black support for Obama (up from 86–13 in 2004) and 76–22 His-
panic support (up from 60–39 in 2004). And in Florida, while the minority 
share of voters did not increase, blacks supported Obama by the overwhelm-
ing margin of 96–4 compared to 86–13 support for Kerry, while Hispanics, 
whom Kerry had lost by 56–43, supported Obama by 57–42. The latter is truly 
a sign of change in Florida, as Hispanic voters, spearheaded by relatively con-
servative Cuban- Americans, have long been a key segment of the GOP coali-
tion in the state.
 It is worth stressing that the advantage accruing to Democrats from mi-
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nority voters is going to continue growing. As mentioned, from 1988 to 2008 
the proportion of minority voters increased from 15 to 26%. But that is just 
the beginning. People tend to think of 2050 as the year when America will 
become “majority minority.” But the dates are closer than that: the latest cen-
sus projections put them at 2042 for the entire population and at 2023 for the 
population under eighteen.3 By 2050 the United States will actually be 54% 
minority: 30% Hispanic, 9% Asian, 13% black, and 2% other race.
 Of course the minority community is not monolithic nor all growing at the 
same rate, so it is worth rehearsing some of the specifics of the black, His-
panic, and Asian vote.
 Black voters are the most reliable Democratic constituency. In 2004 Kerry 
had a margin of 88 to 11 among blacks, down only slightly from the margin 
of 90 to 9 for Gore in 2000. In 2006 Democrats carried the black congres-
sional vote by 89 to 10. Then in 2008 blacks voted by an amazing 95%–4% 
margin for Obama. Also in 2008 the share of black voters rose from 11% to 
13%, hugely impressive for a group whose share of the overall population is 
growing very slowly.
 Hispanic voters, while strong for Democrats, are not nearly as strong as 
blacks, and have famously been more volatile in their support. In 2004 it 
was initially reported that they gave Bush 44% of their vote. However, that 
initial exit poll figure is now widely acknowledged to have been flawed, and 
the generally accepted estimate is that Kerry carried Hispanics by 58 to 40.4 
Still, that represented a significant improvement of 5 points in Bush’s support 
among Hispanics over 2000 and a substantial compression of the Democratic 
margin among this group.
 There was much debate about the causes of this shift. Probably the best 
treatment of the issue was done by the political scientists Marisa Abrajano, 
Michael Alvarez, and Jonathan Nagler (2005), whose thorough analysis of 
exit poll data from 2004 indicates that for an unusually large proportion of 
Hispanic voters the pull of national security and moral values toward the 
GOP outweighed that of the economy, healthcare, and education toward the 
Democrats. This can be illustrated by the fact that Bush had an advantage of 
13 points among Hispanics on being trusted to handle terrorism, while Kerry’s 
advantage among Hispanics on being trusted to handle the economy was a 
more modest 5 points.5 These figures underscore the extent to which Demo-
cratic appeals to Hispanics fell short in that election.
 There was even more debate about the long- term significance of Bush’s 
winning 40% of the vote among Hispanics. Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler 
found no evidence that a specific cultural issue like abortion was realigning 
Hispanics, nor did they find evidence for the “economic advancement” hy-
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pothesis: that Hispanics, particularly second- and third- generation Hispanics, 
are moving toward the GOP as they are becoming richer as a group.
 It is also worth noting that the average level of Hispanic support for the 
Democrats was slightly higher in the two Bush elections of 2000 and 2004 
than in the two Reagan elections of 1980 and 1984.6 And in the next election 
following Reagan’s relatively good performances among Hispanics—1988—
the Hispanic presidential vote moved sharply Democratic, to 69%–30%.
 Interestingly, the latter figures exactly match the Democrats’ support 
among Hispanics in the congressional elections of 2006. And in 2008 His-
panics voted 67–31 for Obama, a 36- point margin that was double Kerry’s 
margin in 2004. Though some observers speculated that racial frictions be-
tween Hispanics and blacks would prevent Hispanics from giving Obama 
wholehearted support, that most emphatically was not the case.
 If Democrats can hold this group’s support, demographic trends assure 
them of greater electoral benefits in years to come. The Hispanic population 
is growing rapidly, both in terms of absolute numbers and as a share of the 
United States population. Before 1980 the census did not even record His-
panic origin when it surveyed the country’s residents. Today Hispanics have 
surpassed blacks as the nation’s largest minority group, and census estimates 
indicate that there are about forty- five million Hispanics in the United States, 
15% of the nation’s population (Frey 2008).
 This rapid increase in demographic importance will continue for decades. 
The Hispanic population has grown by 32% since 2000 and has accounted 
for about half of United States population growth in that period (Frey 2008). 
And as mentioned, census projections indicate that by about mid- century 
Hispanics will account for 30% of the United States population.
 Of course it is true that the population strength of Hispanics is not cur-
rently matched by its voting strength, because of the large proportion of His-
panics who are not citizens and therefore cannot vote or are simply too young 
to vote. For example, of the 5.7 million Hispanics added to the United States 
population between 2000 and 2004, 1.7 million were under eighteen and 1.9 
million were noncitizens. As a result, only 42% of Hispanics overall are eli-
gible to vote, compared to 77% of non- Hispanic whites and 66% of African 
Americans (Suro, Fry, and Passel 2005; Frey 2009). Still, the proportion of 
Hispanics among the voting electorate has grown steadily and will continue 
to grow. Having made up only 2% of voters in the early 1990s, they rose to 
9% in 2008 and within ten years will likely surpass the level of blacks as a 
proportion of actual voters.7
 Asians over the last fifteen years or so have become a fairly solid Demo-
cratic constituency. In 2004 they supported Kerry over Bush by a margin of 
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56–44, similar to the margin they had given to Gore over Bush (55–41) in 
2000. And in the Congressional election of 2002, when much of the elec-
torate was going in the opposite direction, Asians increased their support 
dramatically for House Democrats, from 56–44 in 1998 to 66–34 in 2002. 
In 2006 Asians remained strong for the Democrats at 62–37.8 And in 2008 
Asians supported Obama by 62–35.
 Asians’ rate of growth was slightly higher than that of Hispanics in the 
1990s. And since 2000 they have not been far behind (26%, versus 32% for 
Hispanics). Right now they account for 5% of the population and about 2% of 
voters.9 Both figures will increase in the next ten years owing to this group’s 
fast rate of growth, but because they start from a much smaller base than 
Hispanics, their impact on the population and voting pool will be far more 
limited.
Single, Working, and Highly Educated Women
As is well known, Democrats typically do better among women than men. But 
women voters are a vast group, and the true areas of strength for Democrats 
are among three subgroups: single, working, and highly educated women. 
In 2004 Kerry carried single women by 62–37, college- educated women by 
54–45 (60–38 among those with a postgraduate education), and working 
women by 51–48.10
 All of these margins, however, were smaller than they had been in 2000, 
particularly for working women, who gave Kerry a margin no greater than 
his margin among women as a whole. This was primarily attributable to his 
poor performance among married working women, part of the Democrats’ 
general problem with married women voters in that election. Single work-
ing women, however, remained a very strong progressive constituency, with 
Democrats dominating by 65–35.11 In 2006 Democrats generally did better 
among these constituencies, carrying single women by 66–33 and college- 
educated women by 57–42.12 It is likely they also did better among working 
women, but since the exit polls did not ask respondents for their work status, 
this possibility could not be tested directly.
 In 2008 single women voted Democratic by 70–29, a substantially larger 
margin than in 2004. And working women, who had voted Democratic by 
only 3 points in 2004, voted Democratic this time by an impressive margin of 
60–39. Even married women with children, traditionally a difficult group for 
Democrats, supported Obama by 52–47.
 While the balance of women relative to men is changing little, of course, 
trends within the female population are quite favorable to Democrats. Single 
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women now make up almost half of adult women: 47%, up from 38% in 
1970.13 Their current size in the voter pool—more than a quarter of eligible 
voters—closely approximates the size of white evangelicals, the GOP’s largest 
base group. And since the current growth rate of single women is so great—
double that of married women—the proportion of single women in the voting 
pool will continue to increase (Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research 2007).
 And there is every expectation that this burgeoning population of single 
women will continue to be resolutely Democratic in its politics. Survey data 
consistently show this group to be unusually populist on economic issues and 
generally opposed to the conservative agenda on foreign policy and social 
issues (Women’s Voices, Women Vote 2007).
 Single working women tend to be a particularly progressive group among 
single women, as indicated by data cited earlier. They are also a rapidly grow-
ing group, increasing their share of the adult female population from 19% in 
1970 to 29% today.14 That is even faster than the growth rate among single 
women as a whole.
 Finally, college- educated women are also a rapidly growing population 
group. Their share of the female population twenty- five and older has more 
than tripled since 1970, from just 8% to 28% today.15
Professionals
In the last fifteen to twenty years professionals have become a very strong 
Democratic constituency, something they decidedly were not in earlier eras. 
In the presidential election of 1960, for example, professionals supported 
Nixon over Kennedy by 61 to 38. But in presidential elections from 1988 to 
2000, professionals supported the Democratic candidate by an average of 
52 to 40. And in 2004 they moved still further in this direction, supporting 
Kerry over Bush by 63–37.16 In 2006 exit poll data—using postgraduates as 
a proxy for professionals—suggest that professionals’ support for Democrats 
was once again at record high levels.17 And in 2008 Obama received 58–40 
support from postgraduates. That figure included 54–44 support among white 
postgraduates.
 Strong support from professionals is especially good for progressives be-
cause professionals are a rising group in American politics and society. In the 
1950s they made up about 7% of the workforce. But as the United States has 
moved from a blue- collar, industrial economy toward a postindustrial one 
that produces ideas and services, the professional class has expanded. Today 
it constitutes just under 17% of the workforce. In another ten years they will 
be 18% to 19% of the workforce.18
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 Moreover, reflecting their very high turnout rates, they are an even larger 
percentage of voters—and not just of employed voters, but of voters as a 
whole. Nationally they account for about 21% of voters; in many Northeast-
ern and Far Western states they form probably one- quarter of the electorate.19
The Millennial Generation
The Millennial generation is even larger than the Baby Boom generation. This 
is true no matter what definition we use. (A young generation often does not 
have a common name and clear start and end dates until a consensus emerges 
among demographers and social commentators over time.) For example, if we 
start Millennials in birth year 1978, after the “baby bust” (to which Genera-
tion X is typically linked) had ended and an era of steadily rising births had 
begun, and continue to 2000—as is common in market research—the size 
of this generation is truly staggering: 95 million (though only about half are 
adults) out of a population of 300 million, compared to 78 million Boomers. 
By 2018 Millennials, by this definition, will be 100 million strong and will all 
be old enough to vote. Even if we exclude noncitizens, there will still be 90 
million citizen- eligible Millennial voters.20
 And even if we use 1996 as the last birth year for the Millennials, so that 
the span of birth years covered by this generation (1978–96) is of the same 
length as that covered by the Baby Boom (1946–64), this generation is still 
larger than the Boomers: 80 million today and 83 million by 2016, when the 
members of the tail end of the generation vote in their first presidential elec-
tion.
 The Millennial generation is so large partly because many of its members 
are children of the Boomers (and make up the “echo boom”), while others are 
the children of immigrants, who settled in the United States in unprecedented 
numbers in the last several decades. The Millennials are the most diverse gen-
eration by far. According to census data published in March 2006, only 61% 
of Millennial adults were non- Hispanic whites, 18% were Hispanic, 14% were 
black, and 5% were Asian.
 Like the Boomers, the Millennials are poised to have an impact on the 
country at every life stage and in myriad ways—but particularly in politics. 
By 2008 the number of citizen- eligible Millennial voters had neared fifty 
million. By the presidential election of 2016 Millennials will be 36% of the 
citizen- eligible electorate, and about a third of actual voters21—and this is 
making no assumptions about possible increased turnout rates among Mil-
lennials in the future, which could make their weight among actual voters 
higher. In addition, from that point on the Millennials’ share of the electorate 
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will rise steadily for several decades as more and more of the generation enter 
middle age.
 On the level of sheer partisan politics, the increased number of Millennials 
in the voting pool is having substantial effects, since they have voted more 
heavily Democratic than other generations in their first few elections. For 
example, in 2006 voters aged eighteen to twenty- nine voted 60–38 Demo-
cratic for Congress, with the subgroup of voters aged eighteen to twenty- 
four going 58–37 Democratic (note how similar the strength of Democratic 
support is between the smaller group of Millennials and the larger group, 
implying that transition Millennials—those twenty- five to twenty- nine—did 
not vote much differently from their early Millennial counterparts). In 2004 
voters aged eighteen to twenty- nine (dominated by the subgroup aged eigh-
teen to twenty- six, who qualify as Millennials) voted 54–45 Democratic for 
president (55–44 for the House). But note here that the subgroup aged eigh-
teen to twenty- four—Millennials all—voted 56–43 Democratic for president, 
while the older subgroup, twenty- five to twenty- nine—mostly not Millen-
nials—voted only 51–48 Democratic. Even in 2002, a terrible Democratic 
year, voters aged eighteen to twenty- four (the first time Millennials consti-
tuted this group) still voted Democratic 49–47.22
 But it was in 2008 that the Millennial vote had its largest effect. This is the 
first year that voters aged eighteen to twenty- nine belonged exclusively to 
the millennial generation (those born 1978 or later), and they gave Obama a 
34- point margin, 66–32. This compares to only a 9- point margin for Kerry in 
2004. The youth share of voters also increased across the two elections, from 
17 to 18.
 Obama’s support among voters aged eighteen to twenty- nine was remark-
ably broad, extending across racial barriers. In that age group he carried 
not just Hispanics (76%–19%) and blacks (95–4) but also whites (54–44), 
a 10- point advantage that contrasts starkly with Obama’s 15- point deficit 
among older whites.
 Obama’s huge overall margin among Millennials contributed mightily to 
his strong victory. Without voters aged eighteen to twenty- nine, Obama’s 
popular vote margin would have been slightly under one percentage point. 
That figure means that 87% of Obama’s popular vote victory was attributable 
to the support of Millennials between eighteen and twenty- nine. Indeed with-
out these Millennial voters Obama would have been hard- pressed to claim 
much of a mandate from his election victory.
 These results could hardly be more positive for the Democrats. And Mil-
lennials’ influence on the electorate is certain to grow for the next several 
elections. There were about 48 million eligible Millennial voters in 2008, a 
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figure that will rise to 64 million in 2012 and 81 million in 2016. That is a huge 
number of potential Democrats, given how this generation is leaning. In a 
Pew survey in early 2007, 48% of Millennials between eighteen and twenty- 
five identified with or leaned toward the Democratic Party, compared to just 
35% who identified with or leaned toward the Republicans. The latter figure 
represents a huge crash in support for the Republicans among this age group: 
in the early 1990s voters in this age group, members of “Gen X,” were identi-
fying at a 55% rate with Republicans.
 Gen Xers continue to be the most Republican generation today, while the 
Millennials are emerging as the most Democratic generation by a substan-
tial margin. Other polls of Millennials and Millennial- dominated age groups 
confirm this solid Democratic lead in party identification. On election day in 
2006 the exit polls showed the Democrats with a 12- point lead on party iden-
tification among voters aged eighteen to twenty- five.23 And polls taken since 
then have continued to give the Democrats strong double- digit leads on party 
identification among this age group—Pew had the Democratic advantage at 
an astonishing 25 points in data covering the period from October 2007 to 
March 2008. Numerous political science studies confirm that party identifi-
cation, once formed in a generation’s twenties, tend to persist over a lifetime.
The Secular, the Less Observant, and the Non- Christian
It is a commonplace in American politics today that the highly observant—
especially evangelical Christians—are a bedrock conservative constituency. 
Less well appreciated is the extent to which the secular, the less observant, 
and the non- Christian are a bedrock Democratic constituency. In 2004 Kerry 
carried those who attend religious services a few times a year by 54–45 and 
those who never attend by 62–36. And he carried all non- Christian groups by 
very wide margins: Jews (77–22), Muslims (74–25), those who profess some 
other religion (72–25), and those who profess no religion (67–31).24 Demo-
cratic support among these groups was even stronger in 2006: those who 
attend religious services a few times a year (60–38), those who never attend 
(67–30), Jews (87–12), those who profess some other religion (71–25), and 
those who profess no religion (74–22).25
 According to exit polls, the less observant made up 43% of voters in 2004 
(the latter figure, incidentally, is exactly equal to the percentage of voters 
who were highly observant). That figure is likely to go up in the future. In the 
University of Chicago’s General Social Survey (GSS), those who attend church 
only once a year or less is now 42% of adults, up from 29% in 1972.
 Data from exit polls in 2008 suggest that attempts to inflame cultural 
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issues in the election campaign were not successful. Democrats gained sup-
port throughout the religious spectrum. Consider first the vote broken down 
by how often people attend religious services. In the United States over the 
last couple of decades there has been a strong relationship between how often 
you attend services and how you vote, with those who attend most frequently 
being much more conservative than those who attend least often. This rela-
tionship was not broken in 2008, but it did become less strong.
 For example, Obama ran the same relatively modest 12- point deficit among 
those who attend services more than once a week as he did among those who 
attend weekly. In fact, Obama’s 17- point improvement from a 35–64 Demo-
cratic deficit among the most frequent attenders in 2004 to a 43–55 deficit in 
2008 was his largest improvement among the different attendance groups in 
2008. He also improved the Democratic margin by 8 points among those who 
attend a few times a month, by 10 points among those who attend a few times 
a year, and by 11 points among those who never attend.
 In terms of religious affiliation, Obama improved the Democratic margin 
among Catholics by 14 points, from a 5- point deficit in 2004 to a 9- point ad-
vantage in 2008. He also reduced the Democratic deficit among Protestant 
and other Christian voters by 10 points, from 19 to 9. And he achieved enor-
mous margins among Jews (78–21), members of other religions (73–22), and 
unaffiliated voters (75–23).
 Speaking of unaffiliated—secular—voters, it is this group, not white evan-
gelicals, who are the fastest- growing religious group in the United States. 
This, combined with racial and ethnic trends, will ensure that in very short 
order we will no longer be a white Christian nation. Even today only about 
55% of adults are white Christians. By 2024 that figure will be down to 45%. 
This means that by the election of 2016 (or 2020 at the outside) white Chris-
tians will be in the minority. That will provide another long- range boost to 
Democratic prospects.
Union Household Voters
Union household voters have been a consistently strong constituency for pro-
gressives, and the election of 2004 was no exception. These voters supported 
Kerry by 59–40 and made up an impressive 24% of the voting pool.26 In 2006 
union households did even better for the Democrats, supporting them by 
64–34, while making up a similarly high share (23%) of voters.27 And in 2008 
these voters supported Obama by 59 to 40, a margin essentially identical to 
Kerry’s in 2004. Yet their representation among voters (21%) was 3 points 
less than in 2004. Even this 21% figure is impressive, however, given that 
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union membership in the United States now stands at only 12% of workers. 
Clearly the union vote has little potential for growth and considerable poten-
tial for further decline without significant changes in labor law such as those 
proposed in the Employee Free Choice Act, which would make it easier for 
unions to organize workers. Given the progressive proclivities of union house-
hold voters, that would be of great benefit to the Democrats.
The White Working- Class Challenge
The key weakness of the emerging Democratic coalition can be summarized 
easily: very weak support among white working- class voters (defined here 
as whites without a four- year college degree). These voters, who are over-
whelmingly of moderate to low income and, by definition, of modest cre-
dentials, should see their aspirations linked tightly to the political fate of the 
Democratic Party. But they do not. Instead the white working class, as it has 
declined in numbers, has shifted its allegiance from largely Democratic to 
largely Republican. Here is the story of that decline and political shift.
 Let us start with basic numbers: the size of the white working class about 
the time of the the Second World War and today. Using the broad education- 
based definition above, America in 1940 was an overwhelmingly white 
working- class country. In that year 86% of adults twenty- five and over were 
whites without a four- year college degree. By 2007, with the dramatic rise 
in educational attainment and the decline in the white population, that pro-
portion was down to 48%.28 A similar trend can be seen if one uses a narrow 
education- based definition. In 1940 82% of adults twenty- five and over were 
whites with a high school diploma or less. By 2007 that figure was down to 
29%. Or, using a broad occupation- based definition, in 1940 74% of employed 
workers were whites without professional or managerial jobs. By 2006 the 
steady climb in professional and managerial jobs, combined with the decline 
in the white population, had brought that proportion down to 43%.29 A nar-
row occupation- based definition yields a decline of similar magnitude. In 
1940 58% of workers were whites without professional, managerial, or cleri-
cal and sales jobs (or, looked at another way, whites who held manual, ser-
vice, or farm jobs). By 2006 that figure had fallen to 25%.
 The final class indicator to look at is income. Using a broad income- based 
definition of the white working class, 86% of American families in 1947 were 
white families with less than $60,000 in income (2005 dollars). With rising 
affluence—especially rapid in the period from 1947 to 1973—and the decline 
in the white population, that figure had declined to 33% by 2005.30 Using a 
narrow income- based definition, 60% of families in 1947 were white families 
with less than $30,000 in income. That figure had dropped to 14% by 2005.
The Evolving Democratic Coalition 173
 So each indicator that can be used to define the white working class, 
whether applied broadly or narrowly, shows huge declines from the Second 
World War era to today—declines roughly in the range of 30–50 percent-
age points. The income- based definitions show the sharpest declines and the 
occupation- based definitions the least, with the education- based definitions 
somewhere in between. And in each case these shifts have moved the white 
working class from being the solid and sometimes overwhelming majority of 
United States adults (or workers or families) to being a minority.
 But the story of the white working class in the years following the Second 
World War is one of not just one sharp decline but also profound transforma-
tion. This is true no matter what indicator one uses to define the white work-
ing class. That is, whether one looks at white families with less than $60,000 
income, whites who do not hold professional and managerial jobs, or whites 
without a four- year college degree, there have been dramatic shifts in the 
character and composition of the white working class.
 Consider the following shifts among whites without a four- year college 
degree. In 1940 86% of these working- class whites had never graduated from 
high school (or even reached high school). But today just 14% of the white 
working class consists of high school dropouts. About two- fifths have some 
education beyond high school, with 13% having achieved an associate de-
gree.31 Note, however, that the economic situation of those with an associate 
degree is very similar to those with some college but no degree: the median 
household income of whites with an associate degree is only a few thousand 
dollars more than those with some college only (Teixeira and Rogers 2000, 
16).
 While the unavailability of data precludes a precise estimate, the economic 
situation of the white working class has altered dramatically. A reasonable 
guess is that median family income among the white working class rose from 
around $20,000 to $50,000 between 1947 and 2005, a 150% increase. And 
the jobs that the white working class holds have also altered dramatically. 
Today most white working- class jobs are not manual or blue- collar but low- 
level white- collar (technical, sales, clerical) and service occupations. And 
the blue- collar jobs that remain are increasingly likely to be skilled positions: 
only about a sixth of the white working class holds unskilled blue- collar jobs 
(even among white working- class men, the figure is less than one- quarter).32
 Today only about a sixth of the white working class holds manufacturing 
jobs (even among men, the proportion is still less than one- quarter). In fact 
the entire goods- producing sector, which includes construction, mining, and 
agriculture as well as manufacturing, provides less than three in ten white 
working- class jobs. The remaining seven in ten are in the service sector, in-
cluding government. There are about as many members of the white work-
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ing class working in trade alone (especially retail) as there are in all goods- 
producing jobs.
 Accompanying the decline and transformation of the white working class 
was a very significant shift in its political orientation, from pro- Democratic 
in most respects to pro- Republican, especially at the presidential level. The 
story of this shift away from the Democratic Party starts with the New Deal 
Democrats and their close relationship with the white working class. The 
New Deal Democratic worldview was based on a combination of the Demo-
crats’ historic populist commitment to the average working American and 
their experience in battling the Great Depression (and building their political 
coalition) through increased government spending and regulation and the 
promotion of labor unions. It was really a rather simple philosophy, even if 
the application of it was complex. Government should help the average per-
son through vigorous government spending. Capitalism needs regulation to 
work properly. Labor unions are good. Putting money in the average person’s 
pocket is more important than rarefied worries about the quality of life. Tra-
ditional morality is to be respected, not challenged. Racism and the like are 
bad, but not so bad that the party should depart from its main mission of ma-
terial uplift for the average American.
 That worldview had deep roots in an economy dominated by mass produc-
tion industries and was politically based among the workers, overwhelmingly 
white, in those industries. And it helped make the Democrats the undisputed 
party of the white working class. Their dominance among these voters was 
the key to their political success. To be sure, there were important divisions 
among these voters—by country of origin (German, Scandinavian, Eastern 
European, Eng lish, Irish, Italian), religion (Protestants, Catholics), and re-
gion (South, North)—that greatly complicated the politics of this group, but 
New Deal Democrats mastered the complications and maintained a deep base 
among these voters.
 Of course the New Deal coalition as originally forged did include most 
blacks and was certainly cross- class, especially among groups like Jews and 
southerners. But the prototypical member of the coalition was indeed an 
ethnic white worker—commonly visualized as working in a unionized fac-
tory, but in some cases not belonging to a union and in some cases work-
ing in a non- manufacturing blue- collar sector such as construction or trans-
portation. It was these voters who provided the numbers for five consecutive 
Democratic election victories—four by FDr and one narrow one by Harry 
Truman in 1948—as well as political support for the emerging United States 
welfare state, its implicit social contract, and a greatly expanded role for gov-
ernment.
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 Even in the 1950s, with the Republican Dwight Eisenhower as president, 
the white working class continued to put Democrats in Congress and support 
the expansion of the welfare state, as a roaring United States economy deliv-
ered the goods and as government poured money into roads, science, schools, 
and whatever else seemed necessary to build up the country. This era, stretch-
ing back into the late 1940s and forward to the mid- 1960s, created the first 
mass middle class in the world—a middle class that even factory workers 
could enter, since they could earn relatively comfortable livings even without 
high levels of education or professional skills—a middle class, in other words, 
that members of the white working class could reasonably aspire to join and 
frequently did.
 So New Deal Democrats depended on the white working class for politi-
cal support, and the white working class depended on the Democrats to run 
government and the economy in a way that kept that upward escalator to the 
middle class moving. Social and cultural issues were not particularly impor-
tant to this mutually beneficial relationship; they had only a peripheral role 
in the uncomplicated progressivism that animated the Democratic Party of 
the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. But that arrangement and that uncomplicated 
progressivism could not and did not survive the decline of mass production 
industries and the rise of postindustrial capitalism.
 First, there was the transformation of the white working class itself, dis-
cussed in detail previously. The white working class became richer, better 
educated, more white- collar, and less unionized. To get a sense of how impor-
tant unionization was, consider that in the late 1940s unions claimed around 
60% or more of the northern blue- collar workforce (Judis and Teixeira 2002, 
63). Second, as this great transformation was changing the character of the 
white working class, reducing the size and influence of the Democrats’ tra-
ditional blue- collar constituencies, the evolution of postindustrial capitalism 
was creating new constituencies and movements with new demands. These 
new constituencies and movements wanted more out of the welfare state than 
steady economic growth, copious infrastructure spending, and the opportu-
nity to raise a family in the traditional manner.
 During the 1960s these new demands on the welfare state came to a head. 
Americans’ concern about their quality of life overflowed and their expecta-
tions increased: from a two- car garage to clean air and water and safe auto-
mobiles; from higher wages to government- guaranteed healthcare in old age; 
from access to jobs to equal opportunities for men and women and blacks 
and whites. Out of these concerns came the environmental, consumer, civil 
rights, and feminist movements of the 1960s. As Americans abandoned the 
older ideal of self- denial and the taboos that accompanied it, they embraced a 
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libertarian ethic of personal life. Women asserted their sexual independence 
through the use of birth control pills and the right to have an abortion. Ado-
lescents experimented with sex and courtship. Homosexuals “came out” and 
openly congregated in bars and neighborhoods.
 Of these changes the one with most far- reaching political effects was the 
civil rights movement and its demands for equality and economic progress 
for black America. Democrats, both because of their traditional, if usually 
downplayed, antiracist ideology and their political relationship to the black 
community, had no choice but to respond to those demands. The result was a 
great victory for social justice, but one that created huge political difficulties 
for the Democrats among their white working- class supporters. Kevin Phillips 
captured these developments well in his book, The Emerging Republican Ma-
jority (1969): “The principal force which broke up the Democratic (New Deal) 
coalition is the Negro socioeconomic revolution and liberal Democratic ideo-
logical inability to cope with it. Democratic ‘Great Society’ programs aligned 
that party with many Negro demands, but the party was unable to defuse the 
racial tension sundering the nation. The South, the West, and the Catholic 
sidewalks of New York were the focus points of conservative opposition to the 
welfare liberalism of the federal government; however, the general opposi-
tion . . . came in large part from prospering Democrats who objected to Wash-
ington dissipating their tax dollars on programs which did them no good. The 
Democratic Party fell victim to the ideological impetus of a liberalism which 
had carried it beyond programs taxing the few for the benefit of the many . . . 
to programs taxing the many on behalf of the few.”
 But if race was the chief vehicle by which the New Deal coalition was torn 
apart, it was by no means the only one. White working- class voters also re-
acted poorly to the extremes with which the rest of the new social movements 
became identified. Feminism became identified with “bra burners,” lesbians, 
and hostility to the nuclear family; the antiwar movement with appeasement 
of third world radicals and the Soviet Union; the environmental movement 
with a Luddite opposition to economic growth; and the move toward more 
personal freedom with a complete abdication of personal responsibility.
 Thus the New Deal mainstream that dominated the Democratic Party was 
confronted with a challenge. The uncomplicated commitments to govern-
ment spending, economic regulation, and labor unions that had defined the 
Democrats’ progressivism for over thirty years suddenly provided little guid-
ance for contending with an explosion of potential new constituencies for the 
party. Their demands for equality, and for a better as opposed to merely richer 
life, were starting to redefine what progressivism meant, and the Democrats 
had to struggle to catch up.
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 Initially Democratic politicians responded to these changes in the fashion 
of politicians since time immemorial: they sought to co- opt the new move-
ments by absorbing many of their demands, while holding on to the party’s 
basic ideology and style of governing. Thus Democratic politicians did not 
change their fundamental commitment to the New Deal welfare state, but 
grafted onto it support for all the various new constituencies and their key 
demands. After Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the party 
moved over the next eight years to give prominent places within the party to 
the women’s, antiwar, consumer, and environmental movements. This stance 
reflected both the politician’s standard interest in capturing the votes of new 
constituencies and the broadening definition of what it meant to be a Demo-
crat, particularly a progressive one.
 But of course there was no guarantee that gains among these new con-
stituencies would not be offset by losses among the older constituency—the 
white working class—which had little interest in revising what it meant to 
be a progressive and a Democrat. The conflict was brought to the fore in 1972 
with the nomination and disastrous defeat of George McGovern, who enthu-
siastically embraced the new direction taken by the party. McGovern’s com-
mitment to the traditional Democratic welfare state was unmistakable. But 
so was his commitment to the various social movements and constituencies 
that were reshaping the party, whose demands were enshrined in McGovern’s 
campaign platform. That made it easy for his Republican opponent, President 
Richard Nixon, to typecast McGovern as the candidate of “acid, amnesty and 
abortion.” The white working class reacted accordingly and gave Nixon 70% 
of its votes (Judis and Teixeira 2002, 63).
 Just how far the Democrats fell in the white working class’s eyes over this 
period can be seen by comparing the average vote for Democrats of the white 
working class (whites without a four- year college degree) in 1960–64 (55%) 
to its average vote for Democrats in 1968–72 (35%) (Teixeira and Rogers 
2000, 32). The Democrats were the party of the white working class no longer.
 With the sharp economic recession and Nixon’s scandals of 1973–74, the 
Democrats were able to develop enough political momentum to retake the 
White House in 1976, with Jimmy Carter’s narrow defeat of Gerald Ford. But 
their political revival did not last long.
 Carter did little to defuse white working- class hostility to the new social 
movements, especially the black liberation movement, and economic condi-
tions in the late 1970s conspired to make that hostility even sharper. Stagfla-
tion—a vexing combination of high inflation and high unemployment with 
slow economic growth, including, critically, slow wage and income growth—
had first appeared during the recession of 1973–75, but it persisted under 
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Carter and was peaking on the eve of the election of 1980. As the economy slid 
once more into recession, the inflation rate stood at 12.5%. Combined with an 
unemployment rate of 7.1%, it produced a “misery index” of nearly 20%. By 
that time white working- class voters had entered an economic world radically 
different from the one enjoyed by the preceding generation. Slow growth, de-
clining wages, stagnating living standards, high inflation, and high interest 
rates were really battering them economically. The great postwar escalator to 
the middle class had drastically slowed down and for some even stopped.
 These economic developments fed resentments about race—about high 
taxes for welfare (which were assumed to go primarily to minorities) and 
about affirmative action. But they also sowed doubts about Democrats’ ability 
to manage the economy and made Republican and business explanations of 
stagflation—blaming it on government regulation, high taxes, and spend-
ing—more plausible. In 1978 white backlash and doubts about Democratic 
economic policies had helped to fuel a nationwide tax revolt. In 1980 these 
forces reinforced the massive exodus of white working- class voters from the 
Democratic tickets first seen in 1968 and 1972. In the presidential elections of 
1980 and 1984 Ronald Reagan averaged 61% support among the white work-
ing class, compared to an average of 35% support for his Democratic oppo-
nents, Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale (Judis and Teixeira 2002, 63; Tei-
xeira and Rogers 2000, 32).
 Such a thrashing, coming not that long after the debacle of the McGovern 
campaign, led many Democrats to form a new organization, the Democratic 
Leadership Council (DlC), to propose a reconfiguration of the Democratic 
approach. These “New Democrats” argued that in the late 1960s the liberal-
ism of the New Deal had degenerated into a liberal fundamentalism, which, 
in the words of William Galston and Elaine Kamarck (1989), the public had 
“come to associate with tax and spending policies that contradict the inter-
ests of average families; with welfare policies that foster dependence rather 
than self- reliance; with softness toward the perpetrators of crime and indif-
ference toward its victims; with ambivalence toward the assertion of Ameri-
can values and interests abroad; and with an adversarial stance toward main-
stream moral and cultural values.”
 Galston, Kamarck, and the DlC advocated fiscal conservatism, welfare re-
form, increased spending on crime through the development of a police corps, 
tougher mandatory sentences, support for capital punishment, and policies 
that encouraged traditional families. This new approach did not really take 
off until it was embraced by the Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clin-
ton in 1992, who synthesized these views with a moderate version of New 
Deal economic populism. It proved to be an electorally successful approach 
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for Clinton both in 1992 and, thanks to some good economic times, in 1996 
as well. But despite Clinton’s electoral success, he did not receive a great deal 
of white working- class support: he averaged only 41% across his two elec-
tion victories. But he did at least prevent these voters from siding with his 
Republican opponents in large numbers, eking out 1- point pluralities among 
the white working class in both elections (in each election a third- party can-
didacy was mounted by Ross Perot).33
 Clinton’s designated successor, Al Gore, was not so successful. He lost 
white working- class voters in the 2000 election by 17 points. And the next 
Democratic presidential candidate, John Kerry, did even worse, losing these 
voters by 23 points in 2004.34 One could reasonably ascribe the worsening 
deficit for Democrats in 2004 to concerns about national security and terror-
ism after 9/11, but not so for the very sizable deficit in 2000. Apparently the 
successes of the Clinton years, which included a strong economy that deliv-
ered solid real wage growth for the first time since 1973, did not succeed in re-
storing the historic bond between the white working class and the Democrats.
 Exit polls typically do not classify respondents by occupation, but they do 
classify by income as well as education. If one looks specifically at voters who 
seem to correspond most closely to one’s intuitive sense of the heart of the 
white working class—white voters of moderate income who are not college- 
educated—one finds that these are precisely the voters among whom Demo-
crats did most poorly. For example, among non- college- educated whites with 
a household income of $30,000–$50,000, Bush beat Kerry by 24 points (62–
38); among college- educated whites at the same income level Kerry man-
aged a 49–49 tie. And among non- college- educated whites with $50,000–
$75,000 in household income, Bush beat Kerry by 41 points (70–29), while 
leading by only 5 points (52–47) among college- educated whites at the same 
income level.35 Thus the more voters looked like hardcore members of the 
white working class, the less likely they were to vote for Kerry in 2004.
 Clearly Democrats need to do better among white working- class voters if 
they are to capitalize on their burgeoning advantage among the constituen-
cies enumerated earlier. And in 2006 and 2008 they were able to do so. In 
2006 the Democrats dramatically improved their performance among white 
working- class voters, running only a 10- point deficit, down from a 20- point 
deficit in congressional voting in 2004. The Democrats also reduced their defi-
cit from 32 to 21 points among non- college- educated whites with $50,000 to 
$75,000 in household income and completely eliminated their deficit among 
non- college- educated whites with $30,000–$50,000 in household income, 
going from 22 points down in 2004 to dead even.36 In the election of 2008 
the Democrats lost the white working class by 18 points, also an improve-
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ment over 2004 when they had lost them by 23 points, but worse than pre- 
election polls indicated they would do. As it turned out, Democrats were 
able to achieve a solid victory even with this large white working- class defi-
cit. This is because minority turnout and support were at record highs and 
white college graduate support for the Democrats increased smartly as well. 
So an 18- point white working- class deficit was in the end adequate to produce 
a solid victory for the Democrats, rather than the squeaker that many, in-
cluding myself, had expected. Indeed, if Obama had achieved a significantly 
lower deficit among these voters—say in the 10- to 12- point range—he would 
have won in a true landslide, given his support among other demographic 
groups. But Obama did not attain that: his white working- class deficit (18 
points) was very similar to Al Gore’s (17 points). It is also interesting to com-
pare Michael Dukakis’s performance in 1988 among white working- class and 
white college graduates to Obama’s performance. In 1988 the Democratic 
deficit among these two groups was identical: 20 points. In 2008 the white 
working- class deficit was only a slight improvement (down 2 points), but the 
white college graduate deficit was just 4 points, a 16- point Democratic swing 
since 1988. This stubbornly high deficit for Democrats among white working- 
class voters is mitigated by the greatly diminished share of the voting pool. 
According to the exit polls, the proportion of white working- class voters is 
down 15 points since 1988, while the proportion of white college graduates is 
up 4 points and of minority voters up 11 points.
 On the state level Obama did stunningly well among white working- class 
voters in four of the five highly competitive states that the Democrats won 
in 2000 and 2004 (Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin). The aver-
age white working- class deficit for Kerry in these states in 2004 was 8 points. 
In 2008 Obama had an average advantage in these states of 6 points, a pro- 
Democratic swing of 14 points. In Pennsylvania, however, the other highly 
competitive state that the Democrats won in 2000 and 2004, Obama did 
worse than Kerry, losing the white working class by 15 points as opposed 
to Kerry’s 10 points. But college- educated whites in Pennsylvania swung 
Obama’s way by 17 points, turning a 12- point deficit in 2004 into a 5- point 
advantage in 2008. The Democrats were also helped in Pennsylvania by the 
rapidly shifting distribution of voters. Since 1988 the share of white working- 
class voters has declined by 25 points, while the share of white college gradu-
ates has gone up 16 points and the minority share by 8 points.
 In the highly competitive states that the Democrats lost in both 2000 and 
2004 (Florida, Missouri, Nevada, and Ohio) the pattern was different. In 2004 
the average Democratic white working- class deficit in these states was 13 
points; in 2008 the average deficit was actually slightly worse (14 points). 
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But Obama made progress in other ways. Among white college graduates the 
Democrats improved their average margin by 9 points. And minority support 
went up substantially and in some cases spectacularly. Further, in each of 
these states one sees the same long- term trends in the distribution of voters: 
fewer white working- class voters, more white college- educated voters, and 
more minorities.
 One factor that should favor the Democrats, albeit over the longer term, 
is that the decline of the white working class is likely to continue. First, there 
will be a continuing decline in the white population as a whole. By the presi-
dential election of 2020, the Census Bureau projects that non- Hispanic whites 
will be down to around 60% of the population. By 2050 that share will have 
dropped to about 46%. Educational upgrading is also likely to continue, 
though it may slow. A working paper published by the Census Bureau (Day 
and Bauman 2000) predicts a 4–7 point increase in the high school comple-
tion rate, a 7–12 point increase in the college attendance rate (some college 
or higher), and a 4–5 point increase in the four- year- college completion rate 
by 2028.
 Occupational upgrading will continue, though here too the rate may slow. 
According to occupational projections to 2016 by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, while professional (and service) jobs will grow at the fastest rate among 
major occupational groups, professional occupations will increase their share 
of jobs by only about a percentage point, a slowdown from the rate of share 
increase from 1950 to 2000 (changes in occupation coding make the compari-
son inexact). In addition, managerial occupations will grow at the second- 
fastest rate (though their share will remain flat).
 Income upgrading should also continue, though the rate is very difficult 
to assess. Recall that median family income increased about 150% from 1947 
to 2005. But most of that increase was in the twenty- six- year period between 
1947 and 1973, when family income more than doubled, with an annual 
growth rate of 2.8%. In the thirty- two years between 1973 and 2005, income 
only went up 23%, an annual growth rate of 0.6%.37 So how much income 
goes up in the future will depend very much on whether income growth fol-
lows the pre- 1973 or post- 1973 pattern, or something in between.
 Since we do not know the answer to this question and recent history is 
inconclusive—there was a period of rapid growth in median family income 
from 1995 to 2000 (up 11%), followed by negative growth from 2000 to 2005 
(down 2%)—one approach is to use the growth rate over the entire period 
1947–2005 period (1.6%), which in effect averages the growth rates in the 
“good” (1947–73) and “bad” (1973–2005) periods. Applying this rate to me-
dian family income produces an estimate of $83,000 for the year 2030 (in 
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2005 dollars). Moreover, if one applies this rate to the fortieth percentile 
of the family income distribution, the fortieth percentile would move up to 
around $67,000 by 2030, meaning that roughly 65% of families in that year 
would have more than $60,000 in income. In 2005 the corresponding figure 
was about 47%.
 The downward trajectory of the white working class therefore seems as-
sured if its rate of decline is uncertain. As with the data since the Second 
World War reviewed at the beginning of this chapter, it appears likely that 
the future rate of decline will be fastest under an income- based definition, 
slowest under an occupation- based definition, and intermediate under an 
education- based definition. More precise statements about the projected 
population share of the white working class are difficult, but some educated 
guesses can be made.
 Looking first at the broad education- based definition (whites without a 
four- year college degree), the rate of decline of the white working class since 
the Second World War has been 0.57 percentage points a year. Adjusting this 
rate downward a bit to allow for the expected slowdown in educational up-
grading and projecting it forward to the presidential election of 2020 yields 
an estimate of 41% of adults in the white working class and perhaps a per-
centage point more of voters. Under the occupation- based definition (whites 
without a professional or managerial job), the rate of decline since the Sec-
ond World War has been 0.47 percentage points a year. Adjusting the rate 
downward to allow for the projected slowdown in occupational upgrading 
and projecting forward to 2020 yields an estimate of 37% of workers in the 
white working class. Finally, under the income- based definition (white fami-
lies under $60,000), the rate of decline since 1947 has been 0.91 percent-
age points a year. Keeping the rate the same and projecting forward to 2020 
yields an estimate of 20% of families qualifying as white working class.38
 These changes now make it possible for the Democrats to build majority 
support with smaller proportions of the white working class. Conversely, Re-
publicans, who are dependent today on supermajorities of the white working- 
class vote to cobble together a majority coalition, will need ever larger ma-
jorities of the white working-class vote over time to sustain their coalition.
DESPITE THE SETBACK in the 2010 midterms, together the foregoing trends 
have put the Democrats in a position to eventually build a dominant center- 
left majority in the United States. Fundamental changes in the American elec-
torate are more likely to favor them than the GOP for a considerable time 
to come. As recent events have demonstrated, however, the real challenge 
for the Democrats now is governance—and they entered office at a particu-
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larly challenging time, with the most serious economic crisis since the Second 
World War gripping the country. But with this crisis also came opportunity. 
It was far more feasible for Obama and the Democrats to attain passage of 
large- scale reforms with commensurate levels of spending than it would have 
been in more tranquil times.
 Obama took advantage of this situation. Start with the $787 billion stimu-
lus bill that included significant investments in education and clean energy. 
These expenditures, combined with extensive interventions to stabilize the 
banking system, pulled the United States economy back from the brink of 
a truly catastrophic meltdown and onto a growth path that while currently 
slow, should pick up considerably in the future.
 And then there is healthcare reform, something that progressives in 
America have been trying to accomplish for nearly a century. It was a long, 
grueling process, but a healthcare reform bill was finally passed and signed 
into law by President Obama. It covers more than thirty million people who 
were previously uninsured, reforms the insurance market so that people with 
pre- existing conditions cannot be denied coverage, and much, much more. 
The details are byzantine, but the most important fact is this: for the first 
time, the principle that everyone in America should have access to affordable 
healthcare has been enshrined in law. The law will have to be extended and 
modified in the future, but the stunning nature of this accomplishment can-
not be denied.
 Obama also delivered on his promise to tackle climate change. Besides the 
investments in clean energy mentioned above, he pushed a cap- and- trade 
energy bill through the House of Representatives, although it unfortunately 
died in the Senate. And Obama traveled to Copenhagen, where he helped 
negotiate a preliminary agreement that may eventually lead to a binding 
international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions. The contrast could 
not be sharper with the Bush administration’s lack of interest in fighting cli-
mate change. There is also a sharp contrast with the Bush administration’s 
approach to international relations. Obama has thoroughly revamped the 
United States approach to working with other countries and international 
institutions, replacing Bush’s unilateralism with an open, cooperative multi-
lateralism.
 Obama achieved one more important legislative goal: a regulatory reform 
bill for the financial sector, the most significant such legislation since the 
1930s, establishing new federal regulatory powers to police financial markets 
and protect consumers and reining in the derivatives market that lay at the 
heart of the financial crisis. He promised to take bold action in this area dur-
ing his campaign.
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 That is where we are on Obama’s progressive agenda. But what of Obama’s 
Democratic majority? Here the news is obviously not so good. Obama’s ap-
proval rating peaked at 67% in the Gallup poll around the time of his inaugu-
ration in January 2009. Since then it has declined considerably, standing at 
about 47% across all polls in April 2011. His approval ratings are lower still 
on the economy, the budget deficit, and healthcare.
 This declining public support for Obama and his policies contributed to 
the Republicans’ 2010 midterm election victories. A few fundamental or 
“structural” factors explain this outcome: the poor state of the economy; the 
abnormally conservative composition of the midterm electorate; and the 
large number of vulnerable seats in conservative- leaning areas. Independent 
voters, white working- class voters, seniors, and men broke heavily against 
the Democrats because of the economy. Turnout levels were also unusually 
low among young and minority voters and unusually high among seniors, 
whites, and conservatives, thus contributing to a massively skewed midterm 
electorate. The Democrats therefore faced a predictable, and arguably un-
avoidable, convergence of forces (for a much more detailed discussion see 
Teixeira and Halpin 2010).
 Although Obama and the Democrats lost support since the 2008 election 
among most demographic groups, the biggest decline was among the white 
working class. This makes sense for two reasons. First, this group is very 
sensitive to economic conditions, and those conditions have been terrible. 
Obama may have succeeded in averting an economic cataclysm, but he could 
not prevent a steady rise in the unemployment rate since his election (though 
it appears that that rise has finally abated). In November 2008 the unem-
ployment rate stood at 6.8%. By the following November it was 10%, and 
a year later it was still 9.6%. Second, the white working class, even more 
than the American public as a whole, is inclined to be suspicious of govern-
ment interventions and spending, of which there has been a considerable 
amount since the election. This hostility toward “big government” was bound 
to be inflamed by the perceived failure of these government actions (if we are 
spending so much money to fix things, why is the economy in such terrible 
shape?) and by the relentless attacks on Obama by the conservative opposi-
tion, ranging from the Republicans in Congress to “Tea Party” activists at the 
grassroots.
 It is important to note, however, that although their loss of the House and 
the reduction of their Senate majority was a serious rebuke to the Democrats 
and the political status quo, it was not an endorsement of a conservative 
agenda. Data on voter opinions expressed in pre- and post- election polling 
confirms that the 2010 election was neither a mandate for antigovernment 
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and Tea Party ideology nor an endorsement of GOP policies on taxes and 
regulation. Nor did the election turn on a repudiation of Obama’s healthcare 
plan, despite staunch Republican opposition.
 Given all this, looking ahead toward the presidential election of 2012, what 
is the prognosis for Obama’s coalition? Better than one might expect in the 
wake of the recent midterms. In this regard the example of Ronald Reagan is 
instructive. Reagan had to contend with a severe recession, just like Obama—
indeed for Reagan, unemployment peaked at 10.8%, higher than Obama has 
experienced. At about this point in Reagan’s first term, his approval rating 
was actually lower than Obama’s current rating, and his party wound up 
losing twenty- six House seats in the congressional election of 1982. But 1983 
and 1984 were years of strong economic growth, and the unemployment rate 
declined over those years, reaching 7.2% by election day 1984. In that election 
Reagan won a landslide victory with 59% of the popular vote.
 Obama’s first term could well follow a similar trajectory. As noted above, 
his party lost seats in 2010, largely as a result of the poor economy and the 
historical tendency of incumbent parties to lose seats in midterm elections. 
But by 2012 the economic situation should be improved and unemploy-
ment lower—Obama’s version of Reagan’s “morning in America.” Moreover, 
Obama will have the advantage of four more years of growth in his demo-
graphic coalition plus an election (presidential) in which that coalition is 
likely to turn out at high levels. The result, I believe, will be a victory for 
Obama in 2012 and the reemergence of the Democratic majority that we saw 
in the United States presidential election of 2008.
Notes
 1. Author’s analysis of data from Current Population Survey (CPS) and exit polls.
 2. Author’s analysis of 2006 exit polls from National Election Pool (NEP).
 3. In 2009 the Census Bureau issued a set of projections that are “supplemental” to 
the 2008 projections. What this means is that even though the 2008 projections remain 
the recommended data series for general use, the 2009 supplemental projections can 
be used to assess the effects of different immigration scenarios on future population 
levels and distribution. Of the scenarios provided, the “low net international migra-
tion,” or low NIM, which projects the number of immigrants per year to increase slowly 
to 2050, is fairly close to the original 2008 projections and quite similar to the projec-
tions produced by the demographers Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohen for the Pew Re-
search Center (“US Population Projections: 2005–2050,” 11 February 2008), based on 
a constant rate of immigration relative to population size. The low NIM scenario puts 
the majority- minority crossover point at 2045. Some argue that the constant NIM sce-
nario (under which the number of immigrants per year remains constant to the year 
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2050) should be preferred, since it corresponds well to the recent experience of the 
United States with immigrant flows (see William Frey, “Immigration and the Coming 
‘Majority Minority,’” Brookings Institution, 19 March 2010). The constant NIM scenario 
has a majority- minority crossover date of 2050, corresponding to the date frequently 
cited in popular accounts of rising diversity.
 4. See Ruy Teixeira, http://www.emergingdemocraticmajorityweblog.com/donkey 
rising/archives/001234.php, for references and discussion.
 5. Author’s analysis of 2004 NEP national exit polls.
 6. If you do an apples- to- apples comparison of data; see Ruy Teixeira, http://www 
.emergingdemocraticmajorityweblog.com/donkeyrising/archives/001227.php, for 
analysis and discussion.
 7. Author’s analysis of data from Current Population Survey (CPS) and exit polls.
 8. Author’s analysis of 2000–2006 exit polls.
 9. Author’s analysis of data from CPS and exit polls and Frey, “Immigration and the 
Coming ‘Majority Minority.’”
 10. Figures in this and next paragraph based on author’s analysis of 2004 NEP exit 
polls.
 11. Author’s analysis of 2004 NEP exit polls.
 12. Author’s analysis of 2006 NEP exit polls.
 13. Author’s analysis of census data on marital status.
 14. Ibid.
 15. Author’s analysis of census data on educational attainment.
 16. Author’s analysis of 1960–2004 National Election Study.
 17. Author’s analysis of 2006 NEP exit polls.
 18. Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational projections.
 19. Judis and Teixeira (2002); author’s analysis of 2004 National Election Study.
 20. All data in this and subsequent paragraph from author’s analysis of census popu-
lation projections.
 21. Author’s analysis of 2008 census national population projections, 2008 national 
NEP exit poll and 2004 Current Population Survey voter supplement data.
 22. Author’s analysis of 2002–2006 exit polls.
 23. Author’s analysis of 2006 NEP exit polls.
 24. Author’s analysis of 2004 NEP exit polls, except for the figure on Jews, which is 
taken from Mellman, Strauss, Greenberg, McCreesh, and Wald, “The Jewish Vote in 
2004.”
 25. Author’s analysis of data from 2006 NEP exit polls.
 26. Author’s analysis of 2004 NEP exit polls.
 27. Author’s analysis of 2006 NEP exit polls.
 28. Data in this and following paragraph from author’s analysis of 1940 census and 
2007 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement.
 29. This and following paragraph based on author’s analysis of 1940 census and 
2006 American Community Survey occupation data.
 30. This and following paragraph based on author’s analysis of 1947 and 2005 Cur-
rent Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement income data.
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 31. Author’s analysis of 1940 census and 2007 Current Population Survey Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement education data.
 32. Data in this and following paragraph are conservative extrapolations from Tei-
xeira and Rogers 2000, 16–17.
 33. Data in this paragraph from author’s analysis of 1992 and 1996 Voter News Ser-
vice (VNS) national exit polls.
 34. Data in this paragraph from author’s analysis of 2000 VNS and 2004 NEP na-
tional exit polls.
 35. Data in this paragraph from author’s analysis of 2004 NEP national exit polls.
 36. All data in this paragraph from author’s analysis of 2006 NEP national exit polls.
 37. This and following paragraph based on author’s analysis of 1947–2005 Current 
Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement income data.
 38. This paragraph based on author’s analysis of 1940–2000 census data and 2007 
Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement education data; 
author’s analysis of 1940 census data and 2006 American Community Survey occupa-
tion data; and author’s analysis of 1947–2005 Current Population Survey Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement income data.
Party Politics and the  
American Welfare State
Christopher Howard
Including the United States in this book may strike some readers as odd. If 
one aim is to chart the transformation of left parties into center- left parties, 
why study a polity that has never had much of a left? For years scholars 
have been analyzing the sources and symptoms of “American exceptional-
ism.” Their central question, posed and answered in different ways, has in-
volved the weakness of left- wing organizations and ideology (e.g., Kingdon 
1999; Lipset and Marks 2000; Sombart 1976 [1906]). The best showing of 
any United States socialist party in national elections was a meager 6% of the 
vote—and that was way back in 1912. The power of organized labor was never 
great to begin with and declined throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century. The size of government, measured by public spending as a share of 
GDP, has consistently been smaller in the United States than in Europe. When 
socialism collapsed across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union broke apart, 
the dominant reaction in the United States was a feeling of vindication, not 
loss. In the context of this book, it would seem to make more sense to focus 
on countries such as Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, 
which several authors do.
 Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to investigate the American 
case. As the editors note in their introductory chapter, the United States is 
hardly sui generis. Lower union membership, the shift from manufacturing 
to services, the decline of Keynesianism and rise of neoliberalism, and new 
styles of political campaigns are evident on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
“new social risks” discussed by Jenson (this volume)—rooted in longer life 
expectancy, higher rates of female employment, and more single- parent fami-
lies—affect millions of people in the United States as well as in the countries 
she analyzes. Policies long established in the United States, such as means- 
testing of benefits and the use of market mechanisms in healthcare, are be-
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coming more common in Europe. As we shall see, recent trends in social 
spending, poverty, and inequality are also similar in the United States and 
Europe. In short, we should not exaggerate American exceptionalism.
 In some respects the United States is a good choice for a case study. It is 
one thing to argue that certain forces have moved social democratic and labor 
parties toward the center. If those same forces affect the Democratic Party, 
which occupies the left in the United States but would be center- left almost 
anywhere in Europe, then they must be powerful indeed. Readers who won-
der where the European left could be heading may consider the American ex-
perience a useful roadmap—or a cautionary tale.
 The welfare state is a major component of the modern state, and how offi-
cials treat their welfare states tells us much about how they govern. In this 
chapter I will indicate how Democratic officials have changed their approach 
to the American welfare state in recent decades. When creating new pro-
grams Democrats have gravitated away from social insurance and toward tax 
expenditures and social regulations. While protecting some programs, espe-
cially those for the elderly, they have helped retrench programs for the poor. 
The net effect has been a bigger American welfare state. That is what a classic 
left- wing party is supposed to accomplish. And yet these changes have made 
it harder, not easier, to reduce poverty and inequality. “Doing more, achiev-
ing less” captures the current state of United States social policy.
 To understand these developments we cannot focus solely on the Demo-
crats. We also need to pay close attention to the Republican Party. When the 
American welfare state was established between the 1930s and 1960s, Re-
publicans were clearly the minority party. Not anymore. Republicans have 
made important gains politically, winning five of the last eight presidential 
elections. Since 1980 they have controlled at least one house of Congress two- 
thirds of the time (Stanley and Niemi 2008). Without some cooperation from 
Republicans, the story would have been gridlock. Cooperation meant more 
than simple acquiescence; at times Republican leaders took the lead in enact-
ing social programs and shifting the distribution of social benefits.
 Because this book covers so much territory historically and geographi-
cally, readers may be unfamiliar with the specific details of individual coun-
tries. The beginning of this chapter presents, as quickly as possible, some of 
the significant moments and trends in United States social policy since 1975. 
This information will help readers to understand what happened before we 
consider how and why. The basic point is that the American welfare state 
is doing more but accomplishing less than it did in the immediate postwar 
era. This chapter then analyzes the role of Democrats and Republicans in re-
shaping United States social policy. Neither party acted in a vacuum; signals 
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from the general public and from voters encouraged elected officials to find 
common ground.
The Contemporary American Welfare State
Scholars generally agree that the three decades following the Second World 
War were a golden age for welfare states. Across Europe and North America 
new social programs were enacted and existing programs expanded. Gov-
ernment social spending increased dramatically. Poverty and inequality di-
minished. At the same time, the power of left- wing political parties was rela-
tively high, leading many scholars to link the remarkable growth of welfare 
states to the ascendance of these parties (Esping- Andersen 1985; Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Shalev 1983). The United States was no exception. Although 
Social Security was created in 1935, it did not become an important source 
of retirement income until the 1950s, and it experienced rapid growth in the 
1960s and early 1970s. Disability insurance started in the 1950s; Medicare, 
Medicaid, and Food Stamps all originated in the 1960s. “Welfare,” meaning 
income support for poor, single- parent families, grew rapidly in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The nation cut the poverty rate almost in half (from 22.2% to 
12.3%) between 1960 and 1975.1 Income inequality fell sharply around the 
time of the Second World War, and the share of national income controlled 
by the richest 1% dropped gradually in the 1950s and 1960s. This was an era 
when Democrats ruled Congress and Democratic presidents such as Lyndon 
Johnson made bold pronouncements about eradicating poverty and building 
a Great Society (Berkowitz 1991; DeNavas- Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007; 
Derthick 1979; Howard 2007a; Piketty and Saez 2003).
 Scholars sharply disagree over what has happened since the mid- 1970s. At 
one end of the spectrum we find references to various crises of the welfare 
state—fiscal, political, ideological (Kotlikoff and Burns 2004; Mishra 1984; 
Offe 1984; Stoesz and Karger 1992). Less ominously, several studies find evi-
dence of retrenchment as countries tightened eligibility for social programs, 
lowered benefits, and introduced forms of privatization (Allan and Scruggs 
2004; Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and 
Palme 2003; Pontusson 2005a). Or retrenchment occurred indirectly as gov-
ernments failed to address growing social needs (Hacker 2004; Taylor- Gooby 
ed. 2004). Other scholars are more optimistic and stress the resilience of mod-
ern welfare states. “Thus in most of the affluent democracies, the politics of 
social policy centers on the renegotiation, restructuring, and modernization of 
the terms of the post- war social contract rather than its dismantling” (Pierson 
2002, 370; see also Brooks and Manza 2007; Pierson 1996; Wilensky 2002).2
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 While the American welfare state never reached the crisis stage, there cer-
tainly were episodes of retrenchment. The most prominent cutbacks came 
in 1996, when officials replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), a core “welfare” program, with Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). This was not a simple one- for- one exchange: AFDC was a 
budgetary entitlement, but spending on TANF was capped; AFDC imposed no 
time limit on recipients, but TANF did. The goal was clearly to reduce gov-
ernment support for poor families with children. The current TANF caseload 
is less than half the size of the AFDC caseload circa 1996. This same bill in-
cluded large cuts to the means- tested Food Stamps and Supplemental Secu-
rity Income programs, most of them affecting recent immigrants. Other social 
programs were cut less dramatically. Officials increased the normal retire-
ment age for Social Security from sixty- five to sixty- seven, which reduced the 
number of years that people can collect benefits. It became more difficult to 
qualify for disability insurance in the 1980s (Howard 2007a; Weaver 2000). 
The best example of outright termination occurred in 1981. As officials were 
cutting the budgets of several social programs, they completely eliminated 
public service employment (PSE). At its peak in the late 1970s PSE employed 
725,000 people. Many of these people were teenagers and racial minorities 
who had great difficulty finding jobs in the private sector (Mucciaroni 1990).3
 Nevertheless, for every cutback or termination there was at least one ex-
pansion. Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid became three of the largest 
items in the national budget. All these programs benefited the elderly, which 
helps to explain why the poverty rate for senior citizens continued to decline 
after 1975 (DeNavas- Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007). And the United States 
continued to create social programs. Several of these addressed the “new 
social risks” discussed by Jenson (this volume), such as the spread of low- 
wage work and the plight of children. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
enacted in 1975, provides income support to millions of low- income Ameri-
cans, especially those with dependent children. The primary objective of the 
EITC is to “make work pay” by providing subsidies to taxpayers who earn in-
come from employment.4 The Child Tax Credit (1997) benefits millions more 
families with children and is not means- tested. These two tax credits cost 
the United States government over $100 billion in forgone revenues and tax 
refunds in 2009 (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010). To put 
this figure in perspective, it was greater than what the government spent on 
TANF, Food Stamps, and public housing combined. Another new policy de-
signed to help parents balance work and family was the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMlA), enacted in 1993. The FMlA mandated twelve weeks of 
parental leave, a first for the nation.
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 With so many Americans uninsured or underinsured, the United States has 
had many opportunities to innovate in healthcare. The Consolidated Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBrA, 1986), was designed to make health 
insurance more portable for those who were between jobs. A second law, 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 1996), was 
supposed to make it harder for private insurers to deny coverage to people 
with preexisting medical conditions. The Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act (1986) compelled virtually every hospital to provide emergency 
care to all patients, even those without health insurance. In addition, new 
spending programs took root. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP, later renamed CHIP) was enacted in 1997. The goal of this new block 
grant was to extend health insurance to low- income children, especially 
those from families with incomes too high for the existing Medicaid pro-
gram. Congress approved a large prescription drug benefit for the elderly in 
2003. Annual spending for this benefit is soon expected to exceed $50 billion 
(Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2008; Howard 2007a).5 These episodes 
lacked the drama of the attempted Clinton health plan, but they were clearly 
important. And then, of course, historic changes to health policy were en-
acted in 2010. Over time the ranks of the uninsured are expected to drop sub-
stantially (but not disappear), and costs are expected to rise more slowly. I 
will have more to say about this episode later in the chapter.
 Apart from these new social programs, the other major breakthrough oc-
curred in disability policy. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) became 
law in 1990. It compelled innumerable public agencies and private businesses 
to make greater accommodations for their disabled customers and employ-
ees. As with COBrA, HIPAA, and the FMlA, the United States government 
tried to effect social change without spending taxpayers’ dollars.
 The net result of retrenchment and expansion has been growth. Measured 
by the number of social programs, the American welfare state is larger now 
than it was thirty years ago. Trends in social spending tell the same story. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the United States devoted 13.1% of GDP to its welfare state in 1980. 
This is what most studies refer to as a nation’s “welfare state effort,” and it in-
cludes public spending at all levels of government. By 2005, the most recent 
year for which figures are available, that figure had risen to 15.9%. We see 
similar trends in other affluent democracies. The Canadian welfare state grew 
from 13.7% to 16.5% of GDP during this same era. The OECD average rose from 
16.0% to 20.6% of GDP between 1980 and 2005 (OECD n.d.; OECD 2007a).6
 These figures actually understate the true level of social spending because 
they omit a variety of tax expenditures, or what the OECD calls tax breaks for 
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social purposes (TBSPs). Tax expenditures refer to a variety of exceptions to 
the normal tax code such as tax credits and tax deductions. Many countries 
have created special provisions in their tax codes to address a variety of so-
cial problems, and this indirect spending deserves to be counted just as much 
as traditional forms of direct spending do. Tax expenditures have been quite 
common in the United States. Besides the Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Child Tax Credit, notable examples include tax breaks for employer- provided 
pensions and health insurance, and the home mortgage interest deduction. 
Since 1980 the largest of these tax expenditures have grown faster than tra-
ditional forms of social spending. Tax expenditures helped fuel the growth of 
the American welfare state (Adema and Ladaique 2005; Howard 2007b).
 Such growth was impressive on several counts. It occurred even as the 
growth in overall government spending was negative or close to zero in 
many OECD countries. Thus the welfare state has accounted for a gradually 
increasing share of government spending in the United States and abroad. 
One might argue that this growth simply reflected greater social needs, par-
ticularly the aging of the population. Castles (2004) has calculated the ratio 
of social spending to dependents—defined as people over the age of sixty- five 
plus all working- age adults who are unemployed—and found that the United 
States spent more per dependent in 1998 than it did in 1980. If one creates a 
comparable ratio for social spending and the poverty population, the story 
remains the same: the ratio is larger now than it was a quarter- century ago. 
For the entire population, real social spending per capita has also increased 
substantially in the United States since 1980. Finally, one might ask whether 
the rapid growth in medical costs has been largely responsible for the growth 
in social spending. It certainly has played a part, but the public share of total 
health spending in the United States has grown too (OECD 2007b). Changes 
to Medicaid and the creation of SCHIP helped to increase the government’s 
role in paying for medical care. The new drug benefit for the elderly will help 
sustain this trend.
 Nevertheless, despite this growth the American welfare state has appar-
ently lost its ability to fight poverty and inequality. Since the mid- 1970s the 
poverty rate has fluctuated between 11% and 15%, depending on the economy. 
Although the rate was the same in 1975 and 2006, the United States economy 
was just pulling out of recession in 1975, whereas recovery from the 2001 re-
cession was well under way by 2006. Severe poverty, meaning income of less 
than half the poverty line, increased from 3.7% to 5.2% of the population 
between 1975 and 2006. In addition, income inequality has been worsening. 
The most common indicator is the Gini coefficient, which ranges from 0 (total 
equality) to 1 (total inequality, i.e., one person has all the income). According 
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to the Luxembourg Income Study, the Gini coefficient in the United States was 
0.318 in 1974. By 2004 it had risen to 0.372. The U.S. Census Bureau, using a 
different methodology, calculated that the Gini coefficient moved from 0.395 
to 0.470 during this period.7 The richest one- fifth of the nation controlled 
50% of national income in 2006, up from 44% in 1975. The richest of the rich 
saw their incomes grow even faster (DeNavas- Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007; 
Luxembourg Income Study n.d.; Piketty and Saez 2003; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census n.d.).8
 The United States has not been the only country experiencing difficul-
ties. Income inequality has grown in Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Nor-
way, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in recent decades. Poverty rates have 
remained constant or slightly increased in a number of wealthy democra-
cies (Kenworthy 2008; Luxembourg Income Study n.d.). The combination of 
spending more on social welfare and achieving less has thus become more 
common among nations. This insight may help reconcile some of the conflict-
ing judgments discussed earlier in this chapter. Crisis, retrenchment, and re-
silience may depend on which features of the welfare state are being studied.
 It is quite possible that the American welfare state has been doing more 
and accomplishing less because the United States economy has been gener-
ating more poverty and inequality than it used to do. To test this argument 
we need to know how much money people had before taxes and government 
transfers, or what are sometimes referred to as “market poverty” and “market 
inequality.” Market poverty rates have gradually increased and decreased in 
recent decades, with no clear upward trend. Market inequality, on the other 
hand, has definitely increased (Kenworthy 2008; U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1992; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007). We 
might conclude that changes in the United States economy have been widen-
ing the gap between rich and poor, and that public policy has been slow to 
adapt (Hacker 2004).
 While true, and important, this conclusion leads us to focus on govern-
ment inaction, and yet we know that the United States has been creating a 
number of new social programs and increasing social spending. Elected offi-
cials have not ignored the plight of citizens trying to afford healthcare and 
balance the demands of work and family. Officials have tried to help some of 
these people—particularly those in the middle and upper middle classes. Re-
cent laws designed to shore up private health insurance (COBrA and HIPAA) 
have helped workers who have such insurance, who tend to be well- educated 
professionals, union members, and public employees. The Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act had a large exemption for small businesses, whose workers tend 
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to have less education and lower incomes. Moreover, because the FMlA only 
required unpaid parental leave, it has provided more help to families that can 
afford to live without a paycheck. Similarly, families earning over $50,000 
have been the main beneficiaries of the new Child Tax Credit (Howard 2007a; 
Howard 2007b; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010). Such poli-
cies are a good way to expand a welfare state without making much progress 
against poverty or inequality.
 A number of older social programs fit this same profile. The clearest evi-
dence comes from the largest tax expenditures. The United States tax code 
has provided a huge and growing subsidy for private pensions (roughly $100 
billion a year). On average, one- half of United States workers participated in 
some sort of tax- favored retirement plan in 2003. But averages can be deceiv-
ing. The participation rates ranged from 20% for workers earning less than 
$20,000 to 80% for workers earning over $120,000. Higher- income workers 
also contributed more to their plans and thus received a larger per capita 
subsidy from the government (Congressional Budget Office 2007). Sheils and 
Haught (2004) have calculated that tax breaks for private health insurance 
were worth ten times more to a family earning over $100,000 than to a family 
earning less than $20,000. Taxpayers earning over $100,000 claimed three- 
quarters of the value of the home mortgage interest deduction, the nation’s 
largest housing program (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010). 
Considering that homes are the largest single asset for many families, this tax 
break exacerbates inequalities in wealth.
 Tax expenditures are sometimes criticized for redistributing income from 
poor to rich, but that is not entirely accurate. Few Americans earning less 
than $40,000 a year pay any income taxes. Whatever they owe is offset by the 
standard deduction, personal exemptions, and the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
Overwhelmingly, income taxes are paid by the upper middle class and the 
rich, people earning over $100,000 (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, 2010). The individual income tax is one of the more progressive taxes 
in the United States—certainly more progressive than payroll taxes or sales 
taxes. As a result, any deductions, exemptions, or credits are usually worth 
more to people in the higher tax brackets. Someone in the 28% tax bracket 
who puts $1,000 in a 401(k) pension plan will benefit more than someone 
in the 15% bracket who puts away the same amount of money. This example 
helps to explain why major tax expenditures for health, housing, and pen-
sions are skewed toward the more affluent. Another reason for the skew is 
that these same people can afford to buy bigger homes and save more for re-
tirement. Thus to the extent that tax expenditures redistribute income, most 
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of the impact is limited to the upper half of the income distribution. Tax ex-
penditures help the haves from falling farther behind the have- lots.
 While social policy in recent decades has favored the middle and upper 
middle classes, less affluent Americans have not fared so well. The lives of 
low- income children hardly improved. True, they were helped by the expan-
sion of Medicaid, the creation of SCHIP, and the remarkable growth of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit.9 Greater access to public health insurance helped 
to offset the decline of private health insurance, but the rate of uninsured 
children was basically the same in 2001 as it had been in 1977 (Cunningham 
and Kirby 2004). The EITC helped millions of families among the working 
poor, and its expansion in the 1990s coincided with a meaningful decline in 
the child poverty rate. Still, the rate was essentially the same in 2005 as 1975 
(DeNavas- Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007). The nonworking poor have been 
the big losers. They were the ones who were kicked off welfare after 1996. 
They were the ones who watched the value of welfare and unemployment 
benefits gradually erode in the face of inflation.10 They were the ones who 
could not qualify for unemployment benefits because they worked part- time 
or had been employed only a short time before being laid off (Graetz and 
Mashaw 1999). Recent immigrants also found it more difficult to get benefits. 
In many ways the United States safety net has been compromised. Little won-
der that poverty stopped declining and severe poverty has been on the rise.
Party Politics and Social Policy
Since the 1970s divided government has been the norm in the United States. 
One might suspect that “doing more, achieving less” represented a compro-
mise between the two parties: Democrats enacted new programs and in-
creased social spending, while Republicans made sure that government ex-
pansion did little to reduce poverty or inequality. The reality turns out to be 
more complicated. Consider recent legislative milestones. The Clinton ad-
ministration signed off on the Family and Medical Leave Act, new HIPAA 
regulations, and the Child Tax Credit, which was exactly what we would ex-
pect Democrats to do. But a number of social programs were enacted during 
Republican administrations. President Ford signed the Earned Income Tax 
Credit into law. The first President Bush and a number of congressional Re-
publicans pushed for the Americans with Disabilities Act. After the ADA was 
enacted, Bush referred to it several times as one of the crowning achievements 
of his administration. An early version of the Child Tax Credit appeared in the 
GOP Contract with America. President George W. Bush was instrumental in 
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passing the new drug benefit for senior citizens (Howard 2007a).11 These pro-
grams were every bit as important as those passed under Clinton.
 By the same token, Clinton’s health plan went down to defeat even though 
Democrats controlled the White House and both houses of Congress. Al-
though President Reagan cut or eliminated several means- tested programs 
in 1981, the welfare reform law signed by President Clinton in 1996 was ar-
guably more severe. It was Clinton, after all, who promised to “end welfare 
as we know it.” Republicans also defended certain social programs against 
cutbacks, especially the sizable tax breaks for health insurance, retirement 
pensions, and housing (Howard 1997; Howard 2007a). When Ronald Reagan 
signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which included the first major increase to 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, he publicly declared the EITC to be “the best 
antipoverty bill, the best profamily measure, and the best job- creation pro-
gram ever to come out of the Congress.”12
 Trends in social spending have also been confusing. The nation’s welfare 
state effort declined during the Reagan administration. That was no surprise. 
But it also declined under Clinton. Thank goodness for the Bush family. Social 
spending increased during the father’s administration and the son’s first term, 
and those gains more than offset what happened under Reagan and Clinton. 
Spending also grew during President Carter’s time in office (OECD n.d.; OECD 
1985; OECD 2007a).
 Democratic administrations have performed somewhat better than their 
Republican counterparts on key social indicators. The poverty rate reached a 
lower point under Carter (11.4%) and Clinton (11.3%) than it ever did under 
Reagan (13.0%), George H. W. Bush (12.8%), or George W. Bush (11.7%). Of 
all these presidents only Clinton made any real progress against poverty. Ana-
lyzing the distribution of income between 1948 and 2001, Bartels (2004) has 
shown that inequality grew considerably faster when Republicans were in the 
White House. While this pattern held true for the entire postwar era, it was 
less pronounced after 1975. As measured by the Gini index, inequality was 
basically unchanged under Carter and actually increased a bit under Clinton 
(Democrats made a bigger dent in inequality under Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson). Inequality has definitely grown under the three most recent Re-
publican administrations (DeNavas- Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007).
 Thus it appears to be the responsibility of both political parties that the 
American welfare state is “doing more” and “achieving less.” A closer look at 
public opinion and elections will help us to understand why the two parties 
converged enough to make meaningful changes to social policy. Over the last 
few decades opinion surveys have sent a clear and consistent message: Ameri-
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cans want their government to play a central role in social welfare, and in 
most cases that means spending more, not less. The main exceptions are wel-
fare, which most Americans dislike, and unemployment benefits, which trig-
ger mixed feelings. The biggest pieces of the welfare state—retirement pen-
sions and healthcare—receive strong backing (Gilens 1999; Howard 2007a).
 Although support has been stronger among self- identified Democrats, 
most Republicans also expect government to help the elderly, the sick, and 
the poor. When Republicans made history by capturing both houses of Con-
gress in 1994, a large majority of people who called themselves strong Repub-
licans said that current spending on Social Security was either too little (43%) 
or about right (44%). When President George W. Bush was reelected in 2004 
Republican support for Social Security was, if anything, a little higher. More-
over, a majority of Republicans in 2004 said that too little was being spent on 
education and health. Only one of eight Republicans felt that too much was 
being spent to help the poor.13 Republican officials may have wanted to slow 
the growth of the American welfare state, but they risked alienating their 
core supporters if they tried to shrink it.
 Americans did not, however, want officials to expand the welfare state in 
any manner that they pleased. Most Americans, regardless of party affiliation, 
appeared to offer little support for redistributing income from rich to poor. 
And most Americans, regardless of party affiliation, did not trust their gov-
ernment very much. In this environment anyone pushing for a guaranteed in-
come or national health insurance was going to be rebuffed. Relying on what 
are known as “tax expenditures” and social regulations was the better way to 
go. Tax expenditures usually relied on individuals and businesses to provide 
the desired goods and services and to complete the necessary forms. Social 
regulations likewise tried to harness the private sector to fulfill social objec-
tives. Neither policy tool, as discussed above, did much to narrow the gap be-
tween rich and poor (Howard 2007a).
 Of course public opinion in general may matter less than the views of 
those who actually vote. The American electorate does not, in fact, look like 
the American public. With turnout running between 55% and 60% in presi-
dential elections, and around 40% in off- year elections, lots of Americans are 
not voting. They are disproportionately less educated and of lower income. In 
the election of 2004, for instance, almost three- fourths of college graduates 
reported voting, compared to only one- third of high school dropouts. People 
earning less than $15,000 represented 14% of the population but only 8% of 
actual voters (DeNavas- Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007; Stanley and Niemi 
2008).14 Voting is not unique in this regard. Other indicators of political par-
ticipation—campaigning, donating money, contacting officials, and belong-
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ing to interest groups—all increase with income, education, and age (Camp-
bell 2003; Jacobs and Skocpol eds. 2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
Moreover, inequalities in political participation appear to be widening. Ac-
cording to data collected by National Election Studies, the gaps in voter turn-
out are growing larger between voters with high and low levels of education, 
and high and low incomes.15
 During the late twentieth century and the early twenty- first, a period when 
the two parties were so evenly matched and control of government changed 
so frequently, Democrats and Republicans worked consistently to expand so-
cial benefits for the politically strong and periodically to retrench programs 
for the politically weak. Members of both parties protected tax breaks for 
housing, healthcare, and pensions, all of which were targeted at the more 
affluent members of society. Clinton wanted the Child Tax Credit to show 
middle- and upper- middle- class families that the Democratic Party had not 
forgotten them. Bush wanted the new drug benefit to show that Democrats 
were not the only ones who cared about senior citizens. Members of both 
parties pushed welfare reform to show middle- class voters that welfare de-
pendence among the poor would no longer be tolerated. Democratic and Re-
publican officials thus had similar reasons for expanding the American wel-
fare state and for not pushing hard to reduce poverty and inequality. They had 
middle- and upper- middle- class constituents to satisfy. They could help those 
constituents pay for health insurance, save for retirement, purchase child 
care, and buy a home—in effect, to achieve the American Dream.16 Other fac-
tors, specific to each party, also moved them in this direction.
Democrats
In several respects the Democratic vision of social policy has changed since 
the 1960s. More accurately, the views of many Democratic officials have mod-
erated. The party is still so large and diverse that broad generalizations are 
hard to make; some contemporary Democrats would have been quite at home 
in the days of the New Deal and the Great Society. For the most part, though, 
the current generation of party leaders has stressed equality of opportunity 
over result, economic growth over redistribution, and work over welfare. 
They have preached fiscal discipline and become more concerned about defi-
cits (Baer 2000; Pierson 1998; Shoch 2008).17 One should not exaggerate the 
extent of change. The New Deal relied on a combination of work programs 
and cash relief. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was one of the mile-
stones of the Great Society.18 In historical perspective, recent changes in the 
Democratic Party have been modest but meaningful.
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 One key change has been the choice of policy tools used to remedy social 
problems. During the New Deal and Great Society the main tools were social 
insurance, financed by payroll taxes, and grants, financed by general reve-
nues. Democrats since the 1970s have shied away from payroll tax financing. 
Clinton officials used all kinds of mechanisms to fund health reform—higher 
tobacco taxes, administrative savings, contingent caps on insurance premi-
ums, and a complicated set of charges on employers—but not payroll taxes 
(Skocpol 1996). More recently, while congressional Democrats objected to 
several features of Bush’s proposed drug benefit for the elderly, few wanted 
to rely on payroll taxes rather than the combination of general revenues and 
monthly premiums that eventually passed. Faced with problems in existing 
social insurance programs, few Democrats proposed a general increase in 
payroll taxes. When the Social Security trust fund started to run dangerously 
low in the early 1980s, the main answer was to increase the retirement age. 
When Medicare experienced financial troubles, the main answer was to limit 
reimbursements to doctors and hospitals (Oberlander 2003).
 This shift was part of a larger change in policy discourse (Campbell and 
Morgan 2005). Since the 1970s conservatives in the United States have been 
increasingly successful at focusing policy debates on the question of financ-
ing. “Who pays?” became just as salient a question as “Who benefits?” In this 
context liberals grew concerned about the regressive nature of existing pay-
roll taxes and their impact on lower- and middle- income families. As a result, 
many Democratic officials came to view payroll taxes as unfair. The heavy 
focus on taxes obscured the impact of benefits, which in social insurance pro-
grams like Social Security clearly favor lower- income workers. With payroll 
taxes marginalized, “the American welfare state lost a major source of financ-
ing, stymieing redistributive initiatives for decades to come” (Campbell and 
Morgan, 2005, 180).
 Instead Democrats embraced policy tools whose costs were less evident. 
Tax expenditures gained favor because they looked as much like tax cuts as 
spending. Democrats could (and did) say that the EITC and Child Tax Credit 
helped working families keep more of their hard- earned dollars. Tax expen-
ditures have not figured prominently in official budget documents, a practice 
which obscures their cost. Social legislation such as the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act required businesses and 
individuals to change their behavior; their budgetary cost to the government 
was minimal. Instead of paying for parental leave the government told many 
employers to give their workers unpaid leave, and effectively told parents 
who wanted leave to find a way to live on less income. Instead of enacting 
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national health insurance, the government tried to make private health in-
surance more widely available. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, many of 
these tax expenditures and social provisions benefited the haves more than 
the have- nots (Howard 2007a).
 Democratic leaders also changed their approach to poverty. For one thing, 
their attention to the problem has diminished. Gerring (1998) analyzed Demo-
cratic presidential candidates’ acceptance speeches and found that references 
to the poor and underprivileged peaked in the 1960s and then dropped off. 
Clinton’s speech in 1992 barely mentioned poverty at all. In 1968 the official 
Democratic platform trumpeted the party’s success in reducing poverty. It 
argued that the government’s War on Poverty was working and should be 
expanded. The view from 1996 was far less sanguine: “Today’s Democratic 
Party knows there is no greater gap between mainstream American values 
and modern American government than our failed welfare system. . . . Thanks 
to President Clinton and the Democrats, the new welfare bill imposes time 
limits and real work requirements—so anyone who can work, does work, and 
so that no one who can work can stay on welfare forever.”19 Tellingly, the dis-
cussion of welfare in 1996 appeared in the section of the platform titled “Re-
sponsibility,” in which the Democrats also discussed crime and illegal immi-
gration. Subsequent party platforms have reiterated the themes of work and 
individual responsibility when discussing poverty.
 More than ever, Democrats came to believe that a strong economy was the 
best way to fight poverty. Democrats have wanted to keep unemployment 
low, interest rates low, and wages growing. Reducing the deficit was a key 
step in accomplishing these goals. Before President Clinton tried to reform 
healthcare or welfare, his first budget relied on a combination of tax increases 
and spending cuts to lower the deficit.
 Nevertheless, Democratic officials knew that a rising economic tide would 
not lift all boats high enough or fast enough; targeted aid would still be 
needed. They proceeded to draw a bright line between the working poor, who 
would get additional money from the government, and the nonworking poor, 
who would get a stronger push to earn money. The Earned Income Tax Credit 
attracted considerable Democratic support and grew rapidly during the 1980s 
and 1990s. By definition the EITC benefits only those who work for wages. It 
now serves many more families than TANF and costs a lot more. At the same 
time, Democrats helped Republicans cut spending on traditional welfare pro-
grams, notably in 1981 and 1996. Democrats helped tighten eligibility rules 
and work requirements. They tried to collect more child support from absent 
parents. They shifted more spending away from income support and toward 
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services such as childcare and transportation that would help welfare recipi-
ents find employment. The new measure of success was moving people off 
welfare, not out of poverty (Howard 2007a; Weaver 2000).
 These changes were connected to the resurgence of the GOP and the emer-
gence of the New Democrats (Baer 2000; Hale 1995). Republicans won both 
the presidency and the Senate in 1980, the first time in a generation that 
Democrats failed to control both houses of Congress. President Reagan won 
reelection in 1984 by a huge margin, capturing forty- nine states. In response a 
number of moderate and conservative Democrats joined forces to chart a new 
path. To become competitive again, these “New Democrats” wanted their 
party to shed its tax- and- spend image and promote a leaner, more efficient 
government. They wanted to shift responsibility away from Washington and 
toward lower levels of government, as well as toward businesses and indi-
viduals. New Democrats wanted to spend less time helping specific groups of 
disadvantaged citizens and more time helping the middle class, broadly de-
fined. They talked often about the ability of economic growth to promote the 
American dream. This new vision would in theory appeal to a wider range of 
voters and enable the Democratic Party to win national elections more con-
sistently. The creation of the Democratic Leadership Council and the Progres-
sive Policy Institute gave New Democrats formal mechanisms for generating 
ideas and communicating with one another. Clinton’s election and reelection 
gave them a president who shared many of their goals and managed to trans-
late their vision into specific social programs. Al Gore and John Kerry did 
not depart from this vision when they campaigned for president in 2000 and 
2004.20
 Within Congress, however, were many traditional Democrats who still be-
lieved in the New Deal and Great Society. When Bill Clinton promised as a 
candidate to spend billions of additional dollars to improve the nation’s infra-
structure, these Democrats were hopeful. When Clinton as president failed to 
deliver, they were dismayed. Although Clinton felt that national health in-
surance along Canadian lines was a political non- starter, the liberal wing of 
his party disagreed and introduced single- payer legislation (Skocpol 1996). 
Traditional Democrats often viewed New Democrats with suspicion, if not 
hostility. The New Democrats, they argued, were turning their party into a 
watered- down version of the Republican Party.
 Over the last few years the friction between new and old Democrats has 
diminished. Much of the credit belongs to George W. Bush, whose presidency 
helped Democrats realize that the differences among them were not nearly as 
important as the differences separating the two parties. To some degree, how-
ever, important elements of the New Democrats’ creed have become accepted 
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within the entire party. The Democrats now criticize the GOP for running 
deficits and expect new government programs to be deficit- neutral (except in 
a prolonged recession). After Democrats recaptured the House of Represen-
tatives in 2006, the incoming speaker, Nancy Pelosi, declared that “‘Demo-
crats understand the importance of a growing and vibrant economy.’ . . . To 
be successful, ‘you have to govern from the middle’” (Dunham 2006, 37; see 
also Scheiber 2007). The leading Democratic presidential candidates in 2008, 
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, proposed a number of new programs for 
healthcare, retirement pensions, housing, and education. Most of them relied 
to some degree on tax breaks. None of them qualified as social insurance.21
 The Democrats’ triumph in 2008 gave them united control over govern-
ment for the first time since 1992. Obama had promised health reform on the 
campaign trail, and in his first year in office the new president started to de-
liver. He quickly approved a children’s health insurance bill that President 
Bush had vetoed. He also expanded government’s role in subsidizing health 
insurance for workers who had lost their jobs and their coverage. By far the 
biggest triumph came in 2010, as President Obama and congressional Demo-
crats pushed through the largest changes to health policy since the Great So-
ciety. Given Republicans’ unwillingness to cooperate, serious disagreements 
within the Democratic Party, and the loss of a key Senate seat after the death 
of Ted Kennedy (D- Mass.), failure was always a strong possibility. Neverthe-
less, the Democrats prevailed.
 The health reform bill was as notable for what it did not do as what it did. 
The United States did not adopt a single- payer system similar to Canada’s, 
and it did not even consider a national health service comparable to Great 
Britain’s. It did not create a government insurance program to compete with 
private insurers, even though most liberal Democrats wanted this “public 
option.” And it did not rely on any general increase in payroll taxes for fund-
ing. Instead health reform relied on a combination of regulations, tax breaks, 
and traditional spending to expand private and public health insurance. For 
example, it mandated that most individuals must buy health insurance, a 
step that some conservative think tanks and politicians had embraced years 
earlier. It prohibited insurers from denying coverage to people with preexist-
ing medical conditions, or from imposing lifetime dollar limits on coverage. 
And it extended Medicaid to more low- income Americans. To pay for broader 
coverage the package relied on a variety of administrative reforms, limits 
on the growth of Medicare, new taxes on specific sectors in healthcare, and 
higher payroll taxes on the most affluent Americans (Kaiser Family Foun-
dation 2010). According to the Congressional Budget Office, health reform 
should actually reduce the national deficit over the next decade, a feature 
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that Democrats worked hard to achieve (Herszenhorn 2010). In all these ways 
the Democrats’ approach to health reform in 2010 bore a stronger resem-
blance to President Clinton’s plan than to President Johnson’s.
Republicans
Hardly anyone is surprised to hear that President Reagan cut means- tested 
programs, or that congressional Republicans led by Newt Gingrich worked 
overtime to undermine Clinton’s health plan and eliminate welfare as an en-
titlement. Republicans are supposed to be the party of limited government. 
The more interesting question is how the American welfare state managed 
to grow during a period when the Republican Party was strong and gaining 
power.
 There were times when Republicans were simply outnumbered. For ex-
ample, the first President Bush vetoed parental leave legislation twice. Presi-
dent Clinton made the issue one of his top priorities and, with the help of a 
Democratic Congress, enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act early in his 
administration. At other times, Republicans accepted measures to achieve 
modest expansion of the welfare state when they were coupled with other 
legislation that they strongly preferred; this is how the SCHIP health insur-
ance program passed through a Republican Congress.
 Nevertheless, as we have seen, Republican officials were important advo-
cates of expansion on several occasions. In addition to the motives discussed 
previously, Republicans acted strategically. They expanded some parts of the 
American welfare state to keep other parts in check. The Earned Income Tax 
Credit was supposed to keep the poor off welfare and reduce pressure to in-
crease the minimum wage. One of the primary motivations for the ADA was 
to make it easier for the disabled to work. In particular, the ADA would help 
people who could not meet the strict eligibility requirements of disability in-
surance yet clearly faced difficulties in the job market because of some handi-
cap. Without the help of the ADA, many of these people might have had to 
rely on public assistance. Tax breaks for retirement pensions would slow the 
growth of Social Security. Tax breaks for employment- related health benefits, 
and government regulation of those benefits, would make national health in-
surance unnecessary (Howard 1997; Howard 2007a).
 In short, many Republicans have been trying to build a different kind of 
welfare state, one focused heavily on work and benefits received through 
work. This goal has created opportunities for coalitions across party lines, 
especially with New Democrats. Those two groups could agree to block na-
tional health insurance, oppose increases in the minimum wage, abolish wel-
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fare “as we know it,” slow (but not stop) the growth in entitlement spending, 
and use the tax code to make social policy. Nonetheless, that kind of welfare 
state was less capable of fighting poverty and inequality than one based more 
on social insurance and a reliable safety net.
Concluding Thoughts
This new bargain—do more, achieve less—may not strike readers as very 
desirable. True, the American welfare state does reduce poverty and in-
equality. It just does not do so as well as it did formerly, or as well as most 
other wealthy democracies do now. For policymakers here and abroad, the 
lesson may be to focus less on the level of social spending and more on the 
distribution of benefits. What this new bargain lacks in performance, how-
ever, it makes up for in political viability. Directing government aid to the 
middle and upper middle classes means helping the most active members of 
the polity. That is a smart strategy for practically any Democratic or Republi-
can official.
 Compared to other chapters in this book, my account emphasizes domes-
tic influences on center- left parties. In the latter decades of the twentieth 
century Democratic officials changed their approach to social policy in re-
sponse to election outcomes and public opinion. They largely abandoned 
social insurance, which has been the foundation of modern welfare states. 
Instead they embraced more indirect forms of assistance, especially tax ex-
penditures and regulation, which required less obvious forms of government 
involvement than the old New Deal and Great Society model. They were more 
likely to declare war on welfare than war on poverty. This was neoliberalism 
American- style, and it often attracted support from Republicans.22
 If history is any guide, the elections of 2008 mean that we should expect 
less poverty and inequality because Democrats are now in charge. The first 
two years of Obama’s administration pointed in that direction. The Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 included a number of provisions 
aimed at lower- and middle- class citizens. This act expanded the scope of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit and increased its value; made the refundable part 
of the Child Tax Credit more widely available to poor families; exempted 
some unemployment benefits from income taxation; and created a Making 
Work Pay Tax Credit, designed to offset regressive payroll taxes. All these 
moves ran counter to the dominant trend in tax policy. They used the tax code 
to make social policy without directing most of the benefits to upper- income 
taxpayers. This same American Recovery and Reinvestment Act boosted tra-
ditional social spending as well, providing more money for unemployment 
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benefits and Food Stamps. To a significant degree health reforms enacted in 
2010 will use money from the rich to pay for health insurance for those with 
below- average incomes (Leonhardt 2010).
 That said, we should not expect reductions in poverty and inequality to 
be immediate or large. Unemployment and poverty are again on the rise as 
the economy suffers its worst slump since the Great Depression. Income in-
equality remains high (DeNavas- Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009). Much of 
what the Obama administration has accomplished will keep these problems 
from getting worse, but it is hard to expect more than a standoff in the near 
future. The president, for obvious reasons, is worried more about economic 
growth and unemployment, and so are ordinary Americans (Frank 2008, 
BU5).23 Compounding these difficulties is a foreign policy agenda that is 
much more complicated—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Iran, terrorism, interna-
tional environmental agreements—than what President Clinton faced in the 
1990s. Moreover, the electorate has not changed. Voters with above- average 
incomes divided their votes evenly between Obama and the Republican can-
didate, John McCain, in 2008; those with above- average incomes still made 
up the majority of voters in 2008. Those with below- average incomes voted 
Democratic by a 3:2 margin. The same basic patterns held for elections to the 
House of Representatives.24
 The midterm elections of 2010 will make poverty and inequality even more 
difficult to address. Republicans took control of the House of Representatives 
and gained additional seats in the Senate. Their top priorities include pre-
serving tax cuts for the rich, repealing parts or all of the 2008 health reform, 
and cutting social spending. As I write (December 2010), these Republicans 
seem less willing than their predecessors to compromise and less interested in 
creating alternative types of social programs. The differences between Demo-
crats and Republicans, at least in Congress, will be stark. There have been 
periods of divided government in the United States when officials managed 
to make progress in fighting poverty and inequality; this does not appear to 
be one of them.
Notes
This is a revised version of a paper that I presented at the conference “What’s Left of 
the Left? Liberalism and Social Democracy in a Globalized World” at the Center for 
European Studies, Harvard University, in May 2008. Many thanks to Andrea Camp-
bell, Jim Cronin, Jane Jenson, Jonas Pontusson, and Jim Shoch for their helpful sug-
gestions and comments.
 1. The postwar low was 11.1%, in 1973.
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 2. Considering that scholars differ about what happened in recent decades, it is not 
too surprising that they disagree about why as well. While some believe that political 
parties are still central to the development of welfare states (Allan and Scruggs 2004; 
Korpi and Palme 2003), others argue that interest groups (Pierson 1996), changes in 
the global economy (Mishra 1999), demographic pressures (Kotlikoff and Burns 2004), 
or public opinion (Brooks and Manza 2007) have become equally if not more signifi-
cant.
 3. This was not the first time that social programs had been terminated. A number 
of public jobs programs created during the New Deal, whose collective impact was far 
greater than PSE, were phased out in the 1940s (Amenta 1998).
 4. The creation and expansion of the EITC might be considered evidence of the im-
pact of globalization on United States social policy. Greater competition from firms 
overseas may have depressed wages and created more members of the working poor. 
Nevertheless, a large number of EITC recipients work in service industries (e.g., fast- 
food restaurants, hotels), which do not have much foreign competition. Moreover, 
policymakers linked the EITC to domestic issues such as escalating welfare rolls, in-
creasing payroll taxes, and the minimum wage (Howard 1997; Howard 2007a).
 5. Following Jenson (this volume), one might say that the addition of the Medicare 
drug benefit also qualifies as a “new social need,” considering that prescription drugs 
were a growing expense for the elderly, driven by changes in medical treatment and 
longer life expectancies.
 6. Although the OECD tracks social spending back to at least 1960, the categories 
used before 1980 are not entirely comparable with those after 1980 (OECD 1985).
 7. Unless otherwise noted, all references to income inequality in this chapter are 
based on disposable income, after taxes and transfers.
 8. While most of the debate over inequality has focused on income, differences in 
wealth have been much larger. The richest one- fifth of United States households con-
trolled almost 85% of the nation’s wealth in 2004, while the richest 1% controlled over 
one- third of all wealth. Like income, wealth has become more concentrated. The Gini 
coefficient for net worth was already an astonishing 0.799 in 1983, and it rose to 0.829 
by 2004 (Wolff 2007).
 9. The EITC is unusual among tax provisions in that eligibility is limited to low- 
income families and the benefits are refundable, meaning that taxpayers with zero tax 
liability can still benefit. It proves that tax expenditures do not have to benefit the more 
affluent.
 10. Single- parent families are often considered a “new social need” in Europe. Such 
families have long been helped in the United States, dating back at least as far as Aid 
to Dependent Children (1935). Public policies helping two- parent families, such as the 
Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, are more recent.
 11. Education is sometimes considered part of the welfare state and sometimes not. 
It is worth noting that President George W. Bush pushed for the No Child Left Behind 
Act partly because he felt that reducing educational inequalities would later reduce 
poverty and income inequality.
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 12. Reagan’s comments can be viewed online at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=36629&st=&st1=.
 13. These figures are based on responses to the General Social Survey, which can be 
accessed at http://sda.berkeley.edu/archive.htm.
 14. For more evidence of the growing importance of professionals to the Democratic 
Party see the chapter by Teixeira in this volume.
 15. See table 6A.2 (“Voter Turnout”) at www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/nesguide 
.htm.
 16. I am assuming that such concerns would be highly salient to voters, which would 
prompt the two parties, even if ideologically polarized, to work toward some compro-
mise (see, e.g., Binder 2003).
 17. While this chapter features general trends more than single events, it is worth 
noting that both Pierson (1998) and Shoch (2008) point to Ross Perot’s impressive 
showing as an independent candidate in 1992 as a main reason why President Clinton 
and other Democrats became much more concerned about the deficit.
 18. The act created Head Start and the Job Corps, designed to improve human capi-
tal and ultimately the performance of American workers.
 19. Democratic Party platforms can be accessed at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/plat 
forms.php.
 20. Bertram (2007) shows that the conservative wing of the Democratic Party 
started to reshape antipoverty policies away from welfare and toward work starting in 
the early 1970s.
 21. For a useful summary of the candidates’ tax policies go to http://www.tax 
policycenter.org/tpccontent/tax_plan_matrix15a.pdf.
 22. I agree with Huber and Stephens that globalization does not seem to have exerted 
a major influence on the American welfare state. As a general rule, countries that are 
more closely integrated into the world economy find themselves more vulnerable to 
unemployment (e.g., when demand for their exports drops). During the last decades 
of the twentieth century the authors “found that the immediate cause of welfare state 
retrenchment was a large and apparently permanent increase in unemployment. With 
more people dependent on welfare state transfers and fewer people paying taxes to 
support the welfare state, budget deficits ballooned and governments moved to control 
and then reduce deficits by cutting entitlements” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 2). The 
pattern in the United States has been the opposite: although unemployment declined 
during Reagan’s and Clinton’s administrations, so too did welfare state effort; as un-
employment increased during the first Bush administration, so did welfare state effort. 
Moreover, spending cuts in the United States have been targeted at means- tested pro-
grams while the major entitlements have largely been spared. I am not saying that the 
impact of globalization should always be downplayed. There may well be policy do-
mains in the United States (Shoch, this volume) or overseas (Ross, this volume) where 
changes in the global economy matter a great deal. But changes in major United States 
social programs do appear to have been driven more by domestic influences such as 
political parties and public opinion.
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There is a long and large debate over the relationship between globalization and the 
welfare state. To learn more one might start with Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao (2007), 
Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt (2005), and Iversen and Cusack (2000).
 23. See, e.g., survey questions about the nation’s most important problems at www 
.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm.
 24. For exit poll data from 2008 see www.cnn.com/ElECTION/2008/results/polls
.main/.
Grappling with Globalization
The Democratic Party’s Struggles  
over International Market Integration
James Shoch
Europe versus America
In recent decades the American Democratic Party, like center- left parties 
everywhere, has confronted the challenge posed by economic globalization. 
But the Democrats’ response to growing international market integration has 
differed from that of most European social democratic parties.
 European parties—especially in the Nordic countries, characterized by 
small, open economies—have long recognized that trade liberalization raises 
aggregate national welfare by fostering exports, lower prices, and increased 
productivity and growth.1 But these parties have also recognized that moves 
toward greater economic openness could be blocked by those suffering job 
and income losses related to globalization—especially less skilled workers 
in manufacturing industries that compete with imports, and more recently 
blue- and white- collar workers of all skill levels in industries engaged in off-
shore outsourcing, as well as other workers partly competing in the same 
labor markets.2 Thus since the 1930s and 1940s social democratic parties, 
again particularly in the Nordic countries, have built successful coalitions in 
support of open markets by arranging deals whereby globalization’s “win-
ners”—firms and more skilled workers in export- oriented and multinational 
sectors—agree to compensate the “losers” with extensive unemployment 
benefits, retraining, healthcare, pensions, and other welfare policies (Hays, 
Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Cameron and Kim 2006).
 Moreover, since the early 1990s many of these same parties, grappling with 
the economic supply- side problems of the previous two decades, especially 
productivity shortfalls, have also backed greatly increased public investment 
in education, training, and technological research. These policies have in-
creased overall economic productivity, thereby improving competitiveness, 
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preserving jobs, and raising wages, while also creating well- paying new jobs 
in government and dynamic new industries. At the same time improved pro-
ductivity has boosted tax revenues, helping to pay for public programs whose 
rising costs have at times eroded their popular support (Boix 1998; Benner 
2003; Bernard and Boucher 2007; Becker 2007; Aiginger 2008).3 All of this 
has again aided these parties in maintaining support for economic openness 
and broadening their coalitions among different sectors of the workforce.
 Consequently, despite recent challenges from the nationalist and protec-
tionist far right (Swank and Betz 2003; Burgoon 2009), by simultaneously 
pursuing open markets and compensatory social spending and public in-
vestment strategies, European social democratic parties—albeit more in the 
Nordic countries than on the continent (Einhorn and Logue 2010)—have suc-
cessfully fostered growth, employment, social equality, and inclusion.4
 The American Democratic Party has taken a different path. Historically 
the party of free trade, in the 1960s the party became much more equivocal 
in its support for that doctrine. Pressured by labor constituents battered by 
imports, many Democrats embraced protectionism and opposed further trade 
liberalization efforts. With a leap in the trade deficit, especially with Japan, 
and the political salience of trade during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan 
and his successor, George H. W. Bush, Democratic members of Congress and 
presidential candidates pushed bills first to curb imports and then to pry open 
closed markets, particularly Japan’s. During his first term in office Bill Clinton 
also pressed Japan to open its markets.
 Since the early 1990s, however, the United States has renewed its drive for 
further trade—and investment—liberalization.5 Recent years have seen the 
approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement, a new General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty, permanent normal trade relations 
with China, and the Central American Free Trade Agreement, along with 
other bilateral deals. But whereas in Europe, as noted above, social demo-
cratic parties have been key supporters of trade liberalization, in the United 
States Democratic backing for liberalization has been much less reliable. In 
the American system of separated powers, movement toward freer trade has 
been due to the efforts of pro- trade presidents of both parties, allied with 
congressional Republicans and a substantial number of Senate Democrats, 
but only a minority, sometimes a small one, of House Democrats. For various 
reasons, above all pressure from the still powerful labor movement and wide 
public anxiety about globalization, the majority of House Democrats have 
opposed, sometimes overwhelmingly, almost all of these trade liberalization 
initiatives. During the 1990s their opposition led to the defeat of two impor-
tant procedural measures, if not actual agreements.
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 More recently the entrance of the “BrIC” nations—Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China—onto the world economic stage has further heightened labor and 
public concern over globalization and trade. At the same time the ranks of 
congressional Democratic critics of free trade were expanded when the party 
regained control of the House and Senate in the midterm elections of 2006. 
The result was the blocking and delaying of new trade liberalization pro-
posals in Congress, while the Democrats’ presidential nominee and eventual 
victor in 2008, Barack Obama, also tilted, at least temporarily, against new 
free trade agreements and called for a more aggressive approach to China.
 One reason for the Democrats’ push for tougher trade policy and opposi-
tion to trade liberalization in recent decades has been their inability to win, 
or credibly promise, a substantial increase in compensatory social spending 
and public investment. That sort of increased spending might have reduced 
labor and popular objections to expanded trade as it has in much of Europe. 
Until recently, spending on the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, 
intended to help workers dislocated by trade, had actually declined since 
1980. Once a leader in publicly funded education, infrastructure, and techno-
logical research, after the 1960s the United States slipped in all three areas. 
With American industrial competitiveness eroding, in the early 1980s and 
again in the early 1990s the Democrats embraced first industrial policy and 
then increased public investment, along with certain compensatory social 
policies. But Democratic leaders soon backed off from these ideas, partly be-
cause of concerns fueled by the news media about budget deficits, and with-
ering Republican and business criticism that the Democrats were advocating 
more “big government” and “tax- and- spend liberalism.”
 Again in the wake of the emergence of the BrICs and the Democrats’ elec-
tion victories in 2006, congressional Democrats renewed their efforts to in-
crease TAA and public investment, while Obama backed similar policies dur-
ing his campaign. But the scale of these proposals was again limited by deficit 
worries and Democratic fears of being politically tarred with the brush of fis-
cal irresponsibility. That is, until the global economic crisis struck in the fall 
of 2008.
 That crisis for a time loosened constraints on government economic inter-
vention. With Obama’s victory and the expansion of the Democrats’ congres-
sional majorities in 2008, Obama and his congressional allies enacted a major 
economic stimulus package and a year later a historic healthcare reform bill 
that should eventually ease the dislocations caused by globalization and help 
build a more productive, competitive economy. In the short term, however, the 
economy remained weak while public skepticism toward the growth of gov-
ernment increased, leading to big Republican gains in the congressional elec-
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tions of 2010. Had Obama and his party been able to produce policies that over 
time proved successful and thus popular, it is possible that opposition to trade 
liberalization from labor and the public at large might at some point have de-
clined, allowing the Democrats’ approach to globalization to draw closer to 
that of their European colleagues. But these prospects have now dimmed.
 In this chapter, after presenting a very brief framework for understanding 
the determinants of party economic policy stances, I will explain the evolu-
tion of Democratic positions on trade, compensatory spending, and competi-
tiveness policy, with a focus on the years since 1980.6
Parties and Economic Policymaking in the White House and Congress
As both the nation and his party’s main economic policy actor, a newly elected 
president, assisted by his advisers, often tries to develop a new political- 
economic strategy and a corresponding policy program. Both strategy and 
program will be influenced by (1) the president’s personal beliefs, including 
his normative values and his cognitive understanding of the causal dynamics 
of the economy; (2) the preferences of core party constituents, activists, and 
donors; swing voters; and powerful economic interests, especially business 
and labor; and (3) the anticipation of what Congress will accept (Spiliotes 
2002; Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich 2008). The president’s program is al-
most never enacted without controversy and conflict. Members of the presi-
dent’s party in Congress usually benefit politically from his achievements 
and thus will be generally predisposed to back his proposals. But opposition 
party members have little interest in the president’s success and will usually 
fight to change or replace them. Beyond this, congressional party members’ 
positions on floor votes will also be determined by their own normative and 
cognitive beliefs, the preferences of their own core partisan and swing con-
stituents, majority party members’ desire to fashion an electorally valuable 
collective party record and minority party members’ concern to prevent them 
from doing so, congressional party leaders’ strategies and pressure, interest 
group lobbying and campaign contributions, presidential bargaining and per-
suasion, and the overall climate of interparty relations (Bond and Fleisher 
eds. 2000; Smith 2007; Lee 2009; Thurber ed. 2009).
 Various cultural, political, and economic structures also influence the 
interests and preferences of contending political actors, constrain and enable 
their behavior, and condition the outcomes of their policy battles. Among 
these factors are (1) the nation’s anti- statist political culture; (2) our distinc-
tive electoral system and fragmented state institutions;7 (3) configurations 
of institutional authority, including partisan control of the presidency and 
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the partisan and ideological balance within both houses of Congress; (4) do-
mestic and international socioeconomic structures;8 and (5) international 
“regimes” and geopolitical relations.
Parties and Trade Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan
The Great Depression of the 1930s destroyed the old Republican political 
order and its dominant coalition of northern industry and labor. The succes-
sor Democratic or New Deal order and its underlying coalition—including 
unionized labor, urban ethnics, southerners, African Americans, middle- class 
liberals, and liberal business interests—emerged from the turmoil of the De-
pression and the Second World War. The new order rested on an economic 
base of “Fordist” mass production and consumption. It was institutionally 
stabilized by a new system of collective bargaining, new financial market 
regulations, a large military establishment, and a limited welfare state,9 con-
strained in part by America’s individualist and anti- statist political culture.10 
Democratic presidents employed a “Keynesian” political- economic strategy 
that relied on countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy to prevent another 
collapse of effective demand.
 The New Deal era also saw the beginning of the dismantling of the prevail-
ing system of tariff protection, which had sharply divided Republicans and 
Democrats since the mid- nineteenth century.11 This system was erected and 
maintained mainly by the GOP, with the support of northern industries that 
competed with imports. It was mostly opposed by the low- tariff Democrats 
and their backers among southern agricultural export interests. In 1930 the 
Republicans, still dominant, responded to the onset of the Depression by en-
acting, in the face of united Democratic opposition, the Smoot- Hawley Tariff 
Act, which dramatically raised tariffs and may well have deepened the crisis.
 In 1932 Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats took unified control of gov-
ernment. Two years later, this time in the face of strong Republican oppo-
sition, they passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which delegated 
to the president the authority to negotiate reciprocal, bilateral tariff reduc-
tions. After the Second World War, spurred in part by the beginning of the 
cold war, the Democratic administration of President Harry Truman took the 
lead in founding the GATT, under whose auspices tariffs were further reduced 
through several rounds of international negotiations.
 The Democrats recognized that maintaining both economic openness 
and their own political support would require the protection of vulnerable 
domestic interests from trade- related economic distress. Thus was born the 
American version of the “compromise of embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982; 
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Ruggie ed. 2008; Hays 2009). In exchange for their support for openness, 
American companies and workers were cushioned against, or compensated 
for, exposure to foreign competition. Various devices were used to curb im-
ports; hence trade would be “liberal” or “freer,” rather than unqualifiedly 
“free.” Certain limited social welfare and other spending policies were also 
employed, including TAA, passed in 1962, which provided unemployment 
benefits, relocation, retraining, and other assistance to help workers move 
into new jobs (Kapstein 1998).
 Also important to the maintenance of the liberal postwar trading order 
was the eventual decline of partisanship surrounding the making of trade 
policy. This decline was due in part to the imperatives of the cold war, the in-
fluence of the GATT regime, and the operation of the embedded liberal com-
promise. But also important were the frequently cited “lessons” of Smoot- 
Hawley, sustained postwar prosperity, the still relatively closed nature of the 
United States economy, and the expansion of pro- trade export and multi-
national business interests. Thanks to all these factors, the political salience 
and divisiveness of trade issues gradually faded, and a bipartisan consensus 
in favor of liberal trade emerged by about 1960.
 In the early 1960s, however, America’s Fordist mass- production industries 
came under pressure from firms in Western Europe and Japan, whose econo-
mies had recovered from the devastation of the Second World War. These 
problems were soon compounded by a “crisis of Keynesianism,” as the Demo-
crats’ postwar political- economic strategy of demand management now con-
tributed to new supply- side cost and productivity problems that fueled infla-
tion and cut into corporate profits and competitiveness. By 1971 the United 
States was running a trade deficit in manufactured goods for the first time 
since 1888.
 Protectionist pressures, which had begun to gather in the 1950s, now in-
tensified, while the organized labor movement, having obtained almost no 
aid through the TAA program, added its own demands for relief from imports. 
Partisan divisions over new trade liberalization measures also reemerged, at 
least in Congress, in the early 1970s, although the parties’ historic positions 
were now reversed.
 As noted above, before the 1930s the Democratic Party had been rooted 
mainly in the South, dependent on exports and hence pro- trade. But after the 
New Deal realignment of the 1930s the Democrats became more dependent 
on the votes, volunteers, and money of the increasingly protectionist labor 
movement in the Northeast and Midwest. Meanwhile the Republicans be-
came more closely allied with exported- oriented and multinational business 
interests that backed liberal trade.
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 Throughout the 1970s the dual crisis of Fordism and Keynesianism deep-
ened, manifesting itself as “stagflation,” a painful combination of high un-
employment and high inflation that hastened a long, disruptive transition to 
“post- Fordism” involving several shifts: from mass production for mass mar-
kets to flexibly specialized production for niche markets; from basic manufac-
turing industries to new high- technology sectors; from a manufacturing- based 
industrial society to a service- oriented, postindustrial, or knowledge- based 
society; from a production- dominated international economy to a “financial-
ized” global economy; and from a “Keynesian welfare state” focused on de-
mand to a more supply- oriented “competition state” emphasizing cost cut-
ting and productivity growth (Amin 1995; Castells 2000; Jessop 2002; Cerny 
2000; Coriat, Petit, and Schmeder eds. 2006; Zysman and Newman eds. 
2006).
 Politically the crisis disrupted the New Deal coalition. Many white 
working- class voters, already alienated by the Democrats’ identification with 
the social movements of the 1960s, now also turned away from the party 
for its failure to deliver continued prosperity. The transition to post- Fordism 
and post- industrialism simultaneously shrank this same blue- collar indus-
trial working class while expanding the ranks of professionals, managers, and 
routine white- collar workers (Teixeira, this volume). Accordingly, leaders of 
both parties sought new political- economic strategies intended to facilitate, 
cushion, or in some cases slow the transition to post- Fordism, revive the econ-
omy, defend their core constituencies, and attract new constituencies (Blyth 
2002; Collins 2000).
 In 1980 Ronald Reagan, a staunch Republican proponent of “neoliberal-
ism” or “market fundamentalism” and limited government, was elected presi-
dent, inaugurating a new conservative political order. Reagan’s victory was 
due mainly to voters’ anger at Jimmy Carter’s apparent mismanagement of 
the economy but also to a rightward shift in the public mood toward gov-
ernment (Stimson 2004). Reagan’s conservative “supply- side” political- 
economic strategy included big corporate and personal tax cuts, reduced so-
cial spending, deregulation, restrictive monetary policy, and a commitment 
to liberal trade. Politically the strategy was intended to win the support of 
core middle- class Republicans; new middle- and working- class swing voters, 
including blue- collar “Reagan Democrats”; and big and small business inter-
ests, all of whom were weary of inflation and taxes (Blumenthal 1986, 55–86, 
197–203). Soon after Reagan took office, though, the Federal Reserve’s tight 
money policy drove interest rates and the value of the dollar up and the econ-
omy into what became the worst downturn since the Great Depression, while 
the United States budget and trade deficits ballooned.
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Democrats Turn to Tougher Trade Policy and Competitiveness Initiatives
In response the Democrats intensified their search for a new political- 
economic strategy of their own. Their advocacy of demand stimulus policies 
was largely ruled out by the intellectual discrediting of Keynesianism, the 
more conservative public view of government, and the Democrats’ embrace 
of fiscal discipline to score political points against “Reaganomics.” Thus the 
Democrats instead launched what would become a decade- long attempt to 
make tougher trade policy a winning electoral issue for their party. The trade 
deficit with Japan was rising explosively, so the Democrats focused on curb-
ing Japanese imports and then opening Japanese markets.
 With imports battering the country’s Fordist mass- production industries 
during his first term, Reagan, rather than strengthening the embedded liberal 
compromise, instead abandoned it. He only sparingly used the nation’s trade 
remedy laws to stem the import tide. And along with cutting other welfare 
spending, he actually slashed TAA funding despite Democratic opposition. 
As a consequence many Democratic legislators from industrial states backed 
legislation and administrative action to curb imports—of cars, steel, and tex-
tiles—in the hopes of defending their embattled labor supporters, regaining 
lost working- class support, and perhaps even winning some support from 
business interests concerned about imports.
 In the end, trade played little role in the presidential election of 1984. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of Reagan’s second term the Democrats sensed 
continued Republican vulnerability on the issue, now even among export 
interests. They thereupon turned toward efforts to break into closed foreign 
markets, again especially Japanese markets, through the tactic of “aggres-
sive reciprocity.” A long legislative process driven by Democrats culminated 
in the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The 
heart of the bill was the “Super 301” provision that threatened retaliation 
against unfair foreign traders who refused to open their markets to United 
States goods (Schwab 1994). The trade issue was again of little importance 
in the presidential race in 1988, but the Democrats kept the pressure on any-
way. Four years later, in the middle of the next presidential contest, the House 
of Representatives, controlled by Democrats, passed another bill that would 
have reauthorized the expiring Super 301 law and imposed a cap on sales in 
the United States of Japanese cars, but the Senate failed to produce its own 
version of the bill.
 Trade policy was not the Democrats’ only foreign economic policy focus 
during the 1980s. Throughout the decade many Democrats, looking for an 
alternative to protectionism, supported different versions of a relatively low- 
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cost supply- side or “competitiveness” strategy of their own, intended to both 
reverse the nation’s apparent economic decline and revive Democratic politi-
cal prospects (Hughes 2007). In the early 1980s, recalling both the short- 
lived planning experiments of the Depression and the Second World War and 
the apparent successes of the Japanese “statist” model of development, “old” 
liberals of the Rust Belt, backed by labor, called for an “industrial policy” 
to provide aid mainly to declining mass- production or “sunset” industries. 
At the same time, middle- class “neoliberals” from the suburbs and the Sun 
Belt,12 facing the erosion of the Democrats’ traditional blue- collar, working- 
class base, urged help for new, post- Fordist, high- technology or “sunrise” in-
dustries. Their hope was to expand their support among the growing ranks 
of post- industrial professionals and other white- collar workers, as well as 
among politically unaligned high- technology business interests (Graham 
1992).
 After several years of intense debate, by mid- 1984 the Democrats had re-
treated from their advocacy of industrial policy for a number of reasons, 
including economic and administrative objections from Republicans, busi-
ness, mainstream economists, and the news media. More fundamentally, the 
Democrats became convinced that industrial policy was bad politics. First, 
divisions between traditional liberals and neoliberals threatened to split the 
party. Second, the mass political appeal of industrial policy was undermined 
by its technical character and by the uncertain and long- term nature of its 
likely benefits. Third, the economic recovery of 1983–84 reduced the per-
ceived political urgency of government action. Finally and most important, 
Democrats worried that intensified attacks on the concept by Republicans 
and other elites would further resonate with the public’s long- standing anti- 
statist cultural sensibilities, branding the Democrats as the party of big gov-
ernment.
 Although industrial policy had been driven from the political agenda by 
mid- 1984, productivity growth and economic performance during the rest 
of the decade remained relatively lackluster, while after falling for several 
years, the United States trade deficit, especially with Japan, headed back up 
again. Concern for the apparent decline of American industry, now including 
high- technology firms, therefore also remained alive. Consequently, policy 
experts aligned with the Democrats developed new proposals for what was 
now termed expanded “public investment”—in education and training, infra-
structure, and dynamic new technologies. Some proposals of this kind were 
included in the Trade Act of 1988 (which Democrats sponsored), were ad-
vanced by the Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis that same 
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year, and were subsequently introduced by congressional Democrats during 
George H. W. Bush’s presidency.
The Clinton Years:  
From Promoting Public Investment to Battling over Free Trade
Clinton’s Public Investment Program and Its Demise
The Democratic presidential nominee in 1992 was Governor Bill Clinton of 
Arkansas. A self- proclaimed “New Democrat,” Clinton had led the Demo-
cratic Leadership Council (DlC), a moderate group formed shortly after 
Ronald Reagan’s reelection in 1984 to break the grip of labor and other “spe-
cial interests” on the Democratic Party and pull it back to the political cen-
ter. Making a new political- economic strategy central to his campaign, Clin-
ton sought to facilitate the transition to a more internationally competitive 
post- Fordist economic order. But he also hoped to cushion the impact of this 
transition and to spread its benefits by reviving, albeit in more limited form, 
a version of the embedded liberal compromise.
 Accordingly, in a plan released in June 1992, Clinton, like other New 
Democrats, embraced freer trade. But again influenced by public policy ex-
periments during the Depression and the Second World War and by Japanese 
and European technology and labor market policies, he also called for in-
creased public investment in physical and human capital.13 Technology and 
manufacturing plans followed in September. This strategy was to be comple-
mented by the establishment of a comprehensive new national health insur-
ance system. At the same time, Clinton’s plan called for halving the burgeon-
ing federal budget deficit within four years.
 Clinton’s plan was therefore actually a hybrid of statist, social democratic, 
and neoliberal elements intended to appeal simultaneously to core Demo-
cratic constituencies, including labor and African- Americans; swing voters, 
including blue- collar “Reagan Democrats,” middle- class suburbanites, and 
the socially diverse, deficit- conscious supporters of the independent presi-
dential candidate Ross Perot; and various industrial and financial interests.
 Yet by the time Clinton had become president and submitted his first eco-
nomic plan to Congress in February 1993, his original public investment pro-
posals had been cut in half in favor of a greater stress on deficit reduction. 
This shift of emphasis was due in part to the influence of the Federal Reserve 
chairman, Alan Greenspan, and Clinton’s own economic advisors, who con-
vinced him that the financial markets, averse to deficits and inflation, had to 
be further conciliated to bring down interest rates. Also important was Clin-
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ton’s perceived need to secure reelection support from the backers of Perot, 
who had won a stunning 19% of the vote in the presidential race. In Congress 
Clinton’s plan faced severe criticism from Republicans and business who saw 
it as a return to big government and “tax- and- spend liberalism.” When these 
attacks appeared to resonate with voters’ anti- statist cultural values, Demo-
crats facing reelection, especially southern conservatives, voted to cut Clin-
ton’s investment program by half again to make room for still more deficit 
reduction. A year later Clinton’s healthcare plan was similarly torpedoed by 
intense Republican and business opposition, which transformed initial public 
enthusiasm for the plan into opposition and again prompted leading congres-
sional Democrats to back away from offering their own support.
 After the Republicans captured control of Congress in the midterm elec-
tions of 1994, their opposition limited Clinton’s subsequent public investment 
and social spending initiatives. But Clinton and his Democratic colleagues 
themselves continued to retreat from these ideas throughout the rest of his 
presidency. This was due to the subsequent economic recovery, which was 
attributed by the White House to the president’s shift toward fiscal restraint; 
the election debacle, which was accurately perceived as being in part a re-
action to Clinton’s alleged tax- and- spend proclivities; and Clinton’s reelection 
and modest Democratic congressional gains in 1996, which appeared to con-
firm for him and his party the political wisdom of his economic policy course 
adjustments.
The Intra- Democratic Struggle over Trade Liberalization
With the demise of his public investment strategy by the summer of 1993, 
Clinton turned to a two- pronged strategy of “export- led growth” to help re-
vive the sluggish economy and improve his reelection chances. First, the 
White House escalated efforts begun by Reagan and Bush under Democratic 
pressure to open Japan’s markets, concluding limited agreements with Tokyo 
in both 1993 and 1995. Second and more important, Clinton pursued a num-
ber of bilateral, regional, and multilateral free- trade agreements. By the 
early 1990s growing international economic integration had expanded the 
ranks of export- oriented and multinational firms, while interests threatened 
by imports had either been driven out of business or been forced to adjust 
to more competitive market conditions by technologically modernizing and 
moving production offshore. Together with the waning of Japanese economic 
strength, these changes produced a lasting reorientation of the objectives of 
American trade policy away from import limits and aggressive reciprocity 
and toward trade and investment liberalization.
Grappling with Globalization 221
 Most presidents are free traders, because of their national electoral con-
stituencies and their foreign policy responsibilities. But Clinton’s concerted 
efforts to negotiate and win approval of these new trade deals were also con-
sistent with his personal belief in open trade, and intended to win him the 
support of internationally oriented business interests and voters who were 
expected to benefit from export- related job growth. Conversely, Clinton was 
willing to risk provoking opposition from organized labor, many of whose 
members, absent any significant expansion of paltry existing compensation 
programs, were likely to be harmed by further trade liberalization.
 The fate of Clinton’s substantive and procedural free- trade initiatives was 
mixed. Congressional approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in the fall of 1993 was followed a year later by ratification of the 
“Uruguay Round” GATT treaty, which among other things established the 
new World Trade Organization (wTO). In both 1997 and 1998, however, trade 
liberalization ground to a halt, when the House of Representatives blocked 
legislation to extend Clinton’s “fast- track” trade negotiating authority. Fast- 
track authority facilitates the negotiation of free- trade agreements by award-
ing them quick up- or- down votes in Congress without amendments that can 
unhinge the entire process. Clinton had hoped to use this renewed authority 
to strike new free- trade deals with Latin American and Asian nations. But two 
years later, in 2000, Congress approved legislation granting “permanent nor-
mal trade relations” status to the People’s Republic of China.
 This seesawing set of outcomes was decided mainly in the House, since 
Senate support for free trade was less problematic.14 The variable and often 
very close House votes were determined principally by the shifting positions 
of House Democrats. By contrast, two- thirds to three- quarters of House Re-
publicans consistently supported these measures, in large part because they 
represented mostly export- oriented and white- collar districts and were de-
pendent on internationally oriented business donors.
 During the Clinton years a deep split over trade opened in the Democratic 
Party, including within Congress. On one side were liberal, blue- collar, and 
labor- backed urban “old” Democrats from the Northeast and Midwest. The 
majority opposed free trade, not least because the demise of Clinton’s public 
investment and healthcare plans left their working- class constituents heavily 
exposed to the dislocating pressures of the world economy. On the other side 
were moderate and conservative white- collar, business- supported, suburban 
“new” Democrats from the South and West, often aligned with the centrist 
DlC. Most supported free trade. The fluctuation in House Democratic voting 
on trade issues during these years can to a degree be explained by election- 
induced shifts in the relative strength of these two Democratic factions.
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 Other considerations were also important, including the varying inten-
sity of the lobbying campaigns mounted by pro- trade business interests and 
by labor and other opponents of free trade, shifts in the relative dependence 
of House Democrats on business and labor campaign contributions,15 the co-
hesiveness of the House Democratic leadership, and the effectiveness of the 
bargaining activities of Bill Clinton and other White House officials.
Trade Liberalization Advances: NAFTA and GATT
In November 1993 the first of Clinton’s trade and investment liberalization 
deals, NAFTA, was ratified, thanks to a split in the House Democratic Cau-
cus.16 Hoping to appeal to both old and new Democratic constituencies, Clin-
ton had endorsed NAFTA during his presidential campaign while also pledg-
ing to negotiate labor and environmental side agreements to allay the fears of 
unions and environmental groups of a “race to the bottom” by United States 
corporations looking to take advantage of Mexico’s cheap labor and poorly 
enforced environmental laws.
 Criticizing the agreements negotiated by the Clinton administration as 
too weak, organized labor and its allies waged an intense campaign against 
NAFTA, eventually leading 60% of House Democrats to oppose it. The other 
40% of House Democrats had a number of reasons for voting in favor. First, a 
bloc of moderate and conservative, disproportionately southern Democrats 
backed the deal, encouraged by the DlC. Second, internationally oriented 
business interests organized a strong pro- NAFTA lobbying campaign, focused 
mainly on undecided Democrats. Third, the Democrats’ dependence on busi-
ness campaign contributions had increased since the early 1980s. Fourth, 
there was a deep split in the House Democratic leadership, reflecting rank- 
and- file differences. Finally, Clinton undertook furious efforts to persuade 
Congress and the public, which included both appeals to party loyalty and 
promises of selective import curbs and a new trade adjustment assistance 
program.17
 In the following year the Uruguay Round GATT treaty was ratified by the 
House with considerably greater ease, as fully 65% of the Democratic cau-
cus supported the accord. The key here was that labor expressed only token 
opposition to the deal, the effects of which seemed likely to be diffuse rather 
than focused on specific income groups; this made labor less concerned about 
the Uruguay Round than it had been about NAFTA, which the unions feared 
would produce a devastating flight of capital to Mexico (Baldwin and Magee 
2000, 29, 42).
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Trade Liberalization Stalled: The Fast- Track Battles
Three years later, in November 1997, the process of trade liberalization stalled 
when Clinton was forced to withdraw the “clean” fast- track proposal he had 
introduced (it contained no significant labor and environmental provisions). 
Principally dooming the proposal was the opposition of about 80% of House 
Democrats (Shoch 2000; Conley 1999; Schnietz and Nieman 1999; Bardwell 
2000).
 This pronounced shift in Democratic behavior had several causes. First, a 
substantial number of pro- trade Democrats retired or were defeated in the 
congressional elections of 1994 and 1996, while the latter year saw the elec-
tion of a number of liberal and moderate Democrats from mostly northern 
districts where opposition to free trade was stronger. Second, the business 
campaign for fast- track authority was poorly organized and unenergetic, 
largely because fast- track was a procedural measure lacking concrete bene-
fits, unlike the NAFTA accord, which contained many. Third, despite its secu-
lar decline labor waged a more intense and effective campaign against fast- 
track than it had done against NAFTA. In conjunction with the unions’ success 
in turning out and influencing the labor vote in the congressional elections 
of 1996, this led most Democrats to oppose Clinton’s bill in the hope of bene-
fiting from a similar labor effort in the midterm elections in 1998 (Francia 
2005). Fourth, after the elections in 1994 there was a shift of business cam-
paign contributions from the Democrats to the now majority Republicans, 
as well as an increase in labor donations to Democratic candidates. This left 
the party, including even New Democrats, more dependent on labor money. 
Fifth, the House Democratic leadership undertook a more unified campaign 
against fast- track. Finally, Clinton’s lobbying efforts were less concerted and 
effective than they had been on NAFTA. His “inside- the- beltway” strategy of 
promising concessions failed to sway Democrats alienated by his failure to 
deliver on retraining and other promises made during the NAFTA fight.
 Hoping to mend relations with House Democrats, Clinton decided to hold 
off on sending another fast- track proposal to Congress until after the midterm 
congressional elections in November 1998. Instead, it was the Republican 
House speaker, Newt Gingrich, who in late June announced a fall vote on a 
new “clean” fast- track proposal. Gingrich hoped to use the bill in the elections 
against Democratic fast- track opponents from districts with concentrations of 
export- dependent agricultural interests (Shoch 2000; Biglaiser, Jackson, and 
Peake 2004).
 In late September the House decisively defeated the GOP bill, as 86% of 
the chamber’s Democrats voted against it. Democratic opposition to the bill 
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was heightened by splits among businesses over the timing of the vote and 
the bill’s poor prospects. Second, the unions waged another strong campaign 
against the bill. This again led both liberal and moderate Democrats to op-
pose it in the hope of securing grassroots activism and campaign contribu-
tions from unions in the upcoming elections. Third, Bill Clinton and many 
New Democrats refused to support the bill, which they saw as an obvious GOP 
attempt to embarrass and divide their party before the elections.
Trade Liberalization Resumed: PNTR with China
The final free- trade battle of the Clinton years was over permanent normal 
trade relations (PNTr) with China. PNTr status would have allowed Congress 
to abandon its annual vote on whether to grant “most favored nation” status 
to China, a cold war practice intended to pressure Beijing to improve human 
rights. Administration officials believed that awarding PNTr status to China 
was necessary if eager American firms were to receive the various market- 
opening and investment concessions that Beijing had made in an agreement 
struck with the United States in late 1999 to facilitate China’s entry into the 
wTO. After yet another furious battle, the PNTr bill was approved by the 
House in May 2000. The key to the measure’s passage was support from 35% 
of Democrats, up from the 20% and 14% of party members who had backed 
the fast- track bills in 1997 and 1998 (Hasnat and Callahan 2002).
 This new turnaround in Democratic behavior was partly due to the vic-
tory in 1998 of a number of young, pro- business, pro- trade moderate Demo-
crats from affluent suburban districts, mainly in the Northeast. Organized 
labor, fearing the offshoring of United States production to China, had waged 
another strong campaign against PNTr. But that effort was weakened by 
support for the deal by some union locals representing workers in trade- 
dependent industries, and by fears that defeat of the measure would jeopar-
dize the prospects in the forthcoming elections of the Democratic presiden-
tial nominee, Al Gore, or the Democrats’ hopes of recapturing control of the 
House. A third reason was that business interests saw vast market and in-
vestment opportunities in the China deal and undertook a massive lobbying 
campaign on behalf of PNTr in Washington and at the grassroots, as they had 
not done when the procedural fast- track bill was being considered in 1997. 
Fourth, the 1999–2000 election cycle saw a new if limited shift of business 
campaign contributions back to the Democrats. Many corporate leaders, en-
couraged by various New Democratic groups, recognized in the wake of the 
fast- track defeat in 1997 that in dramatically shifting their support to the Re-
publicans after the midterms in 1994 they had lost influence with the Demo-
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crats, who had become more financially beholden to, and therefore more sup-
portive of, organized labor. Fifth, that same election cycle saw the emergence 
of the internationally oriented high- technology sector as a major contributor 
to Democratic candidates, especially pro- trade New Democrats. Sixth, a new 
split opened among House Democratic leaders, some of whom, although op-
posed to PNTr, refrained from actively organizing against it to avoid offend-
ing existing and potential business donors. Finally, there were the reenergized 
lobbying efforts of Bill Clinton, who hoped that approval of PNTr would help 
to secure his legacy as a champion of free trade and lighten the stain of the 
House’s vote to impeach him in 1998.
The Democrats and Trade Liberalization during the Bush Years
The dramatic presidential race of 2000 saw the election of George W. Bush, a 
Republican who pushed to complete the neoliberal “Reagan Revolution” with 
big new tax cuts. The process of trade liberalization also continued during 
Bush’s presidency, but only after bruising fights, again mainly in the House. 
In the summer of 2002, after a series of extraordinarily close and partisan 
House votes, Congress gave Bush fast- track authority—now renamed “trade 
promotion authority” (TPA)—to help him negotiate a new international trade 
agreement under the auspices of the wTO and a Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas. Finally, after another bitter, close, and partisan fight in the House, 
Congress approved the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 
the summer of 2005.18
 Whereas the positions of House Democrats on the several major trade lib-
eralization measures of the Clinton years were quite variable, Democratic 
opposition to both TPA and CAFTA rose substantially. This was in part be-
cause the Democrats were no longer confronting a fellow Democratic presi-
dent whose political fortunes they to a degree shared, but rather a staunchly 
conservative Republican one. But other factors discussed below were impor-
tant too.
 Bush’s victories on both issues were thus due not to shifts in Democratic 
behavior but rather to increased GOP support for trade liberalization. Strong 
business lobbying and pressure from House Republican leaders and the White 
House played a role in this. Particularly important was the inclination of Re-
publicans who might have opposed the trade liberalization proposals of a 
Democratic president to instead back TPA and CAFTA as the initiatives of a 
Republican president whose fate they in part shared.
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The Trade Promotion Authority Battle
Despite the victory of PNTr, as George W. Bush took office in early 2001 pro- 
trade business leaders and policy experts remained concerned that presiden-
tial fast- track authority to facilitate the negotiation of new free- trade agree-
ments had still not been renewed. Thereupon, in early October 2001 a trade 
promotion authority proposal sponsored by the GOP was introduced in the 
House. In the hope of winning at least some support from moderate New 
Democrats, the measure gave greater prominence to labor and environmen-
tal standards than previous bills had done. But to avoid GOP opposition, the 
bill was largely silent on enforcement mechanisms, which angered labor and 
environmental activists.
 In early December, after a bitter fight, the bill passed by an excruciatingly 
close margin of 215–214 (Biglaiser, Jackson, and Peake 2004; Destler 2005, 
290–98; Forgette 2004, 163–65). Six months later the House approved a mo-
tion to send the TPA bill to conference with the Senate—again, almost incred-
ibly, by the margin of a single vote: 216–215. In a successful move to win more 
New Democratic support for the measure, a provision originated by Senate 
Democrats was added to expand the TAA program and provide a new health-
care tax credit and a wage insurance program for displaced workers. A month 
later the House narrowly passed a compromise conference bill by yet another 
extremely close vote, 215–212.
 These were all not only close votes but also exceptionally partisan ones; 
the most partisan, in fact, of any congressional trade votes taken since the 
Second World War. Democratic opposition to TPA rose to 90% on the vote in 
December 2001 (up from 65% on PNTr), to 95% on the vote in June 2002 to 
send the House version of the bill to conference, and to 88% on the final con-
ference bill. This would have been enough to defeat the measures had not Re-
publican support for TPA on the three votes climbed to 89%, 93%, and 88%.
 Opposition to TPA was strong among Democrats of all ideological orien-
tations—including most moderate, usually pro- trade New Democrats—for a 
number of reasons. First, there was the perception that public anxiety over 
globalization was growing just as the economy was falling into recession. Sec-
ond, a strong campaign was waged against the bill by environmental activists 
and especially organized labor, which was unimpressed by the limited TAA, 
healthcare, and wage insurance provisions included in the measure.19 Labor’s 
influence within the party had grown because of the unions’ massive mobili-
zation for Al Gore and other Democratic candidates in 2000 and the substan-
tial union effort planned for the midterm elections of 2002, when low turn-
out was forecast. The decision by the AFl- CIO to endorse up to seventy- five 
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moderate Republican candidates in those races also made it harder for the 
Democrats to take labor’s support for granted. Third, there was the beginning 
of yet another shift of business campaign contributions back to the Republi-
cans after Bush’s victory and the GOP’s success in retaining control of the 
House, which again left Democrats more dependent on labor money. Fourth, 
the collapse of the “dot- coms” and troubles throughout the high- technology 
sector hurt the New Democrats’ fundraising, still further increasing their reli-
ance on labor money. Fifth, because of a secular geographical and ideological 
realignment of the parties’ electoral coalitions, the growing polarization of 
party activists, a combatively conservative Republican congressional leader-
ship, and a divisive president playing to his base rather than to swing voters, 
the level of partisanship in Washington was extremely high, while both old 
and new Democrats were angry in particular at the way Bush and congres-
sional Republicans tried to ram the TPA bill through the House. Finally, House 
Democratic leaders made determined efforts to rally their members against 
the TPA bill, which contrasted with their much more passive role in the PNTr 
fight.
 The strong Democratic opposition to TPA would have been sufficient to 
sink the bill had it received a level of support from Republicans comparable 
to their support for free- trade measures of the previous decade. But for the 
reasons mentioned above, GOP support for TPA rose to new heights, making 
this the key to the bill’s victory.
The Central America Free Trade Agreement
Buoyed by his narrow TPA victory, over the next several years George W. Bush 
used his new authority to negotiate and obtain the ratification of several un-
controversial bilateral trade agreements. In the summer of 2004, however, 
his administration also struck a much more contentious deal: the Central 
America Free Trade Agreement.20 Central America was not a big market for 
United States goods. But the White House and business interests saw the ap-
proval of CAFTA as a stepping stone to the successful conclusion of the “Doha 
Round” of international trade negotiations, begun in Qatar in late 2001, and 
the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.
 As usual, the House battle over CAFTA in the spring and summer of 2005 
was a bitter one, culminating in another nail- biting, highly partisan victory 
for the White House by a vote of 217–215. Democratic opposition to CAFTA 
reached 93%, which again would have sunk the pact had not 88% of Republi-
cans supported it.
 The unified Democratic opposition to CAFTA, which included most New 
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Democrats, again had multiple sources. First were the still growing fears 
that economic globalization was eroding the jobs and wages of United States 
workers, while there was also more specific disappointment with the results 
of NAFTA and of PNTr with China. Second, there was additional dismay that 
Bush had not delivered on training and education provisions of the TPA bill 
enacted in 2002. Third, labor undertook yet another energetic mobilization 
effort against the deal. Fourth, New Democrats, already inflamed by Republi-
can hard- line conservatism and authoritarianism, were further angered by 
how they were treated during the CAFTA fight. House GOP leaders excluded 
the New Democrats from discussions of the CAFTA implementing legislation, 
goaded them to oppose a bill with weak labor and environmental provisions, 
and pressured corporate donors, including high- technology interests, to 
abandon their already diminished support for Democratic candidates. Fifth, a 
resulting further decline in business contributions left Democrats of all ideo-
logical stripes still more reliant on labor money. Finally, opposition to CAFTA 
was strong among House Democratic leaders.
 As with TPA and for similar reasons, the key to CAFTA’s passage in the face 
of strong Democratic opposition was the almost equally strong Republican 
backing for the deal.
Democratic Resurgence:  
Trade, Compensatory Spending, and Competitiveness Policy
Despite CAFTA’s approval, during the past six years popular concern over 
globalization has continued to mount, in part because of the emergence of 
four major new economic challengers, the “BrIC” nations—Brazil, Russia, 
and especially India and China—on the global economic stage. Organized 
labor, still a key Democratic constituency despite its long-term decline, re-
mains resolutely opposed to new trade and investment liberalization mea-
sures. And the wider public is increasingly convinced that globalization, in-
cluding expanded trade and now the offshore outsourcing of both blue- and 
white- collar jobs, has contributed to slow employment growth, stagnant 
wages, and eroding healthcare and retirement benefits.
 The Democrats benefited from these sentiments in the congressional mid-
term elections of 2006. The party regained control of both houses of Congress 
for the first time since 1994, thanks in part to the victory of a significant num-
ber of “populist,” labor- backed critics of free trade. During the next two years 
congressional Democrats refused to renew Bush’s trade negotiating authority 
and blocked approval of a number of bilateral free- trade agreements, includ-
ing, most controversially, one with Colombia (Destler 2007).
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 The Democrats’ presidential nominee and eventual victor in 2008, Sena-
tor Barack Obama, was at heart a free trader. But during his campaign—and 
especially just before crucial primaries in heavily working- class Ohio and 
Pennsylvania—Obama called for a halt to the negotiation of new trade agree-
ments without strong labor and environmental standards. He also pledged 
to revisit NAFTA. Finally, Obama also promised to get tough with China for 
unfairly subsidizing its exporters with cash, loans, and an undervalued cur-
rency. After his victory, however, freed from immediate election pressures, 
Obama softened his position on NAFTA and China, in the latter case for fear 
of provoking a sell- off of United States government debt held by the Chinese. 
He also hoped to win quick congressional approval of stalled trade agree-
ments with Panama, Colombia, and South Korea and to finish negotiations on 
a global trade deal by the end of 2010 (Ashbee and Waddan 2010).
 But with the victory of still more populist Democrats to Congress in the 
same election, and especially with the economy only slowly recovering from 
the worst recession since the 1930s, congressional Democrats continued their 
hardened approach to trade policy. Supported by labor and some manufactur-
ers, in their big economic stimulus bill in early 2009 the Democrats included 
a controversial, albeit watered- down, “Buy American” provision. Later, 
strong congressional opposition, especially from House Democrats, led the 
White House to temporarily back off from its drive for new trade deals and 
to pledge instead to focus on more aggressively enforcing existing trade and 
labor rights rules, in the hope that doing so would eventually weaken oppo-
sition to further trade liberalization.21
 In the late spring of 2010, however, along with an ambitious plan to spur 
job growth by doubling exports, Obama renewed his promise to push ahead 
on stalled and new free- trade agreements, including a new Trans Pacific Part-
nership.22 A deal was subsequently reached in early November with South 
Korea that reduced barriers to United States auto and food exports to the 
country. The following April an “action plan” to improve labor rights in 
Colombia was negotiated to facilitate completion of the stalled free trade pact 
with the nation. Most of the labor movement, however, continues to oppose 
these agreements, which are still felt to lack sufficiently strong workplace and 
environmental standards. As a consequence, most congressional Democrats 
also remain opposed to these deals. Instead, about half of House Democrats 
are backing legislation that would require a wide-ranging review of NAFTA 
and other trade pacts and boost the role of Congress in negotiations over 
future deals. And in early October 2010 House Democrats, joined by many 
Republicans, passed a bill that would impose tariffs on imports from China 
should Beijing continue to manipulate the value of its currency. It is possible, 
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though, that sufficient support for pending and future free trade agreements 
will eventually be found from Republicans and pro-trade Democrats to secure 
their approval.
 With respect to compensatory spending, in November 2007 House Demo-
crats passed a bill to expand and extend TAA benefits, but Senate Republicans 
blocked it. Democratic leaders suggested that approval of this measure and 
related unemployment, training, and other legislation was necessary before 
new trade deals with Colombia and other nations could be voted on. Obama 
likewise supported such compensatory policies during the presidential race. 
Both he and congressional Democrats also called for a major revamping of the 
United States healthcare system to expand access and lower costs.
 Meanwhile, after fading away during Bill Clinton’s second term and 
George W. Bush’s first, the issues of competitiveness and public investment 
have recently returned to the United States political agenda with the rise of 
the BrICs. Building on the House Democrats’ Innovation Agenda from 2006, 
in August 2007 Congress passed and George Bush signed the America Com-
petes Act. The bill called for increased spending on various federal energy, 
science, technology, and research programs. Congressional Democrats also 
introduced legislation to modernize the nation’s aging infrastructure. During 
his presidential campaign Obama had similarly promised to increase pub-
lic investment in education and training, infrastructure, renewable energy 
sources, and technological research.
 Then in the fall of 2008 came the dramatic worsening of the develop-
ing crisis of “financialized capitalism,” the product of stagnant wages and 
rising consumer debt, an influx of foreign capital and loose monetary policy 
by the Federal Reserve, risky mortgage lending and derivatives trading, and 
lax financial regulation (Rajan 2010). Contributing to the demise of the Re-
publican order and renewed Democratic control of the White House and Con-
gress, the severe crisis also relaxed various constraints on greater government 
activism. Most important, as Obama took office in January 2009 the Ameri-
can public, traditionally hesitant about the economic role of government,23 
now backed a big economic stimulus package that included substantial new 
spending, even if it was expected to lead to bigger budget deficits.24
 In addition, faced with collapsing consumer demand, frozen credit mar-
kets, growing unemployment, and the threat of deflation, as well as the seem-
ing impotence of monetary expansion and lower interest rates to bring about 
recovery, usually deficit- wary economists, including veterans of Clinton’s ad-
ministration who were advising Obama, rediscovered the merits of Keynesian 
fiscal policy. Mainstream economists typically worry that big deficits will 
lead to inflation, a sell- off of government securities, a sagging dollar, the 
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“crowding out” of private borrowing, and rising interest rates. But with eco-
nomic resources lying idle, interest rates near zero, and domestic and foreign 
investors, including Chinese and other central bankers, nevertheless rush-
ing to buy “safe” debt issued by the U.S. Treasury, most economists at least 
temporarily put aside their deficit fears and backed the major fiscal stimulus 
package and its big spending increases.
 Accordingly, in mid- February Obama and Congress enacted a hefty $787 
billion bill, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, with broad sup-
port from business, labor, and the public. Most of the bill consisted of per-
sonal tax relief and unemployment, healthcare, and other direct aid to indi-
viduals and fiscally strapped states. But there was also almost $270 billion in 
new public investment and about $30 billion in tax incentives intended to 
encourage both short- and long- term growth. Although the package was less 
than some liberals had hoped for, it was more than Clinton had been able to 
win in his entire eight years in office. The bill provided for tax credits and 
new and increased spending to promote infrastructure (roads, bridges, and 
mass transit), “green” investments (renewable energy sources, a new elec-
tric grid, and conservation), computerized medical records, rural broadband 
networks, scientific and technological research, education and training, and 
Trade Adjustment Assistance.25
 Shorn in recent decades of most of their conservative southern wing, 
Democrats overwhelmingly supported the bill. Conversely, with the purge 
of moderate Republicans in the two previous elections, the legislation drew 
near unanimous GOP opposition, as party leaders again conjured well- worn 
images of pork, waste, deficits, big government, and even socialism. Never-
theless, the stimulus measure narrowly passed in a form that looked very 
much like Obama’s original proposal.26
 In late February Obama presented his budget proposal for fiscal 2010, 
which included hundreds of billions of dollars in additional spending on 
new energy projects (some of which were included in the climate and clean- 
energy bill passed by the House in June), high- speed rail, increased grants for 
college students, and most controversially a major healthcare expansion and 
reform plan. After another fierce battle, a final $3.4 billion budget resolution 
(or outline) passed both houses of Congress in late April without a single Re-
publican vote.27 The administration also provided tens of billions of dollars in 
loans and other assistance to bail out the beleaguered United States auto in-
dustry, even assuming a 60% ownership stake in General Motors, which had 
filed for bankruptcy.28 Later in the summer Obama also proposed important 
new programs to improve the quality of K–12 and community college educa-
tion. Bills backed by the president to establish a National Infrastructure Bank 
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were introduced in both houses of Congress. Finally and most important, in 
the face of continued Republican intransigence and a public now increasingly 
concerned about the growth of big government, in March 2010 Obama and 
his congressional Democratic allies passed a historic ten- year healthcare re-
form bill with a cost of $940 billion (Howard, this volume).29
 Obama and the Democrats’ initiatives to date have been mainly designed 
to save and create jobs and reduce economic insecurity. But these measures 
should also help the country adjust to the challenges of globalization—by 
cushioning its impact on workers and communities, improving the competi-
tiveness of existing industries, and fostering globally competitive new ones.
Conclusion: Toward a Revived Embedded Liberal Compromise?
In the past few years a number of prominent American policy intellectuals, 
including the former director of Obama’s National Economic Council, Law-
rence Summers, and even some business interests have called for reviving and 
strengthening the embedded liberal compromise (Shoch 2008; Schatz 2008). 
They propose a mildly social democratic approach to globalization that would 
combine open markets with substantial increases in compensatory social 
spending and public investment (Scheve and Slaughter 2007; Kuttner 2008a; 
Kuttner 2008b; Summers 2008; see also Pontusson 2005a and especially Hays 
2009). This approach would involve learning from Europe, particularly from 
the Nordic countries, and a consequent degree of “hybridization” of Ameri-
can and European “social models” or “varieties of  capitalism.”30
 Although not mainly intended as such a hybrid approach to globalization, 
Obama’s economic and social program, even more than Clinton’s ill- fated ini-
tiatives, embodies key elements of it, and the future of this approach depends 
in part on the success and popularity of Obama’s overall program. What if 
Obama’s and the Democrats’ policies had contributed to a strong recovery 
and the beginning of a new era of growth while mitigating economic insecu-
rity, including the trade-related dislocations experienced by workers in un-
competitive sectors? In addition to Obama’s reelection and continued Demo-
cratic congressional dominance, this outcome might also have reduced labor 
and public opposition to further trade liberalization (Schatz 2008). That in 
turn might have encouraged Obama to conclude new trade deals contain-
ing strong labor and environmental standards, which congressional Demo-
crats, together with pro-trade Republicans, might then have approved. In 
other words, we might have seen the emergence of a new embedded liberal 
compromise and a narrowing of the differences between the approaches to 
globalization taken by the Democratic Party and its European counterparts.
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 It does now appear that the “Great Recession” has bottomed out and that 
a recovery has begun, including in the labor market, thanks to an expansion-
ary monetary policy but also to the stimulus bill, whose beneficial effects 
have not been widely recognized. It also appears, though, that absent an-
other significant but politically unlikely stimulus package or a strong demand 
for exports, the recovery is likely to be a protracted and relatively “jobless” 
one—a “lost decade” like that endured by Japan is possible—because of the 
retrenchment of consumer spending, continued wage stagnation, employers’ 
restructuring of their workforce, state and local government spending cuts, 
the tapering off of stimulus spending, and a reduction in bank lending and 
business investment in the face of weak effective demand. In addition, sus-
tained, often deceptive Republican attacks on the stimulus program, govern-
ment bailouts, and the healthcare bill, together with the perceived failure of 
these measures to strengthen the economy, have contributed during the past 
year to mounting public apprehension over the growth of government spend-
ing, deficits, and intrusiveness.
 The struggling economy and negative sentiment toward their healthcare 
and other reform efforts cost the Democrats six Senate seats and control of 
the House of Representatives in the midterm elections in 2010. With the Re-
publicans pressing for deep cuts in government spending, Obama’s and the 
Democrats’ programmatic achievements are now likely to be eroded rather 
than expanded. Even if Obama is reelected in 2012, the Republicans are likely 
to keep control of the House and even to regain control of the Senate, since 
23 of the 33 seats to be contested are currently held by Democrats. This will 
doom any significant new Democratic compensatory and public investment 
spending initiatives, which in turn means that labor, popular, and Democratic 
opposition to trade liberalization will remain strong. Hopes for a revived, 
Democratic-led embedded liberal compromise will unfortunately go unful-
filled.
Notes
 1. The commitment of these parties to trade liberalization has been further secured 
by the delegation of trade policymaking authority by member states first to the Euro-
pean Economic Community and later to the European Union (Katzenstein 1985; Han-
son 1998; Young and Peterson 2006).
 2. Here I am straddling Stolper- Samuelson and Ricardo- Viner, or “specific fac-
tors” models of individual trade policy preferences. The former theories, assuming 
that production factors are fully mobile across industries, argue that scarce factors 
(in advanced countries, unskilled labor) will support protection, while abundant fac-
tors (capital and skilled labor) will support free trade. The latter theories, assuming 
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that production factors are completely immobile, maintain instead that capital and 
labor in import- competing industries will support protection, while capital and labor 
in export- oriented and multinational sectors will support free trade. For recent empiri-
cal studies of public opinion on trade issues based on these two theories see Scheve 
and Slaughter 2006 and Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005. If instead, as others have 
argued (cf. Blonigen 2008), factor mobility varies over time and across countries, 
and production factors in the contemporary United States are partially mobile, then 
worker trade policy preferences may be influenced in the way I suggest. For additional 
recent discussion see Mansfield and Mutz 2009 and Jeong 2009.
 3. It should be noted that a number of welfare state activities, especially “human 
capital” policies like education and training, have “productive” as well as “protec-
tive” functions. Thus, contra Esping- Andersen’s well- known view (1990) that in “de-
commodifying” labor, politics work “against” markets, politics can also work “with” 
or “for” markets. See Room 2002; Andersen 2007; Hudson and Kuhner 2008; and 
Obinger, Starke, Moser, Bogedan, Obinger- Gindulis, and Leibfried 2010.
 4. To briefly situate this discussion within current debates among comparative and 
international political economists, proponents of the “compensation” hypothesis see 
greater or increasing economic openness leading to a larger public sector, as win-
ners compensate losers and often expand public investment to preserve open markets. 
Supporters of the contrasting “efficiency” hypothesis argue that globalization forces 
governments to cut spending and taxes in order to maintain national economic com-
petitiveness and prevent capital flight. “Skeptics” find no causal link between global-
ization and the size of government, emphasizing instead the importance of domestic 
factors. For recent reviews of, and empirical evidence for, the competing positions see 
Busemeyer 2009, Potrafke 2009, Haupt 2010, Jensen 2010, and Walter 2010.
I would argue, following Carles Boix (2006), that the influence of globalization on 
government policy is contingently mediated by electoral politics, as parties struggle 
to construct winning political coalitions by deploying competing political- economic 
strategies. These strategies can include protectionism and opposition to further trade 
liberalization as an alternative to compensation and public investment or to fiscal con-
servatism.
 5. Most of the free- trade deals of the past fifteen years have actually been intended 
more to open foreign countries to United States investors than to exporters. In this 
chapter I mostly use the shorter term “trade liberalization” for economy.
 6. For a book- length version of much of the material contained in this chapter 
through Bill Clinton’s presidency see Shoch 2001.
 7. Including (1) winner- take- call, single- member district, two- stage, staggered, and 
separated presidential and congressional elections, and (2) the separation of powers, 
the presidential veto, bicameralism, the congressional party and committee systems, 
the Senate filibuster, federalism, and policy feedback effects.
 8. Including prevailing macroeconomic conditions; the level of economic develop-
ment; demographic, class, sectoral, and skill structures; the balance of social forces; 
the level of economic openness; the international division of labor; and the depen-
dence of the state on globally mobile capital.
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 9. Critics of “American exceptionalism” argue that if socially oriented tax ex-
penditures (Howard 2007a; Howard, in this volume) and employer- provided but 
government- subsidized and regulated social benefits (Hacker 2002) are counted along 
with direct government spending, the United States welfare state is actually compa-
rable in size to the welfare states of Europe. This kind of concept “stretching” makes 
it unclear why anything the government does that affects social welfare should not be 
considered part of the welfare state (Hacker 2005).
 10. On this “Lockean liberalism” and its policy consequences see Kingdon 1999 and 
Lockhart 2003. Scholars of American political development have demonstrated that 
there are actually “multiple traditions” or elements within this country’s political cul-
ture. But as James Morone (2005) argues, in the narrower economic sphere the liberal 
element is generally dominant.
In singling out the importance of political culture and mass public opinion in re-
straining the size of the American welfare state, I am reacting to analyses that neglect 
these influences in favor of other limiting factors like the weakness of organized labor 
or the strength of business, racial divisions and the power of southern Democrats in 
Congress, this country’s fragmented state and majoritarian electoral institutions, the 
economy’s dependence on general rather than specific skills, etc. (see also Zelizer 2003 
and Schickler and Caughey 2010). For three recent comparative studies of the impact 
of public opinion on the welfare state see Mehrtens 2004, Brooks and Manza 2007, 
and Kang and Powell 2010.
 11. On parties and trade policy in American history see Rattner 1972; Eckes 1995; 
Keech and Pak 1995; Destler 2005; and Shoch 2001.
 12. This label for moderate Democrats in the early 1980s should not be confused 
with the more general term used above to designate a form of contemporary conser-
vatism: “neoliberalism.”
 13. On the development of and the subsequent battle over Clinton’s plan see Shoch 
2008; Akard 1998; Weatherford and McDonnell 1996; and Pierson 1998.
 14. The Senate is generally more supportive of free trade than the House is, for a 
number of reasons. First, most senators represent fairly large, heterogeneous constitu-
encies, including consumers and internationally oriented interests, that counterbal-
ance the views of domestically oriented interests opposed to free trade. Second, the 
Senate overrepresents more agricultural, less unionized, and therefore more pro- trade 
parts of the country. Third, senators have long terms, giving ideological free traders 
considerable leeway to resist pressure from protectionist interests. Finally, senators 
have broad foreign policy responsibilities that incline them to try to avoid trade con-
flicts with other nations. On the first two of these points see Wirls 1998.
 15. Labor unions donate almost all their campaign money to Democrats in the hopes 
of influencing which party controls the House. Conversely, some particularly ideologi-
cal business interests give almost exclusively to Republican candidates. But most busi-
nesses are pragmatic, seeking instead to influence legislative decision making, which 
leads them to support incumbents of both parties. These same business interests con-
tribute additional money to candidates from the party in control of the House, or ex-
pected to win control of the House, as well as to candidates of either party who either 
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share or may be induced to share their positions on important issues. Consequently, to 
some degree business support for House candidates shifts with changes in (1) control 
of the chamber, either actual or anticipated, (2) party policy stances, and (3) the in-
clination of business donors to try to induce such changes in party positions (Fellowes 
and Wolf 2004; Stratman 2005).
 16. The agreement was actually negotiated by George H. W. Bush’s administration. 
For four excellent analyses of the politics of negotiating and approving NAFTA see 
Grayson 1995; Mayer 1998; Cameron and Tomlin 2000; and MacArthur 2000.
 17. For a lengthy list of mostly quantitative analyses of the House vote see Shoch 
2001, 344–45.
 18. For a much more detailed analysis of the TPA and CAFTA fights see Shoch 2006.
 19. Throughout the history of the program, organized labor has provided only weak 
support for TAA, choosing instead to focus on blocking trade agreements. From hard 
experience, labor knows that politicians, having secured the approval of free- trade 
deals, have often reneged on promises to deliver adjustment aid, which in any case is 
often ineffective and does little to save union jobs (Kapstein 1998; Burgoon and Hiscox 
2000; Burgoon and Hiscox 2008; Davidson, Matusz, and Nelson 2007).
 20. The CAFTA countries included the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.
 21. Toward this end, and to preserve labor support for his healthcare reform effort, 
in September 2009 Obama announced a 35% tariff on Chinese tire imports and later 
imposed duties on Chinese steel pipe imports.
 22. In which the United States would be joined by Australia, Brunei, Chile, New Zea-
land, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.
 23. For the well- known argument that Americans are “ideologically conservative” 
but “operationally liberal,” i.e., that they oppose government in the abstract but sup-
port the maintenance or expansion of most specific government programs, see Cantril 
and Cantril 1999. For a review of recent public opinion data on Americans’ views of 
government taxing and spending see Shoch 2008.
 24. For evidence of considerable public support for economic stimulus legislation 
see PollingReport.com 2009. Some polls did show that the public had concerns about 
overspending—concerns that would increase during the battle over healthcare re-
form—and preferred tax cuts to spending increases to boost the economy.
 25. TAA benefits, previously reserved for manufacturing workers displaced by trade, 
were both increased and extended to service- sector workers whose jobs were lost to 
foreign imports or moved offshore.
 26. House Democrats had wanted a bigger bill containing more spending and smaller 
tax cuts, but they were forced to make concessions in conference to a handful of mod-
erate Senate Republicans and Democrats whose support was necessary to reach the 
sixty votes required to waive a budget point of order.
 27. Later in the year Congress appropriated the funds for many of these initiatives.
 28. Of course Obama, continuing efforts begun by George W. Bush, has also spent 
hundreds of billions of dollars to rescue the nation’s banking system.
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 29. The bill also shored up the Pell Grant student loan program and allocated $2 bil-
lion for worker training programs at the nation’s community colleges.
 30. Adherents of the Varieties of Capitalism theory (Hall and Soskice 2001) see little 
likelihood of convergence or hybridization between what they call “liberal market 
economies” (lMEs) like the United States and the “coordinated market economies” 
(CMEs) of Europe, because of the presence within both types of economies of reinforc-
ing “institutional complementarities” that prevent such change. I would suggest that 
more hybridization of different models is possible than this overly structuralist theory 
allows (Crouch 2005; Becker 2009; Campbell and Pedersen 2007). The structural and 
institutional complexes characteristic of the two (or more) varieties of capitalism are 
typically only loosely integrated and constraining. Consequently, a number of domes-
tic political factors—including public opinion, the relative strength and influence of 
business and labor, party competition and conflict, and policymakers’ ideas—can com-
bine in various ways to produce a range of economically viable policies, including 
some borrowed from other capitalist models. Consistent with this view, Jonas Pon-
tusson (2005a; and chapter in this volume) argues that lMEs can adopt quasi- Nordic 
social democratic policies—for example expanded education, healthcare, and other 
social welfare spending—even in the absence of social democratic institutions. But 
although lMEs can adopt certain social democratic policies, domestic political factors 
may instead prevent this. Thus Pontusson argues as well that without stronger unions, 
it will be very hard to move American economic and social policies in a social demo-
cratic direction. I will suggest below that additional domestic political influences are 




New Risks, New Challenges, New Possibilities

European Center- Left Parties  
and New Social Risks
Facing Up to New Policy Challenges
Jane Jenson
European center- left parties and the governments that they have formed or in 
which they have participated face a set of social policy challenges. Since the 
mid- 1990s they have acted in an environment shaped by sociological and eco-
nomic transformations that have put paid to many of the assumptions under-
lying the policy hopes of social democrats and the design of social policy 
during the years of postwar boom. In addition, the environment of these 
center- lefts has been profoundly altered by the neoliberal politics and enthu-
siasm for remaking the role of the state that swept through European soci-
eties in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. While not all parties faced strong 
and avowedly neoliberal opponents, all had to live with ideological currents 
in their own societies and international organizations that worked to de legiti-
mize some of the most cherished post- 1945 victories of social democracy.
 Social and economic transformations have generated what have come 
to be called “new social risks.” Some changes are common to all societies. 
Population aging not only results in concerns about the sustainability of pen-
sion systems but also raises questions about social care. Who will, for ex-
ample, provide—and pay for—care for the frail elderly as the ranks of the 
“oldest of the old” swell across European societies? Faced with this ques-
tion, most European countries have instituted “cash for care,” that is, benefits 
paid to elderly persons in need of services, but the conditions of access and 
amounts vary. Other changes are more challenging for some policy regimes 
than others. Where the postwar settlement included a strict gender division 
of labor for paid and unpaid work, policy adaptation to declining male earn-
ings and rising numbers of single- parent families has been difficult, whereas 
there is less of a policy challenge around the balance of work and family 
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where the dual- earner family has been the norm for decades. Finally, some 
policy choices made in the years of neoliberal hegemony have created greater 
stress than other choices on social policy design. Where income- security poli-
cies sustained attacks from neoliberals, the rates of child and family poverty 
are now much higher than where income transfers were redesigned rather 
than assaulted. As Christopher Howard (this volume) documents for the 
United States—and the situation is equally true for other liberal regimes1 
in Europe such as the United Kingdom and Ireland—poverty in general and 
child poverty in particular remains very high in international terms, and this 
despite significant policy attention to it over the last decade.2
 The 1990s saw an increase in public social expenditure across Europe, just 
as it did in the United States.3 It is important to emphasize from the beginning 
that the response to new social risks cannot be assessed simply by examining 
spending levels, which reveal little about the composition of spending.4 Gov-
ernments have shifted resources from one policy area to another and altered 
the mix of taxes, social transfers, and services. In general these reforms, even 
those promoted by center- left parties and governments, reflect ideas about 
the role of the state different from those that dominated in the years after 
1945. The state was to be responsible for “social investments” in human capi-
tal—education, including early childhood education, and training—at least 
as much as for social “protection” against the risks of ill- health, job loss, and 
old age.5
 After presenting the notion of new social risks and the challenges they 
present in more detail, this chapter examines the responses to them by three 
center- left parties: the Swedish Social Democratic Party, Britain’s Labour 
Party, and the German Social Democratic Party. All three have recently 
been in government, and have therefore had the opportunity to shape pub-
lic policy. The chapter describes their initiatives primarily as responses to 
“policy challenges” rather than as elements of political strategy.
The Policy Challenge of the New Social Risks
“Old social risks”—aging, illness, unemployment, and so on—have not dis-
appeared. They remain both real in people’s lives and on the agenda of gov-
ernments. Nonetheless, attention has also turned to the risks resulting from 
income and service gaps in postindustrial labor markets as well as from demo-
graphic and social transformations. Labor market shifts associated with the 
emergence of knowledge- based as well as service- sector employment polar-
ize skills and earning capabilities. Families with only one income have a sub-
stantially higher risk of being poor. Yet transformations in family life have 
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brought a significant increase in single- parent families. There has been a de-
cline in the fertility rate and an increase in life expectancy. The working- age 
population and several specific categories, such as single- parent families and 
those in need of social care, are more at risk of social exclusion as well as of 
low income.6
 Policy challenges are of two broad types. One relates to the means of en-
suring adequate income. If a single wage supported several adults and chil-
dren fifty years ago, this is much less true today, both because of job losses in 
the industrial sector and because of the rise of the service sector, which tra-
ditionally has lower- paying jobs. More generally, the polarization of the post-
industrial income structure in many countries has generated an increase in 
low- income rates among young families, whether single- parent or headed by 
couples: therefore the appearance of what has been termed “child poverty.” 
These patterns are often also concentrated among minority ethnic groups and 
in cities. High unemployment and low employment rates also plague many 
economies. A second broad challenge is to social care arrangements. Across 
all types of welfare regimes there are now serious contradictions between the 
realities that families face in balancing work and family life and the assump-
tions used when European social protection systems were designed after 
1945. For example, women’s higher labor force participation means reduced 
availability for full- time family caring, while single- parent families have only 
one adult to provide both income and care. Aging populations mean more 
frail elderly in need of care and fewer family members at home to care for 
them.
 Governments have reacted to the new structure of risk, albeit at different 
rates. One widely shared strategy is the deployment of labor market policies 
that seek to foster labor force participation by almost all working- age adults. 
These often focus on workers in declining sectors, on women, on youth, and 
on any category in need of skills training or updating. If active labor market 
policies (AlMP) have been widely used in Nordic countries since the 1950s 
(see Pontusson, this volume), they are now found in one form or another in all 
types of welfare regimes, within member states of the European Union and at 
the level of the EU itself.7 As Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder put it in their 
manifesto for “third way” politics (1999), “A welfare system that puts limits 
on an individual’s ability to find a job must be reformed. Modern social demo-
crats want to transform the safety net of entitlements into a springboard to 
personal responsibility.”8
 Blair and Schröder, like many other center- left thinkers, argued that 
achieving these ends would involve remodeling income- transfer programs. 
But they also understood the need for additional services for improving indi-
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viduals’ employability and for social care. One example is the call for im-
proved childcare services, including services that pay attention to the edu-
cational and developmental needs of children, which comes not only from 
advocates for gender equality and children’s rights but also from long- time 
proponents of labor market activation strategies, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Mahon 2006).
 We can see the results of responses to new social risks. Across all types 
of welfare regimes, services have gained ground in the expenditure mix. As 
figure 1 documents, the numbers for 1999 are all higher than those of 1980. 
In addition, the classic cross- regime patterns also continue to structure out-
comes, with levels of spending varying in the usual way. They are highest in 
social democratic regimes and lowest in liberal ones.
 Equally important is the timing and content of reforms, as shown by the 
detailed case studies discussed here. The social democratic welfare regimes 
altered several policy positions early on, so that the impact of new social 
risks was mitigated although not eliminated in the most recent decade. The 
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Figure 1. Spending on services for new social risks as percentage of gross domestic 
product in EU countries, by type of regime (developed from Taylor- Cooby 2004, 16).
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breadwinner models under pressure from the social partners, but in the last 
decade have recognized the significance of the challenges and are under-
taking redesign. The liberal regimes, as is their wont, relied on market solu-
tions to welfare problems and found themselves faced with some severe 
manifestations of the costs of new social risks, especially in the form of high 
rates of poverty.
Center- Lefts Respond to New Social Risks: Three Welfare Regimes
Given these observations, this chapter concentrates on one case from each 
type of welfare regime: Sweden represents the social democratic type, Great 
Britain the liberal type, and Germany the continental- corporatist type.
A First Responder: New Social Risks and Sweden
Swedish Social Democrats: Platform 2006
 Work for all is the most important goal for social democracy . . .
Justice and security are the core values of social democratic welfare policy . . .
Along side these primary goals the social democrats intend to carry through re-
forms in the coming parliament that provide the basis for a long term modernisa-
tion of our country:
 1. A competitive Sweden with modern jobs . . .
 2. Sweden, a model for the green turnaround . . .
 3. The next step in welfare policy involves dental care . . .
 4. Sweden will be the best of countries to grow up in . . .
 5. Sweden will be the best of countries in which to grow old . . .
 6. We all gain from supporting each other.9
If the new social risks are the result of labor market restructuring and new 
needs for social care, Sweden had a response to these risks well before the 
other two countries examined in detail in this chapter. Indeed Sweden had 
its own “third way” long before other countries were even thinking of one. 
During the heyday of international neoliberalism the Social Democratic gov-
ernments (between 1982 and 1991), partly in response to the drop in the 
employers’ enthusiasm for corporatism, promised a middle route between 
Thatcherism and Keynesianism (Ryner 1999, 60). But responses to new social 
risks predated even this precocious third way.
 Sweden has a long tradition of active labor market policy. Indeed, as Jonas 
Pontusson argues (this volume), it has been a core ingredient of Swedish social 
democracy. Through the 1990s thinking about Swedish labor market policy 
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was shaped by principles put forth at the end of the 1940s by the trade union 
economists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. For them AlMP was a necessary 
ingredient in a policy mix designed to combine low inflation, full employ-
ment, and wage compression. Fearing unemployment in low- productivity 
sectors that would follow from anti- inflation measures, they recommended 
labor market retraining and other mobility- enhancing measures that would 
allow workers threatened by unemployment to transfer to high- productivity 
sectors, and thereby to relieve labor shortages there. While the original em-
phasis was on labor mobility, from the 1960s through the 1990s it gradually 
shifted toward holding down unemployment in general (Calmfors, Forslund, 
and Hemström 2002, 3–4).
 The anti- unemployment objective was dominant by the 1990s, as Sweden 
entered its deepest postwar recession. Employment fell by 13% between 1990 
and 1994, and as a result, placement of the unemployed in a labor market pro-
gram served as the main short- run policy instrument to counteract the steep 
decline. Enrollment in a program became a mechanism of short- term income 
security, filling the gap when unemployment benefits ran out and as a means 
to regain entitlements.10 As we will see below, exit from the recession also 
brought a redesign of AlMP.
 Public provision of non- parental childcare developed early in Sweden in 
comparison to many other non- Nordic countries. By the mid- 1960s the “sex 
role debate” was roiling through the Social Democratic Party and the major 
labor federation.11 Led by feminists from left and liberal circles, it divided 
not only left from right but also the forces of the left itself. Eventually reach-
ing a certain level of consensus by promising parents “choice” between work 
and care as well as about forms of non- parental care (center- based or family 
daycare), new investments in services brought a rapid increase in childcare 
spaces, from a modest 17,900 in 1965 to 224,900 a decade later. In the same 
years parental leaves were debated and introduced. In 1972 the Social Demo-
cratic Party opted for paid parental leaves, clearly rejecting the preference 
of the right- wing parties and some liberal feminists for a “care allowance” 
that would subsidize parental (stay- at- home mothers) as well as non- parental 
care.
 This decision, which generated legislation two years later, alongside the 
commitment to public support for non- parental childcare, was decisive for 
the way that social care has been organized in Sweden. Its continuing influ-
ence shaped governments’ decisions over the next decades to extend paren-
tal leave and childcare services. It also continues to be shaped by the Social 
Democratic Party’s approach to gender and employment, which is that all 
Swedes enjoy “the right of being both an active parent and an active gain-
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ful employee.”12 As economic crisis shook Sweden in the 1990s, reliance on 
these policy instruments to organize social care were tested and debated but 
not abandoned. Electoral losses by the Social Democrats brought a revival of 
the care allowance proposal, and the center- right government of Carl Bildt 
introduced a “care wage,” which was intended to reimburse partially the “lost 
wages” of parents who provided their own childcare. The same government, 
however, also introduced a guarantee of a childcare place for any child whose 
parent wanted one (something the Social Democrats had talked about for at 
least nine years) and a “father’s month” as an incentive to fathers to share 
parental leaves. On their return to office in 1994 the Social Democrats re-
scinded the care allowance, while promising to institute a second father’s 
month.
 Social care for the elderly was launched on a generous high road in post-
 1945 decades, as services and housing were arranged in ways to maximize the 
possibilities for the elderly to live on their own, avoiding both residential care 
and dependence on their families, even when their health declined and their 
frailties increased. These early choices implied both improved housing and 
high levels of in- home services. Thus in the 1970s studies found that almost 
40% of Swedes over eighty received home- help services, although another 
30% were cared for in institutions (Sundstrom, Johansson, and Hassing 2002, 
351). In contrast to childcare, the high point of coverage was reached in the 
1970s, and it has declined since.
 These policy instruments in the domains of AlMP and social care came 
under pressure as the new social risks structured the circumstances of more 
Swedes. The deep recession of the 1990s and subsequent restructuring hit sev-
eral population categories particularly hard. The cutbacks in social spending 
instituted at the time were particularly costly for young people, single- parent 
families, recently arrived immigrants, and those poorly anchored in the labor 
market (Timonen 2004, 85). Three responses will be considered here: recon-
figuring AlMP policies, addressing the needs of the elderly, and investing in 
children.
 Swedish jobs rebounded somewhat after the 1990s, although not all the 
way back. Employment rates did not return to their previous highs, and de-
pendence on public income transfers did not fall back to their previous lows 
(OECD 2007d, chapter 7). Precarious work, particularly in the form of part- 
time and limited- term contracts, has increased, and it affects women more 
than men. One policy response has been to provide better social protection to 
part- time workers with even very short hours. The emphasis on lifelong learn-
ing has also been intensified, with the Social Democrats proposing to create 
a new right to obtain it in their party program in 2001.
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 In a classic reading of the new social risks, the Swedish government also 
targeted youth and technological change. The “youth guarantee” program 
offers priority in receiving work, training, and education to workers aged 
twenty to twenty- four, and placement programs for youth were introduced 
and redesigned in the 1990s. Grants are also available to employers who hire 
the older long- term unemployed displaced by changing skill requirements. 
Computer training centers and other programs for new technologies were 
introduced over the 1990s. And an “activation guarantee” (aktivitetsgarantie) 
was instituted in 2000, targeted toward the long- term unemployed but also 
those working shorter hours than they wished (Timonen 2004, 96–97).13
 In the same years awareness of population aging and an expansion of the 
number of frail elderly led to program adjustments. The proportion of older 
persons receiving publicly provided homecare has declined in Sweden in 
the last decades. A major reform by the center- right government in 1992 as-
signed responsibility for both residential care and home help to municipali-
ties. As the number of elderly rose in Sweden, municipalities squeezed for 
funds maintained their coverage rate in residential care (that is the care used 
by the most frail and those without family support), but homecare coverage 
declined. Whereas in 1994 68% of seniors living alone and in need of help 
received some homecare from the municipality, by 2000 that number had 
fallen to 52%. The result was that almost half of frail seniors living alone 
and in need of help with everyday living relied on informal care from non- 
cohabiting family or friends. This was a big jump from the one- third who had 
found themselves in the same situation a decade earlier (Sundstrom, Johans-
son, and Hassing 2002, 353). Better- off seniors have moved into the private 
market to hire the help they need, and poorer seniors have returned to reli-
ance on their families. There are also labor shortages in the social care field. 
Poor working conditions and better job prospects drain workers to other sec-
tors. Municipalities, responsible for providing all public homecare services, 
face severe labor shortages (Timonen 2004, 89–92). These issues were ad-
dressed in the party platforms and program of the current decade; as noted 
in the passage quoted above, the Social Democrats promised to make Sweden 
“the best country in which to grow old.” Yet in party documents attention to 
children and youth far outpaces that going to the elderly.14 Significant gaps 
remain between needs and available services. With regard to these new social 
risks, Sweden is falling behind in comparison to its earlier record.15
 Single- parent families constitute a paradigmatic location for new social 
risks. In Sweden the needs of this type of family have always been dealt with 
through standard labor market instruments as well as by providing generous 
family benefits to all families. In other words, mothers raising children alone 
have always been expected to be employed, and they have received the same 
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family benefits as families headed by couples. In addition, the state guaran-
tees a small monthly child maintenance payment if the non- custodial parent 
does not make his or her child support payments.
 Child poverty has become an increasingly important topic in policy circles, 
and Sweden’s single- parent families have not escaped the scourge (Kamer-
man, Neuman, Waldfogel, and Brooks- Gunn 2003, 6). In its pathbreaking 
study of child poverty in rich countries, UNICEF identified single parent-
hood as the overwhelmingly important factor in Swedish child poverty. Al-
though Sweden has by far the lowest rate of child poverty overall (only 2.6% 
of children live in poverty after taxes and transfers are considered), the rate 
among single- parent families, which in Sweden are numerous, was almost 
five times greater than that of two- parent families (UNICEF 2000, 17, 10).16 
Policy changes have been proposed, such as replacing the housing allowances 
by a more generous income transfer. This proposal has been opposed quite 
widely, however. Therefore action falls back on the traditional strategy, and 
labor market policies are used to try to increase the employment of lone par-
ents (Halleröd 2007, 26). Here performance lags. While Sweden is a strong 
performer in UNICEF’s general “child poverty league tables,” it is only in 
the middle- performing group with respect to rates of workless households, 
many of which are likely to be headed by one adult (UNICEF 2000, 17). These 
poor performance indicators result from the basic new social risk, which 
is the intransigence of new labor market structures in which young people 
in particular have so many difficulties finding employment, and especially 
good jobs.
 Yet overall, much less attention is now paid to families than to children. 
This is a shift from the golden age of Swedish social democracy, when gener-
ous parental leaves and accessible childcare of high quality were promoted 
as policy instruments to achieve gender equality within the family and so-
ciety. “[For] the development of pervasive, high quality and affordable pub-
lic childcare in Sweden, starting in the 1960s . . . one motivation was just to 
allow gender equality in practice, by allowing women both to have children 
and to stay in employment and develop careers. Three particular landmarks 
are the 1976 law requiring municipalities to draw up ten year childcare ex-
pansion plans, the 1985 law giving all children aged eighteen months to seven 
years, with working or studying parents, or with special needs, a place in pub-
lic childcare by 1991, and the 1995 law making it obligatory for municipalities 
to provide childcare on demand. The Family Policy Committee’s 1972 Report 
also recommended buttressing the gender equity effects of the public child-
care system by transforming maternity leave into a much longer and gender- 
neutral parental leave, subsequently introduced in 1974” (Ahlberg, Roman, 
and Duncan 2008, 83).
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 It was only with the reform of 1995 that access to childcare was clearly 
separated from parental labor market status. This was a turning point toward 
the child- centered social investment strategy that is now so prevalent.17 This 
emphasis has been dominant for a decade now, shown by a simple quantita-
tive indicator. The Social Democrats’ election manifesto of 2006 mentioned 
families twice, parents twice, and children twenty- five times. Children had 
become the focus of policy interventions for combating poverty, achieving 
equality, and ensuring the future. The Social Democrats’ program of 2001 
had also devoted an extraordinary amount of attention to children. Thus the 
promise cited above that “Sweden would be the best of countries to grow 
up in” translated into promises to invest in services for children because, as 
the manifesto put it, “the choices made by children today will determine the 
future of Sweden.” Children have become actors in their own right, and hold 
the future of the country in their little hands!
 This shift to an emphasis on new social risks has not been without oppo-
sition. Trade unions and pensioners have used their solid organizational 
strength to defend earnings- related benefits and to launch campaigns to re-
store cuts to unemployment insurance. Nonetheless, new coalitions have also 
emerged, led by church and community- based groups, which present some-
thing of a challenge to the long- standing organization of Swedish politics 
around producer groups. These new coalitions promote the rights and advo-
cate for the needs of groups such as immigrants and the working poor who 
have been most touched by the new social risks (Timonen 2004, 105). There-
fore the full political consequences of the Swedish response to new social 
risks remain to be assessed.
Great Britain: New Labour Focuses on Child Poverty and Social Investment
In our third term we will make public services safe for a generation. No going back 
to one- size- fits- all monolithic services. No going back to the Tory years of cuts and 
privatisation. Going forward instead to services free to all, personal to each: break-
ing once and for all the dropout culture in education and the waiting- list culture in 
health, by raising investment and driving innovation through diversity of provision 
and power in the hands of the patient, the parent and the citizen.
 In our third term we will cement a new social contract with rights matched by 
responsibilities. No going back to “no such thing as society.” Going forward instead 
to power and resources in the hands of the law- abiding majority. A government 
committed both to abolishing child poverty and to putting the values of individual 
responsibility and duty at the very heart of policy.
 —Labour Party Manifesto 2005
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The British center- left provides a classic example of a liberal welfare state’s 
response to the new social risks. Out of power for a decade and a half while 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party reshaped the social as well as eco-
nomic landscape, Labour had ample time to reflect on ways to transform 
itself into New Labour. Eventually the social policy spotlight was shifted to 
new social risks, particularly worklessness and child poverty, and solutions 
were framed in terms of social investments.18
 In the 1990s unemployment was high in the United Kingdom, as industrial 
restructuring slashed jobs from traditional industrial sectors and the service 
sector did not provide sufficient replacements. The recession at the beginning 
of the decade was severe, such that in 1994 21% of men aged fifteen to twenty- 
four and 14% of women were unemployed. Rates of economic inactivity were 
rising, and at 14.2% of all households, the rate of those that had no one in 
employment (that is, “workless” households) was the second- highest of the 
EU- 15 (Taylor- Gooby and Larsen 2004, 58).
 In large part because of this statistic, in a liberal welfare regime with 
little in the way of family benefits (in contrast to Sweden, for example), 
child poverty was also very high. Indeed “a fifth of Britain’s children lived 
in poverty in the 1990s, a rate more than twice as high as in France or the 
Netherlands and five times higher than in Norway or Sweden. . . . And while 
child poverty has remained stable or risen only slightly in most industrial 
nations over the last 20 years [that is the 1980s and 1990s], it tripled in Brit-
ain” (UNICEF 2000, 21). The poverty rate was particularly high among single- 
parent families, in which the employment rate was significantly lower than 
elsewhere: 47% as compared to 59% across the EU as a whole (Taylor- Gooby 
and Larsen 2004, 58).
 Given these patterns and under the pressure of successive electoral fail-
ures, the Labour leader John Smith established the Commission on Social 
Justice (CSJ) in 1992 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Beveridge Report, 
which underpinned the design of much British social policy after 1945. While 
rejecting any return to past policy habits, the commission’s report called for, 
among other things, more “investments.” This was a language that clearly dis-
tinguished it from the Conservatives’ continuing reliance on the neoliberal 
goal of reducing the role of the state by cutting back. For example, “invest-
ing in skills, we raise people’s capacity to add value to the economy, to take 
charge of their own lives, and to contribute to their families and communi-
ties” (CSJ 1994, 119–20). The report set out an argument for the advantages of 
spending on employability programs rather than welfare, on lifelong learning 
and on work for all. It made the point too that social justice is “an economic 
not merely a social necessity.” The report also promoted concentrating on 
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children for social investment: “the investment we make in babies and young 
children is wholly inadequate”; “children are not a private pleasure or a per-
sonal burden; they are 100 percent of the nation’s future . . . the best indicator 
of the capacity of our economy tomorrow is the quality of our children today” 
(CSJ 1994, 122, 311). Finally, it concluded that “the best way to help the one 
in three children growing up in poverty is to help their parents get jobs” (CSJ 
1994, 313).
 Chosen as Labour’s leader after Smith’s early death, Tony Blair rarely ac-
knowledged directly any debt to the CSJ. Yet the commission, housed in the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPr), showed a skill for finding the 
middle ground within a divided party that identified a path for New Labour 
when it took office. Drafted by one of New Labour’s rising stars, David Mili-
band, the commission’s principles underpin the key values enunciated by 
Blair for New Labour. Reducing child poverty became one of the big policy 
ideas of the Labour government, and in 1999 Blair pledged to end it in a gen-
eration. For his part, Gordon Brown was in full agreement: “Our children are 
our future, and the most important investment we can make as a nation is in 
developing the potential of all our country’s children. Together we can en-
sure that no child is left behind” (H.M. Treasury 2001, iii–iv). Child poverty, 
and the use of various benefits and services to lower the rate, were a major 
theme in Treasury documents for the decade before Brown succeeded Blair 
as Labour’s leader. When he took over as prime minister on 28 June 2007, 
one of his three new creations was the Department of Children, Schools and 
Families.19
 In contrast to the story of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, New 
Labour’s is one of significant policy shifts in the mid- 1990s (see Cronin, this 
volume). Whereas the Swedish Social Democrats could adjust to the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1990s and the rise of new social risks by fine- tuning exist-
ing policies and programs such as parental leave, childcare, and homecare, 
New Labour struck out on new paths in several policy areas. In doing so it 
did not abandon its standard approach to designing policy within a liberal 
welfare regime (much of which had been built by “old” Labour after 1945). It 
remained true to the long- standing preference for market solutions to welfare 
problems, using instruments of income transfer and services targeted to the 
most in need. Nonetheless new programs were invented so as “to make work 
pay,” with several built on work subsidies for families, in contrast to the pre-
vious Conservative governments (Seeleib- Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007, 430).
 In this way the focus on investing in children and ending child poverty 
came together in several initiatives with the issues of employment and com-
bating worklessness. New Labour’s commitment to increasing access to em-
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ployment came in the form of several New Deals. “New Deal policies provided 
intensive training and work preparation programmes and slightly enhanced 
rates of benefit, and were targeted on specific groups of those out of work, 
most prominently young people and lone parents” (Taylor- Gooby and Larsen 
2004, 68). The election manifesto of 1997 had promised that 250,000 young 
people would be moved into work by the next election, and the New Deal for 
Lone Parents set a target of 70% in work by 2010. Additional New Deals were 
then added for partners of the unemployed (in effect women), persons with 
disabilities, those over age fifty, and the long- term unemployed. The pro-
grams for youth and the long- term unemployed were effectively workfare 
schemes, participation being compulsory in order to claim benefits (Taylor- 
Gooby and Larsen 2004, 69). The other programs were voluntary.
 Learning has been a constant theme in international discussions of em-
ployability and was at the core of New Labour’s approach to new social risks 
too. The green paper The Learning Age: A Renaissance for a New Britain (1998) 
encouraged workers to invest in their own training and learning throughout 
their lives, with some financial support from the state. Spending on learn-
ing would be an arm in the fight against childhood poverty, helping parents 
to upgrade skills and to ensure that children did not follow their parents 
along the low- skill road. Improving skills was closely linked to welfare re-
form. For example, single parents were targeted in the strategy Skills for Life, 
and basic skills counseling became part of their New Deal (Dobrowolsky and 
Jenson, 2005). While the New Deals offered some basic skill training, the 
major focus in this strand of the analysis is on learning by children. “The seed 
of inequality in adulthood is denial of opportunity in childhood. Education 
is the most important transmission mechanism—people with few skills and 
qualifications are much less likely to succeed in the labour market” (H.M. 
Treasury 1999, 7). Thus the “skills agenda” would include a heavy dose of in-
vestment in schooling.
 Because Britain is a liberal welfare state, albeit a “modernizing” one, New 
Labour in its responses to the new social risks demonstrated a continuing 
preference for market solutions. Three kinds of important programs work at 
the margin of markets. The first set of programs was designed to “make work 
pay,” and they operated at the margins of the labor market. These were of 
three types: increases in the minimum wage; policies holding down benefits 
for those out of work, to increase their incentives to seek work; and supple-
ments to earned incomes.
 With respect to linkages between unemployment programs and AlMP, 
Clasen and Clegg describe Britain as being no less forceful than Denmark in 
coordinating access to benefits and policy institutions, represented, for ex-
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ample, by the Jobcentres Plus that deal with both the unemployed and those 
in receipt of social assistance benefits. This effort to create a single point of 
entry is part of “the transition of UK labour market policy from an emphasis 
on unemployment to an increasing emphasis on ‘worklessness’” (Clasen and 
Clegg 2006, 204). In large part the accent has been on reduced access to un-
employment insurance, job searching, and some training, as noted above re-
garding the various New Deals.
 The redesign and enrichment of benefits for the low- income employed and 
their families came in the form of various tax credits and benefits, some tar-
geting low- income workers and some intended to help families with children. 
The Child Benefit and the Child Tax Benefit are available to adults caring 
for children, the latter being income- tested. In addition, some non- parental 
childcare costs are addressed by the Working Tax Credit. In other words, 
much of the redesigned social spending is work- tested, child- tested, or both. 
New Labour’s Manifesto (2005) promised that “tailored help, especially for 
lone parents, is key, but we are also committed to making work pay—with a 
guaranteed income of at least £258 per week for those with children and in 
full- time work.”
 A second type of child- oriented program stressed improving access to 
childcare. Again the goal was market- shaping. Over the years of Labour gov-
ernment childcare has always been treated as a support for working parents.20 
On this issue the British government continued to be much less convinced than 
many other countries are that educational care of high quality—and more 
than part- time nursery school—is good for all children (Mahon 2006). New 
Labour always had clear ideas about the needs of children who are at risk of 
suffering from childhood poverty: they need superior publicly supported ser-
vices to compensate for disadvantages at home. Sure Start, a neighborhood- 
based program targeting disadvantaged children, was the expression of this 
prong of the National Childcare Strategy launched in 1997. For the rest, how-
ever, the government continued to promise parental “choice.” It preferred to 
“rely on private mechanisms through the expansion of childcare tax credits 
rather than the development of public childcare facilities” (Daguerre 2006, 
222).
 Third, New Labour innovated with a policy instrument for providing mar-
ket access: asset building. Not long after the election of 2002 Blair described 
his vision of welfare reform. In a speech he saved his greatest enthusiasm and 
his most upbeat description of the future for one idea: “But if we are serious 
about transforming the welfare state, our strategy has to be about more than 
helping people into work and relieving poverty. To enable people to be inde-
pendent and make their own choices, they need the back- up of having some 
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savings in the bank or a nest- egg. Money put aside changes your horizons. 
It makes you plan, brings responsibility, offers protection and opportunity. 
And I want to ensure that those on lower incomes—and the next generation—
can share those advantages” (Blair 2002).
 Such notions about the wide range of benefits from fostering savings and 
the acquisition of assets are the purest expression of the social investment 
perspective. The Treasury had already been working on the idea, floated in 
the white paper Savings and Assets for All (2001). In presenting the white 
paper, Gordon Brown suggested that the initiatives had the potential of “cre-
ating a democracy where wealth ownership is genuinely open to all,” and the 
first policy experiment was with the Child Trust Fund, a long- term savings 
and investment account. The government provides a lump sum to each child, 
and the package includes financial education for children, intended to create 
the “saving culture.”
 New Labour clearly responded to the new social risks. In doing so it ar-
rived at rhetorical flourishes not all that different from those of the Swedish 
Social Democrats. Recalling the promise in 2005 that “Sweden will be the 
best of countries to grow up in,” Labour’s Children’s Plan (2007) opens with 
the statement: “By 2020 we want Eng land to be the best place in the world to 
grow up.”21 In contrast to both Sweden and, as we will see, Germany, much 
less attention has gone to the needs of the frail elderly.22
 In postwar social policy, services for the frail elderly were provided by 
local authorities based on need and means testing. Under pressure from the 
disability rights movement, made up primarily of young activists who pro-
moted independent living for the disabled, and seduced by the cost- control 
promises of in- home rather than residential care as well as by the discourses 
of “choice” so dear to neoliberalism, the Conservatives instituted a series of 
measures to enable care services in the home (Ungerson and Yeandle eds. 
2007, 5, 188). In 1996 this basket of policies was expanded to include “cash- 
for- care,” or direct payments to the disabled to allow them to assemble a care 
package themselves. Persons over sixty- five were excluded from this program 
until 2000, when the Labour government extended access to them, so that 
they could also receive direct payments in order to put together their pre-
ferred care packages (Ungerson and Yeandle eds. 2007, 115.) The benefits are 
needs tested and scaled to financial resources (LeBihan and Martin 2006, 42). 
Still, participation in the payments- for- care program remains low, and Brit-
ain does not shine internationally as a provider of care services for the frail 
elderly.
 Instead, and in line with its driving theme of “social investment,” the 
Labour Party in office concentrated on increasing employment through 
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activation strategies and programs of human capital (from the early years 
through post- secondary education). Adults and their needs for training and 
retraining were a preoccupation, though one often justified as a means to 
ending child poverty, and in particular to increasing the employment rates of 
single parents. In contrast to Sweden, and somewhat unexpectedly for such a 
pure case of the social investment thematic, parents have not lost their place 
as policy targets. They remain linked to their children, who have become 
nonetheless political actors: “Children cannot be the forgotten constituency 
of politics; parents put their children first and they deserve support from gov-
ernment” (Labour Party Manifesto 2005, 79).
Germany: Rethinking the Risk Structure
Our aim is to pursue a holistic policy for families, senior citizens, women and youth 
which promotes and reinforces solidarity between the generations and therefore of 
society as a whole. We want to encourage families to have more children, and we 
want a stronger role for the family in society. We want to make it clear that without 
children, Germany has no future.
—Coalition Agreement 2005
Any analysis of the center- left’s response to new social risks in Germany must 
take into account the strong structuring effects of previous policy choices, 
many of them initiated by left governments or grand coalitions in which the 
Social Democrats played a key role. As a policy process in which corporatist 
political relations as well as Bismarckian social insurance policy regimes have 
played a key role, the emphasis in studies of the German case is often on sta-
bility and blockages to change. Nonetheless, like other European countries 
Germany has experienced major changes in labor markets as well as in family 
and employment policy in the last decade. These reforms have been often in-
stituted by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in power, either in coalition 
with the Greens or, after 2005, with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
and others in the Grand Coalition. One dimension of these changes has been a 
solid focus on demography, which has been shaping much social policy (thus 
the choice of quotation above).
 In confronting one of the new social risks—social care for the frail elderly—
Germany was an early innovator, though the innovations relied on the tradi-
tional policy instruments of social insurance. In 1994 the government, led by 
the CDU, instituted long- term care insurance, a proposal which had also been 
pushed by the SPD (Morel 2006, 233–34). In addition to relieving fiscal pres-
sures in government finances, the goal of the new program was to promote 
European Center-Left Parties 257
family- based care by recognizing and subsidizing it (Ungerson and Yeandle 
eds. 2007, 138–39). Thus even in this innovation the difficulties that Germany 
has faced in moving away from the male breadwinner model, enshrined in so 
much of the German social architecture after 1945, are evident. But much of 
the deadlock has been recently removed by the actions of the current Grand 
Coalition government, headed by Angela Merkel since November 2005.
 With a traditionally strong industrial sector, highly regulated labor mar-
kets, and low rates of women’s employment, Germany has had an employment 
structure characterized by a large proportion of permanent, full- time em-
ployment. Nonetheless the industrial sector has shrunk, women have entered 
the labor market, and non- standard employment—particularly part- time em-
ployment—has increased. The result has been more “mini- jobs,” low- skill em-
ployment, and working poor (Aust and Bönker 2004, 33–34). These changes 
have not gone unnoticed, of course, and they have been vigorously debated 
for two decades now. The controversy has turned on two issues: atypical em-
ployment and adjustments to the welfare state.23 The center- left and trade 
unions were on the side of protecting long- term employment and opposed 
plans by Helmut Kohl’s right- wing government to deemphasize fixed- term 
employment and accept even more mini- jobs. The consequences singled out 
for attention by the center- left were those for pensions in particular. With re-
gard to the low- skilled, a lively debate within policy communities turned on 
whether to “make work pay” by supplementing (subsidizing) the earnings of 
low- waged jobs. Opposed by unions and some academic economists and sup-
ported by others, the center- left government after 1998 contented itself with 
a few pilot projects. The third prong of debate about labor market policy has 
been the interface between unemployment insurance and social assistance, 
with the center- left proposing a “modernized” welfare state that promotes 
activation (Seeleib- Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007, 437).
 Despite opposition from trade unions and state and local governments, 
the second government led by Schröder adopted measures that added up 
“to a substantial transformation of German labour market policy” (Aust and 
Bönker 2004, 46). Among these were “job centers” modeled on Britain’s one- 
stop locations for job seekers (Seeleib- Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007, 431–32). 
Social assistance and unemployment benefits were merged for many without 
jobs, thereby reducing the pool of unemployed who could count on replace-
ment income; they received a much less generous benefit, similar in amount 
to the earlier social assistance rates.24 One result was to widen the cleavage 
between insiders with jobs or full insurance benefits and the rest, whose ac-
cess was to means- tested unemployment or job- seeking assistance. Nonethe-
less, full- scale activation efforts of the Danish or British type were applied 
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only to the unemployed under twenty- five. Social Democrats’ hopes to do 
more were hampered by the constitutional division of powers, which assigns 
responsibility for “active” and “passive” measures to different levels of gov-
ernment (Clasen and Clegg 2006, 202).
 In large part these policy stances adopted by the center- left reflect a long- 
term process of change in party philosophy. “Although intellectually the So-
cial Democrats had recognised the limits of Keynesian policies in the mid- 
1970s, they more or less continued to follow the traditional Social Democratic 
policy path in terms of economic and employment policies until the mid- 
1990s” (Seeleib- Kaiser, van Dyk, and Roggenkamp 2005, 21). Thus change 
dates from the second half of the 1990s, just as in Britain. By 1998 the Social 
Democrats (and the Greens) were campaigning on the position that deficit- 
financed economic stimulation was impossible and social insurance contribu-
tions (the heart of a Bismarckian welfare regime) had to be limited, all to stay 
competitive in the global economy. The market was also rehabilitated as a 
social mechanism. As Blair’s and Schröder’s Third Way manifesto of 1999 put 
it, “we need to apply our politics within a new economic framework, mod-
ernised for today, where government does all it can to support enterprise but 
never believes it is a substitute for enterprise. The essential function of mar-
kets must be complemented and improved by political action, not hampered 
by it. We support a market economy, not a market society.”25
 If change has been slow but steady with respect to the new social risks of 
low- wage work and unemployment, the same is now less true of social care, 
both for the elderly and children. In both cases, though, it has been gov-
ernments led by Christian Democrats that have brought about the most far- 
reaching reform.
 In the Federal Republic of Germany the risk of long- term care until the 
1990s was covered by a means- tested social assistance program of last re-
sort and was a local government responsibility. But local authorities found it 
increasingly difficult to meet rising demand, and they turned to the central 
government to take responsibility for care of the frail elderly. There was also, 
as we have noted, some earlier mobilization for such a program by the Social 
Democrats. The Care Insurance Act (1994) is a compulsory insurance regime 
that provides basic benefits to those in need of care, as assessed by an expert 
team that includes doctors, nurses, and social workers. Benefits may be used 
in conjunction with personal resources or social assistance and may be taken 
in cash or in services. The incentive structure of the program is to increase re-
liance on home care and informal care. The recipient has full control over its 
disbursement.26 The universal insurance scheme covers approximately 90% 
of the population (Morel 2006, 234).
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 The focus in the German scheme, in contrast to those of some Nordic coun-
tries (Jenson and Jacobzone 2000), was intended to satisfy the needs of the 
frail elderly, and much less attention was paid to informal caregivers (mostly 
female family members). While informal caregivers do receive some social 
security rights, the recipients’ preference is by far for in- home care (71%) and 
within that for cash benefits (73%) rather than formal services (Morel 2006, 
243). This means that the domestic economy of benefit sharing remains pri-
vate and unknown.
 Family policy is the other area of major change in Germany, which is 
finally moving away from the male breadwinner model and toward accept-
ing the need for public intervention to ensure better reconciliation of work 
and family. Until well into the 1990s policy design had favored stay- at- home 
parents. A childcare allowance provided extended benefits to parents—read 
mothers—who remained out of the labor force for three years. The lack of 
non- parental childcare for infants and toddlers as well as school days that 
ended very early made it difficult to combine work and parenting even when 
children were of school age. The tax system penalized a move from part- time 
to full- time work (Gottfried and O’Reilly 2002, 44–45). Overall Germany was 
characterized by both low rates of female labor force participation and the 
third- lowest fertility rate in the EU- 15.
 In the election that brought the Red- Green coalition led by Gerhard Schrö-
der to office in 1998, three of the four main themes in the SPD party platform 
had to do with macroeconomic and labor market policy; the fourth was im-
proving family policies (Seeleib- Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007, 437). Parental 
leave was significantly reshaped in 2001 so as to increase flexibility. Both par-
ents may take leave. They may do so at the same time, or they may split the 
leave in different combinations and at different times, until the child turns 
eight. Parents also gained the right to work part- time during the first two years 
after a child’s birth. A second wave of reform in 2005 introduced an earnings- 
related parental benefit, providing a standard period of twelve months and 
67% of the previous net income of the parent taking leave (capped at €1,800/
month). By including two months of paid benefits with a “use it or lose it” 
provision, the design provides clear encouragement for the second parent 
(read fathers) to take some leave (Daly and Seeleib- Kaiser 2008, 5).
 For a number of years the Social Democrats had advocated better supply of 
childcare, a stance in line with their preference for providing services rather 
than simply income transfers (Huster, Benz, and Boeckh 2008, 20). The Day 
Care Development Act of 2005 required municipalities to provide a childcare 
space for all children under the age of three whose parents were in work or 
in education or training. Then the Grand Coalition government in the spring 
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of 2007 promised to increase publicly financed or subsidized care to fully 
meet demand by 2013. That year as well was targeted for introduction of an 
individual entitlement to childcare for every child. In other words the male 
breadwinner model had tumbled, and Germany’s childcare guarantee mimics 
that of the child- centered Swedish model.
 Short but well- paid parental leaves and generous childcare provision rep-
resent responses to new social risks. Much more than in Sweden or Britain, 
the German responses have been driven by fear of risk of declining fertility, 
as a report to the European Union on child poverty clearly reveals: “Under 
the guiding idea that Germany needs ‘more children in the families and more 
families in society,’ the federal government identifies three priorities with re-
gard to children, youths and families for the current legislative period (2005–
2009): support of young parents during the family formation phase (see the 
Day Care Development Act and the new Parental Benefit Act), strengthen-
ing the bond between the generations (see the new federal model program 
‘multigeneration facilities’), and more attention to be paid to children ‘born 
on the dark side of life’ (meaning children who grow up under difficult social 
and economic conditions)” (Huster, Benz, and Boeckh 2008, 18). Many ana-
lysts attribute the demographic challenge in Germany directly to the long- 
standing commitment in social policy design to the male breadwinner model 
and lack of attention until recently to reconciling work and family. Families 
were forced to choose between having two incomes and having children.
THESE THrEE PATTErNS of response by center- lefts to new social risks, par-
ticularly family poverty and labor market exclusion, have been generated by 
the parties’ understanding of the new social risks and their sometimes enthu-
siastic, sometimes reluctant embrace of the proposition that modernization 
of social policy is necessary. The second half of the 1990s was a key moment 
for all three parties, and indeed almost all European center- left parties. The 
harsh recession at the beginning of the decade and the political space offered 
by stumbling right- wing governments provided an opening for proclaiming 
their commitment to modernization. Sometimes the announcement was dra-
matic, as in Britain when Tony Blair declared that New Labour had arrived, 
or when he and Gerhard Schröder trumpeted their manifesto for a third way. 
Sometimes the rhetoric was more restrained, as center- left parties in Sweden 
and Germany attempted to reassure their long- time constituents and part-
ners, especially in the unions, that change was necessary to maintain com-
mitments to long- standing values.
 There was therefore a political imperative to “modernize.” But just as 
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pressing was the policy challenge arising from recognition of the new social 
risks themselves. There was, it must be said, no significant political mobiliza-
tion by those most affected by the new social risks.27 Rather, sensitivity to the 
challenges came primarily from within social policy bureaucracies and the 
policy experts affiliated with center- left parties. What was to be done about 
the costs as well as the dwindling supply of social care? With women’s em-
ployment essential to the modern service economy as well as an imperative 
of contemporary social relations, who would look after young children and 
the swelling ranks of the frail elderly? How could more working- age adults 
be brought into employment, and which activation models worked best?
 This chapter has documented that in most cases answers to these questions 
were found within initial policy trajectories structured by left politics during 
the trente glorieuses. While it is hard to account for the responses to new social 
risks as the result of contemporary mobilization by the elderly, parents, or the 
poor, it is easy to see how the politics of the “old left” of the years since 1945 
continues to influence the ways the new social risks are addressed. Choices 
about benefits and services frequently echoed those made in the 1950s and 
1960s, in terms of generosity as well as policy design. Swedish Social Demo-
crats’ early response to what were “old risks” of labor market shortages and 
the need to encourage higher female employment rates helped to keep down 
some of the indicators of costly new social risks, because parental leaves and 
childcare services were already in place. Nonetheless the traditional solu-
tion of a job for everyone is less effective these days, as Sweden struggles 
with poverty and joblessness among single- parent families as well as young 
people. This problem is rising in importance and seems intractable to classic 
solutions. It blots the Swedish copybook, as does the foot dragging on care 
for the frail elderly. New Labour too continues its residualist tradition, with 
public programs filling gaps left by market failures for those at the margins 
of society. By dint of harping on social investments, New Labour managed 
to make a dent in child poverty, although many of the structural patterns of 
the new social risks—such as low wages and youth exclusion—remained in 
place. No more than the Swedish Social Democrats had New Labour found 
“the” solution to the new social risks.
 One of the three cases does provide significant novelty. The German So-
cial Democrats stonewalled before directly addressing the new social risks, 
caught as they were between their allies, their own ideology, and an im-
ploding Bismarckian insurance- based regime. The result today is that first 
the Red- Green governments and now the Grand Coalition in which the So-
cial Democrats participate have abandoned some of the fundamental prin-
262 Jenson
ciples of the post- 1945 model concerning the male breadwinner family or the 
insurance- based provision of rights and benefits. Regarding the male bread-
winner model, German family policy has drawn close to that of the social 
democrats. As for insurance- based rights and benefits, the movement seems 
to be in the direction of solutions favored by liberal welfare regimes and away 
from earned entitlements (Palier 2010). Center- lefts’ responses to new social 
risks, in other words, may lead them down roads first mapped in the heyday 
of social democracy, but may also take them over quite unfamiliar terrain.
Notes
 1. This chapter relies on the widely used concept of “welfare regime,” first devel-
oped by Gøsta Esping- Andersen (1990). The United States as well as most of the other 
Eng lish- speaking countries fall into the liberal category, while the Nordic countries are 
classified as social democratic, and most of the continental European ones as corporat-
ist, sometimes termed Bismarckian.
 2. UNICEF 2007, 6, found that the ranking of children living in poverty in twenty- 
one countries placed the United States dead last, the United Kingdom second from the 
bottom, and Ireland in eighteenth place.
 3. See the data reported by Howard (this volume) as well as the comparison of 
twenty- one OECD countries in Castles (2005, table 1, 416).
 4. Even more problematic is that they mask an increasing reliance on policy instru-
ments such as negative income taxes and “tax breaks for social purposes.”
 5. “Social protection” is the European term used to encompass everything from 
health to pensions, unemployment benefits, social assistance (“welfare” in American 
Eng lish), employment support and protections, maternity and parental benefits, and 
family allowances.
 6. For studies relying on these definitions see Esping- Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijk, 
and Myles 2002; Jenson 2004; Bonoli 2005; and Bonoli 2006.
 7. Goldhammer and Ross (this volume) describe, for example, French labor mar-
ket activation policies, and Cronin (this volume) does the same for Britain. Ross 
(this volume) considers labor market policies in the EU. In their manifesto Europe: 
The Third Way (1999) Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder included a chapter entitled 
“An Active Labour Market Policy for the Left” (on http://www.socialdemocrats.org/
blairandschroeder6–8- 99.html, consulted 15 July 2008).
 8. The content and implications of this manifesto for a “third way” are discussed in 
detail in Green- Pedersen, van Kersbergen, and Hemerijk 2001 and Seeleib- Kaiser and 
Fleckenstein 2007, 438.
 9. All the documents of the Swedish Social Democratic Party referred to here are 
available at http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/Internationellt/Other- languages.
 10. “An important side objective of Swedish active labour market policy has always 
been to mitigate the moral hazard problems of a generous unemployment insurance: 
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by making payment of unemployment compensation conditional on accepting regu-
lar job offers or placement offers in AlMPs from the public employment offices, active 
labour market policy has been used as a work test for the recipients of unemployment 
compensation” (Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemström 2002, 4).
 11. The analysis and details in the next two paragraphs are from Daune- Richard and 
Mahon 2001.
 12. Party Program of the Social Democratic Party, adopted by the Party Congress in 
Västerås, 6 November 2001, 15.
 13. For the long list of programs over time see Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemström 
2002, 5–7.
 14. Alongside two mentions of the “elderly” in SAP’s program of 2001 were thirty- 
two going to children.
 15. Because of the more generous benefits available in the “golden age” of its welfare 
regime, Sweden remains an example of a country in which access to services is still 
higher than, for example, in southern Europe or Britain (LeBihan and Martin 2006, 
45).
 16. According to UNICEF (2000), 21% of Swedish children live with one parent, the 
highest rate among the twenty- two countries it studied (the United States was at 16%).
 17. Drawing on Esping- Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijk, and Myers (2002), Pontusson 
(this volume) identifies this child- centered social investment strategy as a core ele-
ment of the current social democratic project. It is worth noting, however, that a policy 
focus on “investing in children” appeared in the mid- 1990s in liberal welfare regimes 
as well (Jenson and Saint- Martin 2006).
 18. In addition to the specific sources mentioned in this section, much of the analy-
sis is from Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2005.
 19. On his prime ministerial website the emphasis on children was clear: “Mr Brown 
sums his own beliefs up as: ‘Every child should have the best start in life, that every-
body should have the chance of a job, that nobody should be brought up suffering in 
poverty. I would call them the beliefs that you associate with civilisation and dignity.’” 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page12037.asp, consulted 17 July 2008.
 20. For example, in the party’s manifesto (2005), consideration of childcare is con-
centrated in the chapter “Families: Support at Work and at Home.”
 21. This document is “The Children’s Plan. Building Brighter Futures” (December 
2007), available from the Stationery Office and on http://www.dfes.gov.uk/publica 
tions/childrensplan/, consulted 19 July 2008. The quote is on page 15.
 22. The election manifesto of 2001, for example, did mention the need to support 
caregivers, but the overwhelming focus on the needs of the elderly was with regard to 
pensions and income. The balance in the manifestos of 1997 and 2005 was the same.
 23. The rest of this paragraph is from Aust and Bönker 2004, 42.
 24. These reforms, known as Hartz IV, created a basic benefit which provides low- 
end security for jobseekers and the long- term unemployed. The changes are described 
and explained by Seeleib- Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) as the product of direct in-
fluence of British policy ideas and policy imitation.
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 25. See “Europe: The Third Way” on http://www.socialdemocrats.org/blairand 
schroeder6- 8- 99.html, consulted 15 July 2008.
 26. For further details see Jenson and Jacobzone 2000 and Ungerson and Yeandle 
eds. 2007, 137–47.
 27. This seeming political puzzle is identified by Bonoli (2005, 433).
Immigration and the European Left
Sofía A. Pérez
In altering the population of a state, immigration has consequences for many 
of the conditions that center- left governments have historically sought to ad-
dress. Employment and competition in the labor market, the promotion of 
skills, and the achievement of greater income equality in a society are all 
likely to be affected by the arrival of a significant number of newcomers. 
Focusing on Western Europe, an area that has become a key destination for 
migrants from around the world in the past three decades, this chapter con-
siders how center- left governments have responded to the political pressures 
created by large scale international migration since the cold war. It is hypothe-
sized that the left faces distinct political dilemmas in dealing with immigra-
tion, dilemmas that reflect a potential conflict at the electoral level between 
the universalistic values that represent the left’s main ideological appeal and 
its commitment to promote the interests of some of its core domestic con-
stituencies. The move to restrict immigration in Europe during the last three 
decades, often under governments of the left, seems to lend support to this 
hypothesis. However, as will be discussed, the policies toward immigration 
under governments of the center- left in Europe have also varied substantially 
across countries, suggesting that the intensity of those electoral dilemmas 
may depend on other factors, such as the structure of national economies and 
the characteristics of different European welfare states.
 We begin with a discussion of the particular political dilemmas that im-
migration presents for the left and then go on to a brief description of the 
major trends in the historical evolution of immigration in Europe over the 
last three decades. These trends can be linked to the three phenomena em-
phasized in this volume: the end of rapid post- war economic growth during 
the 1970s, the end of the cold war, and the intensification of globalization. 
Based on cross- country quantitative data, we find that, on average govern-
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ments of the left have been at least as likely to restrict immigration in Europe 
as governments of the right. Nevertheless, we see very significant differences 
across countries, with center- left governments in some countries pursuing 
very expansive immigration policies while in others they have opted clearly 
to pursue policies that restrict immigration in practice. In the following pages 
we explore how the left, when in government, has responded to the phe-
nomenon of large scale migration from outside the EU in four of the Union’s 
largest member states: Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. One 
common trend that we see across these countries is that center- left govern-
ments have sought to recast the immigration debate by altering the bases 
on which foreigners are admitted to fit other national economic objectives, 
such as economic growth and the promotion of better skills. They have often 
counted on segments of businesss as an ally in this effort. Yet in some coun-
tries (notably Germany among our cases) they have encountered significant 
opposition from within their own ranks and ample segments of the elector-
ate, while in others they have pursued very expansive immigration policies. 
The chapter concludes by offering a possible explanation for these differences 
in immigration policy and considers what they tell us about the wider impli-
cations of immigration for the European left.
Immigration and Left Partisanship
Unlike other aspects of globalization such as financial integration, trade com-
petition, and the rise of the service economy, immigration is rarely consid-
ered an issue with clear partisan implications. Setting aside an important 
literature on the rise of the new radical right (e.g., Betz 1993; Kitschelt with 
McGann 1995), scholarship on the politics of immigration in Europe has 
tended to emphasize factors that apply equally across party lines. Based on 
her influential study of France and Britain, Jeannette Money, for instance, has 
argued that immigration is primarily a matter of local politics, proposing an 
“electoral geography” perspective according to which governments of what-
ever ideology will opt to curtail immigration whenever electoral districts in 
which native citizens compete economically with immigrants for jobs and 
public resources become crucial to the outcome of national elections (Money 
1999). One implication that can be taken from her findings is that immigra-
tion is fundamentally neutral from a partisan perspective, with the exception 
of its possible contribution to the rise of the radical right. Other authors have 
further added to this view by noting that early efforts to restrict immigra-
tion in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s were promoted with equal inten-
sity by politicians of both left and right. Thus Schain (2006) has documented 
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how Communist Party politicians in France were among the first to promote 
efforts to restrict immigration, and Karapin (1999) points to anti- immigrant 
popular mobilization in key electoral districts in Britain and Germany to ex-
plain the decision by governments of both left and right to restrict immigra-
tion laws from the 1960s on.
 To observe that both left and right governments have pushed for restrict-
ing immigration in Europe, or for that matter that immigration preferences 
tend to be specific to locality, does not obviate the possibility that parties 
of the left and of the mainstream right face fundamentally different politi-
cal dilemmas in deciding upon policies involving immigration. Indeed, while 
arguments in defense of the rights of immigrants are commonly associated 
with the left, there are at least two reasons to believe that immigration cre-
ates particular electoral difficulties for the left and hence that governments 
of the left have particular incentives to restrict immigration. The first reason 
is that immigration has different economic impacts on different segments of 
the electorate upon which the left relies. As a number of political economists 
have pointed out, the costs and benefits of immigration accrue unequally to 
different income segments of the population. Immigration tends to weaken 
the labor market position of native low- skilled workers while improving that 
of high- skilled workers and professionals whose labor productivity and cost 
of living are improved by a larger supply of low- skilled and low- wage workers 
(Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Given that low- skilled workers also represent 
the prime beneficiaries of publicly subsidized housing, healthcare, and edu-
cation, and that they are more likely to find themselves living in proximity to 
low- skilled immigrants, competition in jobs carries over to competition over 
such public resources and space. To the extent that voters view immigration 
in terms of their rational economic self- interest and that parties of the left 
must put together an electoral coalition spanning low- skilled workers, high- 
skilled workers, and professionals, the left is likely to face an electoral trade-
off over immigration. Moreover other economic trends, such as the rise of the 
service economy and associated efforts to make labor markets more flexible 
(for instance the recent Hartz reforms in Germany) are likely to aggravate 
these electoral trade-offs by reducing traditional forms of labor market secu-
rity for the working class in Europe.
 In addition to the division over immigration policy that derives from the 
differing labor market positions of the center- left’s potential electorate, po-
litical economists also postulate another way in which immigration can be 
expected to represent a particular problem for parties of the left. To the extent 
that the immigration of low- skilled workers (the primary recipients of social 
transfers) changes the income distribution so as to push former recipients up 
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the relative income scale (turning them into median voters), the preference 
of the median voter may well move toward lower spending levels (Nannestad 
2007). If so, immigration would represent a serious threat to the ability of the 
center- left to protect the European welfare state, and with it a centerpiece of 
its raison d’être.
 While economists suggest that immigration is likely to divide the center- 
left’s electorate along skill and income levels, these economic issues appear 
to divide the population of advanced industrialized countries along the same 
lines as the cultural cleavage between left- libertarian and authoritarian- 
populist values which appears to have emerged as a major feature of the 
electoral space in which center- left parties now operate (Kitschelt 1994; Kit-
schelt with McGann 1995). As Kitschelt’s work suggests, labor market differ-
ences such as the new multiplicity of work experiences among the left’s elec-
torate (with male, manual workers threatened by globalization tending to 
fall in the new authoritarian camp and professionals with higher educational 
levels and communicative skills tending toward the left- libertarian camp) 
may translate into other issues of cultural identity and definition. The effect 
may be to harden antagonistic worldviews among the electorate to the point 
of rendering the actual individual economic impact of immigration a second-
ary matter. This cultural- identitarian dimension of immigration cannot be 
eluded by the left because any choice to restrict immigration (or the rights of 
immigrants) in order to address the impact on native workers requires some 
implicit or explicit justification for limiting social solidarity based on iden-
tity. Resort to such justification may undermine the perceived ideological co-
herence of the left, thus threatening one of its key tools in mobilizing voters: 
the appeal to universal values. At the very least, it is likely to alienate the 
left- libertarian segment of the center- left’s electorate, contributing to parti-
san schisms such as that between Social Democrats and Greens in Germany 
or between the Socialist Party and alternative left candidacies seen in recent 
French presidential elections.1
 Both economic analyses pointing to how immigration affects different sets 
of voters and cultural analyses of the attitudinal trends characterizing Euro-
pean electorates in the post- Fordist period thus suggest that the European 
left is likely to face considerable problems in defining its stance on immigra-
tion in the electoral space in which it operates. Given the possible tensions in 
immigration policy preferences among the center- left’s electorate, how have 
center- left parties in practice addressed the question of immigration and im-
migration policy in Europe in the last decades?
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Immigration and the Left in Europe: A Brief Periodization
Setting aside migratory moves due to postwar expulsions, the history of post-
war immigration in Europe can be divided broadly into four periods. The first, 
lasting from the 1950s to the economic crisis of 1973, saw significant levels of 
immigration into the richer states of Western Europe through guest worker 
recruitment programs designed to alleviate labor shortages and Britain’s and 
France’s preferential treatment of former colonial subjects. The second period 
was marked by the abrupt ending of active worker recruitment schemes and 
the curtailment of lax citizenship provisions for former colonial subjects (the 
latter starting in Britain in the early 1960s). This left only two modalities of 
immigration into most states of Western Europe—family reunification and 
asylum laws—which were often defended by courts and public administra-
tions in the face of government efforts to move to a de facto goal of zero im-
migration. The third period, beginning roughly with the end of the cold war 
in 1989, was marked by sharp increases in immigration through those two 
remaining avenues. It would end a decade later with a radical toughening of 
asylum laws across the EU. Led by Germany, EU- 15 member states rescinded 
their acceptance of asylum petitions for those arriving through a “safe third 
country” (a condition that applied to virtually all arrivals into the EU- 15 by 
land and many by air). Family reunification criteria were also toughened by 
several countries (including Germany), resulting in very low net immigra-
tion, or even a decline in the immigrant population in many countries. The 
most recent period has also been marked by the “securitization” of immigra-
tion policy following the September 11 attacks and a new emphasis on bor-
der control in the face of new, more organized forms of illegal immigration 
through EU’s southern and eastern borders.
 However, as figure 1 makes clear, the move to restrict immigration since 
1989 has not been uniform across Western Europe. Some countries, includ-
ing most strikingly Britain, Spain, and Italy, experienced very large inflows of 
immigrants from outside the EU until the world financial crisis in 2007.2 In-
deed, the EU- 15 area as a whole is estimated to have seen an increase of new 
residents from outside the area.
 What role, if any, have parties of the left had in this recent history of im-
migration in Europe and in the divergence we observe in the decades preced-
ing the economic crisis? Considering the question from a historical perspec-
tive, the first observation is that early postwar immigration regimes across 
Western Europe did not seem to have had any particularly partisan charac-
ter. Work- based immigration, or “guest- worker,” programs that represented 
the main avenue for immigration into the richer states of continental Europe 
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during the 1950s and 1960s were instituted by Christian Democrats in Ger-
many and the Netherlands, by Gaullists in France, and by Social Democrats 
in Sweden (Toro- Morn 2004). They were designed to recruit labor tempo-
rarily without offering a path to citizenship, and social democratic parties 
and labor unions alike were willing to go along with this notion of recruiting 
foreign workers who would not enjoy full social and political rights. On the 
other hand, in Britain both Labour and Conservative governments supported 
generous access for former British colonial subjects without tying it to work 
until 1962 (see Hansen 1999). And in France, where the left remained out of 
office throughout this period, governments dominated by the center- right 
embraced a similarly generous policy toward former colonial subjects from 
North Africa.
 At the time of the oil shocks of the 1970s, the left was in a preeminent 
position across much of Europe. Social democratic governments in Sweden, 
Germany, and the Netherlands took the lead in ending worker recruitment 
schemes, often in direct response to pressure from labor unions.3 Meanwhile, 
British Labour governments took measures to further tighten the restrictions 
on Commonwealth immigration that had first been introduced by the Conser-
vatives in 1962.4 Indeed, in the period after the oil shock immigration policy 
across most of Western Europe seemed to reflect a new consensus between 
center- left and mainstream right parties to stop the influx of foreigners and 
the transformation of European societies in a multicultural direction. No less 
an internationalist than Willy Brandt would declare in January 1973 that it 
had “become necessary to think carefully about when our society’s ability to 















Figure 1. Number of foreign residents by country, 1989–2006 (figures from Eurostat).
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a halt.”5 With the exception of Britain, the consensus was reflected in what 
appears in hindsight to have been an unspoken agreement between main-
stream left and right to end work- based immigration but not to politicize the 
broader question of Europe’s increasingly multicultural character as a result 
of past immigration. In many parts of Europe, from France to Austria and 
Denmark, this modus vivendi was eventually challenged by the electoral rise 
of anti- immigrant parties in the 1980s, which led sections of the mainstream 
right to call for restrictions on immigrant rights, often in the language of law 
and order (France’s “Peyrefitte law” of 1981 and the “Pasqua laws” of 1986 
and 1993 are prime examples). In other places—notably Germany—the un-
spoken agreement appeared to hold until the asylum crisis of the early 1990s.
 The sharp rise in asylum seekers that followed the outbreak of conflict in 
the Balkans as the cold war came to an end posed a challenge particularly to 
the European left. Many of its historic leaders regarded the right to asylum as 
a key guarantee against the kind of political persecution experienced during 
fascism. As a consequence, in places such as France and Germany left party 
politicians often sided with courts that blocked early restrictions imposed by 
governments of the right. In the end, however, the combined pressure of anti- 
immigrant popular mobilization and increased politicizing of the issue by 
the radical and later mainstream right led center- left governments to accept 
a radical curtailment of asylum rights, first in France during the 1980s, then 
in Germany in 1993, then in Germany’s neighbor states. In 2005 the German 
principle of rejecting asylum seekers who had passed through a safe third 
country was finally adopted as the common guideline of EU member states.
 To be sure, asylum was the most wrenching issue for parties of the left in 
Europe. Yet the record suggests that in practice, if not in discourse, the leader-
ship of left parties in many European states also seconded a stance, most often 
enunciated by politicians on the right, of restricting net immigration to zero. 
Starting in the 1990s many European governments toughened requirements 
for family reunification visas, the last significant avenue for legal immigra-
tion into Europe after restrictions on asylum had been passed. The means of 
doing so varied from lowering the age up to which children could join their 
parents (to twelve by Germany, fifteen by Austria), to raising the age at which 
marriage takes place for a valid spousal application (to twenty- four by Den-
mark, twenty- one by the Netherlands), to increasing the sponsor’s income or 
housing requirements, as was done in France and the Netherlands. In addi-
tion to these new legal restrictions, there is widespread agreement that immi-
gration is highly susceptible to many policies that go well beyond the formal 
conditions for entry and residence in a country. These range from simple ad-
ministrative delays in the processing of visas to the conditions under which 
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foreigners are allowed to obtain employment, access to healthcare services, 
education, and other social services or benefits. Many, though not all, coun-
tries in the EU toughened these conditions during the 1990s and early 2000s.6
 Given the many ways governments can seek to restrict immigration, it is 
difficult to assess the overall character of immigration policy pursued by a 
country under governments of different stripes by only looking at legal re-
quirements for residency. One alternative way to consider the question is to 
compare levels of immigration under governments of the left and govern-
ments of the right. A simple test that pools annual figures available from 
Eurostat for eleven member states for 1989 through 2006 suggests that the 
average annual increase in the number of foreigners living in a country as a 
percentage of the population under governments of the left was just half of 
what it was under other regimes. When the data are adjusted by subtracting 
annual inflows of asylum seekers from the annual change in the number of 
foreigners, the results are similar: an average increase of 0.14% under gov-
ernments of the left versus 0.23% under governments of the center or right. 
A more refined regression analysis of the impact of left government on the 
annual increase in immigrant proportion, controlling for key pull and push 
factors such as growth, unemployment, time- period (introduced to control 
for external events in countries of origin such as the Balkan crisis) and social 
spending, also shows left government to be associated with lower levels of 
immigration in Europe than governments not controlled by the left.7
 However, as any visual analysis of developments within countries shows 
(see figure 1), in spite of these overall results there are clear differences in the 
extent to which governments have restricted immigration across Europe. In 
many countries (including Germany, France, and the smaller members of the 
EU- 15) there has been a decisive trend to restrict immigration, and that trend 
appears more acute under governments of the left.8 Indeed, it is this set of 
countries that are responsible for the overall results cited above. By contrast, 
in three European countries (Britain, Spain, and Italy) governments of the left 
allowed for large inflows of immigrants through 2006, and in one case (Brit-
ain) this represented a marked departure from the previous, right- wing gov-
ernments. To explore what this might tell us about the politics of immigration 
in Europe, we next consider the experiences of these three countries along-
side that of Germany, the country that arguably has taken the most restrictive 
turn in its immigration regime over the last decade, a period coinciding with 
the center- left’s tenure in power.
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Diverging Choices: Immigration Policy under the Center- Left  
in Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain
Germany
Germany has long been one of the premier destinations for immigrants in 
Europe. At 12.9%, the proportion of its population that was foreign born in 
2005 was equal to that of the United States and, until recently, the second- 
highest in the EU (only Austria, with a foreign- born population of 13.5%, 
had a higher percentage in 2005).9 Nonetheless, immigration did not consti-
tute a major point of contention between the postwar right and left until the 
1980s. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) showed few differences 
in its approach to immigration from the mainstream of the Christian Demo-
cratic Party (CDU) during Germany’s economic miracle years. Both the CDU 
and the SPD backed the recruitment of foreign guest workers with limited 
rights of residence in the 1960s, and the CDU supported the ending of the 
program when the SPD declared a recruitment ban on foreign workers in 
1973, thereby effectively ending work- based immigration. In the subsequent 
period the leadership of both the CDU and the SPD supported the view that 
Germany was “not a land of immigration” (a phrase most often associated 
with Helmut Kohl but previously deployed by Helmut Schmidt).10 This was 
also reflected in both SPD and CDU governments’ commitment to Germany’s 
principle of ius sanguinis for citizenship status, which precluded large num-
bers of children of guest workers born in Germany from attaining citizenship. 
In all these ways Germany’s postwar immigration policy reflected a consen-
sus among the center- left and center- right that immigration was acceptable 
as an economic imperative but that there was a social limit on the extent to 
which Germany could integrate foreigners. This position appears to have re-
flected a strong fear on the part of the German political elite of the poten-
tial for xenophobic political mobilization among the German public (Karapin 
1999).11 Hence before the 1980s there was little politicizing of the issue at the 
national level (Zaslove 2007).
 What would ultimately threaten this cross- elite consensus was the ar-
rival, beginning in the late 1970s, of a significant number of political asylum 
seekers from places like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Vietnam (Kara-
pin 1999). Both the SPD and the FDP remained formally committed to Article 
16 of Germany’s Basic Law (1949), which allowed to asylum seekers whose 
applications had been rejected at the administrative level a strong right to 
appeal deportation through the German courts. Yet anti- immigrant mobili-
zation by far- right groups in the Federal Republic’s southern regions led seg-
ments of the CDU and the CSU to push for stricter asylum laws in the course 
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of the national elections of 1980. In the run- up to the elections the regional 
government of Baden- Württemberg, then controlled by the CDU, and the CSU 
government of Bavaria announced their own restrictions on asylum seekers, 
a move later seconded by the SPD mayor of Essen. These decisions were in-
spired by local protests against the settlement of asylum seekers in particu-
lar localities and neighborhoods. The threat that such popular mobilization 
would spread led Schmidt’s government to pass special visa requirements 
for citizens of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Sri Lanka just before the elections. 
However, stronger measures were for the time precluded by the constitu-
tional status of Germany’s asylum law, which could only be changed by a 
two- thirds majority vote in the Bundestag.
 It would only be with the arrival of far larger numbers of asylum seekers 
in the early 1990s that the SPD would agree to give Kohl’s government the 
necessary parliamentary support for such a constitutional reform. An amend-
ment in 1993 of Article 16 voided the right of asylum for those having passed 
through a “safe third country” on their way to Germany—in practice, a vast 
majority of cases. At the same time asylum seekers, who had already been ex-
cluded from obtaining work in Germany, were shifted from the protection of 
the Federal Social Assistance Act to a separate social assistance regime that 
provided fewer cash benefits along with food vouchers, a measure that clearly 
stigmatized this part of the immigrant population. SPD support for such radi-
cal measures to restrict asylum applications appears to have been motivated 
by the extensive wave of anti- foreigner violence that occurred after German 
unification, which peaked with 3,365 attacks on foreigners in the first half of 
1993, and the subsequent wave of intra- German migration (Human Rights 
Watch 1994; Karapin 1999). The virtual closure of the asylum route of immi-
gration into Germany is reflected in the sharp curtailment of the previously 
rising number of foreigners residing in Germany from 1994 on (see figure 1).
 After returning to power in 1998 the political left in Germany took two 
major steps intended to create a new immigration regime that would be po-
litically more tenable. First, with the rate of net inflows of foreign residents 
slowing to a halt, and responding to growing concern over the integration 
of second- generation immigrants, the Red- Green coalition led by Gerhard 
Schröder campaigned on a promise to reform Germany’s century- old law 
conferring citizenship only on the basis of ancestry rather than birth. The 
new law, adopted in 1999, made it possible for the children of immigrants 
born in Germany and meeting certain conditions to apply for German citizen-
ship. Indeed, in its original proposals the government sought to make possible 
such applications without requiring applicants to renounce their existing citi-
zenship, a matter crucial to the offspring of Turkish and Polish immigrants for 
Immigration and the European Left 275
whom abandoning their traditional nationality implied giving up inheritance 
rights in their parents’ country of origin. In the end Schröder’s government 
was dissuaded from insisting on the possibility of dual citizenship by the out-
come of an election in Hesse, where the CDU successfully used the nationality 
law as a wedge issue to win control of the regional government.12 The new 
citizenship law passed in 2000 nevertheless held great symbolic importance, 
for it shattered the principle that Germany was not a land of immigration. 
This alone was seen as a step forward in promoting the social absorption of 
second- generation immigrants. Yet because of the exclusion of dual citizen-
ship, it resulted in citizenship applications by only a fraction of Germany’s 
disenfranchised second- generation immigrants (around 750,000 of the origi-
nal 3 million predicted by the government).13
 Secondly, Schröder’s government attempted to pass a new immigration 
law that would have reopened the door for work- based immigration, al-
though only for highly skilled workers. The so- called Schily law (named after 
the coalition’s interior minister, Otto Schily), aimed to alter the skill profile 
of immigrants by significantly toughening the standards for family reunifica-
tion (the one remaining traditional avenue for immigrants) while replacing 
the ban on work- based immigration with a points system that would have al-
lowed residence permits for highly qualified workers in areas in which Ger-
man employers faced labor shortages.14 The resumption of labor immigration 
was backed heavily by German business groups which put strong pressure on 
both the SPD and CDU in favor of the law (Ette 2003). On the other hand, a 
toughening of family reunification criteria (in particular a lowering of the age 
up to which children could join their parents from sixteen to twelve years) 
was advocated by both the SPD and the Christian Democratic opposition, 
which argued that the age should be lowered to ten years. Family reunifica-
tion was held to be responsible for the low- skill profile of Germany’s immi-
grant population because it necessarily built on the low- skill character of the 
earlier guest- worker policy and therefore largely perpetuated its results. The 
law also created new integration requirements in the form of language tests 
for the extension of residency permits.
 Although the policy was legislated by the Red- Green government in 2002, 
it was successfully challenged in court on a procedural matter by the CDU, 
which argued adamantly against any reestablishment of work- based immi-
gration and any expansion of the criteria for political asylum. The final ver-
sion of the law, passed in 2004 with the support of the CDU in the upper 
house, excluded the SPD’s centerpiece—the points- based system of labor im-
migration. It thus maintained the ban on work- based immigration, allowing 
only for three exclusions: one- year visas for foreign students after they fin-
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ished their studies in Germany; permanent residence permits for top- level 
scientists and managers; and temporary residence permits for self- employed 
foreigners investing over one million Euros in designated economic activities 
(Műnz 2004). As a concession to the Green Party, it did include gender- and 
non- state- based persecution as criteria for refugee status, although not politi-
cal asylum.15 The SPD government’s major objective, to create an immigration 
policy regime that would alter the profile of immigrants from low- skilled to 
high- skilled was thus blocked, leaving simply an even more restrictive immi-
gration regime than the one Germany had already adopted in 1993.
The United Kingdom
By contrast to Germany, Britain’s initial postwar immigration regime was 
not driven primarily by economic considerations but by geopolitical ones. 
After the war Labour passed the British Nationality Act of 1948, which turned 
British subjecthood into British citizenship, giving a large number of former 
colonial subjects an automatic right to migrate to the United Kingdom. Yet 
far being from a partisan measure, this generous immigration policy repre-
sented a straight continuation of pre- war policy, which had aimed to pro-
tect Britain’s preeminence within the Commonwealth in a postcolonial era 
through the creation of Commonwealth citizenship (Hansen 1999; Karatani 
and Goodwin- Gill 2003). The permissive stance toward Commonwealth im-
migration implied in Labour’s nationality act thus enjoyed the full support of 
the Conservative Party, which in turn, after returning to power in the 1950s, 
would allow the arrival of many former colonial subjects for permanent 
settlement in the United Kingdom.
 This liberal consensus on postcolonial immigration would be shattered 
by the outbreak of anti- foreigner, and specifically anti- black, violence at the 
end of the 1950s, which was seized upon by a populist wing of the Conser-
vative Party, epitomized by Enoch Powell (Karapin 1999). In response to a 
large number of petitions for immigration controls from local party chap-
ters, Harold Macmillan’s government passed the first significant step toward 
immigration restriction with the first Commonwealth Immigration Act of 
1962, which subjected the right to settle in Britain to government issuance 
of a skill- based work permit. Although Labour initially opposed the measure 
and then worked to have it protect the right of dependents to accompany 
holders of work permits, it engaged in a dramatic about- face on immigration 
policy after winning elections in 1964. The new government of Harold Wilson 
sharply restricted the number of work vouchers, entirely abolishing the cate-
gory of unskilled labor and significantly reducing that of skilled workers in 
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1965. In 1968 it passed the second Commonwealth Immigration Act, with the 
aim of preventing the immigration of Kenyan Asians. The new act for the first 
time distinguished between “patrial” British citizens (those of British birth or 
descent) and other Commonwealth citizens, thereby bringing nonwhite im-
migration to Britain to a virtual end (Hansen 1999).16 At the same time Wilson 
sought to balance this anti- liberal turn in immigration policy by introducing 
anti- discrimination legislation in the Race Relations Act (1968).
 If British Labour, like center- left parties elsewhere in Europe, took a popu-
list stance in restricting immigration during the 1970s, it has played a very 
different role over the last decade. As figure 1 illustrates, after more than a de-
cade of sharp decline in the number of foreigners living in Britain during the 
Thatcher years (and only a modest reversal of this trend in the first half of the 
1990s), the Labour victory of 1997 set the stage for a significant increase in 
immigration into Britain (most of it from non- EU states). Taking the view that 
immigration could be beneficial to Britain’s economic modernization when 
and where it supported economic activity, the government of Tony Blair set 
out on a two- pronged strategy of expanding the issuance of new work per-
mits for third- country foreigners while at the same time moving to deter asy-
lum applicants whom it identified as a burden on Britain’s purse. In a white 
paper titled “Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration 
and Asylum” (1998) the new government decried “backlogs, inadequate con-
trol resources, and outdated procedures” in the existing system of asylum re-
view, which made “it extremely difficult to deal firmly with those who have 
no right to be here” (Home Office 1998, paragraph 3.3). At the same time it 
began to increase the number of work permits granted for those seeking em-
ployment in key sectors. In 2002 Labour introduced the Highly Skilled Mi-
grant Programme, arguing that legitimate, work- based immigration could 
bring “huge benefits: increased skills, enhanced levels of economic activity, 
cultural diversity and global links” (Home Office 2002, 9). It also increased 
visas for low- skilled, casual work. In the following year Blair promised to 
halve new asylum applications while moving Britain to a points- based system 
of immigration. “Operating at different ends of the employment spectrum,” 
all of these initiatives were intended “to improve the supply of labour to the 
United Kingdom economy, to ‘meet the challenge’ of a globalizing environ-
ment” (Walters 2004, 239). The effect was a sharp upward turn in the num-
ber of foreign citizens residing in Britain, from just under 2 million in 1996 




Britain’s move to managed, skill- based migration under Blair represents one 
of the major turns in European immigration policy in the last decades. None-
theless, two other member states that in the past were major sources of emi-
gration to the rest of Europe—Italy and Spain—account for a much greater 
share of the expansion in immigration that the EU has experienced over the 
last two decades. Italy’s registered immigrant population rose in 1989–2006 
from just under half a million to over two and a half million.17 Spain’s trans-
formation has been even more spectacular. In just over a decade the country 
has seen immigration (measured in terms of resident foreign citizens) rise 
from marginal levels (under 400,000 in 1991) to the highest level in the EU in 
proportion to total population. By 2008 foreign citizens residing in Spain, at 
over five million, represented just over 11% of the population (El País, 20 June 
2008).
 This dramatic rise of immigration into the two southern member states is 
often attributed to the restrictive turn in other EU- 15 states and to the difficul-
ties that Spain and Italy have had in controlling illegal immigration because 
of shortcomings in border control and a lack of internal controls on the em-
ployment of illegal migrants. Scenes of boatloads of African migrants arriving 
in Lampedusa, the Canary Islands, or Spain’s southern coast, and of the dra-
matic human tragedies often associated with their attempts, dominate press 
coverage of the phenomenon. Yet however dramatic and significant, illegal 
arrivals by sea represent a small fraction of immigration in the two countries 
(19,900 for Italy in 2007, 18,000 for Spain according to the UNHCr).18 The 
dramatic increases in registered immigration in fact stem from clear choices 
on the part of the Spanish and Italian governments that have produced a far 
more liberal stance on immigration than what is now prevalent in the north-
ern states of the EU- 15. The key features of this liberal stance in the two coun-
tries have been (1) permissive family reunification rules, (2) generous terms 
for the issuance of work permits in sectors deemed to have particular labor 
needs, (3) the extension of social rights to both legal and irregular immi-
grants, and (4) repeated amnesties for irregular migrants who can show em-
ployment. While different in some significant ways (in particular with regard 
to the use of immigration amnesties), the immigration regimes developed 
and maintained by the two southern member states thus bear a significant re-
semblance to the more expansive work- based immigration regime introduced 
in Britain.
 One way in which the Spanish and Italian cases nonetheless are different 
from the British is that the policies allowing for large- scale immigration in 
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the two southern states have been carried out with almost equal intensity 
by governments of the left and the right. This is particularly striking in Italy, 
where governments of the right in the last two decades have included the 
Northern League, a party formation with an explicit stance against immigra-
tion whose leaders often engage in xenophobic appeals. When the right has 
been in power in Italy, its pattern has been to pass tough and even jarring 
“law and order” measures that make headlines (most recently the discrimina-
tory treatment applied to Romanian gypsies), without actually restricting the 
overall levels of immigration. Thus Silvio Berlusconi’s government of 2001 
expanded the total yearly quota for third- country (non- EU) migrants from 
89,000 in 2001 to 170,000 in 2006 (Cuttitta 2008).19 And the Bossi- Fini law 
that it passed in 2002 (which required the expulsion of immigrants whose 
residence permits had not been renewed, and for the first time linked new 
residence permits to the prior attainment of work contracts) was accompa-
nied by the largest immigration amnesty Italy had ever seen. It resulted in the 
legalization of almost all of the 700,000 immigrants who applied (Migration 
Policy Institute 2004). Meanwhile in Spain, the center- right Partido Popular 
passed its own amnesties for illegal immigrants in 1996, 2000, and 2001 and 
in the process approved approximately 400,000 applications (Maas 2006).
 If governments of the right have thus been surprisingly liberal in their 
immigration policies in Italy and Spain, the left has generally gone further. 
In Italy the center- left in 2006 successfully ran on a platform of easing the 
immigration restrictions that had been imposed by the Bossi- Fini law. Ro-
mano Prodi’s government subsequently adopted an open- door immigration 
policy, abolishing the requirement of prior work contracts for the granting 
of residence permits. And while Italy sparked controversy across the EU in 
2007 when it legislated the expulsion of EU immigrants charged with violent 
crime (a measure taken in response to popular outcry over a spike in crime 
attributed to Romanian immigrants), its policies for granting residence and 
work permits to foreign applicants remained among the most liberal ever 
seen in the EU (Chaloff 2005). In Spain the Socialist government that took 
office in 2004 went on to pass Spain’s most generous immigration legislation 
yet, granting full access to healthcare, education, and other social services 
to both legal and illegal immigrants, and passing an amnesty regularizing 




As the cases discussed above suggest, there have been ample differences in 
the stances toward new immigration taken by governments of the left in 
Europe in the last two decades. Germany’s SPD in 1993 went along with a 
constitutional revision that set the stage for a toughening of asylum rules 
not only in Germany but across the EU. Later, when in government, it at-
tempted to shift to a selective, skills- based immigration regime that would 
have raised the skill profile of Germany’s immigrant population (an attempt 
at which it failed owing to opposition from the Christian Democrats). And 
while the Red- Green coalition government sought to improve the integration 
of second- generation immigrants by changing German citizenship law, it also 
toughened criteria for family reunification, the principal remaining channel 
for low- skill immigration into Germany, and introduced new requirements 
for the renewal of residence permits. The result has been a virtual freeze on 
net immigration into Germany over the last decade.
 In sharp contrast to this turn in Germany, New Labour in Britain opened 
the doors of the British labor market to new immigrants from outside the 
EU. At the same time, it shifted immigration into Britain from a rights- based 
system to a skills- based system that gave access to those types of migrants 
demanded by British business, both at the high and the lower ends of the 
skills spectrum. Under Blair’s leadership the Labour government rejected the 
notion (which seemed to prevail in Germany) that there is a necessary trade-
off between allowing more immigrants and achieving successful social inte-
gration; it opted instead to facilitate labor market access for the spouses and 
children of those workers recruited under the new points- based system, bet-
ting that this would also mean more successful integration. Only in the face of 
a worsening electoral outlook and heightened anger from labor unions at the 
large inflow of low- skilled workers did Gordon Brown’s government choose 
to restrict the immigration of third- country nationals who fell outside the 
high skills category, promising 500,000 new “British jobs for British workers” 
just as the first signs of the world financial crisis appeared (Guardian, 10 Sep-
tember 2007).
 Finally, in Italy and Spain, the two countries accounting for the largest 
increases of third- country immigration into the EU over the last decade, 
both left and right governments have chosen to allow high levels of immi-
gration. While governments of the right (in particular in Italy) have sought 
to counteract the perception of this reality through headline- catching “law 
and order” measures, left parties have distinguished themselves primarily by 
extending social rights to immigrants, including non- regularized ones, as a 
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way to promote integration. In both countries governments have made ample 
use of amnesties to bring illegal migrants into the formal economy, and in 
Spain the first government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero made healthcare 
available to all residents, regardless of their residency status. On the other 
hand, in both Italy and Spain as in Britain, governments of the left have been 
able to garner the support of both business and the labor unions for their 
immigration- friendly policies by basing the issuance of new work permits to 
immigrants on a selective system favoring those sectors facing labor short-
ages, ranging from the low- skill construction and domestic work sectors to 
information technology.
 If parties of the center- left can be expected to face similar electoral con-
flicts over immigration policy on theoretical grounds, how are we to account 
for the observed differences in their immigration policy choices, in particu-
lar as regards overall levels of immigration? One common explanation, the 
presence or absence of an electorally viable radical right, does not account 
for the variation among the four cases examined above: the radical right did 
not represent a serious electoral threat in national or even regional elections 
in Germany, whereas it does have significant electoral weight in Italy and 
even participates in government. Nor can the choices be attributed to the 
existing levels of the immigrant population, given that Germany’s share of 
immigrants, while high, had been surpassed by that of Spain as early as 2004, 
when the Socialist government chose to pass yet another amnesty and expand 
the social rights of illegal immigrants.
 A different and more convincing explanation of the contrast between the 
German SPD’s choice in favor of immigration restriction and the more liberal 
stances of center- left governments in Britain, Spain, and Italy would focus on 
the ways immigrants are economically integrated in the different countries. 
Looking first at the labor market, one striking contrast between Germany and 
the other three countries is the wide range in their gaps between the unem-
ployment rate for immigrants and the rate for the native population. In 2005 
unemployment in Germany stood at 17.5% for foreign- born men and 10.6% 
for native- born men, and at 16% for foreign- born women and 10% for native- 
born women. In the United Kingdom and Spain these gaps were consider-
ably smaller: in the United Kingdom there was a difference of only 2.8% for 
men and 3.4% for women; in Spain only 2.5% for men and 1.5% for women. 
In Italy the situation was slightly different: unemployment was a bit higher 
for native- born men (6.2%) than for foreign- born men (6%), though the rate 
for foreign- born women was somewhat lower than for native- born women. 
Still, the contrast with Germany is striking. Moreover, in both Spain and Italy 
the labor market participation rates of foreigners was considerably better 
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than that of native- born citizens: in Italy, 81.6% compared to 69.4% for men, 
46.7% compared to 45.3% for women; in Spain, 79.5% compared to 74.4% for 
men, 60.4% compared to 50% for women (OECD 2007e).
 The reasons for this poor labor market performance of immigrants in 
Germany are complex. They seem to include obstacles to labor market inte-
gration by foreigners and their children that are created by German legisla-
tion, the low skill profile of the immigrant population compared to the na-
tive population (an inheritance from the low- skill focus of the guest- worker 
program), and the poor performance of the German economy, compared to 
the other three economies, at generating low- skill employment (Constant 
and Zimmermann 2005). The last of these features also implies that the left 
in Germany faces a particularly acute conflict between the interests of its 
low- skilled electorate and immigrants. Thus it is noteworthy that precisely 
when it introduced its first new immigration law, Schröder’s government was 
seeking to reduce the high unemployment level among low- skilled workers 
through radical reforms of the labor market, including the introduction of 
more flexible employment contracts in the service sector and major cuts in 
unemployment pay. The so- called Hartz reforms were highly controversial, 
threatening the SPD’s internal integrity. In this context slowing the inflow of 
new, low- skilled workers must have appeared as a good way to ease tensions 
in the labor market, and with it the potential electoral cost of the labor mar-
ket reforms.
 While all of this may explain why the center- left in Germany would be 
under particular pressure to restrict immigration, it does not explain why 
similar governments in the other three countries would not also act on such 
pressure. Here it must be said that Britain’s managed migration policy, even 
before Brown’s clampdown on low- skilled, third- country immigration, was 
structured so as to allow the government to keep a grip on the political ten-
sion that immigration might create among its voters. By limiting immigration 
to either high- growth or high- skill sectors, the managed migration policy also 
allowed the government to limit immigration in lower- growth sectors, where 
it might have had a more obvious impact on lower- skilled native workers.
 An alternative explanation for Labour’s original open- door policy may be 
the weakness of British labor unions, which were in a poor position to resist 
Blair’s new open- door policy toward migrants in the face of consistent pres-
sure from British business in favor of a more liberal immigration policy. In-
deed, the outbreak of wildcat strikes protesting the hire of Italian and Por-
tuguese workers in British oil refineries and energy companies in early 2009 
illustrates the weakness of organized labor in influencing the Labour govern-
ments’ immigration policy and the consequent sense of frustration among 
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blue- collar workers. However, it would be difficult to make a similar case 
for Italy, where unions mobilized politically against the immigration restric-
tions imposed by the Bossi- Fini law, or Spain, where Zapatero’s government 
has based immigration policy on tripartite agreements and where the unions 
participate in setting annual immigration quotas.20 Looking at the actions 
of unions with regard to immigration policy in the latter two countries, it is 
noteworthy that their position on immigration has remained generally very 
favorable (Watts 2002).
 There is another characteristic which the United Kingdom shares with Italy 
and Spain and which sets all three countries apart from Germany and other 
continental EU members: the United Kingdom’s liberal welfare state is quite 
weak in the provision of services such as childcare and elder care (Unger-
son 2003). And for different reasons, so are the Spanish and Italian welfare 
states.21 Consequently, in all three countries there is high demand for cheap 
immigrant labor both from institutional employers such as nursing homes 
and hospitals and from private households. Comprehensive data on such em-
ployment are difficult to attain. Yet there is evidence in all three countries of 
the important role that immigrants play in providing these services. In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, a high proportion of nurses and elder care pro-
viders are from the Philippines (Lyon and Glucksman 2008). In Italy 34% of 
the almost 700,000 immigrants regularized during the amnesty of 2002 ap-
plied on the basis of employment in domestic work, and according to one re-
port immigrants account for over 43% of domestic employment. And in Spain 
that figure is believed to be above 52% (Eiro Online 2006, 2007).
 This role of (primarily female) immigration in the provision of key ser-
vices is important because it suggests that significant segments of the center- 
left’s electorate, including in particular median- income households which 
have become increasingly dependent on two incomes (which require exter-
nal help with child or elder care in the absence of publicly provided care ser-
vices) will have a very concrete personal interest in a liberal immigration 
regime. That the rise of female immigration has coincided with a rise of (na-
tive) female labor market participation rates in the two southern European 
countries attests to the importance that immigrant labor plays in the role 
of many two- income families (Chaloff 2005). In all three countries (Britain, 
Italy, and Spain) immigration thus compensates median- income households 
for the shortcomings of a residual- liberal or late and not fully developed wel-
fare state. This tendency not only turns immigrants into a functional substi-
tute for more comprehensive social provision. It also creates an infrastruc-
ture of personal contacts that is likely to counter anti- immigrant sentiment in 
the relatively affluent segment of the left’s electorate—a segment that might 
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otherwise turn to welfare chauvinism. By contrast, where care services are 
provided by the state either publicly or by allowing mothers to stay out of the 
job market through generous family allowances, this type of private stake in 
immigration is likely to be lacking.
 These observations also speak to the broader relationship between im-
migration and welfare states. Whereas economists have tended to interpret 
lower levels of social spending and redistribution in countries such as the 
United States as a consequence of ethnic diversity—and hence a lack of social 
cohesion (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001)—the recent experiences of 
Britain, Italy, and Spain suggest an opposite causal relationship: that higher 
immigration is encouraged by lower levels of social provision because it com-
pensates for shortcomings in the welfare state. This relationship means that a 
correlation between lower social spending and ethnic diversification need not 
necessarily reflect any inherent conflict between multiculturalism and gen-
erous welfare spending but rather an effect of low social spending on rates of 
immigration. On the other hand, moves to restrict immigration in Germany 
and elsewhere among the corporatist welfare states of northern Europe may 
have more to do with the failure to integrate immigrant populations into the 
labor market, which in turn is more likely to turn them into welfare recipi-
ents. Restrictions on the acquisition of citizenship for the children of immi-
grants, limitations on family reunification, and restrictions on labor market 
access to family members who join legal immigrants—all represent barriers 
to labor market integration, and they may create the social dependence that 
is seen to spark welfare chauvinism in places such as Germany.
 All this suggests that how immigration affects parties of the left is likely 
to depend on how immigrants are integrated into the labor market and on 
how the arrival of newcomers interacts with the characteristics of European 
welfare states (whether immigrants are rendered welfare state dependents 
by laws meant to discourage them from arriving in the first place, or whether 
they act as functional substitutes for citizens but without access to social poli-
cies). The environment will be shaped by the choices of parties on the right 
to politicize, or not to politicize, the immigration issue. But it will also be 
shaped by the politics of the welfare state (although in much more complex 
ways than simple theories of welfare chauvinism would have it), the charac-
teristics of labor and product markets (both matters of government regula-
tion), and past policies that have affected the characteristics of the immigrant 
population and its degree of economic and social integration. In this regard 
past German governments of both left and right, which have insisted on re-
stricting long- term avenues of integration (including paths to citizenship for 
the children of immigrants and the ability of asylum seekers to obtain em-
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ployment), seem to have created a climate in which it has been more difficult 
for the left to advance a new type of immigration policy in recent years—
more so than for governments of the left in the other three countries.
 This discussion of how the politics of immigration differ for center- left 
parties across Europe does not answer the question of whether large- scale 
immigration places the left at a consistent electoral disadvantage vis- à- vis 
parties of the right. The electoral tensions that immigration creates specifi-
cally for the left may mean that the issue can easily be exploited by parties 
on the right for electoral gain and at little political risk. In particular in coun-
tries where an anti- immigrant far right has emerged (such as Italy, discussed 
above, and France), it can be argued that the mainstream right has success-
fully exploited the issue to its advantage in the face of a left hamstrung by 
its internal tensions.22 In Italy, for instance, mobilization of anti- immigrant 
sentiment played an important role in the right’s return to power in 2001, 
even though Berlusconi went on to oversee a substantial increase in legal im-
migration levels while appeasing his populist partners through tougher de-
portation standards and new requirements for legal immigration enshrined 
in the Bossi- Fini law. Nicolas Sarkozy’s victory over Ségolène Royal in 2007 
has been at least partially attributed to his tough, often controversial stance 
on immigration and immigrants, or the children of immigrants.23 And in Ger-
many the staunch commitment of the CDU and the CSU to block plans for a 
new, skilled- based labor immigration policy has been credited with helping 
to bring about the Christian Democrats’ sequence of regional electoral vic-
tories in Hesse in 1999 and then 2003, Lower Saxony in 2003, and, most im-
portantly, North Rhine–Westphalia in 2005. The last of these brought down 
the last Red- Green state government and prompted the federal elections that 
brought an end to the left coalition government.24
 However, while politicizing immigration may indeed create tensions for 
the left and thus tend to work predominantly in favor of the right in the short 
term, it is not costless or unproblematic for the mainstream right. An uncom-
promising stance on immigration, such as that pursued by segments of the 
CDU and CSU during the years of the Red- Green coalition, can result in ideo-
logical tensions within the right as well. Such tensions, both between differ-
ent CDU regional leaders and between the party and church organizations, 
were evident during the prolonged negotiations of a compromise between 
Schröder’s government and the CDU after the failure of the first Schily law.25 
Mainstream right parties face their own tensions over immigration because 
business, one of its key constituencies, typically favors more open immigra-
tion policies. This was evidenced both in Germany, where business organiza-
tions lobbied aggressively in favor of Schröder’s efforts to reopen work- based 
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immigration, and in Italy, where business opposed the requirement imposed 
by Bossi- Fini of prior work contracts for residence permits.26 Tough talk on 
immigration by right- wing politicians is thus less likely to result in immigra-
tion restrictions during periods of right- wing government than the electoral 
rhetoric of the right might imply. And this may ease the political pressure on 
the left that political victories by the center- right in the context of increased 
global migration flows might otherwise produce.
 The examples considered here suggest that although there is a real poten-
tial for the European right to mobilize anti- immigrant sentiment (note the 
electoral success of the Northern League in an area of Italy whose industrial 
economy depends greatly on immigrant labor), the left is not therefore locked 
into an inescapable choice between restricting immigration and permanent 
electoral defeat. In Spain (2008) and Britain (2001 and 2005) the left suc-
ceeded electorally after implementing very liberal immigration policies and 
running in the face of efforts by the right to politicize the issue. And in Italy 
the left won in 2006 after running on a promise to lift a measure imposed 
by the first Berlusconi government to require work contracts for the issuance 
of new residence permits. In Germany, on the other hand, the political pres-
sure to restrict immigration appears largely to be a function of the low- skill 
profile of early immigrant labor recruitment policies coupled with the coun-
try’s unique problems in creating jobs for low- skilled workers. And something 
similar may be true for France.
 While we note these differences, it is also striking that in all four of the 
countries considered here governments of the left have actively sought to 
shape the profile of their immigrant populations in ways that fit the perceived 
needs of their economies, in particular by raising the skills level of the labor 
force. Indeed, while these efforts are now being copied by the right (for in-
stance Sarkozy’s government in France), the move to conform immigration 
policy to other economic policy goals (in particular the raising of the skills 
profile of the EU’s labor force) is one in which governments of the center- left 
have played a leading role, two examples being Blair’s “managed migration” 
model and Schröder’s efforts to introduce a points- based system. One way to 
understand these initiatives is as an effort by the center- left to counteract the 
electoral dilemmas that immigration tends to create by reducing the extent 
to which immigration affects the most vulnerable in society.
 Nonetheless, choosing this sort of pragmatism over a rights- based ap-
proach to immigration may be problematic in other respects. At the very 
least it poses a serious question as to how the European left will reconcile its 
definition of borders among peoples and its commitment to universal human 
rights. It also cannot be overlooked that the choice to promote high- skilled 
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migration into the EU to ease electoral tensions and resolve Europe’s demo-
graphic problems presents a serious moral dilemma. Any further efforts to 
draw human capital away from labor- exporting poorer countries are likely 
to have their own negative impact on precisely those areas of the world from 
which economic migrants in general seek to flee. Thus efforts to alter the 
politics of immigration in Europe by getting the “right” kinds of immigrants 
not only places left governments in an awkward moral position. It may also 
indirectly help to perpetuate the conditions in poorer countries that have 
produced large- scale immigration in the first place, along with the resulting 
dilemmas from which parties of the left are seeking to escape.
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The Central and Eastern European Left
A Political Family under Construction
Jean- Michel De Waele and Sorina Soare
The destruction of the Berlin Wall has had an influence well beyond the po-
litical boundaries of former “people’s democracies,” directly challenging left 
and center- left parties all over the world. The most common forecast of the 
early 1990s was that “socialism was dead and that none of its variants could 
be revived” (Dahrendorf 1990, 38). Eastern Europe during the following years 
thus rapidly became a breeding ground for neoliberal and pro- market ideas 
and an endemic “allergy” to the left. The main dilemma that the new democ-
racies faced was how to bolster the legitimacy of their new regimes. Anti-
communist elites advocated total condemnation of the past, with “lustration 
laws” to purge remnants and reminders of it that were based, it would seem, 
on an underestimate of how completely Marxist ideologies had disappeared 
(Hermet and Marcou 1998; Mink and Szurek 1998; Teitel 2000; Letki 2002; 
Stan 2002; David 2003). An astute observation about Bulgaria works for the 
entire region, save the Czech Republic: “None of [Marxism’s] postulates, its 
main policy recommendations such as central planning, completely admin-
istratively controlled prices, obligatory employment, state property, collec-
tivism, proletarian dominance through one- party rule, were left standing” 
(Ganev 2005, 444). This was also, of course, a moment when the western left 
faced its own crisis because of the end of Fordism, shifting class structures 
and the weakening of class, changing voting trends, the coming of “post- 
materialist” rivals, and the crisis of the welfare state (Callaghan and Tun-
ney 2001, 63). Some scholars even argued that the end of the twentieth cen-
tury could make traditional socialism and even social democracy impossible 
everywhere (Przeworski and Sprague 1986).
 The direction and extent of Eastern European transformations were also 
much constrained by the prospect of joining the European Union. Demo-
cratic politics were essential for membership in the EU, and this obliged the 
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post- communist lefts to declare more or less complete allegiance to market- 
oriented programs in ways which disregarded traditional left concerns (Agh 
2004). These constraints also seemed likely to prevent new lefts from emerg-
ing and to hasten the departure of older ones. Parties of the left and center- 
left in central and eastern Europe were thus left to transform themselves in an 
inhospitable environment, and very few observers or participants anticipated 
the resurrection of communist parties. Thus while in Romania the National 
Salvation Front (FSN) and in Bulgaria the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), suc-
cessor parties to the communists, managed to stay in power after 1989 and 
even win the first free elections, in most other places the past was brutally 
rejected. Successor parties in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia all lost 
their first electoral contests. Yet after starting as an endangered species, these 
successor parties would in fairly short order become stunning success stories.1
 Democratization also brought traditional social democracy back to life 
after years in exile. Parties such as the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), 
the Romanian Social- Democratic Party (PSDr), and the Hungarian MSzDP 
were good examples. These parties had been repressed or forcibly incorpo-
rated into Soviet- sponsored communist parties after the Communists seized 
power in the late 1940s. Forty years later, in the first democratic elections, they 
seemed set for a political comeback. Their success proved limited, because 
weak organizations and inexperienced leaderships hampered their visibility 
and limited their electoral relevance (Waller 1995, 478). They were in most 
cases destined to disappear during the 1990s or merge with ex- Communist 
rivals. The exception was the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD), which be-
came one of the most stable center- left parties in the region. Another group 
of hybrid or highly specific and localized left parties emerged, like Smer in 
Slovakia, led by Robert Fico, a charismatic former reform- Communist. And 
some parties like the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), its 
Slovak counterpart the Party of the Democratic Left (SDl), and the Romanian 
Socialist Labor Party (PSM), chose not to drop their old ideology and instead 
made but minor programmatic revisions to fit the new democratic institu-
tional framework. The Czech party has been the only success story in this 
category.
 This chapter surveys the post- communist left or center- left spectrum in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Its 
main goal is to assess whether the evolution of these parties will be marked 
by a long and quiet path toward lasting success or rather enduring weakness, 
indicated by their current electoral problems. In light of these questions, the 
bulk of the chapter focuses on electoral results from the early 1990s through 
2008. Later we shall consider internal and external stimuli leading to the re-
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invention of parties more generally in the region and reflect upon the likeli-
hood of their long- term success.
 Before we begin our analysis we need to clarify certain conceptual issues. 
At a comparative level we see a distinct evolutionary pattern. During the 
initial post- communist transition at the start of the 1990s, the political con-
text blocked the emergence of parties, either left or right, with real ideolo-
gies that translated into programs and policies for well- defined electorates. 
Instead these were years of high politics, when debates were about the past, 
the large changes to be undertaken, and the positions of different countries 
in international affairs. In these conditions both right and left became stuck 
in rhetorical postures with few clear and realistic alternatives, and the region 
embraced a politics based on a superficial consensus in favor of democracy 
and Europe, in which most other problems became secondary.
 In these circumstances left- of- center parties faced a threefold rebuilding 
task. Ex- communist parties first had to demonstrate acceptance of new demo-
cratic rules, including explicit renunciation of their earlier monopoly status 
and a willingness to live in a new multiparty world. Next they had to carry 
out organizational restructurings which included a massive loss of exist-
ing members, made more difficult by the emergence of a new generation of 
leaders whose presence did not help public visibility and recognition. Finally, 
the parties needed to rebuild their programs, abandoning the principles of 
Marxism- Leninism and importing ideological platforms from western Euro-
pean social democrats.
 By the middle of the 1990s the return of left parties to power had de-
manded constructing a new image as “competent agents of change” that 
would distinguish them from parties of the right, using arguments that it was 
better to have “a steady hand at the wheel rather than inexperienced learner- 
drivers” (Hough 2005, 5). By this point their initial weak democratic legiti-
macy seemed for the moment overcome, and in all the countries we analyze, 
ex- communist parties had begun to demonstrate a political professionalism 
and organizational coherence that gave them substantial claims on elector-
ates. Problems in the program persisted nonetheless. With a few exceptions 
the role of the government party constrained them to follow rhythms of re-
form coordinated by the EU and international creditor organizations. No mat-
ter what happened at elections, therefore, political agendas were dominated 
by needs to guarantee stabilization that necessitated policies of economic 
liberalization and privatization and brought extensive social costs.2 In such a 
situation, “while there may be a clear social- democratic profile in program-
matic documents and electoral campaigns, this does not necessarily have any 
bearing to the actual policies of a party in government” (Dauderstädt, Gerrits, 
and Markus [1999] as cited in Paterson and Sloam 2005, 37).
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 Thus however different parties’ genealogies, social democracy often be-
came an empty label. The parties were caught between their positions man-
aging democratization and economic reform and historic affinities for taking 
care of those less well- off. These parties also came to contain numerous suc-
cessful “red” millionaire entrepreneurs, and their policies often sacrificed 
social commitments for fiscal rectitude. Moreover, pro- European positions 
were often mainly electoral slogans, open to competing interpretations of the 
EU’s policies and its future that were vague and slippery. In brief, with the 
exception of the Czech communists in the KSČM, the central characteristics 
of social democracy—its social values and its ties with trade unions and the 
working class—became at best elements in campaign rhetoric.3 “Policy trans-
fers” from western social democracy were typically superficial and meant 
mainly to establish credentials in the eyes of European allies. In this context 
it must be asked whether one is discussing a real political family, with organic 
links to the peoples, societies, and classes whose interests it purported to rep-
resent.4
 The parties’ genealogical patchwork does not in itself preclude a positive 
answer, but it does imply the likelihood of profound differences between 
these different social democrats operating in different national party sys-
tems.5 Virtually all the successor parties quickly began to label themselves 
“center- left,” with rather more weight placed on centrism. Ties to the broader 
social democratic family were nevertheless typically used to demonstrate 
democratic credentials and not to inform program or policy. Therefore the 
family in general was a heterogeneous group of parties who from the outset 
renounced commitments to equality and social justice in favor of pragma-
tism. Left- wing activism and a political culture oriented to the left were quite 
absent, and the parties came to be dominated more by charismatic leaders 
than by particular political appeals. The discourses traditionally associated 
with social democracy have for that reason turned out to be of little use in 
mobilizing supporters, particularly in the face of growing competition from 
populist parties claiming to defend the “rights of the poorest and weakest.” 
Today’s economic crisis has made even clearer this long pattern of conver-
gence between the left and the populist and often nationalist parties, most 
notably on issues of guaranteeing minimum social standards.
Successor Parties: An Electorally Resistant Species?
In the aftermath of 1989 new competitive electoral markets boosted domes-
tic and international confidence in the democratization process (Linz and 
Stepan 1996). Except in Romania and Bulgaria, during the first Central and 
Eastern European free elections, lefts—social democrats, successor parties, 
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and others—suffered severe electoral defeats, results that did not promise 
brilliant futures (table 1). Yet a brief few years later the defeated parties “took 
advantage of a . . . political environment where weak competitors systemati-
cally made strategic mistakes” (Hough 2005, 4). Left successor parties were 
geared toward power, ready to agree to programmatic compromises, and 
eager to occupy central roles in the new political game, which they soon 
proved able to do.
Table 1. Percentage of Votes Cast in Parliamentary Elections, 1990–2007
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Bulgaria KPB 0.7 1.5
BSP 47.2 33.1 43.5(1)
EVrOlEV
Czech Republic KSČM 13.2 14.0 10.3
CSSD 4.1 6.5 26.4
Hungary MSZP 10.9 32.6
Poland SlD 11.9 20.4
UP 2.1 7.2
Romania PSM 3.1 2.2
PS 2.3
PDSr/PSD 66.3 27.7 21.5
PSDr 0.5 20.2 (2) 12.9 (3)
PD 10.2
Slovakia KSS 0.8 2.7
SDl 13.3 14.7 10.4 (4)
SMEr
 1. In coalition with the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union, Alexander Stanboliski, and Ecoglas-
nost.
 2. Part of the Democratic Convention, the PSDr obtains only ten deputies and one senator out 
of the sixty- two CDr mandates.
 3. The Social Democratic Alliance unites the PD and the PSDr.
 4. The Party of the Democratic Left is part of the coalition Common Choice, which also includes 
the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, the Farmers movement, and other small political parties.
 5. Starting with the 2001 elections the Coalition for Bulgaria unites the BSP and a number of 
smaller leftist formations such as the Party of Bulgarian Social Democrats, the Bulgarian Agrarian 
The Central and Eastern European Left 295
Growth and Decline of the Polish Democratic Party
In chronological perspective, the Polish story began in the late 1980s with the 
Polish Round Table. Intricate negotiations between the Polish United Workers 
Party (PZPr), sponsored by the regime, and Solidarnosc were supposed to 
lead to partial liberalization and not wholesale democratic transition. Soli-
darnosc and opposition parties were allowed to run for 35% of the seats in 
Sejm, while voting for the upper chamber was completely open. Despite these 
precautionary measures “Solidarity’s sweeping electoral success sounded the 
death knell of communism” (Millard 2003, 25). By the end of 1989 the Polish 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1.3 17.2(2) 30.9(5)
21.9 (1)












People’s Union “Aleksander Stambolijski,” the Movement for Social Humanism, and the Bulgarian 
Communist Party.
 6. During the 2007 elections the Left and Democrats coalition unites the Democratic Left Alli-
ance, the Social Democracy of Poland, the Labour Union and the Democratic Party.
 7. Initially part of the electoral alliance with the PSD, the PSDr merges with the PSD in 2001.
 8. The Party of the Democratic Left merges with the Smer in 2005.
Source: www.europe- politique.eu, http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/searchera.html, http://www 
.essex.ac.uk/elections.
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Workers Party had been dissolved and Alexander Kwasniewski elected the 
leader of its successor, the Democratic Left Alliance (SlD), in parallel with the 
coming of a multiparty system and completely free elections in 1991. Owing 
to the lack of credibility of parties associated with the past and the predomi-
nance of pro- market discourses, voters then gave massive support to parties 
opposed to communism, with the SlD obtaining only 12%.
 After the post- 1989 coalitions fell apart, early elections were called in 
1993. With functioning democratic institutions in place, political debate was 
centered around the introduction of property rights, the pace of economic re-
form, inflation, and unemployment. The SlD and the agrarian Polish People’s 
Party (PSl), neither of which disputed the need for change, pledged gentler 
economic reforms that would be accompanied by increases in social spend-
ing. The elections, held under new electoral laws, thus led to severe losses 
for the other parliamentary parties, while the SlD, with 20%, came in first 
and formed a new government with the PSl. The defeat of the center- right 
was caused mainly by hardships tied to the reforms promoted under Leszek 
Balcerowicz, which had made voters impatient and desirous of less harsh 
reforms. One of the explicit goals of the Democratic Left, which drew its in-
spiration from the German SPD, was to build a welfare state and implement 
social programs robust enough to provide protection through the economic 
transition period (Buras 2005, 92). Likewise, the party distinguished itself 
from others in the party system by its secularist positions, like those defend-
ing the rights of women and sexual minorities.
 It was not only economic problems that lay behind the electoral shift 
toward the ex- communists, for there was also a practical issue of credi-
bility. The Democratic Left (SlD) was an organized party with professional 
elites energized by young leaders promoting secular values. The anticommu-
nist parties, in contrast, had discredited themselves with nationalistic, pro- 
Catholic discourses and political amateurism. The “pro- SlD” air du temps 
continued into the presidential elections of 1995, which saw Lech Walesa, the 
historical leader of Solidarnosc, face off against the SlD leader Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, who won a surprising victory with 51% of the vote.
 After this a pattern of regular electoral rotation seemed to take over. De-
spite continuous economic reforms and Poland’s image as Eastern Europe’s 
economic “tiger,” the next elections in 1997 were won by Solidarity Elec-
toral Action (AwS). Four years later, with 16% unemployment and very 
high budget deficits, voters focused on the ills of the Polish economy and 
turned sharply against the center- right coalition. The results were a lim-
ited victory for the reformed communists and the complete removal of the 
AwS from Parliament. The Democratic Left (SlD), in alliance with the small 
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center- left Labor Union and the People’s Party, formed the new governing co- 
alition.
 Starting in the mid- 1990s the SlD focused most on macro- policy issues and 
on reinforcing its organization under the leadership of Leszek Miller (Millard 
2003, 36). For almost a decade no other party could match the SlD either in 
territorial strength or in membership (table 2). This pattern was not peculiar 
to Poland, and scholars have often pointed to ex- communist parties’ superi-
ority in membership, territorial organization, and material resources (Szczer-
biak 1999; Szczerbiak 2001; Van Biezen 2003; Lewis 2003). Most new parties 
tended to be concentrated in urban areas and among a young and educated 
electorate, but the SlD had a socially broader and more widespread network. 
In its internal life the leader was the party’s major cornerstone. In time, the 
party gradually consolidated an image of pragmatism that looked more to its 














Czech Republic2 KSČM 1993 350,000 545,000 64.2
1999 160,000 319,800 50
CSSD 1993 13,000 545,000 2.4
1999 18,000 319,800 5.6
Hungary2 MSZP 1993 59,000 165,300 35.7
1999 39,000 173,600 22.5
Poland2 SlD 2000 87,000 326,500 26.7
UP 2000 5,000 326,500 1.5
Romania3 PSD 2001 309,714 —
2003 300,000 1,735,430 17.3
2002 699,431 —
2004 607,412 —
PD 1998 135,288 —
2002 117,000 1,735,430 6.7
Slovakia2 SDl 1994 27,600 127,500 21.7
2000 21,223 165,277 12.9
 Sources: 1. Spirova 2005, 606; 2. Mair and Van Biezen 2001, 17–18; 3. Soare and Preda 2008, 79.
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voters than its members (Buras 2005, 88). In the longer run, however, the fra-
gility and superficiality of its organizational structure and clientelistic rela-
tionships between leaders and members weakened the party’s electoral grip. 
Corruption became systemic and a series of scandals rocked the party, in-
ducing a hemorrhage of members and the creation of a splinter party, Polish 
Social Democracy (SdPl).
 In 2005 the Democratic Left (SlD) was therefore moved to restate its offi-
cial stance: “We want a Poland that is just, democratic, tolerant . . . . Poland 
must be a country for everyone, and not just for the chosen few. We want 
a strong and efficient state in equalizing opportunities for Poles, sensitive 
to human pain, exploitation and inequality. We want a Poland that is open, 
European and proud of its history, treated without falsification and conceal-
ment. We want a Poland that does not forget the achievements of 45 years of 
the People’s Republic and without nationalistic, right- wing fictions.”6 Social 
policy proposals, Pro- Europeanism, and anti- nationalist arguments were thus 
central to the program. Electoral results nonetheless confirmed the relative 
decline of the SlD that had been identified in various pre- election surveys. 
The collapse of the coalition led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski led to early elec-
tions in 2007 and seemed to offer a chance for redemption to the SlD. The 
final competition was between the Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform 
(PO) parties, while the SlD and other left- of- center parties formed a new 
grouping, the Left and Democrats (LiD), which to its dismay obtained merely 
13.15% of the votes (fifty- five seats in the Sejm and none in the Senate).
 More than twenty years after the Berlin Wall fell, the Polish left is at a 
crossroads in a political landscape where the right is now predominant. Popu-
list parties have challenged the center- left’s credibility, while internal con-
flicts and scandals have progressively undermined it. Despite efforts in 2007 
to forge a coherent message and Kwasniewski’s personal comeback, the LiD 
clearly needs both programmatic and organizational reshaping. The coalition 
and its constituent parties have had consistent problems creating an iden-
tity for themselves, even if they have continued to advertise their interest in 
policies tied to work and social rights, secularization, and building a social 
Europe.
The Hungarian Socialist Party: Constancy and Compromise
Hungary was the second communist state to breathe the air of democracy. 
Liberalization had started after the Budapest revolt of 1956 with the aban-
donment of Stalinist positions on social matters and the implementation of 
cautious economic reforms to enlarge and consolidate the legitimacy of the 
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regime. Despite these changes, beneath the official consensus an opposi-
tion quickly organized, and by 1987 the monopoly of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party (MSzMP) had been broken. The Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF) was created, followed by the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) and 
the Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ) (Pittaway 2003, 58). The Hungarian case 
is thus unusual because the reformed successor party “emerged before the 
collapse of the state socialism and not after . . . and played a very active and 
instrumental role in bringing down the former system” (Agh 1995, 492). By 
the end of the 1980s a widening gap had isolated hardliners among the com-
munists (MSzMP), János Kádár had been removed from the leadership, and 
almost one- third of the Central Committee had been replaced.
 Negotiations in June 1989 between the democratic opposition and the 
ruling Communist Party led to the first free elections in 1990. By September 
1989 the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) had become the successor to the 
Communist Party, carrying over a majority of the party elite, rank and file, 
and resources (Van Biezen 2003, 124). Continuity gave the party an important 
advantage in territorial network, financial assets, and real estate. But there 
was a break at the organizational level. The new MSzP adopted a flexible or-
ganizational model based on secret- ballot voting and decentralized selection 
procedures (Agh 1995, 493). Thus, “in line with the party’s aspiration to bury 
the organizational model of the past . . . the MSzP was quite loosely organized 
and its organizational structure scarcely formalized” (Van Biezen 2003, 125). 
Membership was never the top priority of the new party (table 2), in part be-
cause only about 2% of the Hungarian electorate belongs to any party. The 
ironic effect was to make its membership relatively large, the typical mem-
ber being “middle- aged, male, urban, and intellectual” (Agh 1995, 498). Pro-
grammatically the MSzP’s prime concern at first was to advocate free- market 
policies and prove its loyalty to the new regime. Especially after its comeback 
in 1994 the Socialists (MSzP) were the promoters of market reforms based on 
austerity and rapid privatization. Their foreign policy from the beginning was 
open and internationalist, replete with anti- nationalistic and Europhile state-
ments, and they worked to separate themselves from the nationalism regu-
larly promoted by their opponents, mainly the Civic Union (FIDESZ).
 Like other countries in the region, in the early 1990s Hungary experi-
enced the perverse consequences of economic reform. Despite support by 
the Democratic Forum (MDF) for gradual economic transformation, the coun-
try’s transition proved difficult. GDP declined and there was a deterioration in 
living standards. Conflicts inside the government and the amateurism of new, 
non- communist elites accentuated the climate of distrust. In the elections of 
1994, held during an economic slump, the Socialist Party’s organizational net-
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work and its renewed party elite attracted ordinary voters and even seduced 
its former enemy, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz). Like its Polish 
counterpart, the main successor party used its policymaking and administra-
tive experience as key assets (Grzymala–Busse 2002, 138). But once back in 
power it was obliged by international lenders to cut social spending; and in 
the years that followed, Hungary had one of the highest unemployment rates 
in the entire post- communist region. During its time in power, allied with the 
liberals in SzDSz, the party thus became the advocate of austerity and worked 
to dismantle the institutions of the state economy.7 These economic reforms 
eventually paid off, and by 1997 GDP had started to rise. The credibility of the 
MSzP government was nonetheless hurt by austerity and corruption scandals 
while, in parallel, the opposition had already begun to reorganize.
 The electoral campaign in 1998 was dominated by the charisma and popu-
lism of Viktor Orbán, the leader of FIDESZ. Until a few weeks before the elec-
tions the Socialists seemed likely to be reelected, but the party won only 134 
seats versus 148 for FIDESZ. The MSzP held on to 33% of the vote and its domi-
nance in traditional industrialized districts, but opposition unity made the 
difference. Whereas in 1994 fragmentation of the right had helped the center- 
left, four years later a unified opposition blocked its reelection. In 2002 and 
again in 2006 FIDESZ, which was becoming a standard center- right party, 
and the MSzP progressively reinforced their electoral power while the other 
parties were falling apart.8 In an almost bipolar electoral market in 2002, the 
MSzP in alliance with the Free Democrats (SzDSz) gathered a limited ma-
jority with 198 seats. The same formula worked in 2006, and the MSzP- SzDSz 
coalition won 210 seats in Parliament.
 After the forced resignation of Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy, the Social-
ists installed the young businessman Ferenc Gyurcsany, one of the richest 
men in Hungary, as its leader. Under his stewardship the party adopted a 
Blairite “third way” agenda. The MSzP soon joined an exclusive club of post- 
communist parties to have won two successive elections while in govern-
ment. Despite numerous scandals and riots in Budapest in 2006, the MSzP 
seems to be the healthiest left party in the region, despite organizational 
underdevelopment and an ambiguous programmatic posture between cen-
trism and liberal policies.
 The Hungarian Socialists (MSzP) have thus been in office for more than 
half of the two decades of post- communism, and they are one of the most 
pro- European parties in the region, with a history of compromise between 
an inherited left culture and an ambition to win elections. Still, the future re-
mains in doubt. Confronted with one of the largest budget deficits in the re-
gion, especially after 2000, the party has been forced to shift policies so as to 
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lower public spending, a policy that led to growing criticism among its sup-
porters. This tense situation worsened after the crisis of 2006 and especially 
in 2009 under the new prime minister Gordon Bajnai, who was obliged to re-
duce wages, raise taxes, and cut social spending. In these conditions Jobbik 
(Movement for a Better Hungary), a right- wing nationalist party that had 
only been founded in 2002, became more and more important and registered 
a significant advance in the European elections of June 2009.
Common Origins and Divergent Paths: The Czechoslovakian Case
Czechoslovakia was the third country in Eastern and Central Europe to 
be swept up in the wave of democratization. Besides the challenges of the 
“double transitions” to democracy and free- market capitalism, the country 
also faced a serious nationality question (Kuzio 2001). After a “velvet revo-
lution,” the “velvet divorce” put an end to one of the most important states 
in the entire region (De Waele 1998, 49). Czechoslovakia has been regularly 
depicted as the region’s only genuine democracy before communism, and 
ironically it was the one country where the Communist Party had been a rele-
vant political force before 1948. It was known also for a strong social demo-
cratic tradition linked to the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Worker’s Party 
(CSDSD) and Czechoslovak Social Democracy (CSD). In Slovakia, in contrast, 
a traditionally rural economy and the strength of the Catholic Church had 
prevented the emergence of a strong pre- war left party.
 In 1946 the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) had won 38% of the 
votes and then occupied most ministerial posts. Despite this, in February 1948 
the party chose to seize power in brutal fashion. Twenty years later troops 
from five Warsaw Pact countries repressed the Prague Spring and ended 
the party’s and the nation’s attempts to reform from within. The once well- 
rooted ruling party then experienced a progressive decrease in membership. 
The party had 1.79 million members in 1948–49, 1.38 million in the mid- 
1950s, and only 1.17 million by the 1970s, the lowest number since the coup 
of 1948. By 1987 party membership had gone back up to 1.61 million (Stoica 
2005, 703), but despite this, strong demonstrations in 1988 culminated in six 
weeks of protest in November and December. In the same period the Slovak 
branch of the party developed a softer version of communism: “far away from 
both party supervision and decision- making, the then Young Turks from the 
Bratislava-based Institute of Marxism- Leninism, Peter Weiss and Pavol Kanis, 
had organized seminars to discuss the social and economic problems of so-
ciety” and effectively created a reformed party (Haughton 2005, 179). These 
same young communist leaders would be in charge of the party after the Vel-
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vet Revolution. The bloodless overthrow of the communist regime initially 
gave power to the Civic Forum (OF) and the Public against Violence (VPN), 
while the former ruling party remained practically unchanged and “retained 
much of its orthodox profile in both ideological and organizational terms, 
with the hardliners within the party successfully withstanding pressure for 
change” (Van Biezen 2003, 136). The first free elections in June 1990 brought 
sweeping victory to movements and parties opposed to the old regime. At 
the same time divisions between Slovaks and Czechs deepened, and after the 
elections of 1992 leaders in Prague and Bratislava declared the dissolution of 
the former Czechoslovak Republic.
 No fewer than twenty- two parties and movements registered for the first 
free elections. Despite everything in its past, the Communist Party finished 
second with almost 14% of the votes (table 2). The Social Democrats (ČSSD), 
who had been forcibly merged with the Communists but were now newly in-
dependent, failed at the national level to reach the 5% threshold required to 
win parliamentary representation in the country’s proportional electoral sys-
tem (Van Biezen 2003, 135). Initially hesitating between functioning within 
the Civic Forum and establishing an independent political organization, the 
ČSSD in the early 1990s was strongly divided. Those favoring collaboration 
with Civic Forum managed to win several seats under that label. Their oppo-
nents, led by Jiri Horák, controversially chose to collaborate with dissident 
communists expelled from the party in 1968. The effect was to cause turmoil 
in a party run by anticommunist dissidents. Still, Horák’s openness to collabo-
ration with other leftist leaders reinforced the party as an independent politi-
cal force after Civic Forum broke apart in 1991 and allowed it to prosper.
 The parliamentary campaign of 1992 was taken up by economic issues 
and disagreements about the future of the federation, whose breakdown they 
nourished. In the Czech half of the former country a coalition between the 
new Civic Democratic Party (ODS), led by the free- market enthusiast Vaclav 
Klaus, and the Christian Democratic Party (KDS) won thirty- seven seats. A 
left bloc led by the former communists (KSČM) won thirty- five and the Social 
Democrats (ČSSD) sixteen. In the Slovak half the elections were won by the 
successor party to the communists, the Party of the Democratic Left (SDl). At 
this point the former communists in the Czech half of the republic, the Com-
munist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), as it was known since 1989, 
came under internal pressure to change (De Waele 1998, 60). “Soft- liners,” 
represented by the chairman Jiří Svoboda, were keen to promote a smooth 
transformation to the post- communist era, but strong reluctance from the 
base and hardliner control over the organization limited their attempts. Svo-
boda was forced to resign and the party held on to its orthodoxy under Miro-
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slav Grebeníček (Handl 2005). In a subsequent document the KSČM publicly 
rejected the practices of former regimes but also put strong emphasis on its 
“aim to create a modern socialist society, which will guarantee real and last-
ing freedom and equality, regardless of property and social status. This con-
cept is based on Marxism and an open dialogue with new ideas and experi-
ences. Communists have always actively striven to defend and promote the 
interests of the exploited, the restricted, and the oppressed classes.”9 Thus 
while in the rest of the region Marxism seemed to have vanished, it remained 
alive in the Czech Republic. Organizationally the former communists pre-
served broad territorial coverage but rapidly lost membership—by 1991 they 
had about 750,000 members (Van Biezen 2003, 139), by 1999 about 130,000, 
and by 2008 only 77,115.10 More than two decades after 1989 the party’s 
core membership consists of male pensioners, with 15% active blue- collar 
workers. The majority of members have but a modest education, and only 
10% have university degrees. Party statutes continue to emphasize the active 
involvement of ordinary party members: “Membership of the Czech Commu-
nist Party, moreover, is not restricted to activities in the public realm but also 
extends to the private and requires a dedication to personal and political in-
volvement” (Van Biezen 2003, 142). The extent of this involvement has been 
considerable, a pattern also characteristic of the Social Democrats (ČSSD). 
Both parties’ linkages with members and interest organizations have there-
fore been higher than for other Czech parties.11
 After the “velvet divorce” took effect in 1993 it was clear that communists 
would maintain key positions in the Czech Republic, even if they were ostra-
cized by other parties. In addition, the Social Democrats (ČSSD) began to 
gather increasing support. The leadership of the Social Democrats changed 
at its Congress of February 1993, and its new leaders emerged as strong oppo-
nents of the privatization by vouchers promoted by Vaclav Klaus, which 
aimed at rapid and massive redistribution of state property. The party also in-
creased its credibility by unequivocally refusing to cooperate with the former 
communists (KSČM). By its promotion of gentler economic reforms, it was 
progressively recognized as a left alternative and thereby reinforced its elec-
toral appeal.
 In the mid- 1990s Czech economic results were regarded as miraculous be-
cause of rapid privatization with low unemployment and inflation.12 These 
achievements provided the setting for the elections of 1996, which produced 
a vote of confidence in Klaus’s government and its call for a market economy 
inspired by Thatcherism (Orenstein 1995, 184). The government had been 
strongly shaken by the strikes of 1995, including actions by professors, doc-
tors, and railway workers which served to garner support for the social policy 
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positions of the Social Democrats (ČSSD) and to lend credence to the criti-
cisms of the Communists (KSČM). The campaign of 1996 was thus dominated 
by such social and economic issues. The parties of the left were able to expand 
their electoral base, particularly in rural areas, but the right (ODS) was none-
theless able to hold on to its support in the cities and among retired voters.
 Despite this favorable context the successor party’s appeal remained lim-
ited, and it won only 10.3%. During this entire period the party adhered to 
its communist credo, including Pan- Slavism and Russophilia. It also advo-
cated continued collaboration with what remained of the array of communist 
states—Cuba, China, and North Korea—and other opponents of “American 
imperialism” like Milosevic’s Yugoslavia and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Handl 
2005, 126). The leaders and supporters of the not- so- former Communists 
(KSČM) were apparently nostalgic for the ancien régime and eager to protest 
and punish the compromises of the Social Democrats (ČSSD) (Handl 2003, 4). 
The party’s biggest challenge remained its aging and shrinking electoral base, 
and despite some modest modernizing efforts, the organization attracted few 
voters in the election of 1996.13
 The Social Democrats (ČSSD) won almost 27%, putting them just behind 
the Civic Democrats (ODS). But the economic situation then changed very 
quickly, and the Czech Republic fell into a deep recession. The unexpected 
resignation of Klaus, the ODS leader, who had been implicated in a financial 
scandal, deepened the political crisis. The Social Democrats won the elections 
in 1998 with 32.3% of the votes, while the communists won 11%. Refusing to 
collaborate with the successor party, the Social Democratic leader formed a 
minority government bolstered by an agreement guaranteeing opposition in-
volvement in all major decisions. The party (ČSSD) maintained its strength 
in the elections of 2002, and its new leader, Vladimir Špidla, then formed a 
coalition government with the Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union, 
again refusing collaboration with the communists, who nevertheless won 
18.5% and thereby increased their number of seats in the lower chamber from 
twenty- four to forty- one. During their extended period in office the Social 
Democrats (ČSSD) sought to consolidate their middle- class and public- sector 
supporters and progressively moved toward the center, a shift that became 
official under its new leadership. This repositioning nevertheless weakened 
the party in the presidential elections in 2003 and the European elections in 
2004; now plagued by scandals and a blurred identity, the Social Democrats 
(ČSSD) lost in 2006, while the communist KSČM declined to 12.8%. Twenty 
years after the cold war’s end the Czech political landscape remained deeply 
marked by the same ideological confrontation between Social Democrats and 
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former and largely unreformed Communists that had emerged soon after the 
breakup of Czechoslovakia (Handl 2003, 7).
 In Slovakia the Party of the Democratic Left (SDl) was the successor and 
heir to the once powerful Communist Party. Starting in the early 1990s it 
undertook a process of internal and programmatic reassessment. At the same 
time the Social- Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), a historical party led 
by Dubček himself, was reborn. The more hardline Communist Party (KSS) 
briefly won several seats in Parliament, but from the outset the ability of the 
new Democratic Left (SDl) to adapt and the positive effects of its role in rural 
Slovakia reinforced its credibility. Moreover, the harsh economic reforms an-
nounced by President Václav Havel promised difficulty for what there was of 
Slovak industry; in consequence, “The pro- reform, anticommunist consensus 
was far less clear” in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic (Grzymala- Busse 
2002, 151).
 In the elections of 1992 the Democratic Left (SDl) obtained 14.7%, the 
hardliners (KSS) less than 1%. Both left parties were successfully challenged 
by the People’s Party, or Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), led 
by Vladimir Mečiar (Haughton 2005, 180). Initially a reaction against the 
right- leaning pronouncements of the government dominated by the Public 
Against Violence Party (VPN), the People’s Party program was an eclectic 
blend of social policies, nationalism, and populism that directly challenged 
the Democratic Left (SDl) in its core constituencies (Williams 2003, 50). 
In the face of this challenge “the SDl saw its commitment to democracy as 
the main distinction between itself and the HZDS,” and the key feature of 
its program became a formal and explicit commitment to democratic loy-
alty rather than a more typical social democratic identity (Grzymala- Busse 
2002, 151). Like other successor parties the Democratic Left (SDl) “engaged 
in an acknowledged and deliberative emulation of programmatic and politi-
cal ideas from Western social- democratic parties, the Socialist International 
and the Party of European Socialists” (Handl and Leška 2005, 106). As the 
party chairman Weiss declared, “we are for the market mechanisms and plu-
ral democracy . . . we do not want to be an ideological party” (Weiss, quoted 
by Grzymala- Busse 2002, 152). Yet the effort was largely superficial, for the 
party really saw itself as more liberal than the People’s Party, while its free- 
market statements progressively distanced it from the trade unions that had 
been attracted to its populist discourse and program.
 Aiming to broaden its electoral appeal, the Democratic Left (SDl) took 
part in the elections as the main member of the Common Choice coalition 
formed by the Greens, the Social Democrats, and the Farmers’ Movement. 
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The coalition strategy backfired and obscured the party’s visibility, “muddy-
ing the party’s image and program in the mind of the electorate” (Haughton 
2005, 185). Common Choice won only 10.41% of the vote, while its populist 
rivals (HZDS) became the main party in the Slovak republic with 34.95%. 
The hardline KSS did worse, obtaining less than 3%. Typical voters for Com-
mon Choice were young, urban, and highly educated, with a predominance 
of state employees.14
 Four years later, in 1998 the People’s Party (HZDS) obtained 27% of the 
votes, an unsatisfactory result for a party with limited coalitional potential. 
A centrist coalition—made up of the Democratic Union, the Christian Demo-
cratic Movement, the Democratic Party, the Green Party, and the SDSS com-
bined in the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK)—won 26.33%; the Demo-
cratic Left SDl won just under 15% and the unreformed KSS less than 3%. 
The SDK leader became prime minister and the Democratic Left (SDl) joined 
in the government coalition, in which it promoted a series of aggressively 
pro- market reforms and thus alienated its traditional left electorate (Haugh-
ton 2005, 185). The party was riven by debates between a “Third Way,” with 
proposals for economic stabilization that its enemies claimed were inspired 
by the IMF and Milton Friedman, and more orthodox socialists who favored 
building a strong welfare state (Handl and Leška 2005, 114). This second posi-
tion won out, but not without leaving deep scars. At the same time, during the 
coalition of 1998–2004 the party was plagued by scandals, something that 
seemed a common denominator in the entire post- communist political spec-
trum. In this context one of the best- known party leaders, Robert Fico, left the 
SDl to form the Smer (Direction), whose original name included the phrase 
“Third Way,” illustrating Fico’s Blairite programmatic inspiration. Like New 
Labour, Smer sought a “modern” social democratic balance between equal 
opportunities and liberal economics.
 In the elections of 2002 the Democratic Left (SDl) suffered a major de-
feat, securing just 1.36% of the votes while the former communists in the KSS 
registered their highest score in the post- communist elections with 6.32%. 
These elections indicated how much the party had been marginalized, while 
the recently created Smer broke through with 13.46% of the vote (Handl and 
Leška 2005). Three years later Smer became the catalyst for a unification of 
the Slovak left, merging with the Democratic Left (SDl), the Social Demo-
cratic Alternative and the historic Social Democrats (SDSS). In this format 
Smer won the elections of 2006, taking 50 of 150 seats. Surprisingly, the party 
then formed a coalition with the former ally on the right of the People’s Party, 
the SNS, leading it to be suspended temporarily from the Party of European 
Socialists (PES), the EU- level social democratic organization.
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“Once a Big Party”:  
The Rapid Decline of the Romanian Social Democratic Party
It is widely acknowledged that the annus mirabilis after the Wall fell had 
more limited effects in Romania than in the rest of the region, particularly 
since the Romanian Communist Party (PCr) continued in power. The suc-
cessor National Salvation Front (FSN), under various appellations like FDSN 
(Democratic National Salvation Front), PDSr (Party of the Romanian Social- 
Democracy), and the current PSD (Social Democratic Party), was the un-
doubted winner of the events of December 1989. Enjoying organizational su-
periority and two charismatic leaders, Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman, the FSN 
won the first free elections with more than 66% of the vote against a motley 
collection of opposition parties—the agrarians (PNTCD), the liberals (PNl) 
and the historic social democrats—which together barely won 10%.
 In this first part of its new existence the FSN proclaimed a revolutionary 
identity and until 1993 even refused to call itself a party, preferring instead 
the label of Front. This label, which had strong emotional connotations of 
official revolutionary origins, legitimized the FSN by reference “to the virtu-
ous and unified people” (Soare 2004). The Front recalled the emotional soli-
darity of the early days of the “Revolution” and emphasized a direct link be-
tween the demos and the leaders, a quality reinforced by its leader Iliescu’s 
paternalistic approach (Tismăneanu 2000, 11). The party’s catch- all discourse 
guaranteed a broad electoral appeal, with particular penetration among a 
middle- aged electorate in rural areas outside the capital (Dătculescu 1994).
 Benefiting directly from the former communists’ organizational struc-
tures, the Salvation Front built a professional political apparatus to wrest con-
trol over state institutions and reinforce its territorial support and electoral 
strength, while encouraging broad membership as a substitute for credibility 
(table 2). For six years the FSN squashed its competitors and profited from 
its hegemony by deconstructing the wealthy communist state into a capillary 
system of patronage to reward those who supported its positions by giving 
them preferential access to the state’s assets (Soare 2006).15 Joining the FSN 
was thus not only an issue of status but also one of opportunity for economic 
and professional benefits. An unwritten rule has existed since then that what-
ever the turnover, rival parties would do similar things for their own benefit.
 Immediately after the elections of 1990 tensions emerged within the quite 
heterogeneous Salvation Front (FSN). Opposition between hardliners and 
softliners echoed differences in perspectives within the governing party, as 
the visions of the party’s two major leaders—Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman—
clashed. The split was progressively institutionalized within FSN, and by 1992 
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two purportedly social democratic parties had emerged. In elections that year 
the parties together won nearly 40% of the vote, but the real winner was 
Iliescu’s party, the FDSN (which soon became the Party of Social Democracy, 
or PDSr). Still, with fewer than 30% of the votes and the refusal of the Chris-
tian Democrats (CDr) to form an alliance, the party was left to soldier on in 
a minority government until it managed in 1994 to establish the so- called 
Red Quadrilateral Coalition with three right- wing parties: the Great Roma-
nia Party (PrM), the Party of the Romanians’ National Unity (PUNr), and the 
small nationalist- socialist Socialist Party of Labor (PSM).
 There were also traditional social democratic players during the first series 
of elections. Despite repeated electoral failures in the 1990s due to unwise 
strategic alliances, the historical Social Democrats (PSDr) succeeded in be-
coming a regular parliamentary party. In a landscape dominated by issues 
of “high politics,” it was the only party interested in developing a coherent 
social democratic program. Its individual electoral weakness and coalitional 
missteps limited the impact and visibility of traditional left culture, however, 
and in 2001 the party merged with its larger rival, the Party of Social Democ-
racy (PDSr) descended from the largest successor party.
 Beginning in 1993 the FDSN/PDSr had begun a complex programma-
tic realignment. Symbolically it deemphasized its revolutionary claims and 
changed its name. This did not represent a fundamental break with the past, 
and the party’s potential coalition partners were limited to other “outcast” 
parties. The second step of its strategy was a long campaign to join the Party 
of European Socialists and the Socialist International. By 2000, having been 
again renamed, as the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the party itself initiated 
its own, internally oriented campaign for change: it openly affirmed a social 
democratic identity, built greater linkages with trade unions and a more de-
veloped organization, and even introduced new mechanisms for designating 
electoral candidates.
 From 1992 until 2005, of course, the party faced competition from a rival 
successor party. The Democratic Party (PD) was an alternative social demo-
cratic group that came together around the reformist leader Petre Roman. 
The party advertised itself as a new social democratic party inspired by west-
ern social democracy, and Roman’s personal connections with leaders like 
Felipe González were used to open doors in the European family. But after 
electoral failure in 2000 and the election of a new leader, now president 
of Romania, the PD progressively distanced itself from international social 
democratic networks and also refused collaboration with the PSD, prefer-
ring instead to ally with center- right partners. In 2005, in a major program-
matic shift, the PD became a people’s party. Behind this shift lay a pragmatic 
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strategy which had immediate results. Since the political disappearance of 
the Christian Democrats (PNTCD) in 2000, the EPP—the European alliance of 
Christian Democratic and Center- Right parties—did not have a major Roma-
nian partner. This new connection was therefore extremely useful for both 
the EPP and the Romanian party. International visibility and EU parliamen-
tary seats were prizes for which the new party—soon to be known as the 
Democratic Liberal Party and after 2007 as the Liberal Democratic Party—
would gladly trade in its social democratic heritage and identity.
 In spite of these strange moves the electoral results from 1990 through 
2004 suggest that the Romanian social democratic family has been perhaps 
the most stable in the post- communist arena. Ever since the coming of a 
new democracy, at least one supposedly social democratic party has been in 
power. But the record of the Romanian social democratic family also draws 
attention to the strategic capacities of the parties for adapting to their en-
vironment. The Liberal Democratic (PD) realignment just discussed is one 
consequence of the persistent political marketing of post- communist social 
democratic parties and of a strategy that has indirectly been made easier by 
fluctuating societal cleavages. We have pointed out elsewhere that in Central 
and Eastern Europe major socioeconomic divisions have not been effectively 
tapped by parties, which instead have engaged in clientelistic trade-offs be-
tween parties and local leaders (Soare 2004). In Romania the fragmentation 
of the social democratic family—both branches of which profited organi-
zationally from being successors to the communists—was determined more 
by personal and factional differences than by socioeconomic issues, and en-
demic clientelism has been inimical to the creation of strong parties. Partly 
in consequence, a “once big” party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), is 
currently plagued by scandals and internal power struggles, while political 
patronage has in the long run been of limited utility as a substitute for orga-
nization to a party in opposition.
 At the same time, beginning in 2000 the Social Democratic Party (PSD) did 
launch numerous programmatic documents focused on questions of equality 
and social justice. The party’s position in government between 2000–2004 
and 2008 limited the significance of these issues. It is significant, though, that 
the new program launched by the Social Democrats in 2006, “A Social Roma-
nia,” proposed “equal chances and treatment for everyone regardless of their 
background; lifting the minimum salary to the level of the minimum pension 
so that the low- paid can meet day- to- day living costs; investing in the village 
economy; investing in the health system; improving the competitiveness of 
our economy; ensuring that income taxes are progressive; improving absorp-
tive capacity of communitarian funds; and finally, significant investment in 
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education” (Birchall 2007). But once back in power in 2008, and allied with 
their longtime rivals on the center- left, the Liberal Democrats, the party re-
treated from pursuing these policies.16
The Constancy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party
Influenced by perestroika and glasnost and pushed by the Bulgarian politi-
cal elite, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP), led by Todor Zhivkov, had to 
open itself to change even before 1989. Beginning in the early 1980s young 
reformers inside the party quietly promoted a leadership change (Gallagher 
2003). By 1987 the party had announced multiple- candidate regional elec-
tions as a sign of political liberalization. Then, in an apparently calm situa-
tion, during a European environmental conference in Sofia in October 1989 
street protests led to a major mass demonstration in the capital city. Unable 
to control either the party or the situation, and under scrutiny from the inter-
national community, Zhivkov resigned and Bulgaria began its tortuous tran-
sition to democracy led by Mladenov, the former foreign minister. The BKP 
chose a social democratic path to political redemption, becoming the new 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), renouncing Marxism, and accepting the mar-
ket economy. It then proved its loyalty to the new regime by accepting nego-
tiations with the more anticommunist Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF 
in Eng lish, SDS in Bulgarian) and supporting the first post- communist free 
elections (Touykova 1997, 5).
 As in Romania, the rigidity of the Bulgarian communist regime hampered 
the creation of effective alternative organizations. Noncommunist groups 
lacked the territorial organization and professional resources to compete 
with the successor party, the Socialists (BSP) (Spirova 2005, 602). Most of the 
forty- two organizations competing in the elections in 1990 were unknown and 
without widespread support (Karasimeneov 2004, quoted by Spirova 2005, 
602). The campaign was monopolized by the issue of economic transition, 
and the Socialists endorsed gradual economic reform while also promoting 
the decollectivization of agriculture and reform of the banking system. With 
over 47% of the votes, they formed the first freely elected post- communist 
government in coalition with their strongest opponents.
 In July 1991 a new basic law was adopted, and elections held in October 
were won by the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) with 34.4% of the votes. 
The Socialists did almost as well—33.1%—but the party was at the moment 
politically ostracized and without possible coalition partners. The noncom-
munist coalition’s victory was reinforced by the philosopher Zhelyu Zhelev’s 
victory in presidential elections against a candidate from the Socialist Party 
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(BSP) in 1992. From this position of strength the SDS then launched deep 
economic reform, supported strongly by the international community. But 
as early as 1992 the first signs of serious social conflict had appeared in the 
form of regular strikes. The coalition government experienced conflicts be-
tween its dominant partner and the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS), 
while the Socialist Party continued its renewal and organizational rebuild-
ing (Karasimeneov 1995, 579; Touykova 1997, 5). Statements in support of 
the EU and economic reform enhanced its national and international credi-
bility, while its political visibility was enhanced by a functioning organiza-
tion inherited from the Communists—350,000 members and an elite of po-
litical professionals (Spirova 2005, 603). The party maintained direct contact 
with its members through highly popular meetings like the annual May Day 
celebrations. The party’s strategy was therefore to attempt to change and 
adapt to post- communist challenges while preserving continuity in its so-
cial base (Karasimeneov 1995, 581). And beyond a discursive commitment to 
promoting a market economy accompanied by equality and justice, it could 
easily be argued that in Bulgaria, as in Romania, “the declared interest . . . to 
enhance social protection was still not visible at the level of social expendi-
tures” (Sotiropoulos, Neamţu, and Stoyanova 2003, 661).
 By the mid- 1990s the country was experiencing an economic crisis, and in 
the resulting political instability President Zhelev dissolved Parliament and 
called early elections for 1995. The Socialist Party then used its organization 
to advantage against an opponent plagued with internal dissension to win a 
huge victory: 43.5% of the votes and an absolute majority in Parliament. “The 
landslide victory of the BSP was,” according to one analyst, “a vote of hope 
for change to more stability and security” (Karasimeneov 1995, 584). The 
hopes were soon undermined, for once in power the Socialists were forced 
to comply with IMF pressures for rapid economic reforms. By 1996 the Bul-
garian economy faced a severe financial crisis with dramatic social costs, a 
shrinking GDP, high inflation, and a collapsing currency. The result was the 
calling of new early elections in 1997, at which point the Socialists were under 
fire both nationally and internally. Events had called the party’s commitment 
to its “social” policies sharply into question, and an electorate nostalgic for 
the security of the old regime abandoned the party: the Socialist (BSP) vote 
dropped to 22.5%, while the liberal Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) won 
137 seats in Parliament.
 Stability proved elusive, and the elections of 2001 were dominated by a 
new populist party, the National Movement (NDSV), led by King Simeon II 
and campaigning under the motto “People Are the Wealth of Bulgaria.”17 Its 
discourse was a mixture of nationalistic appeals and simplistic solutions for 
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the country and economic crisis. Claiming messianic legitimacy, King Simeon 
was strongly critical of traditional political parties and corrupt institutions. 
The result was that both the liberals (SDS) and the left (BSP) were roundly 
thrashed and the National Movement (NDSV) obtained 42.7% of the vote. Its 
success also proved short- lived, and just four years later the Left Coalition 
for Bulgaria, led by the Socialists, won the elections with almost 31%. In the 
process the Socialists confirmed their role as a regular government party and 
one of the most consistent socialist parties in the region, whose strong elec-
toral results are facilitated by its stable organization and broad membership. 
Equally important, despite the fragmentation of the left and center- left after 
1989, the Bulgarian Socialist Party has progressively become a trendsetter for 
the entire Bulgarian political arena (Spirova 2005). At the same time policy 
implementation lags. Even if party documents argue for raising living stan-
dards, improving social services, and enhancing the quality of healthcare and 
education, it is obvious that once again “this does not necessarily have any 
bearing to the actual policies of a party in government” (Dauderstädt).
Tortured Paths to Redemption and Incomplete Social Democratization
Told one after the other, these stories are fascinating. After 1989 the ex- 
communist parties were supposed to rapidly disappear, and scholars foresaw 
a crisis of the left in general once they did. Yet these parties have managed 
to survive and challenge scholarly predictions with their remarkable elec-
toral consistency. Throughout the region successor parties, historical parties, 
new party formulas, and even orthodox communist parties have managed 
to survive initially grim situations. In most cases the successor parties mo-
nopolized the entire left spectrum, and “no significant social democratic 
alternatives arose where the successor parties could preempt their moder-
ate leftist rhetoric. In contrast, where the communist parties failed to re-
generate, other parties could take up the moderate left side of the political 
spectrum” (Grzymala- Busse 2002, 283). More recently, increasingly balanced 
political competition and increasingly stable party systems may have dimin-
ished the prominence of successor parties on the left as the region’s only well- 
organized and more or less coherent political alternatives. For such parties, 
discredited by their past, the new regime required complicated changes (De 
Waele 1996). Following a classic assumption that “Parties don’t just change,” 
the last part of our chapter will focus on who and what gave left parties the 
motivation and resources to comply with the norms of the new political order 
(Harmel and Janda 1994).
 The answer to what were the primary inputs of change is relatively simple. 
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First came the domino effect that brought down communist regimes and in-
duced the rapid implosion of the USSr, which suddenly narrowed space for 
returning to the past. Overnight Moscow ceased to provide relevant politi-
cal support, making loyalty to the new order the only pragmatic alternative. 
Next, despite the ostracism faced by formerly communist parties, the tran-
sition to democracy almost by definition meant that no political party, other 
than openly extreme groups, could be excluded from political competition. 
These circumstances effectively sealed the successor parties’ commitment to 
the new order.
 The transformation of the ex- communist parties has been quite funda-
mental, involving acceptance of multiparty competition and support for 
the market economy. Even so, it was eased considerably by the institutional 
framework. The transition process presented three main challenges: democ-
ratization, the creation of functioning markets, and the rebuilding of state 
institutions (Offe 1996). State change has been the paramount challenge for 
ex- communist parties, since the end of the cold war dismantled communist 
regimes and the states that embodied them. Under the ancien régime commu-
nist parties had an effective monopoly on legally acceptable political activity, 
and the state itself was deeply rooted in the parties. Throughout the entire re-
gion “the weakness of the communist state left its successor open to predation” 
during the early transition (Grzymala- Busse 2003, 1127). Post- communist in-
stitutional arrangements that characterized states run by parties with flexible 
identities and few principles allowed these groups to make these states com-
pliant with the party in power. All around the region post- communist parties 
were able to penetrate new states and use public offices to their own ad-
vantage (Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007). Reformed communist parties bene-
fited from a state model that was open to the influence of parties in power 
(Ganev 2001; Grzymala- Busse and Jones Loung 2002; Grzymala- Busse 2003). 
In other words, the political experience, know- how, professional capital, and 
broad territorial organization of ex- communists led new leaderships to seize 
the opportunities provided by fluid institutional frameworks.
 The rapid strategic metamorphosis of ex- communist parties translated into 
well- disciplined, centralized, and efficient party organizations, and the pro-
cess was further eased by their economic viability. They inherited financial 
capital from their predecessors at the start of the transition. The privatization 
process and their economic expertise then put the parties in a favorable posi-
tion for doing business and balancing business and politics. A Romanian ex- 
cadre who had become a big- time entrepreneur explained the smooth tran-
sition: “Questioned about his miraculous transformation,” his interlocutor 
explains, “he declared he sees no contradiction between his past and current 
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career: ‘On the contrary, I was a good communist and I’ll be an even better 
capitalist!’” (Stoica 2004, 271). Of course other structural factors such as elec-
toral systems have been significant as well. In most of the case studies, for 
example, proportional representation facilitated the comeback of left parties. 
But being the “successor” to the previous rulers was critical.
 At the electoral level it is hard to construct an ideal picture of the base of 
left parties and to discern the typical voter at the regional level. The Roma-
nian Social Democrats (PSD) and their Bulgarian counterparts (BSP) were 
better implanted in rural zones, where their voters were older and had mini-
mal education. More recently the changing nature of party systems has chal-
lenged this profile and the two parties have lost these electoral fiefs, but they 
have also made inroads into urban areas. In this respect the victory of the 
Social Democratic candidate for mayor of Bucharest in the most recent local 
elections is significant. Hungarian socialist voters, in contrast, remain urban- 
based. The ways the recent economic crisis has hit Polish social democrats 
make identifying their typical voters more difficult. Urban voters are still the 
most important base in Czech and Slovak social democratic electorates. Yet in 
virtually all cases one finds parties appealing to voters over the heads of their 
own party members, a reflection perhaps of ideological weakness but also an 
explanation of membership decline.
 Moving beyond this basic balance sheet, it is difficult to identify the pre-
cise trigger for change. The scholarly literature regularly emphasizes the in-
ertia of big organizations as “a wall of resistance” to change, and one would 
expect even more resistance from highly centralized communist parties 
(Harmel and Janda 1994, 261). But in moments of great uncertainty the ac-
tions of leadership are strongly influenced by circumstances. The vanishing 
credibility of communist parties at a time of pervasive economic crisis and 
the powerful intuition that transition was unstoppable accentuated pressures 
for change. In most cases the communist parties also experienced a rapid and 
drastic erosion of their membership (table 2), which made breaking with the 
past less a choice than a necessity. The parties’ organizational centralization 
nonetheless allowed elites to control the dimensions and pace of adaptation. 
Finally, the legacies of the past and the rigidity of communist regimes further 
enhanced the appeal of change. In Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovakia 
the new communist leadership after 1989 consisted of younger party mem-
bers keen for rapid transformation. In the Czech Republic, where old appa-
ratchiks dominated, reformers had less visibility and space for maneuver. 
The Romanian case is unusual because the new leadership of “softliners” and 
promoters of moderate reformism were inspired more by perestroika than by 
democratization.
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 Twenty years is too short a time to reach definitive conclusions, so we must 
be tentative. We have told the story of an extremely resistant species. A his-
torical and structural approach that favors legacy- based explanations for the 
evolution of the Central and Eastern European post- communist left is par-
ticularly relevant to account for the commonalities and divergences of the 
various political actors. Thus the reluctance of Czech communists (KSČM) to 
change and the longstanding political tradition of the Czech Social Demo-
crats (ČSSD) offer a convincing argument for how historical legacies and na-
tional opportunities can be combined, and in this case explain how the Czech 
path diverged from paths taken elsewhere in the region. As for analyzing the 
shift from Marxism to capitalism by the descendants of the former ruling 
Communist parties, history reminds us that for the most part these parties 
had been imposed from abroad, and despite almost half a century in power, 
they had failed at building the socialism they preached. Homo sovieticus had 
been almost exclusively an issue of propaganda, while Václav Benda’s theory 
of the “parallel polis” was closer to reality. In the end the successful trans-
formation of the ex- communist parties thus attests to a paradox. Communist 
parties had been the only relevant political actors in the region for almost half 
a century. But except in the Czech Republic they all failed at direct continua-
tion into the post- communist era. Symbolically, Marxism and its corollaries 
have been totally and effectively superseded by variants of liberal and pro- 
market theories. Yet the successor parties themselves often succeeded.
 Historically driven explanations of the success of the left and center- left 
parties, and in particular of the ex- communists, focus mainly on their orga-
nizational advantages (De Waele 2002). Transformation of the communist 
parties was an organizational strategy without clear programmatic baggage. 
In the fluid political competition of the early 1990s, organizational continuity 
allowed these parties to preserve their influence and at least partially their 
skilled, experienced political elites. Their organizational resources contrasted 
sharply with those of the fledgling proto- parties that came to power immedi-
ately after the end of the old regime. While holding on to these resources, the 
successor parties also adopted a twofold strategy to achieve new legitimacy 
and respectability. They first gave full support to economic reforms, and in 
government these “social democrats,” old and new, worked at “building capi-
talism.” They then went on to embrace the EU and NATO.
 Their concern for integration in the new capitalist system meant abrupt 
disengagement from traditional ideologies and at times traditional social 
bases. Successor parties and historical social democrats also neglected the 
development of a left or center- left political culture and outlook. Despite per-
vasive organization, the absence of such a political culture has eventually 
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hampered these parties. Support for a market economy and regular stays in 
government have not been cost- free. All over the region populist parties have 
come to exploit this and in several cases have been able to find fertile breed-
ing ground. In addition, traditional alliances between these parties and the 
trade unions, themselves operating at a disadvantage in the new era, have 
been weakened (Mudde 2004). In general the absence of intermediary orga-
nizations and committed social actors must be considered when reflecting on 
the limits of the center- left throughout the region. Domination of the political 
scene by parties, the weakness of civil society, and the alienation from poli-
tics regularly emphasized by surveys have blocked the emergence of a partici-
patory culture. This participation deficit has progressively generated a real 
representation crisis, with a major impact on the center- left in particular.
 The strong support for European and NATO integration has also created 
problems for center- left parties of whatever origin. The paradox is clear: “So-
cial democrats have been the strongest advocates of accession in many coun-
tries . . . Why did social democrats support EU membership in spite of the costs 
and partial drawbacks for their own clientele?” (Agh 2004, 5). The reasons 
for this exaggerated Europeanism were the need for international credibility, 
pragmatism tied to a lack of alternatives, and perceived national diplomatic 
interests. Twenty years on, however, center- left parties are now progressively 
squeezed between EU requirements, national needs to comply with transition 
goals, and popular disenchantment due to the social costs of the new system. 
From the beginning the attempts of parties of the left to develop a coherent 
programmatic identity through the prism of national and local needs and 
social requirements have been neglected in favor of the choice for Europe. 
Despite a certain amount of electoral stability, the progressive shrinkage of 
the blue- collar working class and the appeal to the left’s traditional working- 
class base of new right- wing populist parties have thus become very large 
challenges. In such new political circumstances, the center- left is on the de-
fensive all around the region.
 Twenty years after the fall of “peoples’ democracies,” the post- communist 
political landscape has changed fundamentally. The resurrection of old lefts 
in central Europe was helped by their political experience and organizational 
networks, and by the weakness and fragmentation of their opponents. But 
in time, their weaknesses in ideology, organization, and relationships with 
party members and voters, along with accusations of corruption, have be-
come much more visible with the consolidation of the right and the emer-
gence of new forms of populism. Thus the successes of the 1990s seem mainly 
to have obscured the Achilles’ heel of these left parties, their ideological 
weakness. The ever greater convergence of social policies across different 
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national party systems has also limited their margins of maneuver and pro-
gressively eaten away at their traditional electoral bases. Throughout the en-
tire region the center- left thus remains trapped in a process of reconstruction 
which is made more difficult by outside pressures and a troubled past.
Notes
 1. By successor parties we refer to those parties “that were formerly the governing 
party in the pre- 1989 communist regime and which inherited the preponderance of the 
former ruling parties’ resources and personnel” (Ishiyama 1998, 62).
 2. Between 1991 and 1997 the Eurobarometer surveys measured high levels of dis-
satisfaction with the untoward consequences of democratization, in particular its so-
cial costs (Dauderstädt and Gerrits 2000, table 6).
 3. Outside this divided family the KSČM looks to be the only large Communist party 
in the region continuing into post- communism, defining itself as “the only genuine 
Czech left party,” whose goal remains “the transformation from capitalism to social-
ism” (Zprava, 5th Congress 1999, quoted in Handl 2003, 4). The KSČM may be related 
to the other parties, but it has become a separate case, following its own left social 
democratic paths while denouncing the “laxity” and loss of Marxist- Leninist political 
principles by others.
 4. Even though the notion of the political family is a category of analysis often criti-
cized as vague and based on common sense, it remains a useful tool in analyzing politi-
cal parties, for it offers at the same time a “domain of identification” for party elites, 
members, and voters and a reference point in the “domain of competition” at the level 
of party systems (Mair and Mudde 1998; Sartori and Sani 1983).
 5. On ideological groups and the link with structural cleavages see Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967.
 6. “Democratic left alliance election manifesto 2005,” www.sld.org.pl/index.php 
?view=1&art_id=7158&pid=18&ret_id=175&rsid=0.
 7. The MSzP was to rapidly assume a central role in the rogue privatization of 
the public sector, which will allow the accumulation of capital in the hands of party 
leaders.
 8. The MIEP (Hungarian Justice and Life) fell short of the electoral threshold in 
2002, the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) collapsed after corruption scandals, 
the MDF (Democratic Forum) merged with the FIDESZ, and the SzDSz progressively 
shrank to 5% of the vote.
 9. http://www.KSČM.cz/article.asp?thema=3247&item=28074.
 10. According to an internal analysis, “the decline in KSČM membership oscillates at 
6–7 percent a year, while the membership grows by 0.6 to 0.68 percent a year.” “Czech 
Communist Party Membership Steadily Shrinking,” 9 May 2008, www.praguemonitor 
.com/en/331/czech_politics/22449.
 11. It is worth noting that all Czech parties experienced a steep decline in member-
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ship starting in the early 1990s, with the ČSSD, whose numbers rose from 16,200 to 
18,300, the only exception.
 12. Significantly, the unemployment rate was much lower in the Czech Republic 
than elsewhere in the region. In 1995 unemployment stood at 2.9% in the Czech Re-
public, in contrast to 10.3% in Hungary and 14.7% in Poland. Similarly, the poverty rate 
was less than 1% in the Czech Republic, 2% in Hungary, and 31% in Poland (Graham 
1998, 202).
 13. Handl (2003, 5) observes: “During 1990–1998, 3289 new members entered the 
party. 67,3% party members are pensioners, 64% have only the elementary education” 
(based on Zpráva 5th Congress, 1999, 52–54).
 14. http://slovakia.eunet.sk/slovakia/elections.html.
 15. “Access to patronage typically provides party leaders with the means to build 
and maintain party organizations through the distribution of selective incentives to 
party supporters in exchange for organizational loyalty” (Van Biezen and Kopecky 
2007, 241).
 16. Elections pitting the two dominant parties, until recently in coalition, against 
each other were scheduled for late 2009.
 17. www.ndsv.bg/content/531.html.
European Center- Lefts and the Mazes  
of European Integration
George Ross
The European Union (EU) has been called an “unidentified flying political 
object” because of its constantly changing objectives, scope, size, and insti-
tutions.1 The European left, not an object at all, is many political formations 
varying nationally with each historical moment. Today’s center- lefts are 
powerfully influenced by the EU, and vice versa, and our goal is to discuss 
how these things happen. We review the historic interaction of the EU and 
the left—until the Maastricht Treaty (1992), after the end of the cold war, and 
with the coming of globalization—and then look at the EU’s present implica-
tions for lefts. The basic question that concerns us can be asked simply: Has 
European integration been friend or foe to European lefts?
The EU and Lefts to the Euro
The intertwined histories of the EU and European lefts before the Maastricht 
Treaty demonstrate the complexities of their interactions. European integra-
tion was not an idea that lefts warmly welcomed. But after a deep crisis in 
the 1970s sorely tested both the EU and national political economies, it was 
the French left which favored renewing European integration in ways which 
would promote a new market liberalism and challenge social market achieve-
ments. The EU’s programs to complete the single market and economic and 
monetary union (EMU) undercut the autonomy of earlier national models. An 
argument can be made that these changes at the European level were central 
in transforming European lefts into the center- lefts we discuss today.
Lefts and the EU’s Early Successes and Trials
The EU was started by six countries—France, the German Federal Republic, 
Italy, and the Benelux three—in the Rome Treaties (1957). Its first name, the 
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European Economic Community (EEC), and its colloquial name, “the Com-
mon Market,” underlined its focus on economic matters. The Rome EEC Treaty 
set out great ambitions, including “ever closer union” among EEC members, 
but it was mainly devoted to creating a customs- free zone surrounded by a 
common external tariff within which barriers to trade in manufactured and 
agricultural goods were to be removed.
 Institutionally the EEC copied its immediate ancestor, the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC, 1952). It was basically intergovernmental—a 
council of (national) ministers decided key policy matters. But it also had a 
supranational European Commission given exclusive power to propose legis-
lation. In addition there was a European Court of Justice (ECJ) to adjudicate 
and keep the EEC within its “treaty bases.” Finally there was a “European As-
sembly” (precursor of today’s European Parliament), whose members were 
appointed from national legislatures. The institutional model was chosen be-
cause the EEC’s founders felt that supranational mechanisms like the com-
mission and the court, purpose- built to promote intergovernmental co-
operation, were needed to forestall the ineffective deals that would follow 
if governments were left to their own devices. They felt further that if this 
institutionally unique EEC could promote interstate cooperation in its initial 
economic- market purview, the linkages between economics and other policy 
areas could foster “spillover” and progressively broaden the scope of integra-
tion. Finally, they knew that European integration would work best in a fog 
of political stealth: if people knew too much, the processes might bog down.
 The EEC began in Europe’s postwar boom, when each member had its own 
national economic strategies, welfare states, and industrial relations systems. 
These national models placed limits on how far early Europeanization could 
go. Integration increased intra- EEC trade in manufactured goods, helping to 
stimulate national growth. A Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) prodded 
agricultural investment, cushioned difficult transitions from farming to fac-
tory work, and protected farmers. The external tariff was simultaneously a 
buffer against, and a subsystem within, the Bretton Woods trading system co-
ordinated by the United States.
 Postwar lefts composed of Socialist, Communist, and other parties rep-
resented groups—workers in the first instance—that were relatively new to 
democratic participation. Parties and party systems differed from place to 
place, much like the national models with which they worked. There were 
“mass” parties tied to organized labor like the German SPD that needed 
middle- class support to win elections. Communists, powerful in France and 
Italy, were also mass parties, but tied to the Soviet side of the cold war. French 
and Italian Socialists combined clientelism with a nineteenth- century brand 
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of municipal socialism. In general it was rare for the EEC left to have exclu-
sive representation over all left- leaning constituencies, even if the German 
SPD came close. More often lefts were divided, whether between Commu-
nists and Socialists, as in Italy and France, or by linguistic or religious differ-
ences, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, and these divisions created persis-
tent strategic quarrels and electoral problems. That most lefts also competed 
within multiparty systems complicated strategic problems even more (Pater-
son and Thomas 1977).
 Divided or not, EEC lefts were central in their national political economies, 
with stakes in expanding welfare states, labor rights, and state involvement 
in markets. But even here differences were striking. The German SPD lived 
in a “social market economy” which thrived on exports, wage restraint, and 
tough monetary policies. In direct contrast, center- right statism in France 
after 1958 assumed exaggerated proportions and marginalized a deeply di-
vided left (Schonfield 1969). Belgium and the Netherlands lived within di-
visive pillar arrangements (Liphardt 1977; Visser and Hemerijk 1997). Italy 
was less developed and played catch- up in semi- statist ways which hid be-
hind a clientelist center- right Christian Democratic regime, leaving behind 
the country’s south, where economic conditions could resemble those of the 
third world, and marginalizing its largely Communist left (Hellman 2008, 
249–81).2 In general, if the first postwar decades are rightly associated with 
the construction of what some call “Keynesian welfare states,” different lefts 
did not always have easy times.
 The EEC itself was not a left project, mainly because lefts were focused on 
developing their national systems. Spaak, the Belgian minister who led the 
talks leading to the Rome Treaties, was a titular Socialist, but really more a 
Belgian national politician deeply molded by wartime experiences. Some left 
leaders of the French Fourth Republic (including Guy Mollet, head of the Sec-
tion Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, or SFIO, and François Mitterrand) 
were “Europeans,” but entire swaths of the French left opposed integration 
(Featherstone 1988). German Social Democrats opposed integration initially 
but changed their minds after the mid- 1950s when its economic advantages 
became clearer. The Italian left, socialist and communist, was more positive, 
as were Italian politicians more generally. But the EEC was really the product 
of an elite generation of politicians, often Christian Democrats, haunted by 
the Second World War.
 Lefts had reasons to be apprehensive about the EEC. Trade liberalization 
could change comparative advantages and threaten national jobs.3 The idea 
of “ever- closer union among the peoples of Europe” had federalist connota-
tions which bothered leftists who saw national arenas as their best bets. The 
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Communist line was that the EEC was a plot sponsored by the United States 
to resurrect German power. The treaty’s other explicit objectives, beyond the 
CAP, included common policies for transport, coordinating EEC economic 
policy, and an EEC antitrust regime, all readable by lefts as threatening. In 
addition, the treaty was a “framework agreement” that announced general 
goals and left practical substance for later in ways that implied future sur-
prises.
 The EEC’s institutions prompted additional worries on the left. The Euro-
pean Commission was clearly meant to expand the EEC’s mandate over time. 
This would be hard if the Council of (national) Ministers had the last word, 
giving governments a veto. But the treaty proposed that eventually the coun-
cil would decide by “qualified majority vote” (QMV), in which votes by mem-
ber states would be weighted by relative size, allowing member states to be 
outvoted. The ECJ could also be a threat because through its jurisprudence it 
could make European law that superseded national statutes. Yet the EEC insti-
tutions were empowered only in areas that the treaty specified, and this pro-
vided some comfort, in large part because social and tax policies remained 
national.
 The early EEC thrived on buoyant economic conditions in a win- win game 
between it and national models. But things did not always run smoothly. 
President Charles de Gaulle, a center- right nationalist, spearheaded member 
states’ resistance to the commission’s attempt to acquire more power and to 
enlarging the community by extending membership to the United Kingdom.4 
Introducing QMV decision making was also postponed, making unanimity the 
norm well into the 1980s. De Gaulle spoke for France’s specific French archi-
tectural stipulations about the EEC, but these concerns often reflected deeper 
realities. The Common Market had begun after each of its members had de-
veloped its own economic strategies and each had moved through the 1960s 
in its own ways.
 The 1970s were a turning point (Eichengreen 2007, chapters 7, 8). In 1971 
the United States renounced its Bretton Woods engagement to the convert-
ibility of dollars and gold. Currencies floated, speculators shifted into high 
gear, and financial globalization began. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 
sharply accelerated inflation, particularly in a Europe which had no oil. EC 
governments reacted in dispersed national order. The British Labour govern-
ment and the Gaullist French tried austerity followed by Keynesian refla-
tion, and the result was stagflation. Countries with effective wage restraint 
were less perturbed, although not immune—Germany, for example, which 
used tough monetary policies to maintain price stability. In general, though, 
lefts had difficult encounters with key constituencies and risky paths in the 
international economy.5 During these years central bankers and Anglophone 
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economists pronounced the death of Keynesianism. EC leaders, who at a sum-
mit in 1969 had proposed a list of changes including economic and mone-
tary union, deeper foreign policy cooperation, and new social policies, had 
to abandon almost all of them. Floating exchange rates menaced EC trade 
and the CAP. In addition, changed economic circumstances had led member 
states toward using non- tariff barriers to protect themselves.
 The European Monetary System (EMS), shepherded in 1978 by France 
and Germany, was one of the few innovations of this crisis period.6 All EC 
members belonged to EMS, but its inner circle, the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism (ErM), included only those accepting stronger monetary constraints.7 
EMS was founded on a political equivocation. Stronger- currency EMS mem-
bers used monetary policy to maintain price stability, following the German 
Bundesbank. Weaker- currency ones like France were more tolerant of in-
flation and devaluation.8 French elites hoped that EMS would lead the Ger-
mans to constrain the profligate sides of French policies while the French 
won greater flexibility from the Germans. These differences were to provide 
a central thread in EC history through the 1990s.
 EMS was no remedy for all EC problems. The British had done a bad deal 
when they joined in 1973, contributing more than they got back, and Prime 
Minister Thatcher made this issue a cause, insisting on a “rebate” while threat-
ening to block anything else.9 And after the collapse of southern European 
dictatorships in the later 1970s, the new democracies wanted to join the EC. 
But after Greece, governed by the Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, or PASOK, 
was admitted in 1981 it demanded serious development aid and threatened 
to prevent Spain and Portugal from joining until it got it. The EC was stuck.
 The dramatic evolution of the French left got European integration un-
stuck. Out of power since 1958, the French Socialists and their Communist 
allies won a majority in 1981 after the presidential election of François Mitter-
rand. They brought with them a long list of pledges to reinvigorate France’s 
dirigiste national model, including new nationalizations, planning, industrial 
relations reforms, decentralization, redistributive shifts of the welfare state, 
and strong Keynesian stimulation (Favier and Martin- Roland 1990). The “Mit-
terrand experiment” quickly ran into difficulties (Hall 1987). Pressures on the 
franc led to devaluations and retrenchment, and by the winter of 1983 the 
French faced a choice between leaving EMS, at high risk of isolation and fail-
ure, and staying in and making major policy changes.
 Mitterrand’s decision was providential for European integration. For 
France the new period started with deep austerity, budgetary constraints, 
liberalization including a rationalizing of the bloated public sector, privati-
zation, industrial restructuring, and slow growth. It also brought deflation 
toward parity with the German DM and high interest rates that deepened the 
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recession. France, of all EC countries, and a French left president, of all politi-
cal animals, thus recognized the new international constraints, beginning a 
forced march for French Socialists from radical reformism toward “center- 
leftism.”
 Change was as decisive in foreign policy. Mitterrand, a “European” since 
the 1950s, recommitted France to Europe during the French EC presidency 
in 1984. Under his leadership leaders settled the “British check” issue and 
agreed on how to admit Spain and Portugal, ending the decision- making 
paralysis of the EC. Quite as important, Jacques Delors, former French min-
ister of finances, became president of the European Commission. In January 
1985 Delors announced a program to complete the single market. A commis-
sion white paper soon followed, proposing massive EC legislation to remove 
all barriers to a single European economy and institute the free circulation 
of goods, capital, services, and people. The white paper prompted the Single 
European Act (SEA)—the first major EC treaty change since Rome in 1957—
expanding EC prerogatives, changing decision rules, and granting the Euro-
pean Parliament new powers (Ross 1995).
 The next big EC push began in June 1988, when leaders appointed Delors 
to chair a top- level committee that would produce proposals for economic 
and monetary union (Quatremer and Klau 1997, 151–56). The French and 
other softer- currency countries wanted to get more control over monetary 
policy from the Bundesbank to construct a new basis for European monetary 
policy less biased toward price stability and more growth- friendly. The Ger-
mans, with bargaining advantage from their financial power, set out strong 
preconditions: independent national central banks, an independent European 
central bank to produce price stability, stringent requirements for budgetary 
and economic policy convergence for EMU membership, and liberalization of 
capital markets (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). The drive to EMU culminated 
in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The EMU deal included the Ger-
man priorities to price stability, national budgetary responsibility, and tough 
“convergence criteria.”10 Applicants had to lower annual budget deficits to 
3% of GDP, squeeze longer- term debt to 60% of GDP, sustain low interest 
and inflation rates, and stabilize their currencies. EMU would begin fully on 
1 January 1999, and only those who had met these criteria would be allowed 
to join.11
Stories in the Story: The French Left Makes Center- Leftism Obligatory?
European integration did not begin as a left affair, but it had been relaunched 
in the 1980s by Mitterrand, Delors, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, 
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the two French Socialist politicians in the lead. Relaunch was built on the 
single- market program and monetary integration, both deeply liberal eco-
nomic initiatives. The relaunch would be one of the more important processes 
converting Europe to international market opening and post- Keynesian out-
looks. To be sure, several EC member states had by then already opened up 
markets and abjured Keynesianism, but new European- level policies en-
sured that everyone would have to follow, including left parties and govern- 
ments.
 François Mitterrand was a complicated man. Europe was a traditional 
arena for French operations, the nexus of Franco- German relationships, and 
a key location for France to work indirectly on a global scale. On European 
issues Mitterrand followed long- standing Gaullist goals, promoting integra-
tion to make Europe more independent of American hegemony but eschewing 
supranationalism where possible. France also had foreign economic policy 
interests in decanting German market and monetary power into broader 
European vessels. Still, this does not fully explain France’s dramatic shift in 
the 1980s. Mitterrand cared less about economic policy than about staying 
in power, and his high- visibility European initiatives intertwined with more 
mundane electoral concerns. Mitterrand needed exceptional reasons to jus-
tify abandoning the radical program upon which he had been elected. Pre-
senting his about- face in terms of the sacrifices needed to help Europe flour-
ish anew could put a different spin on things and perhaps cover up some of 
the left’s deep failures. The new “option for Europe” plus day- to- day political 
prestidigitation helped Mitterrand win two terms, until 1995, making him the 
longest- serving president in the history of the Fifth Republic.
 Jacques Delors was a different story. Mitterrand’s outlooks fluctuated 
with his electoral prospects, but Delors had always been “center- left.”12 As 
finance minister after 1981, he had dragged his feet on renewing dirigisme and 
Keynesianism. The reformist strategy that Delors advanced as commission 
president was no surprise, therefore, because he believed in liberalization, 
ending inflationary spending, and serious structural reform. He also sensed 
the coming of globalization before most politicians did. But Delors was at 
heart a left Catholic corporatist who believed that key social groups should 
cooperate for the common good, and he felt strongly that new liberalization 
and monetary stability should be accompanied by social policy initiatives at 
the EC level. He thus invested considerable resources to promote “social dia-
logue” at the European level in the hope of stimulating Euro- level collective 
bargaining.13 His Charter of Fundamental Social Rights (1989) sought new 
legislation in areas of social policy where the EC had legal prerogatives, in 
a not- so- hidden hope for spillover to new EC social policy powers.14 Delors 
326 Ross
also successfully promoted redistributive EC- level development funding for 
poorer EC regions—what came to be called the “structural funds.”
 Delors’s “social Europe” was a gamble, however. EC Europe worked on a 
consensus to which all Europeans, left or right, might subscribe that avoided 
partisan tones and spoke to common European interests. But in the real world 
of the EC the usual doctrinal struggles ground away. Big business and the po-
litical right wanted liberalization, deregulation, and sounder public finances, 
and they were happy to have the EU make them happen. They had little sym-
pathy for social Europe proposals, regarding them as steps back into a past 
that they wanted to leave behind. Delors hoped to mobilize other groups, in-
cluding unions, to Europeanize and reform European social models through 
social Europe. Business and neoliberal constituencies were strong, well orga-
nized, and able to shift resources easily to the European level. Those who 
might favor more social Europe, in contrast, were weaker, less well organized, 
and less mobile. Delors’s social Europe enterprise was therefore a long shot. 
During the Delors years liberalization and monetarism went along with “up-
ward harmonization” in workplace health and safety, equal opportunities, 
and environmental policy, in part because the relatively wealthy EC countries 
that counted most did not want a “race to the bottom.” But momentum toward 
social Europe had stalled by the mid- 1990s, far short of Delors’s hopes.
 What was most significant in the era of Delors and Mitterrand went un-
spoken. Shifting national sovereignty to the EC level was a high- stakes game 
that inevitably constrained EC members to change domestic policies. “Going 
European” was a prime way to circumvent national reluctance to reform. The 
single market program ruled out non- tariff barriers, state aids to industry, 
and pumping up industrial champions, methods that members of the French 
left, among others, had long taken for granted. EMU ruled out excessive in-
flation, high budget deficits, debt, periodic devaluations, and interest rates 
set for national purposes, all honored traditions in several EC member states. 
Thus whatever else they intended, the accomplishments of Mitterrand and 
Delors at the European level bound future national policies and practices and 
obliged European lefts to adapt.
The EU in Middle Age
The EU celebrated its fiftieth birthday in 2007, but the occasion was not very 
happy. The single market had not had the promised positive economic effects. 
EMU had become a corset constraining EU members, center- lefts with them, 
to limit economic growth. The end of the cold war had obliged EU members 
to undertake the complicated new tasks of enlarging to the east, necessitating 
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a redesign of EU institutions for twenty- seven members. Amid these difficul-
ties globalization had exploded, first financially, then in direct challenges to 
European manufacturing sectors. But the particular unfolding of EU policies, 
their impacts on EU citizens, and the ways the EU then responded created 
new puzzles. These responses also revealed how perplexing a terrain the EU 
and its institutions could be as a political arena to center- lefts.
The EU Tries Out European- Level Center- Leftism
EMU, designed during a good economic period, had to be prepared during a 
severe downturn after 1992.15 Then, with a deadline of 1998 to decide EMU 
membership on the horizon the Germans, skeptical about eventual members 
like Italy and Spain, insisted on a new Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that 
would bind Eurozone members to any convergence criteria decided in the 
future. The major troublesome issue has been that the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has emphasized price stability over anything else, growth included.16 
When countries get into difficulty the ECB holds them responsible for disci-
plining market actors and changing domestic policies (Martin and Ross eds. 
2004). This has been difficult for both rights and lefts, but it has often been 
the best- organized constituencies of the center- left—like unions and wel-
fare state stakeholders—that have been on the frontline of the pressures for 
change.
 Criticism of the ECB and the retrenchment that it enjoined eventually tar-
geted the Stability and Growth Pact. This was inevitable, since fully half of 
EMU members, including all the large continental countries and quite a few 
smaller ones, had violated the taboo against running annual budget deficits of 
more than 3% of GDP at one time or another after 2000. SGP reform in 2005 
gave members slightly more room to confront ups and downs, in particular in 
the discounting costs of future- oriented policies for things like research and 
restructuring. In difficult circumstances EMU members thus could exceed the 
annual 3% deficit, but they were also enjoined to lower deficits when things 
went better.17
 In 1993, after it had concluded that important EU economies faced serious 
longer- run problems in the run- up to EMU, the Delors Commission produced 
a new white paper, “Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment,” which 
urged EU Europe to mobilize anew to confront the new monetary environ-
ment and globalization. Levels of European growth and investment had been 
shrinking over decades, it noted, and the EU’s global competitive position was 
worsening. What followed was a manifesto that went well beyond Delors’s 
early single- market, “social Europe” conceptualizations. The white paper as-
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serted that “creating as favorable an environment as possible for company 
competitiveness” was essential, placing stress on innovation to push Europe 
toward an “information society” where new comparative advantage lay. It 
also called for more labor market flexibility, particularly through active labor 
market policies, plus substantial welfare state reform. The document was 
solidly “center- left.” It began from recognition of new constraints from glob-
alization and from the EU’s own single- market and EMU policies, eschewed 
market fundamentalism, and aimed for the preservation of Europe’s commit-
ments to social market economies, but it also argued that Europeans should 
cooperate in the reforms that were needed to achieve that preservation. The 
white paper fell flat politically, however. EU members, facing severe domes-
tic problems, were tired of constant Euro- level tension and refused its request 
for neo- Keynesian, employment- boosting loans.
 The Lisbon Agenda (2000), promoted by a center- left Portuguese EU presi-
dency and backed by Tony Blair, focused again on declining European global 
competitiveness and reformist preservation of the EU’s social market econo-
mies. It declared that EU Europe should become the world’s most advanced 
“knowledge economy” and restore full employment by 2010. It proposed a 
big increase in Euro- level research and development, greater coordination 
among research efforts by member states, training for new skills, new infra-
structure, and environmental policies for sustainable development. It also 
focused on active labor market policies, increasing labor force participation, 
and removing disincentives to work that persisted in many national welfare 
states.
 Delors’s white paper and the Lisbon strategy were both couched in the 
EU’s usual consensus rhetoric, and their goal was to reframe EU perspectives 
on general European economic goals. Their results have been mixed.18 Most 
Lisbon policies fell within national prerogatives, meaning that the success 
of European policies and urging were dependent on voluntary national co-
operation. To produce such cooperation Lisbon institutionalized an “Open 
Method of Coordination” (OMC). OMC began when the EU set out general 
guidelines, then encouraged member states to hold regular, open discussions 
about achieving them; identified national “best practices” and established 
indicators of progress; and finally, publicized successes and failures by nam-
ing and shaming from Brussels. OMC used soft law and exhortation because 
the EU lacked harder tools.19 The hope was that they would help remodel 
overregulated labor markets and welfare state programs while preserving 
the “European social model.” The center- right carved its own goals out of the 
consensual rhetoric of Lisbon, which it sought to use to push neoliberal struc-
tural reforms. By 2005, with the strategy far short of its goals, Lisbon was re-
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centered on narrower issues of structural reform and liberalization, and re-
sponsibilities were reassigned to national state governments in a retreat from 
OMC. Thereafter member states picked and chose what they wanted to do.
 Delors’s white paper and the Lisbon strategy were good examples of 
center- left thinking about economic and social reform applied at the EU level. 
They began proposing ideas, pleas, and programs to achieve new European 
competitiveness in globalizing circumstances. Since the EU could not legally 
oblige member states to follow, it could only hope to persuade them to co-
operate in a decentralized, coordinated way. Would member states, each with 
special economic problems, political and partisan setups, and social models, 
cooperate enough voluntarily to make a difference? On a different plane, 
would OMC be seductive enough to wean labor movements and welfare state 
stakeholders, significant constituencies of the center- left, away from their 
deeply entrenched, often corporatist preferences? Or, in contrast, would it 
simply confuse them or, worse still, antagonize them?
 As Lisbon moved toward the target year of 2010, it was hard not to con-
clude that the choices proposed by both Delors’s white paper and Lisbon 
contained wishful center- left political thinking. The methods that they chose 
involved high- minded EU preaching to member states to produce national 
reform, “new modes of governance,” and procedural innovations like OMC 
that covered up technocratic leadership, decentralization, and depoliticiza-
tion. These approaches merged different issues and policy areas in untried 
ways and underplayed European and national disagreements. Today Lisbon 
has clearly not accomplished enough to live up to the hype surrounding it.20 
It is not at all clear, for example, whether it has helped to advance Europe 
toward greater competitiveness, its ostensible purpose (Buchs 2007; Buchs 
2008). Further, in other quarters market fundamentalists have consistently 
derided original Lisbon formulations as ineffective, arguing that OMC ap-
proaches were too convoluted and that behind its consensual words Lisbon 
really sought to preserve the European social models that were the real bar-
riers to new competitiveness. Center- left efforts at the European level to tran-
scend the structures of older left worlds have not worked yet, or perhaps have 
not worked at all.
Troublesome EU Policies = Troubled EU Citizens
This lack of success correlated with rising public opposition to the EU and 
its policies. During its first decades EU leaders had been able to count on 
“permissive consensus” from citizens. This had left leaders free to use the 
European arena as long as they agreed to do nothing that caused too much 
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national political grumbling. But in the decade prior to its fiftieth birthday, 
the EU dramatically lost favor with parts of public opinion. Its loss of popu-
larity began as the Single Market broke the cocoons of national development 
models, EMU normalized an emerging international price stability regime, 
and Lisbon tried to “flexibilize” labor markets and welfare states. The Maas-
tricht Treaty also increased EU power in areas like policing, immigration, and 
foreign and defense policy, and not everyone approved of this.21 On another 
plane, Western European electorates were not fully persuaded that enlarg-
ing the EU to Central and Eastern European countries was wise, partly be-
cause leaders did not really explain the process and its goals. Enlargement 
and Maastricht’s unfinished business also fed constant intergovernmental 
wrangling about adapting EU institutions and communicated directly to citi-
zens the deep divisions about high EU politics. All this was presided over by 
a generation of national leaders preoccupied with national politics and rela-
tively indifferent to the EU.
 The most immediate explanation for the decline in EU popularity was the 
failure of the Single Market, EMU, and Lisbon Agenda to restore growth, limit 
unemployment, and respond effectively to globalization. Some EU countries 
fared better than others, but the problem of low growth and high unemploy-
ment persisted, and the worst performers were France, Germany, and Italy, 
among the largest EU countries, which together decide the EU’s general eco-
nomic fate. Eurobarometer polling showed that the EU remained valued in 
the abstract, but only 20% associated the EU with democracy and prosperity, 
while the same percentage associated it with bureaucracy and wasted money. 
It was globalization that worried EU citizens most: 42% felt that the EU might 
protect them from its negative effects, while 40% did not (Reynié 2008).
 The most spectacular indicators of weakening public support for the EU 
came in national referenda. In 1992 the Danes fired the first warning shot by 
refusing to ratify Maastricht in 1992, while the French barely voted yes the 
same year. The Irish refused the Nice Treaty in 2002. The French and Dutch 
refused the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005. Most recently the Irish 
refused the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008. The trends revealed in these votes 
were worrisome for anyone invested in European integration. They were 
doubly so to European lefts, for it was constituencies most likely to support 
left parties—workers, the poor, and social movement activists—who dem-
onstrated the least enthusiasm. The problem was complicated by the more 
favorable disposition toward the EU of the new middle-class groups that the 
center- left also needed to attract, making coalition building a perplexing task 
(Fligstein 2008).
 For center- lefts to have influence on EU- level policies they had to be able 
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to play at the EU level, and for this they needed to win national elections and 
mobilize national support behind what they wanted the EU to do. This was 
a real challenge. EU market liberalization breached the borders around the 
relatively self- contained national development models upon which most lefts 
had long depended.22 Globalization then obliged everyone to squeeze down 
inflation and avoid deficits and debt, with EMU and the SGP intensifying the 
squeezing. Newly mobile financial markets limited tax policymaking and 
wage growth and put new pressure on labor markets and social programs. 
Manufacturing successes of lower- wage areas of the world compressed the 
wages and benefits of European manufacturing workers and added to em-
ployment insecurity.
 These changes coincided with the end of socialist dreams, meaning that 
center- lefts had to find new grounds to win the electoral support they needed 
to assert influence at the EU level. The saga surrounding the white paper and 
Lisbon marked perhaps the Euro- level center- left’s best effort to do this, and 
it did not work, or at least has not yet worked. Persuading traditional left 
constituencies and stakeholders to hear and accept new reformist strategies 
was difficult when they faced growing economic insecurity and had strong 
incentives to hold on to positions that the left had helped them win in the 
postwar period. To make things even harder, new radical forces were emerg-
ing, particularly from the new middle classes, mobilized around very differ-
ent dreams: things like environmental change, stopping globalization, and 
anti- immigrant populism. The European world of center- lefts had become an 
uncertain place.
Fragmented Center- Lefts, Biased Policy Agendas,  
and Confusing Institutions
The importance of the EU in its members’ domestic politics and lives has 
grown enormously in the last two decades, to different degrees in different 
countries. The single market and EMU increased employment insecurity, con-
strained public finances, and compressed growth, making it more difficult for 
lefts to reward traditional constituencies. Center- left national governments 
have had to trim spending, remodel welfare states, restrain wages, and intro-
duce new flexibility into labor markets, policies that have often run counter 
to the expectations of center- left supporters. In the meantime deindustrial-
ization had reduced the number of blue- collar workers, undercutting unions 
and service workers, and “new middle class” groups have grown, complicat-
ing coalitional and electoral problems.
 In the abstract it makes sense for center- lefts to work more effectively 
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at the EU level for the changes and reforms they seek. The kinds of poli-
cies proposed in the white paper in 1993 and reposed in the Lisbon Agenda 
ought to be seen as examples of this, while the problems that the center- lefts 
have faced underline the problems of doing so. The EU is a tricky place for 
center- lefts to work. One reason is that the deep historic trajectories of the 
EU asymmetrically favor the center- right. The backbone of what the EU does, 
grounded in international treaties, has been market liberalization and bud-
getary restraint through EMU, things which the center- right has most often 
favored. The center- left has often advocated Euro- policies for “re- regulating” 
markets and redistributing resources, but the EU has always been much better 
at de- than re- regulating, and even when the EU has re- regulated it has done 
so in more economically liberal ways than most center- lefts have desired. Be-
yond this, the treaties have granted to the EU only limited powers to effect 
redistribution, because most social and tax policy matters remain national. 
This is no accident: member states and national parties have preferred to 
keep resources at home rather than donate them to others.
 The EU’s policy asymmetry is complemented by the workings of EU insti-
tutions. Even if it has serious mechanisms to promote binding cooperation 
among members, the EU remains made up of states which evolve in different 
ways and whose national politics vary greatly. When translated into different 
national interests at the EU level, this is one reason why European integra-
tion has proceeded by fits and starts, punctuated by crises. Moreover, at any 
moment the EU is likely to be inhabited by both left and right governments. 
Except in extraordinary circumstances, therefore, not much can happen at 
the EU level unless a consensus can be reached among member governments, 
right and left. Because decisions built on complicated intergovernmental 
negotiations must be compromises between national interests, the EU’s pro-
cesses are slow, sometimes too much so to reach appropriate decisions in time 
to solve important problems effectively.
 The institutional problems of reaching consensus have grown with the en-
largement of the EU since 1995 from twelve to twenty- seven members.23 The 
political mathematics of this are simple. The more EU members there are, 
the greater the likelihood of a divergence of preferences about issues and 
decisions, and of blocking coalitions. When compared to national political 
processes, in which majorities and minorities are derived from electoral re-
sults, it will be harder to do things at the European level. All else being equal, 
this creates a bias in favor of slow forward movement and frequent decision- 
making problems. This makes it difficult to achieve the reforms that are the 
center- left’s stock in trade.
 Irrespective of the limits imposed by EU institutions on the left’s influ-
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ence, to have influence European lefts need to agree on what they want to 
do together. Here is where the largest problems for center- lefts arise. Today’s 
center- lefts are as diverse as their countries, for several reasons. However 
realistic center- left elites might be about European and international con-
straints, they have first to win power nationally. The primacy of this task 
shapes their outlooks by path- dependent national histories, policy legacies, 
institutions, organizations, and coalitional patterns.24 And European- level 
policies will affect each country differently. It also follows that when work-
ing in European arenas center- left governments will pursue national inter-
ests that go beyond and probably dilute partisanship. The resulting puzzle is 
difficult for any center- left to solve. More importantly, different national out-
looks will limit the capacities of center- left parties to cooperate on Euro- level 
policy goals, if only because the degree to which they agree to cooperate on 
these goals may limit their capacities to succeed nationally.
 By now center- lefts have all accepted new constraints on what they can do 
nationally, but this has not appreciably narrowed differences between them, 
as a few examples should demonstrate.25 All the members added when the 
EU was enlarged in 1995—the Scandinavian neutrals except Norway, plus 
Austria—were wealthy and had extensive experience with budgetary and 
wage restraint, employment flexibility, and participation in open interna-
tional markets, making their adaptation to post- EMU EU constraints relatively 
easy. British New Labour had been prepared by Thatcherite deconstruction 
of the old Labour world, which left public finances in order and growth pros-
pects good. New Labour, with openings for domestic social policy initiatives 
of an “activating” kind, could adapt easily (Cronin 2004). Continental lefts 
were the main problem cases, often because of corporatist rejection of labor 
market and social policy reforms and growing electoral problems. The posi-
tion of the French Parti Socialiste was complicated by chronic left pluralism. 
The German SPD, leading a Red- Green coalition from 1998 to 2005, faced 
post- unification difficulties and had to enact unpopular labor market reforms 
which helped create die Linke, a new rival to its left. Italy had divided left 
coalitions that were chronically unable to face its intractable problems. Of 
the left parties in big continental EU members only the Spanish PSOE, helped 
by Europeanization and EMU, has flourished. Lefts in the smaller continen-
tal countries struggled and to varying degrees declined. The new Central and 
Eastern European lefts, involved in democratic transitions, were center- left 
from the beginning and constrained by the requirements of joining the EU, 
but loath to give up any more of their new and hard- won sovereignty. There 
were center- lefts and center- lefts, in other words, each profoundly national 
and each affected in different ways by what the EU did.
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 What this differentiation implied for left cooperation at the European level 
can be gleaned from one of the rare occasions when several center- left gov-
ernments held power at the same time. In the later 1990s New Labour, the 
“plural left” around the PS in France, a center- left coalition in Italy, and the 
Red- Green coalition in Germany governed four of the largest EU member 
states, while eleven of fifteen EU governments leaned leftward more gener-
ally. The effect was to impart a leftish tinge to EU- level politics, leading in par-
ticular to the European Employment Strategy (EES), an immediate precursor 
of the Lisbon Agenda. The EES combined ideas from socialists in the European 
parliament, the Delors white paper of 1993, the commission’s directorate- 
general for employment and social affairs (then led by a very clever Swedish 
Social Democrat), and New Labour “Third Way” prescriptions about employ-
ability (Aust 2004). Its goals included more active and flexible labor markets, 
social programs sustaining commitments to existing social models, and in-
creasing labor force participation. But because labor market and social policy 
realms remained national, the EES used OMC methods. The results, seen in 
EES and the Lisbon Agenda, have been uneven and ambiguous. EU member 
states could choose to cooperate more or less depending on their national 
situations. Changes are ongoing, but are most rigorously pursued in those 
countries that were already committed to such things before the EES and Lis-
bon were devised. In other places, particularly on the continent, opposition 
to protect the status quo has been strong (Pochet and Zeitlin eds. 2005; de la 
Porte 2008).
 The episode surrounding the EES and Lisbon illustrates just how weak 
agreement and cooperation between different EU member state lefts can be. 
New Labour under Tony Blair, more pro- EU than any British government in 
history, remained Euro- skeptical in key areas—participation in EMU and EU 
social policies among them.26 The French “Plural Left” government under 
Lionel Jospin, cool toward the EU in general, was neo- Keynesian, dead set 
against Blairite commitments, and preoccupied with domestic work- sharing 
reforms of which most other center- lefts disapproved. The German SPD chan-
cellor Schröder, preoccupied with domestic concerns, was cynical about the 
EU and the willingness of German unions to undertake changes that might 
jeopardize their domestic positions. The Italian left had usually been pro- 
European—it played a key role in allowing Italy to join EMU—but the govern-
ment of the time was an unruly multiparty coalition which on matters of EES 
and Lisbon domestic reforms was at the mercy of refractory neocommunists. 
The Danish, Swedish, and Austrian center- lefts, deeply social democratic and 
in favor of reforms of the sort embodied in EES, were Euro- skeptical, in keep-
ing with traditional perspectives of “don’t touch our intricate and success-
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ful domestic arrangements.”27 Further, in virtually every case national trade 
union movements, whose cooperation in labor market reforms were essen-
tial, stood behind their national governments’ varying EU positions, despite 
the hard work of the transnational European Trade Union Confederation. The 
larger story was that even when center- lefts had a political edge at the EU 
level and might have weighed heavily on EU decisions, they had difficulty 
agreeing on what the EU might do and on carrying out the EU’s proposals.
 EU institutions also make it difficult to achieve cooperation between Euro- 
reformists and the left.28 Center- lefts are now well organized in a transna-
tional Party of European Socialists, for example, but the European Parliament 
as an institution restricts what they can do.29 Unlike national parliaments it 
cannot initiate legislation, because the European Commission has exclusive 
right to this power. But to exercise this power effectively the commission 
must solicit cooperation among member states. Thus it cannot act like a gov-
ernment or party leader, and can propose only after carefully gauging what 
national governments are willing to accept.30 Proposals for legislation are 
thus the product of consensus across national differences and party lines. The 
European Parliament has usually shared this consensus- oriented outlook and 
often proceeded on agreement between center- left and center- right. Without 
power of initiative, the EP’s work mainly lies in scrutinizing those commis-
sion proposals that it gets, which it does in committees rather than in par-
tisan debate on the EP floor. In addition, the European Parliament is only a 
co- legislator in the EU system. To reach any decisions it must negotiate com-
promise with an intergovernmental Council of Ministers.
 EU institutions in general, like the commission and Parliament, are 
purpose- built to promote and facilitate transnational cooperation, and there-
fore speak in consensual, pan- European languages. The institutions have thus 
more often than not turned potentially partisan issues into technocratic ones. 
These forms of expression have helped make the EU distant from citizens. The 
intergovernmental dimensions of EU- level governance, the European Coun-
cil, which also talks in consensus language, and the Council of Ministers, 
which continues to meet in diplomatic secret, do little to translate EU mat-
ters into national vocabularies. The European Parliament is the most likely 
translator of Euro- level politics into national political dialects, but it has not 
yet replicated national left- right cleavages in readable ways and its concerns 
have rarely penetrated national agendas (Franklin 2006). For these and other 
reasons elections to the EP have had low participation and national issues 
have predominated in election campaigning. Thus if EU policies have pro-
found effects, the EU itself has so far not been able to Europeanize the perti-
nent political lives of center- lefts.
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Conclusions: Center- Lefts in Chilly European Climates?
The EU is today in a difficult situation. Exhausting and complicated debate 
about the institutional change needed for enlargement to twenty- seven mem-
bers, interspersed with French and Dutch no votes on the “constitutional 
treaty” in 2005 and the Irish no to its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, in 2008, 
underline chronic problems that ordinary citizens have in making sense of 
the EU. It is common to talk of an EU “democratic deficit,” even if it can 
be argued that EU institutions meet reasonable constitutional standards for 
democracy.31 Whatever one calls the EU’s political dilemmas, however, the 
European Union has serious problems of legitimacy and credibility.
 EU institutions suffer from serious “readability” problems as well. Citizens 
are accustomed to the structures, cultures, and politics of the countries which 
have first claim on their loyalties and identities. Adding another layer of very 
different institutions at the EU level and expecting citizens to understand 
and identify with them may be overoptimistic. The European Commission is 
thus easy to demonize as a distant and irresponsible “Brussels bureaucracy” 
whose roles are mysterious except to insiders aware that it is designed to pre-
vent strong member states from running the EU show and ensure that govern-
ments honor their commitments. Some citizens know that their leaders get 
together as the EU Council of Ministers and that this makes a difference, but 
they get precious little information about how the council works. To this mix-
ture one must also consider what the EU actually does. It is not a state, and is 
unlikely to become one. Yet it does some things that states do, shares in the 
doing of other things with these states that they used to do by themselves, 
and can have strong indirect impacts in areas where citizens have every rea-
son to expect national leaders to be able to act on their own. The Parliament, 
as just noted, does not resemble anyone’s “real” parliament. On top of all this 
there is no EU “we the people,” but rather twenty- seven different peoples 
with different histories, cultures, and languages.
 All this places the EU at a distance from most of its citizens, whether on the 
left or the right, and when the EU touches matters that are perceived as fun-
damental to the daily lives of citizens it is bound to stir up controversy. Given 
that daily lives are organized differently from one EU country to another, con-
troversies will take on different forms. And since these days, thanks in part to 
center- leftish programs like the Lisbon Agenda, it can look as if the EU is bent 
on shaping up its member states for liberal globalization, the EU is likely to 
be controversial to wary and uncertain “peoples of the left.” The EU’s base of 
support, such as it is, is found among the better educated and better off. The 
lower one goes down the social ladder, the more the EU arouses opposition. 
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The center- left’s traditional constituencies are those likely to be skeptical. A 
more complex problem is that center- lefts must also find ways to appeal to 
higher pro- European strata.32
 In fact “real” European politics happens largely in national arenas, built 
on what national governments want to share with other EU members and 
what they prefer to keep out of EU hands. There exists little European po-
litical culture except among elites. There are no European news media—
despite the claims to pan- European status of Anglophone sources like the 
Economist and the Financial Times—just nationally based media that inter-
pret EU events through national lenses. National parliamentary discussions 
rarely place European issues squarely before the public, while elections to the 
European Parliament remain tightly linked to national political debates. With 
few exceptions—Denmark, for example—national parties have barely begun 
to embrace European matters. The gap between the thickness of national 
democratic deliberative practice and its thinness at the European level is evi-
dent. This is important to center- lefts, whose political bases may be conflicted 
about the EU but whose leaders must also have strategies to work at EU levels 
if they win power.
 All this has tended to make European center- lefts more takers than makers 
of European- level policies. The EU decides and center- lefts integrate the con-
sequences into their diverse national arenas, like it or not. In the EU’s earlier 
years, when European integration was handmaiden to national development 
models and EU members had a national veto, this was less of a burden. It has 
become a much larger one with the EU opening economic and other borders, 
running a monetary union, and engaging in “mission creep” into broader 
areas like policing, immigration control, civil law, education and research 
policy, environmental and energy policy, and foreign and defense policy. 
Also, today’s EU of twenty- seven members includes practically all the peoples 
on the European continent, adding to complex diversity.
 In policy terms things have not worked quite as planned. The EU has lib-
eralized extensively and EMU works in technical terms. But encroaching 
globalization has meant that economic growth and prosperity have returned 
only for those who were already well prepared, for national reasons, to grow. 
Those center- lefts that inherited flexible, muscular economic and social 
policy systems and learned to function without Keynesianism and with non- 
accommodating monetary policies have done best. Other center- lefts, par-
ticularly on the European continent, face constituents who resist the national 
imposition of center- left policy formulas and insistently worry whether 
today’s EU is a cushion to ease them into a globalized world or, in contrast, 
an agent of neoliberal globalization. This is where things now stand.
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 That European center- lefts have been takers rather than makers of Euro- 
level politics does not mean that they should be seen as persistent victims of 
EU policies. EU Europe has historically been an open arena for debating re-
formist changes and sometimes has even led the implementation of changes.33 
While there has been much of bureaucrats talking to other bureaucrats and 
a few Members of the European Parliament, with small groups of academics 
and lobbyists listening, some of the discussion must be taken seriously, as his-
torical record shows. When new members have joined the EU they have been 
expected to accept what is called the acquis communautaire, the EU’s accu-
mulated institutional rules and processes, and this acceptance has enhanced 
their commitment to human rights, good governance, and social, environ-
mental, and other policies. Moreover, the European power of northern Euro-
pean “social market” societies has meant that European- level policies have 
usually involved “upward harmonization” rather than races to the bottom. 
Environmental policies are an important case in point, but there are others, 
such as equal opportunities between men and women in the workplace, and 
workplace health and safety. And even when the EU has few explicit treaty 
powers it can also try to promote reformist change through decentralized 
“soft law” techniques like those used in OMC and the Lisbon strategy.
 What does this all come to? That EU Europe is an obstacle course for center- 
leftists does not mean that the EU is a paradise for the neoliberal forces: they 
too have found EU- level politics frustrating. One reason is that today’s EU 
works badly. It must function ideologically according to the presumed con-
sensus, or at least the presumed common interest, of Europeans—500 million 
individual citizens, different localities, regions, civil societies, and nation- 
states, and, yes, EU officials and leaders. Any such EU consensus is bound to 
be a vague common denominator of the huge variety of interests living under 
and around the EU’s big tent. The lack of clarity that results is not comforting 
for everyone.
 The handicaps of working with such a vague European consensus are not 
the same as those of winning the policy struggles whose content is often 
obscured by the EU’s veils of consensus and difficult- to- fathom institutional 
life. It is hard to underestimate the significance of recent EU battles between 
neoliberals and the advocates of something that might be called social mar-
ket economies. Lefts and their center- left successors have been present and 
active in these battles, which are far from over. As we write, EU efforts to 
liberalize service markets and recent ECJ decisions about freedom of busi-
ness movement across borders threaten social and labor protection programs 
underlying national social contracts. Center- lefts cannot stand aside on such 
matters any more than on other battles about Europe’s place in global com-
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petition and the desirable shape of globalization itself. It is nonetheless clear 
that the center- lefts have not been nearly as effective as they might have been 
in these and other EU skirmishes. The EU demands that center- lefts answer 
vitally important questions, but it is not terribly helpful in providing them 
with answers.
Notes
 1. The official title changes over time. Until 1965 it was the European Economic 
Community (EEC). After a merger treaty in 1965 bundling the ECSC, Euratom, and the 
EEC it became the European Communities, or EC. After the Maastricht Treaty was rati-
fied it became the European Union, or EU.
 2. The variety grew when one looked at the EEC’s near neighborhoods. Scandi-
navian lefts built densely organized egalitarian social democratic systems where so-
cial actors internalized national cooperation for international economic success. The 
British, determined but ineffective saboteurs at the start of the EEC, had a strong work-
erist Labour Party and a Labour- created public sector and welfare state stalled by bad 
economic policies, a flawed industrial relations system, and a collapsing empire.
 3. The Rome EEC Treaty also proposed abolishing “obstacles to freedom of move-
ment for persons, services and capital,” a reform which, were it actually done, might 
pose an even bigger threat to national jobs than open trade in manufacturing.
 4. When the commission proposed a very liberal Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) that threatened French agricultural subsidy systems, it was shot down, replaced 
by a costly scheme of administered price supports that protected EEC farmers interna-
tionally.
 5. Perhaps the best example came when British Labour’s failed “Social Contracts” 
led to the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979.
 6. They also took the lead in promoting direct elections to the European Parliament 
and creating the European Council, which held institutionalized summits of member 
state leaders.
 7. ErM members committed to keeping their currencies within a “narrow band” of 
exchange rates as compared to a basket of currencies tied to the dollar, as well as to 
market intervention to buoy threatened currencies and negotiations to revalue when 
needed. Revaluation occurred twenty- six times between 1979 and 1999.
 8. This endowed EMS with a rhythm. When weaker currencies ran up against the 
“narrow band” barrier, central banks had to intervene. Stabilization was often tempo-
rary, however, and the troubled country might then have to negotiate a revaluation, 
often entailing change in its economic policies.
 9. Wall 2008, chapters 1–3, provides a British insider’s account.
 10. See Dyson and Featherstone 1999 for EMU negotiations.
 11. The French wanted an “economic government” to set EMU macroeconomic 
policy, but the Germans refused, insisting instead on a completely independent Euro-
pean Central Bank statutorily committed to price stability.
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 12. Delors 2004 is an indispensable source.
 13. He managed to persuade the EU to invest heavily in this, getting a clause dedi-
cated to its pursuit included in the SEA and then pumping up the finances of the 
theretofore weak European Trade Union Confederation to allow it to play more sig-
nificantly at the EU level. Martin and Ross eds. 1999, chapter 8.
 14. The Social Charter played a role in the domestic politics of a number of EC coun-
tries. In the United Kingdom, for example, it convinced the Trade Union Congress, bat-
tered by Thatcherism, of the importance of Europe.
 15. Inflation in Germany fed by the unification of West and East put pressure on 
EMS currencies and prompted a severe response from the Bundesbank. Realigning 
currencies might have ended the problems, but few wanted to try realignment in the 
middle of a French referendum campaign to ratify Maastricht. The first result was 
“Black Wednesday,” 16 September 1992, when the British pound left ErM, followed by 
wild currency fluctuations elsewhere. The EMS crisis contributed to lowered growth 
and rising unemployment—to over 10% in the larger continental economies, and made 
EMU convergence a major burden.
 16. In January 1999 the Euro was valued at $1.18, by autumn 2000 at $0.80, and by 
early 2008 at $1.60.
 17. The “policy mix” between federalized monetary policies and decentralized 
macroeconomic policies has often been suboptimal. The “Eurogroup” of EMU mem-
bers has tried to promote coherence through “broad economic policy guidelines,” but 
member states have not been obliged to harmonize macroeconomic policies.
 18. Liberalizing services was a centerpiece, but resistance to a commission proposal 
in 2004 watered down the directive. Financial services and energy market liberaliza-
tion are incomplete. Brussels has moved on chemicals regulation (rEACH) and climate 
change, and talked about lightening its regulatory hand, with limited results.
 19. It had been pioneered in the EU Employment Policy, begun after the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1997 and then extended to social policy areas like “social inclusion” (poverty 
policy) and pension reforms.
 20. Lisbon has certainly helped the professional profiles of the progressive demo-
crats who have waxed eloquently in—often scholarly—journals about the virtues of 
OMC as “directly deliberative polyarchy,” a substitute for representative parliamen-
tarism.
 21. The EU’s rocky foreign policy start did not help. The EU was impotent in its Yugo-
slavian backyard, leaving American help as the only recourse.
 22. Stein Rokkan’s work on shifting borders and nation building in Europe has been 
resurrected recently in discussions of European integration (Bartolini 2005; Kriesi 
et al. 2008).
 23. New CEEC members have just regained sovereignty and are unlikely to want to 
give up much of it to the EU. In addition, their development models are often different 
from those of Western Europe (Zielonka 2006).
 24. Schmidt 2006 hints at this story, alas only part, in trying to analyze the effects 
of the EU on “simple” versus “compound” polities.
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 25. This chapter does not attempt to discuss how EU constraints on national center- 
lefts actually alter the structures and functioning of these national parties, a topic 
that remains badly underresearched and probably underconceptualized. For a critical 
introduction see Gombert 2008.
 26. EES and Lisbon demonstrated an aggressive New Labour line that liberalizing 
reforms of welfare states and industrial relations systems was the only road to future 
successes. For a taste of aggressive Third Way proselytizing on labor market and social 
policy see Giddens 2007.
 27. See the essays by Pekarinnen, Aylott, Haaher, and Veiden in Notermans ed. 2001. 
Chapter 12 in Gaffney ed. 1996 reviews the Scandinavian cases.
 28. Center- rights vary in similar ways, but lesser commitments to re- regulating and 
redistributing at the Euro level and the EU’s liberal bias lessen their coordination dif-
ficulties.
 29. Some experts, like Simon Hix, see this, plus growing right- left divisions in the 
EP, as nourishing stronger “Euro” dimensions in national center- lefts. See Hix 2007. 
There are good reasons to think that this effect will be limited and slow, however. On 
the European Socialist Party see Ladrech 2003 and Moschonas 2007.
 30. This is true even if in recent years commissions have been appointed in the wake 
of European Parliament elections to reflect the partisan balance in the Parliament.
 31. See Moravscik 2002.
 32. Moschonas 2008b provides a different argument, complementary to what fol-
lows.
 33. At the time of writing, for example, EU officials had begun an extensive debate 
on the EU’s “social agenda” by circulating an important document on “Europe’s Social 
Reality.” See European Commission 2008 for details.

Conclusion
Progressive Politics in Tough Times
James Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch
The stories told here are all about the fate of the center- left in tough times. 
What made the times so tough for social democrats and liberals were the 
three critical events noted at the beginning of this volume: the end of capital-
ism’s “golden age” and the loss of faith in the Keynesian policies that guided 
it; the end of communism and its disenchanting effects; and the globalization 
of the economy. All this made for a much less hospitable environment for the 
center- left. So too did the acceleration of the trend toward postindustrial em-
ployment and the shifts in social structure and demography that accompa-
nied the transition. These forces were of course compounded by the legacies 
that liberal and social democratic parties brought into the new era. In some 
cases the center- left was clearly uncomfortable with the managed capitalism 
of the postwar period and had trouble reconciling its transformative goals 
with a more prosaic, if also more prosperous and democratic and equitable, 
reality. In other cases parties of the moderate left had become rather too com-
fortable in the mixed economy, too thoroughly enmeshed in its corporatist 
institutions and in the compromises they represented, and so unable to think 
beyond the time when those arrangements would cease to work. In all cases 
adapting to an era of slower growth and tighter budgets, greater technologi-
cal change, and a more demanding and competitive world economy in which 
markets were seen as more useful than the state was a serious challenge. The 
main work of this book has been to chart and assess this adaptation. Here, 
roughly, is what we have found.
Center- Lefts Have Been Successful
Center- lefts were historically central in building, explaining, consolidat-
ing, and lately defending the modern welfare states and employment rela-
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tions systems which have protected workers and citizens in Europe, North 
America, and elsewhere from the risks and uncertainties of capitalism. These 
innovations have taught us that peoples’ lives need not be completely subject 
to the cycles of markets, the inequalities that markets produce, or the capri-
ciousness that owners of capital might otherwise demonstrate. They have 
thus smoothed and humanized what would have been much rougher lives for 
hundreds of millions of people. Our first conclusion, therefore, is that these 
innovations are still solidly in place notwithstanding the tough times and 
substantial challenges, social changes, and outright attacks. To be sure, other 
actors have contributed to this result, and different center- lefts have played 
their roles in different ways to make this happen. But absent these historic 
victories and the efforts of center- lefts to maintain them, which during the 
tough times beginning in the late 1970s have often required difficult reforms, 
today’s globalizing world would not have models to emulate for those who 
would democratize capitalism. This achievement has meant that neoliber-
alism has not won the decisive victory that three decades of political domi-
nance might have led one to expect.
Center Lefts Vary Greatly
The second major conclusion to emerge from this book is that there is no 
single, universally agreed model either for democratized capitalism or for the 
center- left itself. Some center- lefts have obviously been more successful than 
others. Moreover, the special nature of each center- left has created a wide 
range of organizations, policy practices, and goals. Untangling these variants 
and the political economies within which they have arisen and worked has 
been one of our most important tasks.
 The greatest center- left successes, which provide the most widely admired 
models for many center- lefts, are found in Scandinavia, and the reasons for 
this are elaborated in the chapter by Jonas Pontusson. In this region are sev-
eral small, very well- organized societies where organizations, social groups, 
citizens, and politicians cooperate at a high level to maintain international 
competitiveness and domestic welfare. Here are highly coordinated market 
economies with unusual adaptive capacities and policy creativity which do 
very well on most performance criteria: growth, employment, innovation, 
per capita income, productivity, education, social security, gender equality, 
and reconciling work and family. The Swedish system, promoted as a viable 
“third way” before anyone had ever heard of Tony Blair, is the envy of center- 
leftists everywhere. What the Danes call “flexicurity” has recently been held 
up as a workable and humane policy response to a globalized and highly com-
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petitive economy. Norway continues to impress, albeit while benefiting from 
oil resources, and Finland’s ability to shift gears after the cold war toward a 
growth model led by high technology has been truly extraordinary. Success-
ful labor market reforms in the Netherlands may also have made the Dutch 
into honorary Scandinavians.
 Scandinavian center- lefts are unique. They all emerged from very small 
economies and largely homogeneous societies which could only grow in con-
ditions of trade openness to which they had to learn to adapt. To avoid the 
social disruptions and inequalities that could have followed their adapta-
tion, they also had to find ways to help their citizens manage life transitions. 
Often they did so through institutions that simultaneously obliged employers 
to innovate and helped employees to move from declining to growing sec-
tors. Many social democratic formations drew strong distinctions between 
industrial workers and other citizens. Most Scandinavian parties, by con-
trast, sought to promote equality among citizens, as Sheri Berman underlines, 
through policies of wage compression, redistribution through taxation, and 
universal access to a wide range of social programs and services, including 
retraining to facilitate job transitions. This has turned out to be a fundamen-
tal distinction.
 Scandinavian center- left approaches have had one additional consequence. 
Their combination of well- coordinated, competitive market economies able 
to make supply- side adaptations in the face of industrial change with commit-
ments to equal socioeconomic citizenship have been difficult for opponents to 
dislodge, because practically everyone has become a stakeholder. This helps 
to explain a recent paradox: the systems have held on despite the electoral 
and organizational weakening of center- left political parties. In Sweden so-
cial democrats can still effectively dominate policymaking, even if they are in 
opposition. Norwegian social democrats remain—barely—in control of broad 
coalitions, but the model persists. Elsewhere Scandinavian center- lefts today 
are part of broad coalitions whose precise directions they often cannot con-
trol, or in some places, like Denmark, have been in opposition for some time, 
but again the framework remains intact. Scandinavian political economies 
thus seem durable, even if center- left political hegemony is not.1
 Center- lefts on the European continent, particularly in France and Ger-
many, the most important members of the European Union, have evolved in 
a different fashion. In the postwar period both France and Germany chose 
export- led development models, but in very different ways. In both coun-
tries social democracy came with a focus on industrial workers rather than 
on equal citizenship for all. This focus fed strong concerns about redressing 
workers’ conditions (which in Germany meant primarily male workers), lead-
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ing to compromise with Bismarckian and Christian- Democratic social insur-
ance approaches, in which benefits reflected wage inequalities, and strong 
measures to protect industrial workers in the labor market. In the reconstruc-
tion years of high postwar growth and full employment, virtually everyone 
was a “worker,” however, which obscured potential problems.
 Germany chose corporatist approaches according to which welfare state 
programs and labor market protection were built mainly on private deals be-
tween employers and unions. One result was that Germany’s perennially suc-
cessful export firms built job security, retraining, in- house flexibility, and a 
degree of redistribution into their company practices, often accompanied by 
Mitbestimmung, which gave workers a say in corporate choices. The French 
model had similar aims but used different techniques. Starting from behind, 
France under de Gaulle chose statist techniques to build national champion 
exporters alongside its Bismarckian, corporatist welfare state programs and 
legislated labor market protection (both strategies were informed by the 
goals of a broad Resistance coalition that included Christian Democrats but 
was premised upon an ideology of Republicanism). Neither the German nor 
the French model has weathered recent tough times well, though for different 
reasons.
 Large problems appeared first in France. As Goldhammer and Ross show, 
French statist strategies were stymied by the international changes that began 
in the 1970s. Mass unemployment followed, uncovering large categories of 
citizens who were not “workers” in the traditional sense and so suffered from 
a range of exclusions. The center- left, in power during much of this period, 
devised innovative reforms to combat surging poverty while also deliberately 
removing large numbers from the workforce and promoting work sharing 
among those who remained in it. This policy contravened the conventional 
wisdom of the moment, which instead advocated new supply- side activation 
and more flexible labor markets; it also contributed to growing divisions be-
tween outsiders and insiders, often the remnants of weak French unionism, 
who used their influence to protect their advantages. The French center- left 
suffered greatly as a result. The French political system, in which the presi-
dency is the key to governance, places a premium on forming and managing 
multiparty coalitions. The Socialist Party—which has not won an important 
national election since 1997—has had great difficulty doing so, in large part 
because of widening diversity in the left’s electorate, which has aggravated 
intractable internal problems.
 The German story is different. Germany withstood new challenges after 
the 1970s because of its successful pursuit of monetary stability and its con-
tinuing adeptness at competing in export markets. But unification of West 
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and East Germany proved costly and contributed to a slow unraveling of col-
lective bargaining, greater unemployment, and rising social policy expendi-
tures. If Germany’s export sector was to continue to conquer international 
markets as long as they remained buoyant, to do so it needed strong produc-
tivity gains, leading it to shed more and more labor. One result has been that 
Germany’s once- powerful union movement has fallen into serious if largely 
unacknowledged decline, as unemployment and the growing costs of pen-
sions, healthcare, and unemployment compensation have posed new prob-
lems for German governments. The Red- Green coalition (1998–2005) led by 
Gerhard Schröder finally confronted some of these problems in ways that 
have since proven costly among social democratic voters, while at the same 
time Germany has created its own growing insider- outsider labor market 
problem. The SPD now finds itself in a situation where sustaining its tradi-
tional working- class base, and by implication the German export sector, runs 
counter to reforms that might attenuate the problems of outsiders. The conse-
quence has been a steep decline in SPD electoral performance—to 23% in the 
parliamentary elections of 2009, its lowest score since 1945. It now has severe 
problems in claiming political leadership and preventing the rise of electoral 
competitors, and faces new and difficult coalition- building tasks.
 “Southern” European center- lefts, whose electoral fortunes are discussed 
by Gerassimos Moschonas, have had different histories from both the Scan-
dinavians and the continentals. Portugal, Spain, and Greece, less developed 
than northern European countries, all suffered under unpleasant and protec-
tionist dictatorships during the postwar period. When the dictators all fell in 
the 1970s, the long complicity of right- wing parties with them gave center- 
lefts significant political advantages. The center- lefts then chose strategies of 
catch- up modernization and Europeanization, and when in power, which they 
have very often been, they opened and remodeled their economies, joined the 
EU and received helpful development aid from it, improved national institu-
tions, and revamped social and labor market regimes. What is most signifi-
cant in these stories is the difference in political timing from the European 
North. From the 1980s northerners struggled to adapt over- rigid and costly 
postwar structures, while southern center- lefts embarked on a modernizing 
trajectory that presented opportunities to build electoral strength, win elec-
tions, and govern.2 Yet there are signs that this southern trajectory may be 
running down, mainly because the benefits accruing from being on the right 
side of history are dissipating, while economic growth has become harder to 
engineer and financial stability increasingly difficult to maintain.
 A particular goal of this book has been to give appropriate attention to 
center- lefts in the “liberal market economies” in the United Kingdom and the 
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United States. The two cases are historically rather different. In the United 
Kingdom postwar development toward what might have resembled a con-
tinental model was quite advanced by the 1970s, but it abruptly stopped 
in 1979 after the electoral victory of a Conservative Party that under Mar-
garet Thatcher had rediscovered the virtues of markets. The consequences 
for Labour, as elaborated by James Cronin, have been dramatic. Thatcher-
ism worked such fundamental economic and social changes that Labour was 
forced to adapt, since it could persist in or return to pre- 1979 politics only 
at the risk of electoral irrelevancy. The Labour Party eventually made basic 
changes in outlook and strategy. These were embodied in Blairite “third way” 
politics whose starting point was a broad acceptance of the more market- 
oriented policy frameworks that Thatcher had left behind. The thrust of 
Labour’s new strategy was thus to promote economic management for bal-
anced growth within these frameworks and then, once economic success was 
obtained, to use the fruits of growth to initiate reforms that would reinforce 
safety nets, attenuate the extreme inequalities left by the Thatcher era, and 
rebuild public services on new grounds. New Labour’s record of success at 
most of these endeavors was considerable. One important index was a sub-
stantial reduction after 1997 in the dramatic income inequality that Thatcher-
ism had wrought.3 But after Labour had been in office for more than a decade, 
support began to ebb. Labour began to look tired and exhausted, it was stuck 
with an uncharismatic leader in Gordon Brown whose grip on the highest 
office was nevertheless tenacious, and its record looked decidedly less im-
pressive as the economy was hit by the financial crisis of 2008. As the nation 
and Conservatives looked forward to a Tory victory in 2010—and got some-
thing different but close enough—the key question became how much a new 
government would move away from the policies of New Labour. Labour had 
effectively re- centered the political settlement left in place by Thatcher, mov-
ing it toward the left by making it more humane and restoring public services 
and according to government a greater role in society. Would the Tories under 
David Cameron move back to the right, hewing to their Thatcherite heritage, 
or would they obey the logic of electoral competition and fight on the more 
centrist ground occupied by Labour (Cronin 2009; McKibbin 2009)? The un-
usual outcome of the election of May 2010 seemed to give at least an indirect 
answer: the Tories, in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, would be re-
quired to adopt a rhetoric and style of politics that would distinguish their 
policies from the still toxic past evoked by the name of Margaret Thatcher. To 
this extent the settlement brokered by New Labour would not be quickly or 
easily undone while Labour’s fortunes, ironically, might not easily be revived 
against rivals with which it did not seem to differ greatly. The issue remains 
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very much in doubt, however, for the austerity policies proposed by the coali-
tion are harsh and contain more than a whiff of Thatcherism.
 The American case, discussed from different angles by Ruy Teixeira, 
Christopher Howard, and James Shoch, also begins with a “liberal” market 
context that is quite different from that of Europe and a history different 
from that of Britain. The United States, which during the New Deal in the 
1930s made a strong start toward what might have been a welfare state and 
an industrial relations system along European lines, stalled far short of com-
pletion in the immediate postwar period. Among other New Deal beginnings 
were a Bismarckian pension system, the groundwork for strong labor market 
regulation in the Wagner Act, and initiation of a discussion of national health 
insurance. But despite active Keynesian economic management and the per-
petuation of the New Deal political coalition, reformist momentum slowed, 
sometimes in historically ironic ways. The development of trade unions led 
to collective bargaining for privately provided health insurance and supple-
mentary pensions in ways that benefited insiders at the expense of outsiders, 
and blunted the political thrust behind campaigns for more universal pro-
grams. The successful civil rights movement and disastrous Vietnam War of 
the 1960s and economic problems in the 1970s tore apart the New Deal coali-
tion and opened the door to a powerful neoliberal offensive marked by a stri-
dent anti- statism, a strong reassertion of individualism, and a determination 
to weaken the social programs and labor protections created by the New Deal 
and Great Society programs of the 1960s. In critical respects this thrust lasted 
longer than Thatcherism, encompassing twelve years after 1980, interrupted 
by the two- term presidency of Bill Clinton, during much of which Republi-
cans controlled both houses of Congress, and then, until 2009, the two-term 
presidency of George W. Bush. During that extended period the entire Ameri-
can political spectrum was moved dramatically to the right, bringing with 
it a large increase in inequality and an exaggerated insider- outsider society 
in which the lowest- paid and least secure were kept going, more or less, by 
harsh workfare policies (Wilentz 2008). The victory of Barack Obama in 2008 
appeared to have revived center- left reformism, but Obama was compelled 
to start from a very low baseline. The economic stimulus bill, healthcare re-
form, and new financial regulations were all important achievements. But 
in the face of intransigent Republican opposition, an ambivalent public, and 
significant institutional obstacles, progress has been difficult and, after the 
Republicans’ big gains in the 2010 congressional midterm elections, will be-
come even harder. Further advance, if it occurs, will demand extraordinary 
strategic skills on the part of the center- left, and the results are likely to be 
different from those in Europe.
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 The post–cold war center- lefts in Central and Eastern Europe, discussed by 
De Waele and Soare, provide yet another trajectory. After 1989 there was no 
possibility of reforming the socioeconomic order established by Soviet domi-
nation, and strong incentives existed instead for moving decisively toward 
market- based democracies. In the years immediately following the end of 
communism, this was the path taken throughout the region. Initially the lead 
was taken by anticommunist reformers, but in many places they were quickly 
supplanted by parties that were technically “center- left” but had been hastily 
built around the vertebrae of older communist parties whose leaders had con-
verted to markets and democratic institutions. The secret of this odd success 
story was the ability of ex- communist leaders and parties to shift political 
and organizational resources from the old regime to new purposes, while 
competitors had no comparable resources at hand. These “successor party” 
center- lefts faced contradictions. Once in power they had to pursue liberal-
izing reforms that displeased their supporters and undercut their prospects. 
Predictions about the future in this region are hazardous, of course, because 
the period since the early 1990s is so brief and the outcomes of transition re-
main uncertain.
Center- Lefts Are a Family That Often Disagrees,  
Even about Its Models for Society
The record surveyed here leads to several further conclusions. One is that 
even if center- lefts may have had broadly similar outlooks and have faced 
similar challenges in the tough times we examine, their responses have been 
divergent, and they have often disagreed profoundly on day- to- day matters. 
In brief, center- lefts, given the variety of their situations, have had differ-
ent strategies and goals. This is mainly because their actions have been con-
strained by different political economies which have opened quite different 
“paths” upon which they became “dependent.” These paths, together with 
significant institutional variations, have also created widely varying electoral 
equations. To illustrate, let us take the issue that has perhaps loomed largest 
for center- lefts in recent years: the need to introduce supply- side flexibility 
into postwar social and employment policy systems.
 The Scandinavians have been able to “flexibilize” with relative ease, even 
though they have had to make serious changes, because of their long ex-
perience with international openness and existing practices of supply- side 
flexibility. The “continentals,” in contrast, have had a rockier time because 
changing activation and flexibility policies has meant changing benefit sys-
tems and protective regulations, eliciting strong resistance from entrenched 
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interests. The result has been reluctant, spasmodic, and weak supply- side re-
forms whose economic effects have been modest but which have nevertheless 
contributed to a loss of political support. “Southerners” have faced similarly 
entrenched corporatist interests, but they have often been able to limit the 
damages through their broader modernizing strategies. Center- lefts in “lib-
eral” environments—the United Kingdom and the United States in our vol-
ume—had to work with the consequences of conservative policies to open 
markets, make labor markets more flexible, and weaken unions, regulation, 
and social protection. These changes left a legacy of flexibility with a harsh, 
almost Darwinian edge. Center- lefts could then propose new policies to limit 
the harshness. In the new market democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, 
center- lefts faced yet again different choices. With little choice but to slash 
and burn earlier protective arrangements which had guaranteed social ser-
vices and jobs (not always good ones) for practically everyone, center- lefts 
created “activated” and often much harsher labor markets and social policies. 
Economic growth cushioned these processes somewhat, although better- 
skilled and better- organized center- rights have already emerged to challenge 
these center- lefts.
 There are many more examples of the differences between center- lefts. 
Despite a general commitment to greater social security and justice, center- 
lefts have had widely varying approaches to the new social policy challenges 
surrounding what Jane Jenson labels “new social investment,” particularly in 
the areas of “care” and poverty policy. And while most center- lefts have be-
come vulnerable to rightist anti- immigrant populism, they have responded in 
very different ways—often successfully—as Pérez shows. In the light of such 
persistent differences in approach, there is little mystery in the difficulty that 
European center- lefts have had in finding common ground on EU- level poli-
cies, as George Ross suggests.
Center- Lefts Face Common Challenges
Despite these differences, a common set of problems confronts center- lefts 
almost everywhere. The most important is electoral erosion, which is hap-
pening in different places at different rates, with the one significant but only 
partial and not necessarily lasting exception of the United States. In his wide- 
ranging essay Gerassimos Moschonas notes that this erosion has been slow 
and that it affects major center- right parties as well, although to a lesser 
degree. Deep sociological causes undoubtedly explain a great deal. Tradi-
tional lefts were usually built on a projection that industrial workers—with 
common situations, identities, needs, interests, and goals—would come to 
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dominate politically. But service- sector work and salaried “new middle class” 
work has grown much more rapidly than traditional working- class occupa-
tions. In addition, those who do these “new middle class” jobs have often de-
veloped outlooks quite different from those of workers, sometimes joining 
single- issue parties, social movements, and lobbies which disagree with parts 
of what center- lefts advocate.
 Another reason for the slow electoral erosion is that the basic program-
matic and utopian projects that lefts developed over more than a century are 
now largely exhausted. The goal of “democratizing capitalism” has largely 
been achieved. Programs to take democratization further or in new directions 
do not mobilize in the ways they once did. Today’s center- lefts are often con-
fronted with the apparent need to “modernize” and reform what they have 
largely put in place, a much less glamorous, less inspiring, and also more di-
visive project than before. “Transcending capitalism,” the early left’s utopian 
goal, could in the past connect day- to- day reformism to a grander vision for 
a new and dramatically different society. This utopia is no longer politically 
plausible. Markets are here for the duration, and everyone knows it.
 In the earlier “imaginary,” the goal of transcending capitalism and the re-
formism that came with it promised successive redistributions that would 
reach an end state in which privileged capitalists would no longer exist. 
Center- left reformism, no longer backed by the socialist dream, today lives 
in a reality which seems to demand policies that would reconfigure and fine- 
tune social protections and supports, and redistribute income and opportu-
nity from some parts of “the people” to others. The goal could be restated in 
terms of “equality.” Older lefts could at least pretend to be engaged in a quest 
to create nearly absolute equality among citizens by positing and proposing 
to fight a zero- sum redistributive game with capitalists. Today’s center- lefts, 
while they may still focus on reducing excessive wealth, in particular because 
of the substantial recent increase in high- end incomes, are aware that the 
concentration of wealth is only a small part of the “equality puzzle” they face. 
In many places large insider- outsider gaps have opened in which relatively 
secure salaried employees and unionized workers coexist with badly paid, 
insecure workers who face much harsher labor market and living conditions. 
The need to respond to these gaps is now a central issue, and since doing so 
often requires shifting resources from one part of the center- left’s potential 
base toward another, solutions are not easy. Still, the alternative is to allow a 
caste- like, dualistic social order to emerge. Pledging to increase “equality of 
opportunity,” as practically everyone has been doing for some time, may be 
electorally successful on occasion, but center- lefts stand to lose if the pledges 
turn out to be hollow, as they very often have been in the past.
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Center- Lefts Have Had Trouble Combining Management and Reform
It is also clear from our analysis that center- lefts with serious claims on gov-
ernmental power have long had to strike delicate balances between managing 
markets and reforming them. Finding the right combination has been diffi-
cult, as was amply demonstrated throughout the Keynesian postwar era. It 
may be that in some places electoral decline has been tied to an overempha-
sis on the part of center- lefts on management and a move away from seri-
ous reformism, a reflex that would be understandable in response to brutal 
neoliberal offensives and the inroads of globalization. Given new social pat-
terns and coalitional difficulties, the challenges of creative reformism have 
undoubtedly got much larger, while the tasks of management and govern-
ing have not become any easier. It may also be that the temptation to run 
by proving superior management skills alone has grown among center- left 
parties. Have at least some center- lefts shifted their visions too much from 
creative reforming to managing the complexities of ever more powerful mar-
kets? This is at least what the former French foreign minister and socialist 
elder statesman Hubert Védrine thinks. He found “incomprehensible” the 
miserable results of center- lefts in elections to the European parliament in 
2009: “Perhaps it is because so much of social democracy over the last thirty 
years wanted so much to free itself of the absurdities of communism and 
hard left ideas that they have shifted too far in the other direction. As a result 
ideologically they’ve wrong- footed themselves. They bought into the mar-
ket economy, which they believed to be well- regulated along the lines of ‘the 
Rhine capitalist model’ and instead they woke up in some kind of jungle” 
(Védrine 2009).
 The more “managerial” that center- lefts become at the expense of propos-
ing distinctive reformist programs, the more likely it is that center- left and 
center- right appeals will become difficult for citizens to distinguish. Histori-
cally lefts led reformist crusades, but as reform has succeeded, the crusading 
spirit has ebbed. Though differences of emphasis remain, in recent times the 
center- lefts in many countries appear to stand for programs and policies quite 
similar to those of their rivals on the center- right. In this new context at least 
some voters will look for parties that do have real crusades on offer, while 
others will try to judge dispassionately between the comparable platforms of 
the major contenders on the basis of which is more likely to be a better man-
ager. Still others will vote to throw out incumbents because of perceived per-
formance failures or simple boredom.
 The narrowing of programs and identities between center- lefts and center- 
rights has occurred not only because of growing managerialism on the left. 
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Social changes toward what many call post- industrialism have transformed 
center- left parties into broad cross- class or “catch- all” parties oriented 
toward the much- discussed median (or swing) voter. Together with the ad-
vent of modern polling and other campaign techniques, this transformation 
has helped to erode or blur left- right partisan distinctions and reduce the 
importance of issues altogether, in favor of an emphasis on candidates’ per-
sonal characteristics and other non- policy factors. This point should not be 
overstated, since incentives remain for parties to remain attentive to their 
informed and engaged core constituencies, even in majoritarian electoral 
systems like those of the United States and the United Kingdom where the 
pursuit of the median voter is more likely than in systems based on propor-
tional representation (Pr). In Pr systems the formation of center- left elec-
toral strategy is more complex. To win and govern effectively, successful 
parties must appeal to the political center, but they must also build strong 
and stable coalitions with other parties—usually Greens, liberals, or groups 
further to the left. This task, easier when the key center- left party is domi-
nant on the left side of the political spectrum, becomes more complicated 
when the center- left is less dominant and smaller parties see it as a promising 
source of more support for themselves. In such situations, which appear to be 
becoming more typical, the bidding process for votes on the left may make it 
much more difficult for center- lefts to appeal to critical median voters. Too 
exclusive a focus on centrist median voters, of course, can lead traditional 
center- left supporters to defect to smaller parties to the left.
 Many European center- lefts are thus likely to face more difficult strategic 
circumstances in the electoral “tough times” to come than they have done in 
the period we have reviewed. There are good recent examples of this. In the 
presidential elections of 2002 the French socialists failed to qualify for the 
runoff round when the far- right National Front got slightly more votes. Ana-
lysts attributed this failure to the campaign strategy of the Socialist candidate 
Lionel Jospin, who focused on median voters with the runoff in mind (which 
polls indicated he might well have won had he got through the primary) 
rather than attending to coalitional issues on the left. In Germany’s general 
elections in 2009 the Social Democrats, threatened with a loss of votes to die 
Linke on its left, chose not to move left. Instead they decided to market gov-
ernmental competence against a Christian Democratic chancellor who could 
and did outbid them on these grounds. Italy presents yet a different variant: 
there a motley collection of different left- leaning parties—hard- line leftists, 
left liberals, Greens, and a relatively strong ex- Communist party which has 
become center- left—has on occasion been able to win elections but not to 
stick together on important policy matters thereafter. As might be expected, 
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recurring bouts of failure in government have had disastrous effects on the 
electoral fortunes of the center- left. Dilemmas of this sort present themselves 
across Europe, and they seem to be getting more serious, while effective an-
swers have proved illusive and at best temporary.
Center Lefts in the Great Recession
Lefts and center- lefts have always had to confront new situations, chang-
ing realities, and emerging problems. The onset of the global financial crisis 
in 2007–8 and the protracted downturn that ensued meant that center- left 
parties and movements which had barely and not always effectively adapted 
to the post- Keynesian and post- communist era found themselves at yet an-
other historic crossroads. Are the stances arrived at after thirty years of debate 
and experimentation likely to persist, or will the new Great Recession lead to 
another effort at rethinking and yet another shift in orientation and practice?
 The Great Recession is the largest disruption of capitalism to occur since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. The expanded economic role of govern-
ments in the immediate response to the crisis was initially interpreted as 
a rebirth of Keynesianism which could redound to the political benefit of 
the center- left.4 The reappearance of government and the return of Keynes 
proved superficial and short- lived, however, and three years into the crisis, 
center- left parties have profited little from the onset of hard times. Worse 
still, small but significant groups of voters in Europe, including some who 
earlier may have been on the left, have opted to support xenophobic anti- 
immigrant parties in ways that have shifted electoral balances further to the 
right. Such has been the case in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Austria, France, Italy, and several Central European countries. And 
even where there were historical and institutional barriers to this, as in Ger-
many and the United Kingdom, there have been indirect effects of a similar 
kind.5 In the United States, where Obama’s victory raised the hopes of center- 
leftists everywhere, the rightward shift has had a slightly different shape, but 
has been quite as great.
 The Great Recession began in the United States, where loose monetary 
policies and unregulated financial practices stimulated an extraordinary 
housing bubble, which then burst disastrously. The resulting shock waves 
shook the global financial world. Stock markets dropped, losses decimated 
private savings, credit dried up, and governments and central banks were 
forced to bail out financial institutions because the functioning of the “real 
economy” depended on their ability to provide credit. Different emergency 
efforts across the transatlantic area gradually brought about a semblance of 
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stability, and by mid- 2009 the initial financial panic had subsided and it ap-
peared that the downward spiral toward depression had been limited by vari-
ous stimulus measures.
 Yet the Great Recession was not so easily overcome, as events in the Euro-
zone then confirmed (Dadush et al. 2010). Initial crisis coordination within 
the EU followed the transnational scenario of bailouts, stimulus plans, and 
reregulation of the financial sector. There was one puzzling early European 
indicator—a North- South divergence in interest rate spreads on Eurozone 
government bonds—that was duly noted and then filed away. The bond 
spread issue exploded in the spring of 2010, however, threatening to push the 
global financial order again into chaos and cut short a still anemic economic 
recovery. The initial cause was Greek national insolvency, which spurred in-
tense market speculation, but similar debt problems affected Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, and even Italy. To save the Greeks and then the Irish, devising new 
anti- crisis measures became obligatory for richer EU members, but they dis-
agreed about what to do and took months to find compromises, during which 
the financial markets chipped away at the EU’s financial credibility. Even-
tually a large bailout fund was put in place by the EU and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), but not before much damage was done to Europe’s 
economy and to the EU as an institution.
 The acute phase of the crisis, when global economic catastrophe threat-
ened, would have been much worse had governments not acted as they did. 
But even with these actions, the economic downturn that followed was pro-
tracted and painful. By late 2009 the drive for further government interven-
tion had stalled. Government intervention helped ease the crisis, but it was 
also apparent that the resilience of neoclassical economics and opposition 
from business, parties of the right, and fearful voters to major systemic re-
forms were great. The result for center- lefts was a new and even more com-
plicated situation.
Center- Left Prospects
Our authors have gone to great lengths in examining the kinds of reforms 
to existing social programs and the kinds of new programs that center- lefts 
could promote to ensure the maintenance and continued viability of human-
ized democratic societies in today’s challenging globalizing environment. As 
they have noted, it was heartening that the easiest successes in these areas, 
ensuring the provision of basic security and opportunity needs for entire 
populations, had been won in most places, although not all, as the experience 
of the United States shows. There existed a viable social model that center- 
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lefts had done much to put in place. Reforming successful programs and de-
vising new programs to meet new problems are demanding tasks, but not at 
all impossible, the authors believe. Who but center- left thinkers, movements, 
and parties will devise paths to more genuine equal opportunity? Who but 
the center- left will put in place the new flexibility that market societies need 
by giving people the educational and employment resources that will allow 
them to maximize their personal capacities and confront the frequent life and 
occupational transitions that are already becoming the norm? Who but those 
nurtured in the social democratic tradition are best placed to promote genu-
ine social inclusion? Who but those long committed to an egalitarian society 
can struggle effectively against deepening inequalities in income and wealth?
 The center- left has not gained much in the new century, however, whether 
in the “normal times” before 2007–8 or since the Great Recession. Before 
the crisis center- right parties in countries like Germany, France, Denmark, 
and Sweden had already won power, although often in coalition, by promis-
ing to administer and reform the welfare state, to make it work efficiently in 
the face of new constraints induced by globalization, rather than roll it back. 
Sometimes they also capitalized on growing anti- immigrant sentiments. More 
recently center- lefts across Europe suffered major losses in the European par-
liamentary elections of June 2009, and in September of the same year the 
German Social Democrats had their worst national election vote since the 
end of the Second World War. Next Labour lost the British general election of 
May 2010 and the Swedish Social Democrats failed to regain power in Sep-
tember of the same year. The Greek, Norwegian, and Portuguese social demo-
crats did manage, barely, to win at the polls, and the Spanish left managed 
to cling to power. But who would now want to be in government in Greece, 
Portugal, or Spain in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis? With Obama’s 
victory in 2008 the United States appeared to be an important exception to 
the lack of center- left political success in the Great Recession. It now seems, 
however, that Obama’s election was more a reaction to the noxious policies 
of George W. Bush and the shock of economic crisis itself than any announce-
ment of a growing movement for change.6
 To put it simply, the characteristic twentieth- century pattern of enduring 
and largely class- based political mobilization has given way to a more fluid 
and unstable environment. This context, whose maturation was a key fea-
ture of the era covered by this book, means that no party can be expected 
to achieve the sort of sustained political dominance premised on a “hege-
monic project” or “bloc” that once seemed possible. Success in the new world 
of politics is more temporary and precarious. The resurgence of center- left 
parties in Europe during the late 1990s did not last, and not simply because of 
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the mistakes of its leaders. Obama’s victory in the United States has been even 
more fleeting, and there is no certainty that the few reforms it won will result 
in durable gains for the party. There is thus little certainty either in Europe or 
the United States that the political payoff for reengineering relations between 
state and society and creating a more just and humane social model will be 
either large or permanent.
 The predominance of center- right parties that we see today faces an analo-
gous mix of uncertainties. Just as center- left parties long relied on a big, 
solid phalanx of working- class votes which is no longer so big nor so solid, 
parties of the right long relied on the backing of a solid alliance of the upper, 
middle, and lower middle classes that is no longer so coherent and effective. 
That coalition—brought together by fear of the left and resistance to high 
taxes and union power, and consolidated by the cold war—has also begun to 
fragment. Anticommunism no longer holds the amalgam together, while the 
growth of the professions, the state, and services throws up a highly educated 
new middle class more open to some of the appeals of the center- left, espe-
cially on social issues. Party allegiance on the center- right has therefore also 
weakened, bringing a politics based on ad hoc alignments, “wedge” issues, 
and personalities.
 The medium- term evolution of politics and policy on both sides of the 
Atlantic could thus converge around a pattern in which the center- left re-
mains an important and essential player in a political universe without domi-
nant parties. The implications of living in this universe, which have become 
clearer in recent years, are that center- left victories, when they come, are 
modest, while defeats, when kept within bounds and understood for what 
they are, need not be crippling. This is not an argument for complacency, for 
we must not forget that center- lefts will still have important contributions to 
make in ensuring that global capitalism does not develop unopposed and that 
its progress does not undermine the security and quality of life that parties 
and movements of the center- left have done so much to bring about. It is 
nevertheless a counsel for patience and for looking to the long term.
 Still, the prospects of parties of the left will be enhanced precisely to 
the extent that they can provide effective responses to the challenges of the 
present era. Before the financial crisis the major challenge was to generate 
sustained growth in a highly competitive global economy while preserving 
and making more effective the essential supports that will make it possible 
for ordinary people to live and compete in that world successfully and with 
security and dignity. Post–Great Recession conditions add new challenges. To 
be sure, the economic crisis has underlined how much today’s globalization 
cries out for intelligent new governance and new regulatory initiatives both 
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nationally and internationally, which center- lefts, because they are more 
likely to believe that such things are needed, could provide. But post–Great 
Recession circumstances are likely to make success considerably more diffi-
cult to attain. This is because staving off the worst in the global financial crisis 
has turned into a long- term and very costly enterprise.
 As in any recession, tax revenues declined because of reduced growth and 
consumption, while outlays for social programs rose considerably. Beyond 
this, when governments entered the scene as lenders of last resort to shore 
up credit, employment, and consumption, national budget deficit and debt 
levels shot up. Rare indeed in Europe and North America are countries whose 
annual budget shortfalls after 2007 have been less than 10% annually and 
whose national debts have not ballooned. We should not forget, however, 
that the Great Recession was the first financial disaster of the era of global-
ization, and this has made an ironic difference. The financial markets that 
caused the crisis were quickly called upon to finance the new national debts 
that the crisis produced. Investors had to be repaid, of course, and this meant 
that the markets had to evaluate the quality of the debt instruments that 
were issued, leading to the differential interest rate spreads that among other 
things underlay the Eurozone imbroglio. This, perhaps more than anything, 
limited how much stimulus different countries could enact, and quickly cre-
ated large new concerns about budgetary stability.
 One consequence was that an armada of international authorities (the 
G- 20, OECD, IMF, EU, and ECB, among others) urged a massive turn to aus-
terity. Such a turn, already begun in Europe and pressed by ascendant Repub-
licans and conservative Democrats in the United States despite persistent low 
growth and high unemployment in both regions, greatly complicates the stra-
tegic situation for all political forces. The level of austerity imposed on the 
economically and fiscally weaker European states could be lessened were the 
stronger states, especially Germany, to engage in more fiscal expansion, thus 
boosting exports, growth, and tax revenues in the more vulnerable nations. 
But the continuing hegemony of orthodox economic thinking prevents this.
 Consequently, devising medium- term austerity politics on the scale that 
will be needed challenges everyone. It may be less of a problem for center- 
rights, however, to the degree that they are less committed to social programs 
involving redistribution. Cuts in existing welfare programs, educational sys-
tems, healthcare, and pensions, like those that the recently elected British 
coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats is already implementing, 
may be easier to make in the heat of crisis and “in the interests of all” than 
they would ordinarily be. Indeed, post- crisis conditions may provide a more 
propitious moment for center- rights to work basic change in social programs, 
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perhaps to undercut their universality, for example, than they have seen in 
some time (Vis 2010). That right- wing populist explosions on both sides of the 
Atlantic are moving political discourses and repertories rightward may also 
facilitate neoliberal declensions of austerity.
 The situation presents formidable new challenges to center- lefts. The few 
center- lefts actually in power, in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, for example, 
now have little choice but to propose and administer harsh austerity and to 
do so without dismantling past achievements. This demands strategic intelli-
gence that few of these parties possess. Where center- lefts are now in oppo-
sition they first have to reflect on how to take advantage of the decline in 
center- right popularity that is likely to follow attacks on longstanding social 
programs. This could lead them into a political minefield, however. They will 
inevitably be drawn toward struggles to defend such programs, but excessive 
reliance on defensiveness will allow opponents to label them as irrespon-
sible naysayers in national crusades to survive. To avoid this they will have 
to summon unusual creativity in proposing redesigns of programs that will 
also save money, an almost impossible task. At the same time, they will also 
have to position themselves as better and more innovative managers of aus-
terity than center- rights. The risk is that center- lefts will come to look pro-
grammatically very much like the center- rights whose draconian measures 
they oppose. These are not altogether new strategic dilemmas, but they have 
become much more difficult to resolve in Great Recession conditions. The 
center- left’s future will very much depend on whether it is able to resolve 
them.
Notes
 1. Volatile new forces of the right, mobilized against immigrants, could sap even 
more center- left electoral support. Managing coalitions may therefore turn out to be 
more complicated than fending off neoliberalism.
 2. We should recall here the Italian case, briefly discussed in the Introduction. 
Italy’s center- left probably falls into its own category, somewhere between the other 
“southern” cases and what we have referred to as the continentals, even though com-
parative European politics textbooks often discuss Italy with northern countries. Italy 
had no dictators after the Second World War, but it was politically dominated most 
of the time by the Christian Democrats, whose power was based on Catholicism, cold 
war fears of both the internal and the external left (Italy had one of the most power-
ful and skillful communist parties in the world), old- fashioned clientelistic patronage 
politics, and considerable corruption. The country thus modernized in an unusual way, 
its northern half to levels of development and wealth comparable to those in northern 
Europe, its southern regions as poor as the poorest parts of Latin Europe, its institu-
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tions and welfare state a mixture of clientelism and modernity. Once the center- left 
was able to make claims on governing after both Christian Democracy and the cold 
war collapsed in the 1990s, it suffered from serious multipartisan pluralism. It was 
able to win and sometimes, as in the mid- 1990s, able to work significant change, but 
eventually its coalitions would collapse in acrimony, recently giving way to the odd, 
sometimes clownish, charismatic politics of Silvio Berlusconi.
 3. See the OECD’s recent report Growing Unequal? (2008e).
 4. On the revival of Keynes see Skidelsky 2009.
 5. It is almost as if contemporary successors of the crisis- shaped electoral move-
ments of the early 1930s, which were often protectionist, are now xenophobic. Stu-
dents of electoral politics may soon be able to explain this better than we can now, 
but the answer may lie in political economy: it may be that broad- scale protection-
ists movements have been more or less ruled out by economic globalization, which 
has greatly increased the strength of elites and domestic interests with stakes in open 
international markets. Instead, the sentiments that once rallied behind protectionism 
and restrictions on the movement of goods are now turned against the international 
migration of persons.
 6. Obama’s presidency managed to pass a major reform of American healthcare 
and the financial sector over fierce Republican opposition in Congress, but at the cost 
of many of the other changes that it had initially promised, after which it was stymied 
politically. Worse still, a confluence of different anti- statist, populist, and conservative 
oppositions accusing Obama of a multiplicity of alleged sins, including a desire to in-
stall “European- style socialism,” helped Republicans win a massive victory in the 2010 
midterm elections. The question for the American center- left then became whether it 
would be able to find enough support in 2012 to reelect Obama rather more than how 
to pursue any new progressive agenda.
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